The minutest incidents of childhood, or forgotten scenes of later years, were often revived. I could not be said to recollect them; for if I had been told of them when waking, I should not have been able to acknowledge them as parts of my past experience. But placed as they were before me, in dreams like intuitions, and clothed in all their evanescent circumstances and accompanying feelings. [sic] I recognized them instantaneously.
—Thomas De Quincy, Confessions of an English Opium Eater; emphasis original
In Confessions of an English Opium Eater (1821), Thomas De Quincey famously describes the mind as a palimpsest upon which inscribed memories are never truly lost to the passage of time. These memories, especially of childhood, lurk under the conscious surface of the mind, waiting to be rediscovered during intervals of intensified desultory memory that are made possible for De Quincey by opium-induced dreaming. Opium is utilized during these dreams as a perception-altering technology; memories of childhood are not only recalled while under the influence of the drug, but are revivified in a way that extends beyond the dreamer's normal mental capacity. The formulation of dreaming as a state in which memories buried under the palimpsest of time were retrieved and “relived” was important to a wide array of philosophers, medical doctors, and psychologists over the course of the long nineteenth century, culminating in Freud's seminal The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899. Alongside the theorization of ‘dream science’ in psychological and medical contexts, the Victorian literati provided their own contributions in both sensation novels and realist fiction. Reciprocally, as has been discussed in much recent work within Victorian studies, well-known characters and scenes from contemporary literature were often used to illustrate dream theories, neurological conditions, and philosophical conceptions of the self in scholarly journals and medical textbooks. The most fantastical literary treatment of dream space as a wholly separate realm within which the dreaming subject can fully recover and even surpass the sensations associated with earlier memories occurs in George Du Maurier's oft-overlooked Peter Ibbetson (1891). Over the course of the novel, the titular narrator reveals (inconsistently and in sometimes contradictory ways) dream space to be a world in which the habitual reliving of childhood events is an endlessly satisfying, novel, and strangely embodied experience for the protagonist and his lover, while also possessing connections to human evolutionary precursors and the afterlife. In Peter Ibbetson, habit is not the deadening enemy of novelty and experience that is so often portrayed in contemporary interpretations of Victorian literature. Rather, habit qua the mental technology of “dreaming true,” a form of intense, consciously-directed dreaming practiced by the novel's central characters, is paradoxically portrayed as a method by which the freshness of sensation associated with an original event can be endlessly recreated and even surpassed within a dream of that event. Contrary to twenty-first century depictions of dreams as events that help the subject to become habituated to emotional stresses, Du Maurier presents dreaming true as a practice that intensifies rather than inures the dreaming subject's emotional relationship to vivid or traumatic childhood events (Hartmann 2). Inherent in this reading is a radical formulation of the relationship between habit and novelty as understood in the late Victorian novel, revealing the generative power of habit that is disclosed within dream space.
The nature and purpose of dreams received a variety of formulations throughout the nineteenth century. Medical doctors, psychiatrists, and novelists portrayed dreaming to be alternately (and often simultaneously) a medical, somatic phenomenon caused by simple indigestion; the result of thoughts and emotions experienced by the subject throughout the day; or a wholly metaphysical phenomenon that functioned as a view into the spirit realm. This latter view was also espoused by De Quincey, who referred to the dreaming mind in Suspiria de Profundis (1845) as “the one great tube through which man communicates with the shadowy” (88). The prominent psychologist John Abercrombie characterizes dreams in 1831 as “trains of images brought up by association with bodily sensations,” and offers the commonly accepted view that – contrary to what Du Maurier will later imagine in his novel – we never dream of things we have not seen in person (199). The views of the American neurologist William Hammond are typical of somatic medical theories of dreaming; he affirms in 1869 that “It is well known that dreams are excited by strong impressions made upon the senses, or by irritations arising in the internal organs” (112). Medical views of the purposes and causes of dreaming often assumed an evolutionary or degenerative aspect as well, decades before the theory of natural selection had entered the Zeitgeist. For instance, in 1832 the surgeon Walter Dendy associates sleep and dreaming with a reversion of the mind to a more primitive state, one “approximating the more simple animal life, in which certain faculties may be perceived, but in which the power of correct association is not manifested” (58–59). Notably, dreams never occur in “sound or perfect sleep” according to Dendy (19), but always in “that state which we denominate slumber, the period of transition from waking to sleep, or from sleep to waking, the moments of departing or returning consciousness” (20; emphasis original). Doctor Arthur Durham (1865) concurs that “dreams occur only during imperfect sleep,” but further describes dream states as those in which “the faded pictures, photographed, as it were, on the memory, are restored,” explicitly tying dreaming to the reactivation of earlier life memories that lurk just below the surface of the active mind (24).
Scholarly explanations of dreaming's capacity to uncover long-forgotten memories was perhaps most clearly advanced early in the century by the surgeon Sir Robert Macnish. He explains in The Philosophy of Sleep (1834) that dreams can thrust themselves into the sleeper's consciousness in an embodied form more vivid than the original event that is relived within the dream, “even go[ing] the length, in some cases, of recalling circumstances which had been entirely forgotten, and presenting them to the mind with more than the force of their original impression” (76–77). The child psychologist James Sully connects dreaming most explicitly with childhood memories and sensory revivification in his 1893 essay, “The Dream as a Revelation.” Upon entering the subconscious but eerily embodied realm of “dreamland,” we “survey the spectacle with the pristine directness, with the pure elemental emotions of little children” (116). This altered, childlike perception has an aesthetic value as well, as the dreamer “sees things with the glad dilated eyes of the child artist, and feels once more the masterful spell of earth's beauty” (122). Despite the positive character of this sentiment, Sully, like Dendy, sees dreaming as a weakened, primitive mental activity, but one that is not merely a regression to childhood or a form of wish fulfillment. Sleep and dreaming are “primitive” for Sully because they disallow the reflective capacity of the brain, instead foregrounding the sensorium and the body. The dream “brings up from the dim depths of our sub-conscious life the primal, instinctive impulses, and discloses to us a side of ourselves which connects us with the great sentient world” (118). The evolutionary flavor of this rhetoric fits with popular late-century notions of degeneration theory. Mental states that blurred the boundaries of the self and disclosed “connections” to the outside world were often seen as exempla of this inverted teleological model of evolutionary regression.Footnote 1 The reference to the “primal” and subconscious side of contemporary humanity revealed in dreams also brings to mind the Jungian collective unconscious and Victorian theories of ancestral memory, in which “memories, dreams and the imagination,” were seen as “capable of making both telepathic and trans-historical connections with other minds” (Vrettos par. 3). For Sully, in dreams the mind as palimpsest is capable of activating genetically inherited memories from our ancestors, and importantly, dreams can revivify old personalities and subjective states, particularly those of childhood, that have been written over by subsequent stages of the subject's development.
A common image occurring throughout these medical and psychological texts is the dream as an alternate reality, an embodied “dreamland” in which one is able to recapture the freshness of sensation of the world, re-approaching existence with something like the eyes and subjectivity of the child-self. For De Quincey, opium is a way into this dreamland; it functions as a technology for the spontaneous, desultory recall and revivification of childhood memories. Peter Ibbetson depicts the active cultivation of a mental technology, “dreaming true,” that allows for the retrieval of past memories, which are then relived in a remarkably embodied form that is (generally) separate from the former self who originally experienced the events tied to those memories. Du Maurier reveals how the habitual reliving of childhood memories in the book's dream world can be an endlessly novel process because of its attendant increase in sensory and perceptive qualities, while at the same time showing how a technology like dreaming true may allow for the self to transcend its boundaries, merging with the Other and even reinhabiting the bodies of ancestors.
Peter Ibbetson, Du Maurier's first novel, has been academically and commercially neglected in comparison to his sensational second book Trilby, though it was moderately successful during the author's lifetime and went on to become the subject of a stage production, opera, and two films in the first half of the twentieth century (Zieger 34–35). In brief, the narrative is presented as a found text by Peter's cousin, who attests to Peter's sanity. Peter, originally Gogo Pasquier, describes his childhood Parisian years in brilliantly Proustian detail, which, as Du Maurier's biographer Leonée Ormond and others have noted, closely mirrored the author's own mixed English and French upbringing. Intense sensation and memory are thematized throughout the early part of the novel – memorable events are especially important for their novelty when first experienced and their ability to be recalled in Peter's future life by the senses of touch, smell, and hearing. After his parents die, Gogo is sent to live with his tyrannical uncle in England, where he assumes the name Peter Ibbetson. As a young man, he falls in love with a lady seen at a party, Mary, Duchess of Towers, who is later revealed to be his childhood friend, Mimsey Seraskier. Mary eventually appears to Peter in his dreams and teaches him how to “dream true,” a psychical process learned from her father (that anyone can learn given the right training) that allows the subject to experience their dreams in a richly aesthetic, embodied form. Dreaming true also allows the subject to recreate past experiences that are relived in perfect detail. Mary and Peter become so adept at dreaming true together that they are eventually able to create objects and entire settings in the dream world retrieved from previous memories and experiences. They go on to discover the ability to revisit childhood and to transfer experiences and memories to one another via touch, becoming what William Cohen calls a “transindividual character” (135), something like a “soul [that] exceeds individual human bodies” that is nevertheless accessed through the experience of the body (11). In Peter Ibbetson, a novel that presents transcendence and souls detached from traditional religious elements, this type of relationship might be described more accurately as constituting a transubjective dyad collapsed into one boundary-less body that transforms the separate subjectivities of its dual constituents into something more than the sum of its parts.Footnote 2
The characters are also able to revisit events as far back as the last Ice Age as long as they have a blood connection, an ancestral memory of a person who was present for the original experience.Footnote 3 Utilizing this aspect of dreaming true even allows the pair to view, by inhabiting the body and sensorium of a remote ancestor, a hazy mammoth in the distance, the link of kinship serving as a “multigenerational, embodied camera that produces images akin to composite photographs” (Zieger 47). After carrying on their mental affair for twenty-five years, Mary dies saving a woman from an approaching train, but is still able to visit Peter in the dream world after death. There she reveals to him secrets of the universe, such as the collective stream of essences into which all life passes. Peter dies mid-sentence in the process of composing a book that will more fully relate all of the knowledge accumulated from his conversations with Mary for the collective good of mankind.
The concept of dream space as a physical place that can be accessed via intentional dreaming has interesting ties to the famous account of dreams first posited by Freud in 1899, eight years after Peter Ibbetson’s publication. In The Interpretation of Dreams, and later in his Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis (delivered in 1909; first published in book form in 1910), Freud confronts opponents of psychoanalysis who had insisted that dreams were unintelligible rather than representations of wish fulfillment. He distinguishes between the content of the dream when recounted upon awakening and the thoughts and subjective states experienced while actually dreaming. Because of distortion due to repression, the wish fulfilling and sexual elements of dreams are not initially obvious and require free association to discover the invariably disguised desires that the subject has experienced in the past. Peter Ibbetson depicts no barrier or disconnect whatsoever between the dream world, which can recreate personal and even ancestral memories reaching back thousands of years, and waking existence. Both the content of dreams and the subjective states associated with the experience are perfectly memorable and recordable after the subject awakes. As Susan Zieger points out, whereas Freud figures dreams as “censored material that consciousness had unwittingly permitted to surface,” Du Maurier “imagines [dreams] as consciously directed pseudo-experiences” (44). However, there is a strong similarity between the vivid, embodied dreams of Du Maurier's novel and the symptoms of hysterics discussed by Freud, who “seemed to dream while still awake,” and who “recounted their memories as descriptions of plastic scenes which seemed to appear before them as an independent reality rather than as conscious recollections of past events” (Ferguson 61). Peter and Mary's ability to dream true in the novel actually combines these descriptions; dreaming true is a conscious, directed form of memory, but the dreams themselves attain the status of a sort of hyper-reality, in which bodily sensations are not only present, but magnified beyond their normal capacity.
The embodied dimension of dreaming true has been largely ignored by several recent critics in their discussions of the novel.Footnote 4 Zieger, for instance, claims that Peter Ibbetson “celebrates the erosion of embodied memory” and goes on to point out that when Peter and Mary touch the objects of their dream world, the dream blurs, thus resulting in a shift from a true dream to a regular one, and sometimes even causing the subjects to awaken (33). Zieger's former claim is difficult to maintain in light of Peter's unceasing nostalgia for the subjective states and attendant sensory and somatic experiences of childhood. The memories reactivated via dreaming true are so important to Peter because they allow him to re-experience childhood with both the distanced perspective and body of his nostalgic adult self, as well as, at times, the sensorium and subjectivity of the child Peter, explained in more detail below. Zieger also neglects to mention that, with a little practice, Peter and Mary are able to touch things in a true dream without blurring it; they are unable to permanently alter the physical properties of the dream by touch, but the self within the dream still receives the sensation of touching the object. The sleeping body is also affected by actions performed within the true dream, tellingly revealed by the portrayal of Peter's smoking of a cigarette in the dream world as an event that satisfies his body's craving for nicotine in the real world.Footnote 5 Peter first likens the relationship of the dreaming subject to their relived memories to that of “an independent spectator, an outsider, not as an actor going again through scenes in which he has played a part before!” (227; pt. 4). This is the dominant mode by which Peter and Mary experience their childhood memories; present as ghostly outsiders not visible (except to the child Mimsey) to the people they watch. However, this is not always the case. The novel's orientation to the ability of dreaming true to recreate the childhood experiences recorded on the palimpsest mind is most remarkably expressed just several pages after the above passage, in a detail that has been ignored by critics and that is included by Peter almost as an afterthought. He explains, “Soon I discovered by practice that I was able for a second or two to be more than a mere spectator – to be an actor once more; to turn myself (Ibbetson) into my old self (Gogo), and thus be touched and caressed by those I had so loved. My mother kissed me and I felt it” (230; pt. 4). Dreaming true allows Peter to not only observe his idyllic childhood experiences, but in fact, to momentarily reinhabit his childhood self, replete with its body and sensorium. Moreover, just as dreaming true is a heightened form of reality in which perceptions and sensations are revivified and sharpened, so is Peter's merging with his former self an even higher form of existence: “It was a life within a life – an intenser life – in which the fresh perceptions of childhood combined with the magic of dream-land” (232; pt. 4). These instances, in which the adult and child self co-exist within the same body, even surpass Peter's nostalgic yearning to relive his childhood because they combine sensations from different layers of the palimpsest mind. This state allows Peter to re-experience the novel, “fresh” sensations of childhood through the child's body itself, which are heightened by the intensified nature of the sensorium that differentiates dream space from waking existence, while at the same time allowing him to retain the distanced perspective of his adult self. Reliving his childhood, whether he is outside or reinhabiting his childhood self, is an endlessly novel experience for Peter.
Throughout Peter's descriptions of the strangely physical dream world that he and Mary construct through the mental technology of dreaming true, the craved, embodied memories of the dream world are contrasted against a drive toward disembodiment and transcendence of the boundaries of the self. This is initially presented as the realization of a transubjectivity that allows Mary and Peter to transcend the barriers separating self from other, crossing the boundaries of one another's subjectivities and even inhabiting the bodies of their ancestors. As Anna Neill has pointed out, the Victorian expression of the loss of self and its merger with the other or the surrounding world was common in works that depicted “dreamy mental states,” a term coined by the Victorian neurologist John Hughlings Jackson that “refers to exotic phenomena produced in nervous disintegration that range from the expanded reminiscence of déjà vu to double consciousness, the sense of a former life, or even ghost sightings” (5). While the mystical experiences involving the alteration of subjectivity “are so anchored in the body that they indicate pathological mental events or at least temporary cerebral malfunction, these experiences nevertheless expand awareness beyond the reach of ordinary sense perception, linking events and images across space and time or seeing into the minds of others” (Neill 3). Peter Ibbetson depicts similarly mystical erosions of self that directly allow its protagonists to inhabit the bodies of their ancestors, to literally see through their eyes, yet this is accomplished via the experiences of ostensibly sane characters in an embodied dream space rather than through the psychological episodes of characters known by the reader to be mentally disturbed.
The boundaries of the individual self then are blurred, eventually even erased via an invasion of the self by the other in this dream space, a process presented by the novel as ethically positive that is naturalized over the course of the characters’ twenty-five year dream affair. This loss of definitive boundaries of the self speaks to the perennial philosophical problem of the (in)separability of body and self. If you leave the confines of your body, are you still you? How is this complicated by a dream world in which this is not just a figurative but literal problem? William Cohen has recently revivified the problem of dualism in an analysis of vacillations among late nineteenth century thinkers between an evolutionary, increasingly secular materialism, versus the concept of an immaterial unconscious core important to the burgeoning schema of psychoanalysis. Cohen argues for a late Victorian conception of embodied subjectivity that is nevertheless able to cross the boundaries separating the self from the objective world and other subjects, thus allowing a blurring of somatic and quasi-spiritual affective experiences through a diminution of the borders of the self; “undoing the imaginary coherence of the self by estranging it from its material form” (136). The transcendence that Cohen argues against, a notion that obscures the centrality of the body in arguments about the ethics of the imagined interpenetration of subject and object, is not wholly abandoned in Peter Ibbetson. However, this transcendence is never fully realized, and it cannot be imaged in the novel without falling back on a conception of embodied experience. Toward the novel's end, Mary, in a post-death state, visits Peter in their dream world and discusses with him the stream of life-essences into which all existence eventually dissolves, a universal collective within which all that will ever exist will eventually join all that ever has existed: “everything everywhere seems to be an ever-deepening, ever-broadening stream that makes with inconceivable velocity for its own proper level, WHERE PERFECTION IS! . . . and ever gets nearer and nearer, and never finds it, and fortunately never will!” (400; pt. 6). In describing this stream, Mary encourages selective breeding, “one of Du Maurier's favourite hobby horses,” and utilizes metaphors of biology when explaining these essences to Peter (Ormond 488). They are alternately referred to as “specks of spinal marrow,” “sardines in a box,” “midges,” and, “little bags of remembrance that never dies” (392, 396, 398; pt. 6). This transcendence then, is not a typical spiritual heaven in which the self abandons embodiment altogether. It rather becomes microscopically finite, and is unimaginable in terms anterior to biological conceptions of the existence of self.
During the first visit between Mary and Peter after she has died, she repeatedly represents death as a privileged state over life because it allows for a fuller comprehension of the secrets of life and the universe. Mary takes physical form to communicate with Peter, claiming when she does so that it feels “odd and old-fashioned . . . to have eyes and ears again, and all that – little open windows on to what is near us. They are very clumsy contrivances! I had already forgotten them” (385; pt. 6). Physical form, Mary claims, can offer no information that is unavailable to the disembodied state, the perceptual and sensory qualities of which are apparently much greater than those allowed even by dreaming true. Though Mary denigrates the frailties of the human sense organs intrinsic to the very notion of embodiment, her interactions with Peter and the surrounding environment are not much different than they were before, though her ability to merge with him in the former way has been lost. Du Maurier's illustration of their first meeting after Mary's death reveals her – very much in a physical, non-ghostly form – kneeling down and clasping Peter's hands as he prostrates himself before her. Even the superior experiences allowed by the quality of being dead and becoming an “essence” are couched in physical terms of primarily sensory perception. For instance, Mary notes that, “where I am it is all ear and eye and the rest in one” (387; pt. 6; emphasis original) and goes on to claim that in death the sensory knowledge of all creatures is combined into one mass of collective episteme, sensory knowledge that allows for a kind of hyper-synesthesia: “One can see and smell and touch and taste a sound, as well as hear it, and vice versa . . . Sound is everything. Sound and light are one” (388; pt. 6; emphasis original). By espousing the magnified sensorial capabilities that come with death, Mary subverts traditional modes of contemplating transcendence as a disembodied, wholly spiritual state. In death, Mary's sensorium functions in a simply magnified human capacity, and in her form as “sardine,” “midge,” or undying bag of remembrance, her essence has an even greater capacity for bodily-centered knowledge; indeed, this magnification of sensation and perception seems to be the primary quality of death in general.
Mary eventually states that, even though she cannot fully merge with the collective stream of essences of all existence until Peter joins her in death because of the characters’ merged, transubjective nature, her power to take human form and communicate with him is waning.Footnote 6 As such, she will be “with him in spirit” even after she cannot reappear to him physically. However, her essence remains in the dream world recreation of Mary and Peter's childhood home in Passy in the form of the pair of gloves that she leaves behind. In this scene, like Peter/Gogo's toy wheelbarrow in the beginning of the novel, the persistence of objects and their capacity to act as vessels of memory and experience is stressed. But the gloves go beyond merely functioning as reliquaries of the past and instead become synecdochical of Mary's body itself. When Mary leaves, she identifies herself as a “bundle of old clothes” (403; pt. 6). Several pages later, when falling asleep the next night, Mary is gone, but “she had forgotten her gloves . . . every fold and crease preserved as in a mould – the very cast of her finger-nails; and the scent of sandal-wood she and her mother had so loved” (406; pt. 6). Peter Stallybrass's assertion that, “When a person is absent or dies, cloth can absorb their absent presence” is particularly salient in this context (30). Not only are the gloves a reminder of the absence of the loved one, but the cloth itself is “able to carry the absent body, memory, genealogy, as well as [its] literal material value” (Stallybrass 37). Peter goes on to note that he has laid both gloves, palms upward, on the bench, where they remain still, untouched by the wind or the hand of a thief, and affirms that they will remain so until he, their last link in the dream world, finally joins Mary in death. The gloves, pieces of the person who possessed them, live on, maintaining her smell, the shape of her fingers, and remaining impervious to physical change.
In addition to Mary's gloves, Peter himself remains in Passy night after night. Even after Mary has revealed the universe's secrets to him and he has gained the ability to reinhabit the bodies of his ancestors thousands of years in the past, Peter chooses to return to his childhood home and relive the same days over and over. This sense of reliving early experiences in dreams as a habitual, second life, echoes claims Sully would make about the topic just two years after Peter Ibbetson’s publication: “In the case of many persons, for a certain period at least, this reversion in dreaming to the experience of early life is recurrent and habitual. To this extent dreams constitute a second revived life, which intersects and interrupts our normal waking life” (“Revelation” 120). Peter's obstinate desire to habitually relive the same childhood experiences is not unique to the end of the novel, but is in fact continually present throughout his life due to his more general, non-particular nostalgia. Of course, wanting to re-experience one's childhood is hardly a unique occurrence, and neither is its relation to dreaming and memory. Macnish claims that older people always dream of events of their early lives (78), and Sully avers that we are more likely to forget recent experiences and dwell on the distant past, especially when it comes to dreaming (“Revelation” 119). Freud advances the notion that the repressed desires of early life are given free rein in the adult's dream. In a passage echoing Sully's image of the mind as a palimpsest whose buried layers can be uncovered by dreaming, Freud states that, “In dream-life the child that is in man pursues its existence, as it were, and retains all its characteristics and wishful impulses, even such as have become unserviceable in later life” (Five Lectures 36). This desire, then, to reclaim childhood memories and subsequently relive them in dreamland, is at the core of several of the most well-known Victorian philosophies of dreaming. Peter, of course, unlike the average dreamer, is actually able to re-experience his childhood via the literal recreation of his and Mary's memories.
Peter's obsession with habitually experiencing the same scenes night after night speaks to larger tensions that the novel presents between dreams and memories. At the beginning of Peter's narration, he relates his family's move to Passy and the Eden-like setting in which his childhood transpired. He identifies the move as the key moment that awakened his current sense of self, and calls the day after arriving in his new home the happiest of his life. In the family's shed, he finds a toy wheelbarrow that he plays with all day. However, this bliss is immediately qualified on the next page:
But next morning, though the weather was as fine, and the wheelbarrow and the brick-bats and the genial workmen were there, and all the scents and sights and sounds were the same, the first fine careless rapture was not to be caught again, and the glory and the freshness had departed. Thus did I, on the very dawning of life, reach at a single tide the high-water-mark of my earthly bliss – never to be reached again by me on this side of the ivory gate. (15; pt. 1)Footnote 7
Nothing else in waking life compares to this original primal event, here described as occurring “on the very dawning of life.” After the first intense exposure to the beauty and ideal nature of his childhood surroundings, repeated experiences of the same cause them to lose their freshness and vivid qualities. Peter goes on to claim that, to combat this loss of sensory abundance after repeated viewings, “to make the perfection of human happiness endure,” something more is required, a “fourth dimension” (the dream realm accessible via dreaming true) that he finds “in due time” (15; pt. 1). Repeated experiences of childhood events in their dream world are simultaneously endlessly comforting and endlessly fresh for Peter and Mary. Novelty-in-habit is made possible by the greater amount of sensory data and degree of perception intrinsic to dream space. Thus, even from the beginning of the novel, the inadequacy of waking events to live up to repeated experience is thematized as a negative quality of life that must be combatted via the addition of something else – the psychical technology of dreaming true that allows a subject to relive earlier experiences in an even more intensely sensory-centric manner.
Recognition of this facet of lived experience soon fades into the background, however, as Peter, writing from a mental institution as an old man, continues to relate the story of his early years. Peter's awareness of the inferior status of “real-life” events to those same events experienced in dreamland becomes replaced by a less complex, general nostalgia for the events and emotional states of his childhood. This nostalgia comes to a head when Peter visits Passy as an adult and finds it and the old neighborhoods of Paris suburbanized and gentrified; his sorrow at not being able to physically experience the same locales as he was formerly able to comes on the eve of his first meeting with Mary in dreamland. Memory throughout the novel is divided among desultory memory, occurrences of which are recalled unbidden and are often tied to specific sensations and objects, and active, willed memory that comes from concentrating on recalling a specific remembered event or place, a process that later translates into the mental technology of dreaming true.
Desultory memory is privileged as the dominant mode of memory throughout the early part of the novel, until Peter learns how to dream true, and it is explicitly tied to sensory experience of childhood: “the portrayal of fleeting childhood reminiscences in Peter Ibbetson conforms to theories of ‘pure’ or involuntary memory, and their potential interactions with (and transmission through) the material world” (Vrettos par. 8; emphasis original). For instance, Peter's ruminating over lines from W. C. Bryant's “To a Water-fowl” that he formerly read to Mary/Mimsey as a child causes him to feel as if he has “become a child again as I think of them,” replete with “a child's virgin subtlety of perception and magical susceptibility to vague suggestions of the Infinite” (37; pt. 1).Footnote 8 In addition, the activation of memories is at times figured as spurring physical reactions in the body – Peter's “finger-tips tingle at the bare remembrance” of slapping a man in the face as he recounts the occurrence, decades after the event originally took place (112; pt. 2). As Athena Vrettos has pointed out, “du Maurier explores the central role of the senses in both producing and retrieving memories”; this is true in myriad examples throughout the novel (par. 9). Peter links the process of retrieving memories in the desultory model as being more physically manipulable via sensation than it is usually considered to be, particularly in relation to memory. Early in the novel he notes that memories of childhood are “embedded and embalmed for me in every single bar of at least a hundred different tunes, to be evoked at will for the small trouble and cost of just whistling or humming the same, or even playing it with one finger on the piano” (29; pt. 1).Footnote 9 This capacity to recall is presented as a finite store that must be preserved with the proper “economy,” for “it will not do to exhaust, by too frequent experiment, the strange capacity of a melodic bar for preserving the essence of by-gone things, and days that are no more” (29–30; pt. 1). The economic metaphor here casts a pall on the notion that childhood memories are infinitely retrievable and enjoyable; their recall must be managed, or else the subject risks becoming inured to the memory and its associated sensory, bodily responses. This is in stark contrast to how childhood memories are depicted in true dreams, where no management is necessary because there is something endlessly novel and non-habituating about the process of re-experiencing them.
Peter Ibbetson is remarkable, then, for presenting dreamland as experienced in dreaming true as affording a version of novelty-in-habit that is the exact opposite of how habitual experience has often been theorized. In relation to art in particular, the “Romantic” formulation holds that “time poisons perception” (Clune 3). As Michael Clune has noted, utilizing philosophies of habit advanced by Walter Pater and other nineteenth-century critics, “The first time we encounter an image, our perceptual experience tends to be richly vivid. Repeated exposure leads to a dramatic drop-off in vivacity” (3). This is because, from an evolutionary standpoint, it is desirable to become habituated to and familiar with an object or situation; each time it is experienced, the brain expends less mental energy and time in retrieving information about it. The downside from a phenomenological point of view is that “the achievement of cognitive mastery over form, the ability to recognize the object, simultaneously causes a precipitous drop-off in sensory intensity” (12).Footnote 10 The more opaque and unfamiliar something is, then, the better in terms of prolonging aesthetic engagement and intensity of sensation. Peter's views toward the finite, manageable nature of desultory memory are at least partly in line with this model; the more times a song is whistled, the less engrossing the memories associated with it, hence the need to manage the stores of freshness associated with a memory or association. Contrary to waking life, Peter and Mary's dreamland completely short-circuits this notion by functioning as a space in which freshness of sensation is paradoxically sustained by repeated, habitual experiences. In dreamland, there is no opaqueness; dreaming true provides a view of embodied dream space that is both immediately graspable and endlessly relivable.
This novel phenomenon in Peter Ibbetson speaks to related larger issues surrounding current critical understandings of Victorian psychological and literary conceptions of habit. As Sean O'Toole has recently discussed, the Victorian intelligentsia's relationship to habit was much more complex than is often assumed: writers did not only view habit as a stultifying enemy of creative and intellectual expression, but often as the backdrop against which the vicissitudes of life came into play. O'Toole argues that habit, rather than suppressing a subject's perception of the outside world, actually has a way of priming them to sudden shifts in perception in a way that conscious, directed thinking could never achieve (5). Viewing habit in this way reveals its generative capability, a concept Peter Ibbetson is clearly interested in exploring. My claim, however, is that the novel is even more radical in its dreamland logic. Habitual events do not merely prime the subject to novelty or act as catalyst to the experience of it; rather, novelty is achieved through and in the endlessly repeated habitual experiences themselves because of the hyper-sensory capacity of the technology of dreaming true.
All of this is not to state that the reliving of childhood experiences in true dreams is always valued in the novel above the initial experience that remains a memory, however, for Peter's descriptions are at times inconsistent. Desultory memory's quality of providing a “rushing back” of the images and sensations associated with the first time an action was performed or a scene was perceived, is often espoused as a more desired experience in the novel than is active memory; this is so, to a lesser extent, even after Peter obtains the ability to dream true. The reliving of an event in dreamland never becomes dull in the way that the desultory return of a memory does. However, at many points in the novel, Peter – narrating from the mental institution after he has attained the ability to dream true and experienced his memories in embodied form on multiple occasions – bemoans the fact that he can never truly relive memories in the exact same way that they were first experienced. The clearest example of this fact is presented by Peter when he is, again, narrating his childhood experiences. He reveals that he receives a kind of enjoyment from aching for the memories of his childhood, a joy in sorrow that comes from contemplating that which can never truly be reclaimed in its original form. These are memories that, apart from brief instances, cannot be re-experienced with the body and subjectivity of the child: “This sorrow's crown of sorrow is my joy and my consolation, and ever has been; and I would not exchange it for youth, health, wealth, honor, and freedom; only for thrice happy childhood itself once more, over and over again, would I give up its thrice happy recollections” (47; pt. 1; emphasis added). This passage casts all events since the original idyllic occurrences that produced the subsequent memories as diminished in relation to them. At the same time, Peter also claims that the memories themselves are to be prized above everything that could possibly be exchanged for them, barring “childhood itself,” which would require actually becoming the child self again – something beyond momentarily experiencing childhood memories with a composite of the child's and adult's bodies, sensations, and subjectivities. Of course, there is an underlying sense that even if this re-experienced childhood were possible, it would soon grow at least somewhat dull like everything else, just as the wheelbarrow and the happiness of the first day in Passy had already grown dull by the next morning, just as a song must not be recalled too often in order to avoid causing the subject's relationship to it to become insensate. It is ultimately more novel and non-habituating for Peter to endlessly yearn for his lost childhood and to re-experience it from a distanced, adult perspective than it would be to literally relive his early days.
The imagined telos of existence for Peter, then, is not the ultimate dissolution of the self into the stream of collective human essences in which he and Mary will merge with all other existences. Rather, it is Peter's idée fixe – literally becoming a child again, a goal that is not actually attainable in any form beyond a space of more than a “second or two” (230; pt. 4). The striving toward this goal, however, as well as its coeval nostalgia and ability to relive memories from an outside, alternate perspective as an adult, are endlessly generative in producing desire and are non-habituating in terms of freshness of experience and intensity of sensation. In the novel, even after the characters have mastered the technology of dreaming true, the inability to claim the desired object of memory is ultimately more able to spur endless freshness of sensation and desire than would a re-embodiment of the earlier self that originally experienced the events that constitute those later memories. Sully's indication that dreams may offer replication of a child's perceptual mode of approaching the world is ultimately not actively claimable via normal dreams or (entirely) by the mechanism of dreaming true. Normal sleeping dreams may offer something like a version of a more innocent and naïve, even atavistic mode of perception, but this is an unconscious perception and type of subjectivity that is not able to be recreated or recalled after the subject awakens. Peter Ibbetson shows a way in which some version of an altered, intensified mode of sensory experience may be possible, but it cannot actually provide Peter with the ability to literally become his child-self, outside of very short moments in which the body and subjectivity of the child combine with the mind of his adult self. Thus, the novel's ultimate affect vis-á-vis memory is a yearning nostalgia that paradoxically makes possible the intensity of sensation, obstruction of habit, and erosion of the current self so valued in the desire for re-embodiment in the first place. The recreation of individual memories as the process is portrayed in dreaming true does not function as a one to one representation or recreation of the past; rather, memories are actually more idealized in the novel precisely because they are unable to ever truly be re-experienced in the same way that they originally were. Despite the presence of the psychical mechanism of dreaming true that allows one to recreate past memories, this technology ultimately does not attain a transcendent power in Peter Ibbetson, for it cannot truly allow the subject to relive their past. It presents instead something like a simulacrum – all of the elements and persons associated with the event are present, but the feeling and subjectivity (and body) of the original are not wholly recoverable. This irrecoverability is a void at the center of the text, but it is a profoundly generative void, one that makes dreaming true such a unique phenomenon in Victorian literature.
Du Maurier's fictional explorations of memory and habit occupy a curious place in fin-de-siècle literary culture. On one hand, he depicts “the individual's selfhood as a function of time, of his or her placement on a personal or human continuum” or stream of essences; on the other hand, he is simultaneously unwilling to abandon the role of embodied sensory experience and perception de-emphasized by the transcendent implications of this stream, hence its biological underpinnings in the novel (Galvan 126). He vacillates between alternate theories of nineteenth-century dream science and psychology, for he both foregrounds the role of the body in dreaming, even going so far as to blur the distinction between resting and waking states in the hyperreal realm of true dreams, while also anticipating the repression-centric models of dreaming formulated by Sully and Freud. For Du Maurier, the palimpsest mind can divulge its secret layers of experience via the technology of dreaming true, an idea more in line with Macnish's 1834 claim that dreams are capable of recreating and revivifying wholly forgotten memories than with late-century systematized psychology. The recreated memories of the palimpsest mind reveal earlier layers of the individual subject's experiences, while also revealing – in episodes that recall Dendy's notion of the dreaming mind as in repose or an animal-like state – the “primitive” capacity of dreaming in allowing individuals to connect with their genetic precursors. Modern neurologists and psychiatrists have revealed that dreaming actually takes place not during periods of imperfect sleep in which the mind is in a weakened state, but during the REM cycle, when brain activity is at its highest (Hall and de Castle 31). Like Victorian doctors and thinkers, current professionals are divided over the nature and purpose of dreams. Some contend that dreams represent simply an epiphenomenon of the sleeping human brain and hold no practical function whatsoever, while others attest that dreams act as natural selection tools that select the best ideas and mental connections occurring during sleep in order to use them to subconsciously guide future behavior. The late psychiatrist Ernest Hartmann and his colleagues have argued that dreams act as a mechanism by which traumatic events and challenging emotions are deconstructed and encoded within memories. The habitual replaying of deeply emotional generic scenarios while asleep, the argument goes, can help the dreamer to adapt to distressing situations by stripping them of their traumatic potential through repetition, thus enabling the subject to be better prepared for actual occurrences of similar situations in their waking life (Hartmann 2). In this formulation, the habitual nature of dreaming serves to erode the vividness and sensation associated with specific past events, especially traumatic ones. Peter Ibbetson’s dreaming true also shows how dreams can utilize habit for specific evolutionary functions, but in the complete opposite direction; dreaming true intensifies rather than dulls the emotions and sensations associated with the original event, revealing the capacity of habitual experiences to lead to vivid recreations, as well as acts of wholly new mental creation. By casting dreams as embodied events that allow the subject to both re-experience their childhood and to commune with their ancestors, Du Maurier explores and explodes the implications of popular Victorian theories of memory, evolution, and eugenics. In so doing, he presents a truly unique image of the bounds of the self as experienced through a specific, cultivatable psychic technology that also destroys the numbing quality of habit. Pater and William James, Coleridge, Edmund Burke, and, in the early twentieth-century, Viktor Shklovsky, have all theorized the philosophical problem of habit and the ways by which art may serve as a corrective to its deadening effects through the experience of newness or “defamiliarization.” Du Maurier's most important contribution to the history of literature and aesthetics may be his singular nostalgic vision in Peter Ibbetson of an ideal dream space in which habitually experienced memories, because of the attendant pleasures of increased sensory perception and the less finite boundaries of the self, never get old. Through the fictional technology of dreaming true, childhood memories are not as intensely fresh, vivid, and embodied as the first time they were experienced, but are actually even more so precisely because of the fact that they can never be re-experienced in the exact same way; a wistfully beautiful formulation quite singular among Victorian doctors, psychologists, and literary writers.
