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Accidental Neoliberalism: Democratic Accountability in the Making of the Euro, 1957–92

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2025

Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol*
Affiliation:
History, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy
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Abstract

Neoliberalism can be defined as the drive to shield capitalism from the scrutiny and accountability of democratic processes. This definition is particularly relevant to the creation of the euro, as it reflects some imbalances of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union (EU). The monetary union was designed to function with full independence, largely beyond the reach of democratic deliberations. This article investigates whether this outcome was intentional. It argues that the asymmetric structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was purposefully crafted, as the European policymakers involved in the negotiations were acutely aware of the imperfections of the system being developed. However, these shortcomings were not specifically aligned with a particular neoliberal ideology. Instead, this article shows they resulted from a broader set of concerns, primarily driven by a reluctance to centralise decision-making power at the EU level due to fears of losing aspects of national sovereignty. Understanding the unintentional nature of this outcome is crucial, as confusing what is accidental with what is deliberate can lead to misunderstandings about the motivations behind EMU and misconceive the paths for its reform.

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Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press.