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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
The Islamic law of procedure has not been extensively studied. The present book—a German doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Hamburg—focuses on the law of procedure on the basis of Maliki sources from the 7th to the 12th century, considering it as a link between legal rules and the application of these rules and thus closely connected to all parts of the material law. The author even makes the practicability of a legal system dependent on its law of procedure.
After a historical account of the shari

a and the Maliki school of law in North Africa and Spain, the author reviews the scholarship in this field, criticizing ahistorical approaches that ignore chronological developments, the plurality of legal opinions, regional specificities, and law-school–specific discussions among the jurists. Methodological aspects—such as technique of regulation, systematization, and formal argumentation—are also addressed. This is why the author chooses to focus on methodology and systematic argumentation on the basis of a clearly defined sample, spanning a period of six centuries, from the Maliki law school. This approach is convincing and meets the requirements for a critical historical study. It enables the author not only to analyze the plurality of legal opinions regarding the law of procedure synchronically but also to examine diachronically developments and changes that may have taken place in this school of law.
Extensive quotations, analysis, and comparison of the chapters on procedural law in the fiqh works of Malik (Muwatta

), Sahnun (Mudawwana), Qayrawani (Risala), and Ibn Rushd (Bidaya) give valuable insight into the methodology of the jurists, as well as the pluralism of legal opinions. The author deals with procedural rulings in civil cases separately from those in the ḥudūd, which deserve special treatment because of their different rules of evidence. He proceeds according to the chronological sequence of the procedure rather than the order of presentation of the topics in the fiqh literature, starting with the involved persons, the litigants, the judge, and his staff. Developing his arguments out of the texts, he then meticulously analyzes the different stages of the procedure, such as the filing of action, the defendant's answer, testimony and oath, and the judgment and enforcement. The typical formalism of the stages of procedure seems to confirm Schacht's statement in An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964, p. 195): “The emphasis of the Islamic law of procedure lies not so much on arriving at the truth as on applying certain formal rules.” Thus, a sharp distinction between the roles of the plaintiff (claimant), on whom the onus of proof lies, and the defendant, whose statement is confirmed by the oath, with a special distribution of priorities of testimony and oaths, is typical for Islamic law. The author compares this situation with modern German procedural law, where both parties have the same right to bring evidence.
Regarding the chapters on the qadi in the Muwatta

, Mudawwana, and the Bidaya, the perspectives and themes vary. The later sources—the Mudawwana and the Bidaya—deal with the relationship between the judge and the ruler, whereas the Muwatta

does not. At this point, a historical-critical evaluation of the statements of these texts pertaining to the emergence of judicial structures in Islamic law would have been appropriate. However, the author prefers the legal-comparative perspective, developing a comparison of these rules and procedures with modern German law. The discrepancy is, of course, striking. Whereas in classical Islamic law the ruler appoints and dismisses the judge at will—but cannot interfere with the jurisdiction itself—the modern system of law is based on the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. The enforcement of judgments is dealt with in the case of debtors. At this point, a short discussion of the problem of the enforcement of judgments, which was normally a duty of the state authority, would have been interesting. The law of procedure of ḥudūd, the Qur

anic punishments, is dealt with but not in the same extensive way as the procedure in civil cases.
Extensive quotations from the sources, a meticulous analysis of the statements, and a comparison of the different statements of the texts give lively and valuable insights into the structure of the law of procedure, as well as the jurists' reasoning. Every chapter contains a short side view of the modern German law of procedure. The Arabic technical terms are given in brackets. The quotations convincingly prove the shari

a's flexibility and throw light on the plurality of approaches and concepts, as well as the methods of legal argumentation. An index would have been useful, as would a list of the Arabic technical terms with their translations.
To summarize, this study is a very good survey of the early and medieval law of procedure, with interesting insights into the methodology used by Muslim jurists and their systematic approach. The comparison with modern German law is surely interesting for comparative jurisprudence and the history of law. It has to be kept in mind, however, that the law of procedure in Islamic countries today has undergone a fundamental change since the 19th century under the influence of modern Western law. There is a multilayered court system in every Islamic country today which has replaced the jurisdictional monopoly of the qadi. Still, in many Islamic countries, testimony by a woman counts for half the testimony of a man. A second problem is the question of the practical relevance of the Islamic law of procedure, which the author himself raises in his introduction. The Islamic law of procedure is normally thought to have been neglected either partially or even totally, especially in the ḥudūd, for being unpractical. How is one to pass judgment on someone accused of fornication without having four male eyewitnesses? This aspect is not dealt with in Scholz's book, for the sources are normative law books. A reconstruction of how the jurisdiction functioned in the first six centuries has not yet been undertaken. This would be possible only on the basis of court documents, which are not preserved for this time, or on the basis of historical-chronological sources—for example, the vast biographical lexica in Islam. (For an example from the 19th century, see I. Schneider, “Muḥammad Bāqir

aftī [1180–1260/1766–1844] und die Isfahaner Gerichtsbarkeit,” Der Islam 79 [2002]: 240–73.) These remarks, however, are not meant to detract from the importance of this comparative analysis of procedural law regulations and their underlying methods, which gives us a fresh perspective and a new impetus for the study of Islamic law and comparative jurisprudence.