1 PERSONAL HISTORY
I became interested in economics as a mathematics-major-to-be at Swarthmore College in the very early nineteen-sixties. While I did not quite fit the quantitative nerd stereotype (I was pursuing a philosophy/Greek minor and had interests in history, politics and religion), the appeal of economics for me lay primarily in the dream of using mathematics to give precise quantitative answers to complex social questions. Mathematics appealed to me as a language relatively free from ambiguity, in which the truth and falsity of propositions could be clearly established [for more on me see Foley, Reference Foley and Heertje1999].
I did not take the course or seminar the Swarthmore Economics Department offered in the History of Economic Thought. My undergraduate education in social philosophy and social theory was Larry Sklar's brilliant Social Philosophy Honors seminar, which covered among other topics “good old-fashioned” positivism, the philosophy of history, and the problem of explanation in the social sciences. I did not, in particular, read Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, or Karl Marx as an undergraduate. As I look back on this, it seems significant that by 1960 the history of political economic thought had effectively disappeared from the core courses in economic theory at a school like Swarthmore.
When I became a graduate student at Yale in 1964 there was still a one-semester requirement of a course either in economic history or the history of economic thought. I chose economic history, and was swept up in the Cowles program of mathematical economics and econometrics. The Yale economics theory courses and qualifying examinations did require a familiarity with primary texts in economic theory starting with Alfred Marshall (and including Keynes). But on the whole growth and development at Yale was taught without much emphasis on Smith, Malthus, or Ricardo, and the theory of value without any reference to Marx. Many years later I learned from reading Phil Mirowski [Mirowski, Reference Mirowski2002] how closely connected the Cowles program was historically, institutionally, and intellectually, to the Cold War, but at the time and in the classroom a graduate student did not have many contextual clues to understand what shaped the curriculum.
When I became a junior faculty member at M.I.T. one of my administrative chores was to re-structure the core theory sequence for Ph.D. students to make more room for “tool” courses and mathematical general equilibrium by reducing historically structured review courses such as the Marshall-oriented introduction to Microeconomics Bob Bishop taught. Although Paul Samuelson and Bob Solow were engaged in the “Cambridge controversy” in those years, very little of the issues involved filtered down to distract me from trying to straighten out stock-flow problems in differential equation representations of economic models (though some of the personalities involved, especially Joan Robinson, made a considerable impression on me). But as the turmoil of the Vietnam War led to a crisis of elite universities, with tear gas swirling through Kendall and Harvard Squares, I began to feel the need to know something about political economy proper. I approached these issues initially as a Quaker pacifist skeptical of the grandiose claims politicians were making about national security issues, and aware of the looming issues of social justice and inequality emerging in the new post-colonial nations and the unfinished business of U.S. democracy being addressed by the civil rights and peace movements. The radical student movement appeared to me to be raising real questions about the direction of American democracy and society, though its loudest spokespersons often seemed distressingly vague on the historical and theoretical background of the issues, not to speak of economics per se.
It was not until I landed at Stanford University in 1973 that I found a community of professors and students in the economics, anthropology, and other departments, with whom to carry out an engaged and critical study of Marx. Like most academics trained in the neoclassical tradition which dominated economic theory courses in that period, I had a hard time reconciling Marx's conclusions about capitalist society with the theories of equilibrium and market self-regulation that were my stock in trade as a teacher. One issue that puzzled me was why competition (since Marx clearly enough had in mind a competitive environment) would not drive the profit rate to zero in an economy in which labor was the only ultimate input to production. The notion of an alternative “closure” of the competitive model with an elastic supply of labor at a conventional subsistence real wage began to dawn on me (a point of view later brought into sharp focus by reading Stephen Marglin's remarkable Marshall Lectures [Marglin, Reference Marglin1984]). This line of thinking gradually shifted to wondering just why the real wage did rise in the course of capitalist economic development. It was only much later that I began to appreciate fully the sense in which Marx followed the Classical political economists in regarding the capitalist economic system as a partially self-regulating, though complex, system far from equilibrium [Foley, Reference Foley2003, ch. 1].
I spent a good deal of time at Stanford reading and discussing Marx. Aside from refreshing my interest in economics, which was flagging at that time, this experience led to a watershed in my intellectual development, and a number of new directions in my research. Broadly speaking, in the early 1970s conventional mainstream economists took one of two positions on Marxist economics (and sometimes both simultaneously). On the one hand, they argued that Marxist economics was not “scientific”, being “value-laden” (this allegation sometimes in contrast to the “value-free” character of neoclassical economics), “unfalsifiable”, and, worst of all, not amenable to mathematical modeling, despite the extensive work in Marxist modeling of such figures as Bortkiewicz, Leontief, Sweezy, Dobb, Goodwin, and Marx himself, to mention a highly restricted sample. On the other hand, if the discussion got to the point of acknowledging some of the contrary evidence to these claims, my mainstream interlocutors would claim that the key insights of Marxist economics that had any scientific value had in fact been incorporated into the development of the neoclassical synthesis, so that the study of Marx could safely be relegated to the history of thought, along with Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, and even, as it turned out within a couple of decades, Marshall and Keynes. Thus the research agenda posed for an economist thinking about Marx's ideas at that time centered first of all on doing the modernizing mathematical modeling work for Marx that the Cowles Foundation (including Koopmans, Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie and their students) had done for Walras. This led me to a fruitful set of research topics, including, predictably, tidying up stock-flow issues in the Marxian circuit of capital (where they turned out to be in much better shape than in contemporary macroeconomics to begin with), and quantifying the labor theory of value.
These pursuits led, perhaps predictably, at least in hindsight, if one can speak in that manner, to frictions and conflict with neoclassically trained colleagues. For me personally the most uncomfortable aspect of this friction was pressure to “define” myself as a “Marxist economist”, for example, by seeking an appointment to teach “alternative approaches” to economics. While there are many intellectually stimulating and convincing strands of Marx's thought (for example, the general perspective of historical materialism, Marx's speculations as to the long-run patterns of capitalist economic growth, the Marxist theory of money, and Marx's interest in the social relations of capitalist labor organization) there are also aspects of Marxist political doctrines bound to be uncomfortable for a Quaker pacifist (armed revolutionary struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, to mention two). In any case, I saw myself (who doesn't?) as representing the future of the mainstream in economics, and was reluctant to “define” my work into a narrow sub-field that threatened to become an intellectual ghetto. I escaped the pressure for self-definition by departing Stanford for Barnard College of Columbia University, exchanging institutional-political distance (Barnard is an independent affiliate of Columbia with separate faculty, and in the case of the Economics Department, separate executive committees) for what threatened to be confinement in an intellectual ghetto.
2 HISTORY OF THOUGHT IN UNDERGRADUATE ECONOMICS
It turned out that my work at Barnard also opened a new chapter in my relation to the history of economic thought. One of my junior colleagues, Sylvia Hewlett, with the strong support of the Chair, Deborah Duff Milenkovitch, was in the process of trying to institute a version of the Oxford Philosophy-Politics-Economics curriculum as an option for Barnard undergraduates. (Columbia had a joint Philosophy-Economics major as a result of the energy, support, and passion of Sidney Morgenbesser in its Philosophy Department.) Hewlett's project attracted more verbal than practical support from chronically over-worked Philosophy and Political Science Departments at Barnard, and wound up as a Political Economy “track” in the Economics major. In the original conception, the center of this curriculum was a two-course sequence, “Theoretical Foundations of Political Economy” followed by “Policy Applications of Political Economy”. The Theoretical Foundations course, though it has been taught over the past thirty years in many specific forms by a wide variety of instructors, has always included primary source readings in Smith, Malthus, Marx, and Keynes (often including Ricardo and the early Marginalists). Given my interest in Marx, it was inevitable that I found myself teaching Theoretical Foundations.
It is a commonplace of scholarly wisdom that scholars “really learn” material only when they find themselves teaching it, and so it proved with me and these core texts in the history of economic thought. I had not originally read Marx with any real understanding of the Classical political economy tradition which shaped his understanding of economics. (I had actually taken more trouble to look into Hegel and the philosophical background of Marx's work.) Even though contemporary Marxist scholarship has made considerable progress in putting Marx's thought in the context of classical political economy, I think even more effort in this direction would pay intellectual dividends. In my own case, as I know has been the experience of many economic scholars, the critical and close reading of Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo has been a continuing spring of new research questions and ideas.
One day in the 1980s I had the great good fortune to persuade David Colander to visit my class in Theoretical Foundations, and we, along with the students, got into a discussion of just how Malthus’ concept of demographic equilibrium would play out when combined with Smithian increasing returns to labor from a widening division of labor rather than Ricardian diminishing returns due to the scarcity of natural resources. This discussion led to a paper reformulating Malthus to accommodate the demographic transition and working out the structure of demographic equilibrium in a “Smithian” world oriented toward technical change [Foley, Reference Foley2003, ch. 3]. Ricardo's chapter on Machinery provided a critical background to understanding Marx's theory of the “falling rate of profit” in a broader context as a theory of induced technical change, and to my renewed interest in the theory of endogenous technical change of Kennedy, Weizsäcker, Drandakis-Phelps, van der Ploeg, and others (a theory with immense empirical promise that has not yet quite recovered from the perhaps overly trenchant, but undeniably relevant, critique of Samuelson and Solow) [Kennedy, Reference Kennedy1964; Drandakis and Phelps, Reference Drandakis and Phelps1966, van der Ploeg, Reference van der Ploeg1987, Samuelson, Reference Samuelson1965].
It was also in the 1980s that my research into macroeconomic dynamics and its microeconomic foundations led me in the direction of statistical mechanics and its development into chaos theory and complex systems theory. This perspective sheds light on aspects of the reasoning of the classical political economists, in particular what Pierangelo Garegnani has called the “long-period” method underlying Smith's and Ricardo's reasoning concerning the impact of competition in capital and labor markets. The picture of competition enforcing a ceaseless fluctuation of prices and labor and capital allocation around a point of “gravitation” is also a picture of the self-organization of the complex system constituted by capitalist social relations and markets [Foley, Reference Foley2003]. This line of thinking connected some of my major research questions. The problems of economic dynamics now fell into place as a logical extension of the systems of Classical political economy which informed Marx's thinking. The “family resemblance” or “cousinhood” of neoclassical economics and Classical political economy also became clearer as I understood better how neoclassical economics could be seen as an attempt to approach these problems using equilibrium ideas similar to those of thermodynamics.
The Theoretical Foundations course at Barnard was one of the rare cases of sustained success in curricular innovation. It turned out to be so popular with students that it became a requirement for all tracks of the economics major. Students see the course as providing an “education” in economics of the type that they somehow envisioned when they thought of studying it, and of a type they see precious little of in the model- and technique-oriented introductory and core courses in the field. Theoretical Foundations provides them with an intellectual map of the field of economics, a framework in which they can synthetically locate the particular models and statistical regularities they are offered in bewildering profusion in the rest of the economics curriculum. In these respects Theoretical Foundations complements rather than competing with the rest of the economics major curriculum. It also makes Barnard economics majors familiar with a range of concepts, for example those connected with the analysis of class society, power, and exploitation, which they encounter in discussions in other social sciences.
The difficulty with Theoretical Foundations, which still threatens it, and is a major factor in preventing other schools from imitating it, is the problem of staffing it. Barnard has managed over the years to maintain a deep enough bench of instructors willing to tackle the Theoretical Foundations curriculum to maintain it as a requirement, but only with difficulty because of the disappearance of history of thought from the graduate curriculum for the Economics Ph.D. In Departments where only one or two instructors have the interest and background knowledge to teach this type of course, it is inevitably difficult to maintain it as a stable part of the curriculum in the face of career moves, leaves, and the recurring crises that beset staffing.
3 HISTORY OF THOUGHT IN GRADUATE ECONOMICS
In 1999 I moved from Barnard College to the New School for Social Research.Footnote 1 Student recruitment of the Economics Department of the New School depends to a considerable degree on the Department's international reputation as a center of education in the history of economic thought and economic philosophy. The actual academic situation on the ground is considerably more complicated. The New School Department of Economics is one of the few in the U.S. specialized in graduate teaching. (An economics major at Lang, The New School for Liberal Arts, the residential undergraduate division, will be inaugurated in the Fall of 2008.) Tuition increases have eroded the Department's appeal to local M.A. students and left it chronically understaffed for the number of aspiring Ph.D. candidates it admits. These Ph.D. candidates, in turn, are aware of the limited job market in history of economic thought and economic philosophy, which has led to an emphasis in the curriculum and in research on critical, pluralistic, heterodox approaches to the study of open economy macroeconomics, trade, development, money, and finance. The commitment of individual faculty members to teaching economics in a historical and philosophical perspective remains strong, but the Department, despite its reputation, lacks a critical mass of scholars whose work centers on history of thought and economic philosophy and method to support a major research effort in these fields.
This situation has led to some “mainstreaming” of history of economic thought through its integration into theory and applied courses. The Ph.D. level core micro-economics course I have taught frequently has come to present general equilibrium more and more in historical perspective, emphasizing its roots in Classical value theory, marginalism, the socialist calculation debates, von Neumann's growth model, Leontief's input-output analysis and linear programming as well as in Walras’ investigations. In my view, mainstreaming of this kind is a good idea, because it provides some of the pedagogical benefits in graduate economics education that the Theoretical Foundations course offers for undergraduates. An awareness of the historical roots of modern conceptions of equilibrium modeling and explanation encourages students to integrate separate tools, problems and approaches into a unified perspective. It also alerts them to the tendency for old ideas in economics to be recycled in slightly disguised form as novel approaches (for example, the re-introduction of endogenous technical change, scale effects, and spillovers in the “new growth theory” [Kurz and Salvadori, Reference Kurz, Salvadori and Salvadori2003]).
But mainstreaming of this kind by itself falls far short of providing an adequate representation of history of thought and economic philosophy in the graduate curriculum. A required core M.A. course, Historical Foundations of Political Economy, offers entering graduate students much the same introduction to the Classical political economy tradition as Theoretical Foundations in the Barnard curriculum, and the Department offers seminars in economic methodology and topics in Classical and Keynesian economics, as well as a year-long course in Marxist economics. Compared to most mainstream Departments, the New School offerings are much more diverse and offer a much wider critical perspective on the field as a whole, but students who want to specialize in history of thought or economic methodology and philosophy still have to supply a lot of the essential background in those fields through their own reading and independent studies.
They also need to position themselves for a job market which reflects a diminishing demand for specialized scholarship in the history of thought. My advice to students with a strong interest in economic thought and methodology is to write one chapter of a thesis in this field, but to combine it with applied or theoretical work in another (perhaps related) field, or approaching the same topic from another direction. In this way the student is positioned to apply for jobs advertised in the related field, but also able to use the thesis-writing experience to advance a specialized research program in the history of thought. This strategy has proved to work pretty well with New School students. In fact, the history of thought dimension of their work seems to be a significant asset for many parts of the academic job market, particularly liberal arts economics departments. On the other hand, my attachment to the “three-essay” format for Ph.D. theses earns some scorn from serious scholars on the ground that it deprives students of the opportunity to develop an interpretation of a major problem in depth.
Themes central to the history of economic thought continue to inform my own research agenda. In recent years I've written on the implications of Ricardian rent theory for economic growth with resource limitations such as the finite capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse gas emissions, the relation between Classical political economic conceptions of competition to contemporary complex systems theory, and a book presenting my version of the Theoretical Foundations of Economics course to a general audience [Foley, Reference Foley2006].
4 LARGER IMPLICATIONS
This is, of course, just the story of one person's intellectual odyssey, but it has larger implications.
4.1 History of Thought and Mainstream Economics
The context for my personal story has been the evolving attitude of mainstream economics to history of thought over my professional lifetime. I am aware that judgments in this area are controversial, and I put forward these remarks mainly as testimony about how this has looked to me.
Since the start of my career in economics in the mid-1960s, the position of history of economic thought in the mainstream graduate economics curriculum, never very prominent to begin with, has eroded steadily. In my experience economics has chronically undervalued history of thought as an intellectual project. The idea that history of thought is a subsidiary activity for economic theorists is encoded in trite jokes about major theorists doing history of thought in the twilights of their careers (or “too soon”). My own observation is that major theorists are not by any means universally gifted as historians of thought (any more than they are particularly gifted as philosophers of science), and that their work in this field is extremely uneven. The history of economic thought written by major theorists tends to be a “Whig” history which reads back the presumptions of current scholarship into the old texts. Thus we get an Adam Smith peddling notions of economic efficiency which there is no evidence the great Scot ever entertained, a David Ricardo focused on marginal product theories of rent and strangely oblivious to issues of social class, or a Karl Marx limiting theories of competition to a set of “core” issues in political economy suspiciously reminiscent of Piero Sraffa's separation of pricing and distribution.
The Cold War exacerbated this undervaluation of the history of economic thought because of the unwelcome political implications of much of Classical political economy. Leaving aside the case of Karl Marx, whose work was perhaps distorted equally on both sides of the Iron Curtain, Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo do not actually sit very well with visions of what Sam Bowles calls “utopian capitalism”. Despite the enthusiasm of at least Smith and Ricardo for nascent capitalism, the capitalist society they analyze is as much a machine for reproducing poverty, inequality, and class division as it is a mechanism for delivering technical change and wealth. Too much time spent on these texts would be bound to confuse graduate students of economics, and divert their energies away from their theorem-proving and number-crunching destiny.
Despite Paul Samuelson's many scholarly contributions to the history of economic thought, the larger effect of the “Cowles–M.I.T.” program on the sociology of economics as a discipline was to elevate mathematical and statistical modeling to the status of royal roads to the understanding of social phenomena. When this happens in a science, the history of the science tends to become, in Piero Sraffa's words, “submerged and forgotten”. After all, if we have reached a superior understanding of some phenomenon, the path we followed to get wherever we have arrived is of secondary interest. The establishment of a “consensus” view on disputed scientific questions like the effectiveness of free trade as an economic development strategy, the role of monetary policy in determining the price level, or the tendency of competition to eliminate racial and gender discrimination in labor markets, is much more exciting than picking over the often-ambiguous evidence as to how these ideas got formulated to begin with.
In fact, a certain degree of historical amnesia in a discipline like economics seems to have fitness value in the struggle for limited academic appointments. If a Ph.D. and publication in major journals require a thorough knowledge of only two or one decades’ worth of work in a field, students can achieve professional status that much faster; the field appears to Deans and appointment committees to be a miraculous producer of prodigies and stars compared to the stodgy performance of more traditional social science scholarship. The recycling of ideas, such as endogenous technical change in the “new” growth theory, power issues in the organization of labor processes, or the incompatibility of rational choice utility maximization with observed human social behavior, can take place more smoothly and with less embarrassment with a shorter collective memory.
How this works out in the day-to-day life of graduate departments is all-too-familiar. Very few students get interested in historical subjects to begin with. The path to becoming a graduate student in economics has become more difficult for students interested in history of thought. (David Colander has covered the story of the sea-change in the intellectual origins of economics graduate students over the past 40 years in depth [Colander, Reference Colander2007].) One-semester requirements in history of thought are not adequate to generate much intellectual energy to begin with, especially in students who have no background in this kind of critical thinking, and appear increasingly as a diversion from the all-important acquisition of more sophisticated mathematical and statistical tools. Furthermore, it becomes harder and harder to find anyone to teach these courses. After a while the requirement is watered down to the point of irrelevance, and the retiring part-time history of thought scholar is replaced by an experimental economist.
How much does this matter to the progress of the discipline and knowledge in the field? After all, physics and other natural sciences long ago went through this transformation. (It is interesting to me that the newer and most intellectually progressive sciences, like biology, retain a stronger tradition of major scholars writing on the history of ideas.) I confess I am far from convinced that physics is immune to the intellectual ills produced by historical amnesia. But it seems to me that neglect of its own history carries much more intellectual peril for a social science like economics.
What is this peril? The intellectual danger is that the consensus formed at any moment by the sociology of a discipline may be one-sided or just plain wrong. Physicists hope that a rigorous appeal to experimental verification of theoretical predictions can save them from these pathologies. But the philosophy of science has shown that even in a field like physics the path from theory to experiment is twisted and complex, so this reliance is far from fool-proof. In essence, it seems to locate the living judgment of the discipline in the good sense and historical awareness of the experimentalists, somewhat hidden away from the glare of professional debate.
History can help to protect disciplines from these difficulties in several ways. One of the big lessons of history is that scholars in the past often reached consensus conclusions with overwhelming confidence that look quite wrong from the perspective of the present. Ptolemaic astronomy is the paradigmatic case, but economics has many cautionary tales of its own, including, depending on the point of view of the present a scholar adopts, mercantilism, the labor theory of value, monetarism, Keynesianism, marginal product theories of distribution, capital aggregation, Walrasian contractibility, and perfect information market-clearing theories of allocation. Even a non-specialized understanding of the history of economic thought can help raise the skepticism quotient of economics as a science, which is no bad thing.
Reading the classic texts of economic thought exposes students to strong and quite persuasive arguments for and against whatever might be the dominant positions of any particular period. The refusal of even a minority of scholars to accept superficial or inadequate responses to these arguments can strengthen their resolve not to join consensus positions they question. Thus history of thought can contribute to the intellectual diversity of the economics profession. I am one of those who find appalling the reported agreement of huge majorities of professional economists with consensus positions on controversial and complex issues like minimum wages, price control, trade restrictions, industrial policy, and the like. In this respect a more diverse profession would be an intellectually stronger profession, and the history of thought, in my view, is one path to reproducing diversity. Historically-based skepticism is my personal favorite antidote to the “autism” recently diagnosed in some strains of economics.
A stronger shared education in the history of economic thought might also help an intellectually more diverse economics profession function collegially without feeling the need for witch hunts to exclude scholars with opinions that appear deviant at any particular moment to some constituency with a majority in the executive committee of a Department. For one thing, it might provide scholars a better understanding, just in terms of vocabulary, of the thinking of other schools of economics. The blank stares I provoke in some circles when I mention the rate of exploitation or the average rate of profit are matched only by the systematic misunderstanding in other circles of just what economic efficiency is and what the relation between the marginal product of labor and the wage typically is in capitalist economies. The opinions that divide the schools of economics are less incompatible than they seem when everyone expresses their ideas in their own hermetic terms. Breaking down semantic barriers that unnecessarily polarize intellectual debate is a noble (if also quixotic) mission for the history of economic thought.
4.2 Reproduction of History of Economic Thought Scholarship
The great survival advantage of history of economic thought is the constantly renewed thirst for it on the part of graduate students and younger scholars. (I occasionally receive poignant emails from students who characterize themselves as trapped in mainstream departments wondering about the possibilities of transferring to the New School, which in fact is not an easy move to make.) There is a felt need for historical and critical perspective on economics. But how, given the powerful inertial forces I have just described that tend to marginalize history of economic thought in the graduate curriculum, is the field to reproduce itself as a serious and focused scholarly enterprise?
My own history underlines both the importance of the history of economic thought for the intellectual development of an economist, and the limitations of depending on people like me, who have a strong interest in some facets of the history of thought, but no systematic training in it, to reproduce the field. This problem is somewhat parallel to the situation in fields like classics and philosophy, which make a big contribution to the general education of undergraduate students, but have to reproduce themselves through specialized research and advanced scholarship. Exciting as encounters with the towering figures of Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, and Keynes can be, the history of thought and methodology cannot depend on them exclusively as the material for advanced research projects and Ph.D. theses. As in any scholarly field, a serious attempt to understand the high points of the discipline succeeds only when it is firmly grounded in wide and deep research into the lives and thoughts of secondary figures to establish the context in which major advances have occurred.
It seems to me that it is not viable for the profession as a whole to free-ride on the stubborn commitment of a few distinguished Departments to maintain a critical concentration of scholars to support specialized training in the history of economic thought. Given my own experience this problem appears to be an aspect of the growing gulf, which Dave Colander has done a lot to identify, between the research- and Ph.D. student-oriented elite Departments and the rest of academic economics. As the elite Departments focus more and more attention on “placing” their students with each other, it becomes harder and harder for undergraduate-oriented or general-education oriented Departments to find well-trained teachers with, among other skills, the ability to teach history of economic thought.
In this context, it would be constructive to organize an ongoing summer school where Ph.D. students could take history of economic thought courses at both an introductory and specialized seminar level for credit to supplement the offerings of their own institutions.
In the case of other disciplines such as physics, serious critical work in the history of ideas has tended to migrate to Departments of Philosophy and History of Science. This tendency certainly has the advantage of providing a context where the study of the history of ideas is the center of ongoing scholarly effort. The disadvantage of this arrangement is that it makes it harder for students to become aware of the work that is being done in the history of the field, and easier for practitioners in the field to substitute their own amateur efforts for it, or ignore it entirely. It also seems to me that the resources available to support studies in the history and philosophy of science are not adequate to the need we have to integrate our understanding of the bewildering array of results modern science generates. This is just as acute an issue for economics as it is for other disciplines.
5 PRESSING FORWARD
It is tempting to become discouraged when surveying the landscape of academic economics. One bright spot is that is no more discouraging now than it was thirty years ago, and perhaps in some ways a bit better. The monolithic hegemony of general equilibrium theory has given way to a much more methodologically eclectic profile of economics research and education. The forays of psychologists, physicists, and sociologists into the heartland of rational-choice economics have worked something of an intellectual transformation in the field.
For my personal taste, however, this welcome intellectual diversity has unhappily coincided with something of an eclipse of traditionally central “big concerns” of economics: the future of capitalism in terms of class, distribution, social relations, and uneven development. It happens that these questions are at the center of the core texts of Classical political economy and thus inescapable aspects of the history of economic thought. So there is another (possibly quixotic) mission for the history of economic thought in keeping these central questions alive and marshaling scholarly energy to address them.
As I have said, I believe there is a constituency within and outside the economics profession for the history of economic thought. It may not be the majority of the profession, but it shows no signs of disappearing altogether. I'd like to end this talk with some words of appreciation and warm encouragement to you for your efforts in keeping this beautiful and fertile discussion in play.
