Examining Part Two of Kant's late Conflict of the Faculties (1798) (henceforth Conflict), John Zammito finds Kant “bending over backwards to accommodate ‘enlightened’ autocracy.”Footnote 1 Zammito quotes what he takes to be a damning passage that clearly displays Kant's supine posture. “The best way of making a nation content with its constitution is to rule autocratically and at the same time to govern in a republican manner, i.e. to govern in the spirit of republicanism and by analogy with it.”Footnote 2 Zammito judges absolutist Prussia governing in a republican manner to be far from adequate as a philosophical ideal for politics.
Deeming Kant's position unsatisfactory, Zammito identifies no resources for rendering it coherent, plausible, or worth defending. If Conflict fails to meet Kant's critical standards politically, predominant interpretations judge it a failure epistemically. Pauline Kleingeld claims it is inconsistent at best, dogmatic at worst.Footnote 3 Elisabeth Ellis argues that Kant oversteps his own strict epistemic distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal, rendering his epistemological argument “impossible on the face of it, by Kantian lights.”Footnote 4 Zammito calls it “a distinct failure”Footnote 5 and leaves it “to more creative exponents of Kant to explain how this [republican autocracy] is ‘best.’”Footnote 6
In this article, I attempt just that. My “more creative” interpretation is that Kant's strategy is not to pander to but to criticize enlightened autocracy and to admonish it to reform itself. Instead of bending over backwards to accommodate absolute monarchy, Kant is urging that very monarchy to rule differently. He does this by labeling the Prussian state absolutist, informing it that the values of the French Revolution—the dignity of the individual as citizen, no longer a subject—are on the rise and will inevitably win out. These values will not only inevitably be realized in the world, their realization can, in fact, be predicted and known with certainty. Kant's “recommendation” to the Prussian crown, then, is that it rule in a republican manner lest it be “reformed” by revolt from below rather than reform from above. My interpretation provides a certain picture of the overall function and movement of Kant's argument. Its success turns not on the consistency of Kant's epistemic claims, which commentators view as incoherent, un-Kantian even, as noted above. It turns instead on whether my alternative view is compelling in light of such obvious inconsistencies on Kant's part. An important component of my interpretation is the publication history of Conflict and Kant's relationship to the censors. This history reveals Kant to be politically active and to have put himself and his career at great risk to circumvent the censors in order to publish a text explicitly criticizing the state. My interpretation shows a Kant who is not pandering or bending over backwards and is, indeed, a more creative way to render autocratic republicanism “best.”
Zammito finds Kant's position about absolutist republican governance so problematic because he is reading Kant's argument in the wrong register. Throughout, I read Kant's text politically, in three senses of that term. First, I read the substance of the argument of Conflict as political in nature. Second, I read Kant's mode of argumentation as politics-first, not ethics-first. Third, I read the very publication of Kant's text as a political act. All three senses of the term interrelate to form the argumentative thrust of Conflict, revealing a text which is far more politically subversive than Zammito recognizes.
This article begins with a discussion of Kant's repeated censorship by the Prussian state and his efforts to circumvent it. The publication history of these texts reveals Kant to be a political actor, fighting for freedom of the pen. Particularly significant for this article's argument are Kant's efforts to publish on matters of the state. I then provide my “more creative” exposition of Conflict, reconstructing Kant's political argument and showing how he might have found republican autocracy to be best. I go on to demonstrate that Conflict finds Kant revisiting an argument against the state leveled earlier in “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” Establishing this argumentative precedent supports my interpretation of the political argument of Conflict. I conclude by considering the timeliness of Kant's argument—his use of the French Revolution in 1798, for example—and whether Kant was correct in his prognostications regarding the philosophy of history.
1. Kant and the Censors
Conflict examines the role of the faculty of philosophy within the university, as distinguished from the faculties of theology, law, and medicine. The latter three are the so-called higher faculties of the university in Kant's time. They are “higher” because of their relation to the state. They serve the interests of the government, are useful to it, and are therefore also censored by it. The lower faculty, philosophy, does not serve the state and its interests, but only the interests of science.Footnote 7 Taking a jab at the state's division between higher and lower—written in a mocking voice, I take it, from the point of view of the state—Kant notes, “The reason why this faculty [philosophy], despite its great prerogative (freedom), is called the lower faculty lies in human nature; for a human being who can give commands, even though he is someone else's humble servant, is considered more distinguished than a free man who has no one under his command.”Footnote 8 The state values the higher faculty more because it is under the state's control; philosophy is inferior because it is not.
Not only were the higher faculties subject to censorship by the state; so was any text that dealt with their respective topics. Where Frederick the Great had been rather lax regarding the ability to publish on religion,Footnote 9 his successor reasserted the royal prerogative. In 1788 Frederick William II issued a cabinet order lamenting that “press freedom has degenerated into press impudence, and the book censors have fallen completely asleep.”Footnote 10 With the new king's clampdown, it was only a matter of time before Kant found himself in trouble.
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) consists of four parts, each of which was composed as a stand-alone essay later compiled by Kant. In April 1792 Kant publishes Part I, “Concerning Radical Evil,” in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. He wanted to publish what became Part II, “On the Struggle of the Good Principle with the Evil Principle for Sovereignty over Man” (June 1792), but it was denied by the censors.Footnote 11 Not wanting his work to be rejected in this way, Kant worked to avoid them entirely. Deans of faculties at universities had the right to publish without going through the official censors. So Kant submitted Religion to the theology faculty at Berlin, which decided the work was philosophical, not theological; Kant then sent the manuscript to the philosophy faculty at Jena, which approved it for publication.Footnote 12
Since Religion Part II had already been rejected by the censors, Kant's sidestepping to publish Religion infuriated them.Footnote 13 In October 1794, he was issued a notice by King Frederick William II's censor, Christoph Wöllner.Footnote 14 It (in)famously warned Kant not to publish on religion again and requested a public apology. Kant did apologize; and because he includes his response to Wöllner in the Preface of Conflict, we know that Kant promises the king not to publish on religion again, declaring “solemnly, as Your Majesty's most loyal subject, that I will hereafter refrain altogether from discoursing publicly, in lectures or writings, on religion, whether natural or revealed” ([7:10] 242).
After promising not to publish on religion, Kant had to hold on to some texts he had written on the topic. One is Part One of Conflict, on the dispute between philosophical and theological faculties, written some time between June and November 1794.Footnote 15 Kant held off publishing this. He submitted Part Two of Conflict for publication as a stand-alone essay to Berliner Blätter, but it too was rejected by the censors.Footnote 16 One can imagine the dismay the publication of Conflict might have engendered, with its first part explicitly discussing religion, if only via the theology faculty, and its second part having already been denied publication by the censors; this repeats the publication history of Religion. A footnote to Kant's declaration to Frederick William II comments that “this expression, too”—of speaking directly and only as a loyal subject of “Your Majesty”—was chosen rather deliberately, “so that I would not renounce my freedom to judge in this religious suit forever, but only during His Majesty's lifetime” ([7:10n] 242n). Kant had not promised not to publish on religion forever, since he made no such promise to Frederick William III. Kant's relation to the censors played out, then, not only in the publication history of his texts, but is explicitly at issue within them. This doubling of life and textual argument sets the stage for understanding both Conflict's political argument and its status as a political act, for not only does Conflict advance a criticism of the state, its very publication is one.
2. A “More Creative” Exposition of Conflict
The title of Zammito's essay plays on the fact that Conflict, Part Two, bears two titles. The first title is “Second Part: The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Faculty of Law.” Its second is, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?”Footnote 17 The first situates Kant's essay within the framework of the overall conflicts of philosophy with the higher faculties of the university. Lawyers, as servants of the state, take the law as it is and do not challenge it. Philosophers, however, as Kant construes them, adopt a more reflective point of view, analyzing the very possibility of law and whether law in general and any specific law might be just.Footnote 18 Broadly speaking, then, the battleground of that dispute is between what is and what ought to be. Zammito argues that Kant does not make good on the promise of his first title to discuss a dispute between philosophy and law. He takes Kant's second title to be the “true” one.Footnote 19 Kant does, however, make good on the promise of the text's first title and it provides an important clue on how to read the text as a whole. The content of the argument of Conflict, Part Two, itself serves Kant's point that philosophers should have a right to critique the state—to criticize what is from the point of view of what ought to be.
If Part Two's point is to critique existent law from an ideal point of view, it would seem there is something to Zammito's point: How could enlightened autocracy be best from the point of view of ideal theory? Kant's text exhibits a peculiar strategy. It inhabits a conceptual space closer to nonideal theory than transcendental critique. Kant at once accepts the political conditions of his time while also adopting an ideal, transcendental political standard to guide the overall endeavor of political reform. In the phraseology of Raymond Geuss, Conflict is a politics-first, realist work of politics, not an ethics-first text.Footnote 20 In the latter approach, a political philosopher begins by providing a conception of and parameters for a centrally important political ideal, such as justice. Conception of justice in hand, the philosopher turns to imagining a just polity. Whether an actual state could be created along such lines or an existing state could be modified to resemble it more closely is of secondary concern.
Kant is often read as an ethics-first theorist. As noted above, he seems to have imagined an unlikely global political arrangement, especially for authoritarian Prussia. For a politics-first theorist, by contrast, the starting point of political theory is existing political conditions. Characterizing Kant simply as an ethics-first philosopher is a simplification. He quite carefully spells out that he aims for his ideal to be achieved only slowly from the top down. It relies on autocrats for its realization. Aspersions, such as Zammito's, that Kant is un-Kantian fail to appreciate the politics-first, realist element of Kant's thinking on politics. Indeed, there is a growing trend for scholars to read him as a nonideal theorist. Onora O'Neill notes that Kant, in his philosophy of history, “is idealist about the aims but realist about the means”;Footnote 21 while Loren Goldman attempts to blur the distinction between idealism and realism in Kant's philosophy of history.Footnote 22 Dilek Huseyinzadegan has reconstructed what she rightly calls Kant's nonideal theory of politics.Footnote 23 I add to this body of work and expand its scope. I rectify the neglect of Conflict but, more importantly, show how Conflict is not only political in content but should be read as a form of political activism, where Kant challenges the absolutist mode of governing, going to war, and censorship.
Kant's essay consists of ten sections and a conclusion. Pauline Kleingeld has helpfully divided it into a series of subarguments: prolegomena (§§1–4); an answer to the question raised in the title (§§5–7); an interlude on the philosophy of right (§8); the result of progress to be expected (§9); and a discussion of the conditions of the possibility of progress (§10). After §7 Kleingeld seems to think the text loses focus, since she is no longer able to account for the sections’ discussions as a set of movements in a single argument, treating them instead as detachable discussions with individual goals.Footnote 24
The prolegomena treat the question of progress, beginning by asking what we want to know (§1), followed by how we can know it (§2). Kant's vision of history orients itself toward the future, aiming to secure a kind of history that can be predictive.Footnote 25 Kant entertains and discards three modes of representing such a history: things can get worse,Footnote 26 better,Footnote 27 or stay the same.Footnote 28 Because future history concerns itself with what humans will do, and humans are free, we cannot predict (vorhersagen) or foresee (vorhergesagen) how they will act with certainty. Kant thinks, however, that if we could “attribute to the human being an inherent and unalterably good, albeit limited, will,” then we could “predict with certainty the progress of his species toward the better.” This is because “it would concern an occurrence that he himself could produce” ([7:83–84] 300). In short, although human freedom should yield predictive uncertainty, Kant nevertheless thinks that if he can identify a good will in humanity he could at least predict moral improvement with certainty. It could be predicted because humans themselves would bring it about.
Kant claims the problem of progress is not to be resolved directly through experience.Footnote 29 This makes sense within the framework of hypothetically accepting a predisposition toward the good in humanity. Despite this claim, however, Kant does connect his predictive history to “some experience.” Since he thinks that if a good will can be attributed to humanity, progress can be secured, he makes room for the identification of such a good predisposition via an event which “points to” such a disposition. Furthermore, such an event would be the result of human action and, therefore, humanity can properly be considered its cause. If humanity is the cause of an event that reveals a good will, humans have a moral tendency. Therefore, Kant thinks the appropriate task is to find such an event “as an intimation, a historical sign” ([7:84] 301).
Perhaps a “little too fortunately for his argument,” Kant finds such a sign in the observers (Zuschauern) of the French Revolution.Footnote 30 Although the “occurrence in our time” is not momentous deeds or crimes, the event that in fact shows that history can be viewed as progressive and humans as having a good will is the universal yet disinterested or unselfish (uneigennützige) sympathy of the spectators of the Revolution. Of course, unlike revolution itself, observing and sympathizing with the values of the Revolution and what it symbolizes for political modernity is not a crime, nor is it violent. Because the sympathy of revolutionary observers is universal Kant thinks we can derive a general claim about humanity from it.Footnote 31 Because the sympathy is unselfish, it can be used as evidence about the moral character or predisposition of humanity. Kant thinks the evidence is as follows. First, concerning right, that people think they ought to self-govern and make their own constitution and, second, concerning the end, that the constitution “be just and morally good in itself.” Furthermore, the constitution should be “created in such a way as to avoid, by its very nature, principles permitting offensive war.” The constitution a people would establish “can be no other than a republican constitution. . . . It thus establishes the condition whereby war (the source of all evil and corruption of morals) is deterred” ([7:85–86] 302).Footnote 32 Note just how political Kant's evidence of a moral predisposition is. War is the source of evil and moral corruption. Thinking that the people ought to establish a republican constitution is evidence of a morally good predisposition. Kant's larger political argument is already coming into view. Although his philosophy of future history wanted to establish moral progress with certainty through evidence of a morally good predisposition, it is in the sympathetic observation of a certain set of modern political values that Kant secures such a historiography. I do not mean to suggest that he does not care about moral progress or that it is a ruse in his argument; instead, focusing on moral progress often distracts from its specific role in Kant's political argument and, therefore, the greater political argument itself is overlooked.Footnote 33
Historical sign in hand, Kant predicts, “even without prophetic insight,” that humanity will progress. Over time all peoples and governments will be(come) republican, which entails the respect of individual autonomy and the elimination of war because the republican constitution “cannot be bellicose” ([7:88] 304). No people would will itself to go to war, unlike a monarch willing his subjects to go to war. The French Revolution awakens in all its spectators the view not only that the ancien régime must go, but that all individuals have worth and ought themselves to be participants in rule. Strangely perhaps, Kant cautions about the timeline of such political progress: “so far as time is concerned, it can promise this only indefinitely and as a contingent occurrence.” In fact, if one considers “the whole scope of all the peoples on earth who will gradually come to participate in progress, this reveals the prospect of an immeasurable time” ([7:89] 304–5).Footnote 34 In case his readers were about to give up on self-rule in their lifetime, Kant warns his royal audience that they no longer are entitled to treat their subjects as a trifle. Although humans, from the perspective of nature, are nothing “but a trifle,” absolute monarchs do not have the right to treat humans as such. To treat humans as though they are expendable is “a subversion of the final end of creation itself,” humanity ([7:89] 305).Footnote 35
If §§5–7 concern Kant's answer to the question of his subtitle regarding human betterment, it would seem his work is done. Indeed, as noted above, Kleingeld finds little argumentative link between that argument and the subsequent discussions. I stress their unity, however. Section 7 ends with Kant identifying a set of political ends that absolute monarchs ought not violate. The next move is to define absolute monarchy. It is hard not to see the unity of his argument moving from §7 to §8 since he is concerned in both sections with absolute governance, whether imposing a normative constraint on it or defining it. Furthermore, not only does §7 cohere with its preceding argument, §§8–10 form a unified argumentative set.
Section 8, “Concerning the Difficulty of the Maxims Applying to World Progress with Regard to their Publicity,” concerns not one difficulty but two. One, concerning the difficulty of publicity, is the very difficulty Kant faced in publishing his argument. The second difficulty is perhaps why Kant's “maxims” regarding world progress faced censorship to begin with; namely, his argument about the certain inevitability of progress from subject to citizen is a difficult pill for the crown to swallow. Elucidating the difficulty of publicity, Kant defines the enlightenment of the people as “the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis-à-vis the state to which they belong” ([7:89] 305). Although this public instruction is with respect to the state, it is clear that Kant is playing on the idea of Conflict as a whole. As a philosopher (of law) he is castigated by the crown as an “enlightener” even though he here tries to show what duties and rights individuals have to the state. Indeed, the harvest of progress will be more obedient, law-abiding citizens ([7:91] 307). Where the crown might take Kant to be attempting to subvert its authority and incite revolt, Kant pays deference to it by defining enlightenment of the people vis-à-vis that state's authority. Kant simultaneously subverts his deference in concluding, too, that philosophers ought to be able to philosophize about the state—to publish criticisms of it, even—and that doing so is necessary for progress.Footnote 36 Thus, Kant takes up the issue of censorship that animated Part One of Conflict, and Part Two is itself a criticism of the state that contains within it a justification of that act.Footnote 37
The maxim applying to world progress is that all states, including absolute monarchies, have a provisional duty to govern in a republican manner. Kant distinguishes between absolute and limited monarchies. An absolute monarch has the unlimited capacity to send his subjects to war.Footnote 38 A limited monarch must first “consult the people,” and if “the people say, ‘there is to be no war,’ so there is no war.” For Kant, the ability to go to war is an absolute power of the sovereign, so if an absolute monarch is sovereign, war cannot be prevented, but if the people are sovereign war would never be willed, since the people would be sending themselves to the battlefield ([7:90n] 306n).Footnote 39 In addition to distinguishing between absolute and limited monarchs, and clearly favoring the latter, Kant distinguishes actual from ideal states, also favoring the latter—or, conformity to the latter as much as is possible. There is “a Platonic ideal (respublica noumenon)” which is “the eternal norm for all civil organization in general, and averts all war” and actual states, versions of a “respublica phenomenon” ([7:91] 306).Footnote 40 To arrive at the mechanism of actual states transitioning slowly toward the noumenal republic, Kant relies on his distinction between constitution (“political form”) and governance (“manner of governing”) ([7:88] 304).Footnote 41 Even if the Prussian absolutist state does not adopt a republican constitution and modify the structure of the state itself it can still govern in a republican manner. The Prussian state, as Kant puts it more strongly, not only could govern in a republican manner, it has a provisional duty to do so ([7:91] 306).
If we have certain evidence via an event in history that humanity is improving morally, what can be expected is not individuals acting out of duty toward the moral law but more lawful subjects of the state.Footnote 42 We can expect more obedient citizens or, in Kantian terms, “an increase of the products of legality in dutiful actions whatever their motive” ([7:91] 307). What I want to focus on is why Kant might have privileged the political or legal over the moral, because it bears on the unity of Kant's argument throughout his text. I noted above that Kant's depiction of evidence of a moral predisposition is couched not only in highly political terms but also in political ends and with a political event as evidence of that disposition: the ideals of free citizens, the elimination of war, sympathizing with the French Revolution. In retrospect we can see his earlier “moral” argument regarding progress as having always been working toward the more overtly political argument that concludes the essay. Kant, furthermore, appeals to his royal audience in guaranteeing them increased obedience to the law. He is certain that humanity is capable of improvement, and that improvement is increased obedience to the state and its laws.
Seeking further approval for the eventual realization of republican governance, Kant tasks the absolutist state with political progress by arguing that progress is to be expected from the top down ([7:92n] 307n, [7:93] 308).Footnote 43 Revolt and revolution are not the modes of reform advocated in Conflict.Footnote 44 Rather, the state should reform itself. Kant thus addresses his Prussian state audience on two levels. First, he protects himself from the potential charge of inciting revolt; second, he urges the Prussian state to reform itself, (at least) to govern in a republican manner and to begin the slow process of making war more humane, going to war less often, and ultimately to “renounce” it “altogether.” Once the state eliminates war it then should adopt a republican constitution. Given Kant's evidence of progress—sympathetic observation of the French Revolution—when he writes that “it might well behoove the state” to reform itself, he is warning of what might occur if it does not reform itself; Kant cautions the state to evolve instead of face a revolution ([7:93] 308).Footnote 45 In a draft of Conflict, Part Two, this intent is clear: “But considering that those in power who are rational now already realize that it [republican government] is unpreventable and also in accordance with right, one can predict that these rulers will voluntarily arrange it by themselves.”Footnote 46 Kant is not advocating revolution or inciting revolt, he is predicting the inevitability of subjects’ discontent with an absolute monarch who has a large, and growing, standing army.Footnote 47
Where Kleingeld finds §§8–10 to have a wholly different character from the rest of Kant's essay, I find them forming a coherent whole with its overall argument. Sections 1–7 constitute one set of pragmatic reasons for state reform (certain knowledge of the ascendancy of the values and demands of the French Revolution) and §§8–10 provide another (the state will observe better citizens and can forestall or prevent revolution). The former set of pragmatic considerations play an important role, furthermore, in motivating the conclusions regarding state evolution in the latter. My interpretation finds a unitary argument in Kant's discussion in §§8–10 and fits that argument within a framework of the argument of Conflict as a whole.
As we have seen, the predominant interpretations of Conflict note in one way or another its epistemic shortcomings. Although Kant claims to establish knowledge of human progress with certainty, he is entitled only to a regulative ideal, since he relies on observance of an empirical sign or effect. Efforts to make Kant's epistemic claims consistent,Footnote 48 to condemn them as inconsistent,Footnote 49 or to dismiss them as insignificant to the real argument of Kant's essayFootnote 50 all lack an account of how he failed to notice the inconsistencies.Footnote 51 If the epistemic claims of the essay so obviously violate the standards set by Kant's very own critical philosophy, why didn't Kant himself notice this fact? Instead of judging Kant's epistemic claims against the standards of the critical philosophy, we should ask why Kant thinks he needs epistemic certainty. If he made these epistemic claims for a nonepistemic (i.e., political) purpose, then we might be able to account for him hurrying through the epistemic arguments of the essay. I submit that Kant wants epistemic certainty because it provides stronger reasons for the Prussian state to reform itself. If progress is inevitable, and construed as the slow elimination of war and increase of republican governance, and we know it is inevitable, the Prussian state might have strong reasons to reform itself instead of being swept up in a violent current of history.
Zammito reads Kant as an ethics-first philosopher of ideal theory, whereas if we read Kant as a politics-first philosopher, we can see that his text is an indictment of the absolutist Prussian state and its large, standing army. Although Kant defends republican autocracy as the best possible available option, he is far from bending over backwards to accommodate absolutist Prussia when he urges that very monarchy to rule differently. Part of Zammito's interpretive oversight, then, is to understand what Kant calls “best” in a superlative vacuum, without identifying what republican absolutism is better than. In Conflict, Part Two, Kant adopts a far more politically sensitive understanding of the term, taking “best” as the superlative only within a restricted set of options. An absolute monarch governing in a republican manner quite clearly is better than absolutism as such. In this context the former is “best.”Footnote 52 This is the register in which to read Kant's claim.Footnote 53 His text inhabits its present moment while also critiquing it. This is one reason Kant might have chosen the observation of the French Revolution as the historical sign of progress, as well as why he distinguishes between limited and absolute monarchy. He is both classifying the Prussian state as absolutist and revealing to it that subjects of the state are no longer content to be subjects. The ancien régime is on the way out, and the absolutist state should govern in a republican manner or it too will be faced with revolution—though not at Kant's incitement nor with his approval.Footnote 54
Kant did eventually, even despite initial censorship, publish his criticisms of the state; and this despite the threat of severe penalties for doing so since Conflict was initially viewed as a violation of his promise not to publish on religion. This suggests a further unity with the broader argument of Conflict and its publication as a political act since Part Two's having been denied publication by the censors suggests that it was in fact taken as a threatening and subversive political tract by his initial audience. Kant's argument regarding publicity and censorship—that philosophers ought to have the freedom to publish since they are servants of science and not of the state—applies to the very text in which he argues for the freedom to publish a criticism of the state.
3. Conflict and Enlightenment, an Argumentative Precedent
As I have shown, the publication of Conflict reflects its substantive argument: Kant publishes a text in which he criticizes the state while also arguing that philosophers ought to be able to publish criticisms of the state. He had already discussed the broad contours of a public allowed by the crown to publish ideas freely—even criticisms of the state—in his 1784 essay An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (henceforth Enlightenment). This occasional essay is significant because of the ways its argument is congruent with my reading of Conflict. The two texts in many ways are argumentative and textual complements. Focusing nearly exclusively on Enlightenment, Robert S. Taylor similarly argues that Kant thinks enlightened absolutism not only ought to reform itself but that this is a necessary stage of nonideal politics on the way toward Kant's republican ideal. Kant's “support for enlightened absolutism was sincere,” though Kant “believed that such rule was enlightened insofar as it was ultimately self-extinguishing, a process made possible by the myopic self-interest of the monarch.”Footnote 55 My argument is largely consonant with Taylor's, extending it to Conflict and Kant's specific view of absolutism as best in that text. Although Enlightenment might read like an uncontroversial, light-hearted piece, it is actually a rather serious political criticism that, as John Christian Laursen has pointed out, “undermined absolutism and the conceptual tools of the lawyers who defended it.”Footnote 56 Kant praises Frederick the Great for enabling the freedom of the pen in the cultivation of an age of enlightenment as, in the same stroke of the pen, he criticizes his standing army and extended military campaigns. Indeed, Enlightenment's concluding paragraph finds Kant addressing his royal audience, as he does in Conflict, out of both sides of his mouth. On one side, he speaks rather deferentially; through the other Kant levels a subversive argument, issuing harsh judgment of Frederick the Great. As Ellis notes about Conflict, Kant's arguments function similarly to Machiavelli's version of the mirror-of-princes genre, since he “demonstrates the weaknesses of those in power while ostensibly pandering to their interests.”Footnote 57 There are parallel forms of “Machiavellian” argument in Conflict and Enlightenment.
Frederick the Great often characterized the state as a machine. This would then become an image with which to criticize the state's treatment of its people as cogs in such a machine. Critics would attack the absolutist state “to stigmatize it, in a constantly repeated phrase, as a ‘mechanischer Staat’ or a ‘Maschinenstaat’—a state in which people were treated as cogs in a machine.”Footnote 58 In the last paragraph of Enlightenment Kant calls Frederick the Great “himself enlightened,” while simultaneously calling attention to his “well-disciplined and numerous army.” Kant continues that freedom of thought will “eventually even [have an impact] upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity” ([8:41–42] 22).
The concluding thought of Enlightenment, then, is Kant's “request” to the ruler no longer to go to war. Frederick was well known for prioritizing the military. One of his ministers, von Schrötter commented that what distinguishes Prussia from other European nations is that other countries are a people with an army but Prussia is “an army with a country.”Footnote 59 In one of his Testaments Frederick argued that foreign affairs (military campaigns) were “the sole task of the sovereign to decide about the ‘vital interests of the state,’ that is, to decide when to wage war and with whom.”Footnote 60 By the time Frederick assumed the throne in 1740 the Prussian army had 83,000 soldiers and there were twelve campaigns during his rule.Footnote 61 He invaded Austria taking Silesia in 1740, itself a violation of international law; in 1756 he invaded neutral Saxony without declaring war; he probably initiated the first partition of Poland in 1772, which continued until 1795 with the final partition of Poland.Footnote 62 Kant thus observed Frederick the Great's large standing army being pressed into service. Enlightenment's conclusion suggests its purpose is not only to advocate for the “freedom of speech” as it were, that “as a scholar” one ought to be able to criticize the government and its actions and to recommend an institutional alternative; the conclusion shows that Kant does just that within the very essay he argues he should be able to do it. Even though Kant “praises” Frederick as “enlightened,” he is actually criticizing him for being war hungry, for the abuse of his subjects as cogs in the state's war machine.
Georg Cavallar draws out Kant's critical attitude toward Frederick, rightly noting that Kant's judgment “seems positive or ambivalent, but upon close analysis is ultimately negative” and that in the 1790s Kant “is particularly critical about Frederick.” Kant condemned “the Frederick of military aggression and of wars, the Frederick who constantly violates international law.”Footnote 63 For Cavallar, however, Kant's criticisms are restricted to the 1790s. Cavallar's Kant has a “short-lived love-affair” with Frederick the Great, a sort of “gentlemen's agreement” regarding the freedom of the pen both autocrat and scholar seem to be content with in the 1780s.Footnote 64 Kant was in fact critical of Frederick II the whole time. There is ample evidence within Enlightenment to show that already in 1784 Kant condemned Frederick's military campaigns and his blatant disregard for the dignity of his subjects in sending them to war. Indeed, if Kant praises his gentlemen's agreement with Frederick in Enlightenment he simultaneously mocks it. As noted above, Frederick was rather lenient when it came to publications on religion. Thus in Enlightenment Kant's examples are predominantly religious. Once he points this out, however, he turns immediately to politics ([8:41] 21), a topic Frederick II was not particularly keen on subjects discussing.Footnote 65 Kant seems to pose a sort of challenge or what Ciaran Cronin calls a “tactful exhortation” to the Philosopher King to expand religious liberties to the topic of politics.Footnote 66
Kant's distinction between the private and public use of one's reason in Enlightenment helps to show a further congruity between it and Conflict. “Private” means something like “falling under the purview of the state” or one's use of reason “as a servant of the state.” Because private reason is a thought process in the service of the state, it can be regulated and censored by the state. The “public use of one's reason” is the ability to think and publish freely as a scholar, addressing the world of readers or “the public.”Footnote 67 Where Kant thinks that reason's private use can be restricted without hindering enlightenment, this is not the case with its public use ([8:37] 18). Conflict relies on this very private/public distinction to justify the freedom of philosophers as scholars, serving the interests only of science and not of the state, as discussed above. Furthermore, since Kant denies a right to resist the state and citizens cannot rebel if they think the state has harmed them or violated an implicit contract with them, citizens must at the very least have some means of informing their ruler of what they take to be his violations. Rulers must allow citizens to publish criticisms of the state.
Kant exhibits, then, a similar argument and a similar mode of argumentation in Enlightenment and Conflict, Part Two.Footnote 68 This suggests both that Enlightenment is more concerned with criticizing Frederick the Great than with pandering to him—as the essay is often read—and shows a precedent in Kant's thought for the argument and argumentative structure of Conflict, as I read it. This might lend weight to my reading of Conflict—now construed as an argumentative repetition or second attempt—while also suggesting an interpretation of Enlightenment that shows it to be a more subversive document than commonly thought. I acknowledge the hermeneutic circle at play in my reading of the two works. In order for my reading of Enlightenment to lend weight to my reading of Conflict, one must already accept my reading of Conflict, and vice versa. However, if one does accept the general interpretation, there is some significance to the fact that Kant should repeat such an argumentative form. In this case, argumentative precedent ought to be stressed over interpretive circularity.
4. Conclusion: Judging Conflict
Given his view that there can be no right to revolution, but that philosophers ought to be able to publish criticisms of the state, Kant's view of political activity might, ironically, be aligned with the idealized self-conception of Frederick II's: “Argue as much as you will and about whatever you will, but obey!” ([8:36] 18). If so, it is all too easy now to judge Kant's view as securing very little politically. The restrictive and dangerous publishing environment in his Prussia reveals just how bold his position was, and how intrepid he was as a person and a scholar. Indeed, Kant twice circumvented the censors to publish essays that had already been denied publication. In the case of Conflict, it is within the very text that had been denied publication that Kant argues he ought to be able to publish freely; a right Kant did not actually have, yet exercised.
If Kant was bold to identify sympathetic observation of the French Revolution as a historical sign of progress in the pages of Conflict, his well-known personal advocacy of the progress that the Revolution represented showed how intrepid Kant was, too, in advancing the Revolution's enlightened principles. “There was a time in Königsberg when everyone who judged mildly, and not even with approval, was called a Jacobin and was blacklisted.” Kant, however, “was not deterred by this to speak at noble tables for the goals of the revolution, and they had so much respect for the man that they did not hold his views against him.”Footnote 69
If the terror had led to waning enthusiasm for the Revolution already in 1793, Kant's use of the French Revolution's values in Conflict in 1798 would have been woefully outdated. The Revolution had largely been out of fashion and, as Frederick Beiser puts it, “sadly, the aging Kant had grown out of touch with history.”Footnote 70 Though possibly out of touch with history in his own time, he was right about the Revolution's values and their inevitable ascendancy. What might have read then as not merely an outdated but an obviously problematic sign of history reads today as one of the more obvious signs of history to which to turn. Kant not only assigns a certain “world-historical” significance to the values represented by the French Revolution, he stresses the significance of their realization in the “hearts and minds” of nonruling subjects. About this Kant was certainly right . . . eventually. In the more proximate context of his argument, however, the Hollenzollern family could either rule in a republican manner or dissolve the monarchy in place of a constitutional state, or it would happen for them eventually. In the long term Prussia eventually would become republican. In the short term, however, Kant's prognosis was not to be. In 1806, less than a decade after the publication of Conflict, Frederick William III acceded to Napoleon.
Interpreters have generally judged the argument of Conflict to have failed epistemically as a defense of progress in the philosophy of history. I have shown that whether Kant has earned the epistemic certainty he claims has no bearing on the success of Kant's argument regarding the philosophy of history. My interpretation stresses instead the political purposes of Conflict in its content, its method, and as a form of activism. It accounts for why Kant thinks he needs certainty (setting aside the question whether he is entitled to it). It gives his argument regarding reform from above greater urgency—it even takes on the tone of a threat. My interpretation shows Kant's text to contain a greater unity and coherence than previously thought. It shows a politically engaged Kant who puts his philosophy in the service of an effort to change what is. If Kant's essay is unsuccessful it is only insofar as absolutist Prussia neither ruled in a republican manner nor dissolved itself in favor of a republican constitution, even if republican autocracy might actually have been “best.”
