In Pushing the Agenda, I sought to revisit the basic tenets of presidential coalition building on Capitol Hill. My hope was that tracing the White House's lobbying strategies would not only reveal how they are intended to work but also offer a better blueprint for assessing if they do. To those ends, I theorized that the White House has two basic lobbying strategies—an early game (agenda-centered) strategy aimed at shaping the legislative alternatives considered and an endgame (vote-centered) strategy aimed at determining which prevailed. Tests with a diverse assortment of original data—on the practice of lobbying, the results of key roll-call votes, and the passage of new laws—all corroborated a key point: presidential coalition building operates differently than scholars have thought, with effects greater than previously realized.
This leads to Matthew Green's careful review, which is both generous and judicious. Although he finds no fundamental flaws with the study, Green notes several caveats and quibbles, all I would echo as well. For example, my theoretical exposition is surely too long and, although the book's elite interview and archival data are good, they are certainly not flawless. What is more, I endorse completely Green's measured take-away from Pushing the Agenda, that “while presidents may not be as strong as the public believes, they are not quite as weak as political scientists think they are either.”
There is one critique Green flags as significant. Specifically, he wonders whether I unduly assign presidents credit properly accorded congressional leaders, citing the case of Medicare, which many think reflected Wilbur Mills's legislative genius more than Lyndon Johnson's. As a first point, I would note that more recent research shows Lyndon Johnson coached Wilbur Mills about how to pass Medicare far more than previously realized and with the explicit promise that he would give Mills all the credit (see David Blumenthal and James A. Morone's The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office, 2009, Chapter 5). Of course, this just underscores Green's more important point: distinguishing presidents' influence from that of congressional leaders is a difficult assignment and that more focused study on these relationships is needed.
On that score, here are a few key questions that merit more direct scholarly attention than I offered in the book: 1) In the process of translating presidential principles into legislative language, whose preferences are incorporated into the initial bill—the president, party leaders, chairmen, opposing leaders, ranking members, pivotal voters? 2) I model presidents and congressional leaders as policy maximizers. How do political considerations affect their policymaking calculus—and the outcome? 3) When it comes to across-the-aisle bargaining, who is the lead negotiator with the opposing party? Likewise, are the opposing party's congressional leaders able to exploit whatever divisions exist between the president and his leading allies in Congress?
In sum, charged with writing a response to Green's review, I find myself simply reiterating his points. Rather than keep going, then, I simply conclude by saying that I appreciate Green for thoughtfully reflecting on my work, and also for helping point out profitable paths to pursue in the future.
