The central aim of this book is to resolve what W. calls the ‘utility question’: how can contemplation of the sort described in Ethica Nicomachea 10.7–8 be central to the human good, given that it is described by Aristotle as ‘useless’? W. contends that there are two reasons to be concerned about this question. First, Aristotle's teleological principle that ‘nature does nothing in vain’ commits him to the view that every natural part or function must be useful or beneficial for continued self-maintenance. Second, both contemporaries of Aristotle and later commentators have argued that contemplation is not choiceworthy because ‘it has no functional role in the life of a mortal human being’ (p. 140, see also pp. 38, 130–40). Aristotle, W. claims, can successfully answer the utility question by showing that contemplation of eternal and divine objects is integral to human life and to moral practical activity, guiding the nutritive and perceptive functions and enabling agents to determine the virtuous and appropriate boundaries to the expression of desires and passions.
W.’s discussion of contemplation differs substantially from most approaches to the subject and thus represents a noteworthy contribution to the literature. The discussion of contemplation in recent decades has focused largely on the question of whether eudaimonia consists solely in contemplation or instead consists in contemplation alongside the full range of valuable ethically and intellectually virtuous activities. The question of whether and how contemplation plays a valuable guiding role in the life activities of human beings is worthy of far more attention than it has received.
Having introduced the utility question in Chapter 1, W. offers an account of contemplation's relationship to eudaimonia in Chapter 2, arguing that it is a ‘dominant end’, the sole good that happiness ‘contains or is ordered toward’ (p. 21), while also offering a persuasive argument to show that a dominant end view is consistent with both exclusivism (the view that eudaimonia consists solely of contemplation) and inclusivism (the view that eudaimonia consists of a plurality of virtuous activities) because one (dominant) good could be the highest end within eudaimonia. Chapter 3 offers an account of the nutritive and reproductive (threptic) life function in all organisms, and Chapter 4 focuses on the nested structure of the threptic and perceiving (aisthetic) life functions. Together, they argue that, although the soul is hierarchically organised, with lower life functions serving higher ones, it is also true that the higher life functions serve the lower, with higher perceptive functions enabling organisms to better nourish themselves and reproduce.
Chapters 2–4 are a well-crafted foundation for solving the utility question, establishing that there is a reciprocal relationship between higher and lower life functions, each benefiting and enabling the others. In Chapter 5 W. argues that in human beings this reciprocal relationship extends to contemplation: lower functions benefit and enable contemplation, and contemplation benefits and enables lower functions. Lower functions subserve contemplation in two senses: (1) aisthesis approximates contemplative noetic grasping, because aisthesis assimilates the formal features of sensible particulars as nous assimilates universals from what is perceived (pp. 78–9); (2) noetic functioning relies upon phantasia and aisthesis, which in turn require ‘threptic maintenance’ (p. 79). Higher functions reciprocally benefit lower functions because the highest capacities possessed by non-human animals must conduce to animal self-maintenance in accordance with the ‘nature does nothing in vain’ principle. Animals’ perceptive capacities, which give them access to a vastly better kind of life relative to plants, only exist for them ‘on the condition that these capacities help sustain the whole system’ (p. 85) Analogously, W. claims, the human capacity for noetic contemplation exists only if it contributes to maintaining the entire organism.
Here, W. claims that M.C. Nussbaum is wrong to say that contemplation is an exception to the ‘nature does nothing in vain’ principle because this suggestion is ‘ad hoc’ (p. 83). W. suggests that his view is supported by Aristotle's contention that eudaimonia is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue in a complete life, since a complete life requires time and since the ‘nature does nothing in vain’ principle requires that all of an entity's ‘parts and powers’ conduce to living well (p. 86). Because it contributes to happiness, contemplative nous should contribute to human self-maintenance over time. However, given our special status as the only mortal beings capable of contemplation, the idea that contemplation is an exception to the ‘nothing in vain’ principle does not seem far-fetched, and Nussbaum's reading seems far from ad hoc. Uniquely, we contemplate as god does and have biological self-maintenance needs, as animals do. The plausibility of W.’s view, then, hangs on the arguments of the remaining chapters, which set out to explain how contemplation could contribute to self-maintenance.
The structure of the book suggests that it consists of a single line of argument culminating in a solution to the utility question. Yet W., in fact, seems to offer two distinct arguments in Chapters 6–9, which are mutually supportive but could be accepted or rejected independently. First, Chapter 6 argues that contemplative nous is useful because it guides practical nous, which in turn guides thumos and epithumia, and Chapter 9 argues that proper states of these desires are constitutive of the virtues of character. Second, Chapters 7 and 8 form the heart of an argument for the claim that the contemplation of divine objects is useful because it gives us horoi, defining boundaries or standards, for virtuous behaviour.
The first line of argument is grounded in compelling primary textual evidence and engages with relevant secondary literature. It shows that ‘reason as a general power … albeit a power that includes contemplative nous’ (p. 99) guides the virtuous implementation of non-rational desire. Yet we use the power of reason even if we never engage in contemplation, so this is insufficient to show that contemplation is beneficial for the life functions that maintain the human organism. It therefore does not establish usefulness in the sense that W. requires.
The second line of argument claims that because Aristotle believes that, in order to be fully virtuous, we must fully grasp ‘why certain actions and character traits are good, fine, and choiceworthy for themselves’ (p. 131), we must have a ‘theoretical understanding of human nature and the human good’ (p. 132). This understanding, W. contends, comes from contemplation of both human nature (theoretical psychology) and divinity. Contemplating god enables us to recognise how we, as mortal beings, are akin to other living, embodied beings bound by the demands of maintaining our lower functions, while at the same time we are akin to god because we have the power to contemplate (esp. pp. 159–61, 180–1).
W. offers a very original analysis of how contemplation of the divine compares to friendship in its capacity to enable self-understanding, arguing that the placement of the account of friendship in the Eth. Nic. suggests that the contemplation of friends is meant to prefigure discussion of the contemplation of divine objects (p. 169). He also draws on compelling recent work on the Protrepticus (esp. D.S. Hutchinson and M.R. Johnson, ‘Authenticating Aristotle's Protrepticus’, OSAP 29 [2005], 193–294); the controversial work suggests that looking to nature and the divine ‘allows us to produce, in accord with it, everything’ (56.2, W.’s translation). The approach is innovative but faces significant challenges, even bracketing concerns about the provenance of some of the quotes most favourable to W.’s reading. Importantly, the Protrepticus does not distinguish between theoretical and practical nous, and our unique position between the animal and the divine alone is insufficient to generate concrete horoi.
W. is sensitive to these challenges; and while I believe he is not able to overcome them fully, throughout the monograph he shows himself to be a careful reader of Aristotle and a philosophically nuanced writer. Most importantly, he has offered a novel way of considering the value and the role of contemplation in Aristotle, which will surely spur a new and productive discussion on the subject.
