The United States’ February 2026 attack on Iran flagrantly violated the letter and spirit of international law.Footnote 1 President Donald J. Trump disdainfully declared, “I don’t need international law.”Footnote 2 But in fact he does, in ways that he does not appreciate.
President Trump’s 2026 Iran war will be remembered as both a massive illegality and a policy debacle. Like Russia’s full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, President Trump’s 2026 attack on Iran may be characterized as an illegal “superpower war of choice” that is far from over, and still searching for a stable ceasefire.Footnote 3 But these violations hardly signal what some call a “great unraveling” of the global order.Footnote 4 History has long taught that Great Powers with lawless leaders openly shirk the constraints of international law in pursuit of short-term expedience. However, those grimly predicting the death of international law overlook the many ways that international law provides the very foundation for assessing and redressing such breaches.
The resilience of international law—like the health of the human body—is measured not just by whether crisis strikes, but also by how, in the long run, the system weathers, responds to, and reasserts itself against such assaults. International law cannot only absorb such blows; it signals the only sustainable way forward. In the same way as domestic law breaches are redressed by domestic legal process, international law breaches are redressed by “transnational legal process,” with international law and lawyers signposting paths to durable settlement by injecting law-compliant content into otherwise barren negotiating frameworks.Footnote 5
We have only arrived at the first intermission of two multi-act plays. In Iran and Ukraine, the next acts will be set and the content provided by international law. Despite their illegal beginnings, neither war will likely reach durable outcomes anytime soon unless sustained diplomacy, guided by international legal principles, achieves final peace agreements that accord with international law. In both cases, stalemate can be avoided and successful endgames achieved only if the rules of the game are set by international law. So even as the rules-based order is assaulted, international law can provide a cure, by leading the way back to lasting resolutions even of conflicts that were born in illegality.
The Iran War
Despite being a non-nuclear party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1970, Iran has only intermittently complied with its treaty obligations.Footnote 6 Whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon has long been scrutinized by the NPT’s monitoring agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Until President Trump’s military strikes, the United States had sought to suppress Iran’s capacity to build and deploy such weapons through multilateral diplomacy resting on lawful carrots and sticks. After years of extended diplomacy consistent with international law, the Obama administration and Iran concluded the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Plan) in July 2015.Footnote 7
The JCPOA agreed to restrain Iran’s nuclear program—limiting Iran’s capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon—with U.S. allies and international institutions acting as crucial guarantors. The Plan envisioned sequential political commitments comprising an incentive structure whereby, in exchange for sanctions relief, Iran agreed to specified limits on its nuclear development program. Iran allowed IAEA inspections and certifications of compliance, followed by joint and sequential relaxation by the P5+1Footnote 8 of pre-existing domestic and international sanctions that had been imposed by domestic law and United Nations Security Council resolution.
By 2017, the JCPOA had peaceably led Iran to dismantle much of its nuclear program.Footnote 9 Under the intertwined commitments, U.S. and international sanctions were gradually lifted, but only after Iran complied with its nuclear restriction commitments and in accordance with IAEA’s verification.Footnote 10 The Plan did not require the United States to pay Iran U.S. taxpayer dollars, instead allowing Iran to regain access to its own previously frozen assets.Footnote 11 Roughly 98 percent of Iran’s enriched uranium was shipped abroad, and IAEA inspectors were granted extensive access to nuclear facilities inside Iran. Iran could resume oil sales and access its own reserves frozen in banks overseas only after Iran had already fully complied with the nuclear terms of the deal, by allowing IAEA inspectors into the country and hugely reducing its nuclear stockpile.Footnote 12
The JCPOA worked because it set clear expectations, verified compliance, and staggered commitments that matched the parties’ political and economic incentives. The United States and the European Union removed their nuclear-related domestic sanctions, and the UN Security Council lifted similar sanctions.Footnote 13 Under U.S. domestic law, the JCPOA was implemented largely through executive branch waivers of nuclear-related sanctions imposed by legislation, so long as the president certified every ninety days that Iran was in compliance. At the same time, the Plan required the IAEA to monitor adherence to international law by certifying quarterly that Iran was complying with the JCPOA. By the end of 2018, the IAEA had certified Iran’s compliance more than a dozen times, with the first Trump administration confirming Iran’s JCPOA compliance to Congress eight times.Footnote 14
Despite this documented success, as a presidential candidate, President Trump repeatedly threatened to “rip up” the JCPOA.Footnote 15 During his first term, President Trump largely declined to intervene militarily against Iran.Footnote 16 But in 2018, he abandoned the diplomatic path, unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA after calling it “the worst deal in history.”Footnote 17 Thereafter, Iran resumed its efforts at nuclear enrichment.
More than a year into his second term, President Trump was persuaded by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to pursue a military option that prior administrations had avoided: dropping massive thirty-thousand pound “bunker buster” bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, in support of a wide-scale Israeli military assault.Footnote 18 After proclaiming that Iran’s nuclear capacity had been totally “obliterated,” in February 2026, the Trump administration contradicted itself by claiming the need for self-defense against Iran’s nuclear threat to launch a new war of choice in Iran.Footnote 19
That war has been replete with jus ad bellum breaches of the UN Charter, jus in bello violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and legally questionable uses of economic sanctions.Footnote 20 At the outset, the United States and Israel initiated large-scale air assaults against Iran in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, without either UN Security Council authorization or a valid claim of imminent self-defense.Footnote 21 Although international humanitarian law strictly limits attacks to military targets, the United States and Israel have targeted civilian infrastructure including bridges, schools, oil and gas fields, and water desalination plants.Footnote 22 Particularly egregious was the opening February 2026 strike on a primary school in Minab, Iran, which resulted in the deaths of at least 175 people, many of them schoolchildren.Footnote 23
Strikes on civilian energy infrastructure indispensable to the survival of civilians also violated international law.Footnote 24 A “dual-use” power plant may be targeted as a military objective only when it makes “an effective contribution to military action” and the attack “offers a definite military advantage.”Footnote 25 Even then, the attack must be proportional—i.e., not cause excessive civilian harm in relation to military advantage—and “all feasible precautions” must be taken to avoid civilian harm.Footnote 26 Nor has the Trump administration ruled out attacks on nuclear power plants, which demand special precautions—whether or not they have a military purpose—because of the high risk of releasing radioactive material that could seriously harm the health and safety of millions of civilians.Footnote 27
President Trump and his senior officials not only ignored these principles in ordering attacks, but also repeatedly threatened grossly illegal acts. Most prominently, he declared in March that the United States may conduct strikes on Iran “just for fun”; in April, he posted on social media that if a ceasefire agreement could not be immediately reached, “a whole civilization will die tonight”—referring to a 3,000 year-old civilization and a country of ninety million people.Footnote 28 Standing alone, some of these statements—particularly Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s announcement that “no quarter” would be given—likely violated international humanitarian law,Footnote 29 as well as the U.S. War Crimes statuteFootnote 30 and the Defense Department’s Law of War Manual.Footnote 31 This bellicose rhetoric becomes even more alarming given the administration’s open dismantling of internal institutional safeguards designed to minimize civilian harm and ensure Defense Department compliance with international humanitarian law.Footnote 32
Particularly troubling has been the apparent proliferation of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in targeting.Footnote 33 AI warfare presents the growing possibility that autonomous systems may be used in the future to commit war crimes, both offending an emerging norm of international law and portending increasingly illegal combat driven by AI.Footnote 34 In the ongoing Anthropic litigation, President Trump’s Department of Defense demanded that as a condition of continuing as a Department contractor, the AI company Anthropic must allow its AI technology to be used for fully autonomous lethal weapons.Footnote 35 Regardless of whether the administration ultimately prevails in its attempts to punish Anthropic, it has already obtained a substitute vendor (OpenAI) that appears willing to allow the U.S. government to use its AI for autonomous weapons.Footnote 36 One might reasonably worry that the Defense Department would further proliferate jus in bello violations by deeming it “essential” that AI companies supplying software to the military strip out protections against executing indiscriminate lethal autonomous strikes.
The cascade of U.S. and Israeli violations in the Iran War have chilled allies and international institutions that were actively supported the JCPOA from aiding the military effort against Iran. As UN officials have condemned U.S. military actions in Iran as international law violations,Footnote 37 allied states have become concerned about their legal obligations not to aid or assist allies in committing internationally wrongful acts.Footnote 38 The allies’ refusal to cooperate in President Trump’s illegal acts has limited his ability to ensure free maritime movement through the Strait of Hormuz, ironically forcing him to seek a ceasefire for a war that he himself began.
The Iran-U.S. MOU
On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a fourteen-point Memorandum of Understanding (Iran-U.S. MOU or MOU), mediated by Pakistan, which stated “that from now on [the two parties] will not launch any hostile action against each other, and will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other,” pending conclusion of a final agreement within sixty days.Footnote 39 But even after President Trump personally signed the agreement at Versailles, the two parties continued to rain down strikes on one another, responding to perceived violations of the MOU’s terms.Footnote 40
While a final agreement is yet to come, it is already evident that the 159-page JCPOA worked far better than the two-page MOU. The reasons are partly substantive—the JCPOA negotiators took the time to define and achieve better and clearer terms.Footnote 41 But the broader answer is architectural. The JCPOA framework succeeded not just because international law helped to shape it, but also because its implementation—signposted by international law—helped build confidence among hostile parties, through verification mechanisms that required continuing legal compliance and cooperation with international institutions like the United Nations and the IAEA.
The JCPOA illustrated a law-friendly negotiating strategy in action, which I have elsewhere called an “engage-translate-leverage” approach.Footnote 42 To address the Iranian nuclear threat, the Obama administration engaged with Iran, the P5+1, the United Nations, and the IAEA. It translated Iran’s desire to maintain a civil nuclear program into a deal that verifiably cut off Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon. But it also took Iran’s interest into account, allowing Iran to engage in certain peaceful nuclear activities, without endorsing a legal right to enrich, in exchange for unprecedented IAEA monitoring access to Iranian nuclear facilities. The United States then leveraged that core bargain by first strengthening, then gradually lifting, national and multilateral sanctions and increasing international inspection, thereby achieving an outcome that likely could not have been attained through military force.
As a procedural matter, the JCPOA envisioned regular participation and close coordination with major stakeholders, including allies, the UN, and the IAEA. While constructed as a political agreement not requiring Senate ratification, it was extensively reviewed by Congress (which held hearings at which three Cabinet secretaries testified) and concluded with the solemnity of an international treaty. By contrast, President Trump’s skeletal Iran-U.S. MOU barely looks like the concept of a plan. As subsequent events have made clear, the hastily drafted MOU is full of ambiguous wordings that allow the two sides to give the same negotiated language conflicting interpretations.Footnote 43
First, Paragraph 1, for example, declares “an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon,” but the agreement does not include Israel or Lebanon in either the negotiations or the signature.Footnote 44 While Iran might see this reference as requiring Israel’s termination of Israel’s military campaign and withdrawal from Lebanese territory, the United States might instead see it as allowing Israel to continue occupying southern Lebanon.
Second, Paragraph 5 states that, upon the MOU’s signing, “Iran will make arrangements” for safe toll-free passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz.Footnote 45 Iran may see this wording as de jure affirming its authority to impose tolls on passage within the strait, while Gulf allies and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)—the London-based arm of the United Nations that regulates global shipping—would reply that international maritime law guarantees all nations an unimpeded right to safe, toll-free commercial navigation through a natural international strait like the Strait of Hormuz.Footnote 46 Paragraph 5 concludes by stating that “Iran will conduct dialogue with … Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz[,] in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states[,] in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.”Footnote 47 But even while Iranian officials were citing the first part of that sentence as authorizing Iran to dictate that transiting ships should sail along a potential toll route near Iran’s coastline, Trump was praising the MOU for restoring free navigation through the strait, consistent with a route designated as complying with international law by the IMO. Even after the MOU’s signing, that lingering ambiguity has led to further military exchanges between Iran and the United States, as Iran has attempted to assert control over the strait by attacking ships that have not coordinated their transit with Iran.Footnote 48
Third, Paragraph 6 of the Iran-U.S. MOU includes plans for a novel $300 billion Iranian reconstruction fund, without identifying any sources for that money.Footnote 49 Because the JCPOA was achieved without military force or wartime destruction, nothing in that accord contemplated providing billions of dollars of outside investment to Iran for reconstruction or war reparations for destruction caused by United States military actions. Nor did the JCPOA require the United States to pay Iran any U.S. taxpayer dollars. But in the Iran-U.S. MOU, the United States makes a firm commitment to help guarantee that Iran gets $300 billion from countries outside Iran, including—despite administration denials—perhaps even from the United States. Now that the United States has firmly committed to helping secure for Iran the $300 billion needed to keep the deal going, the United States may be obliged to provide that amount if other countries or the private sector fail to provide those resources.Footnote 50
Fourth, in Paragraph 7, the United States agrees that the final agreement will end all current Iran sanctions, including resolutions of the Board of Governors of the IAEA and the UN Security Council, which under Paragraph 14 must also endorse any final deal.Footnote 51 Yet these are two international organizations over whose decision making the United States does not exercise plenary control and that it entirely snubbed before and during the war. Paragraph 8 further declares that “The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons,” but provides no specifics, instead deferring all details to the final agreement yet to be negotiated.Footnote 52 President Trump’s two-page Iran-U.S. MOU provides virtually none of the safeguards contained in the JCPOA to restrain Iran’s production of a nuclear weapon.Footnote 53 The MOU nowhere requires Iran to reduce or cap its nuclear activities, does not require Iran’s enriched uranium to be shipped abroad (allowing Tehran to keep its enriched uranium stockpile in-country), grants international inspectors no access to nuclear facilities, leaves key inspection and verification measures to future negotiations, and fails to address either Iran’s ballistic missiles or terrorist proxy network.
Finally, legal problems similarly plague the MOU’s provisions on sanctions relief. Paragraph 9 anticipates a reciprocal status quo (“freeze-for-freeze”) arrangement, whereby Iran agrees to “maintain the status quo on its nuclear program,” in exchange for the United States commitment to “not impose new sanctions on Iran or strengthen its forces in the region.”Footnote 54 Paragraph 10 undertakes that “immediately after the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding … the United States Treasury Department will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil” and other key exports and services.Footnote 55 But under U.S. law, to provide those waivers under any “agreement” with Iran, Trump must first have the MOU reviewed by Congress before he is legally authorized to exercise any such waiver authority.Footnote 56
Despite President Trump’s claim of diplomatic victory, on its face, the Iran-U.S. MOU shows that his administration has achieved none of its strategic goals in launching the attacks: the war did not achieve regime change; Iran continues to be a nuclear threat, retains ballistic missiles, still largely controls oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, and continues to launch strikes against American and allied forces in the region both directly and through its proxy network of terrorist groups. Most salient, President Trump’s Iran “excursion” has taught the world at large—and Iran’s leaders in particular—that Iran’s greatest political leverage comes not from building a nuclear weapon, but from its unveiled “weapon of mass disruption”: Iran’s continuing ability to close the Strait of Hormuz virtually at will.Footnote 57 Indeed, one of the greatest ironies of President Trump’s war against Iran—with its many accompanying international law violations—is that the administration now seeks to justify its continuing hostilities with Iran by claiming that it is acting to vindicate the international law principle of freedom of navigation.Footnote 58 This is ironic indeed, not just because the United States has never ratified the UNCLOS, but also because President Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose transit fees in the strait in violation of the UNCLOS, and persists in an ongoing campaign of illegal lethal military strikes against alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean and Pacific.Footnote 59
The costs of this war should be measured not just by casualties from military strikes. The greatest tragedy is that, for the foreseeable future, Iran will likely continue to be ruled by a militaristic regime that is itself a gross human rights violator. The Iran war has done little or nothing to advance Iranian democracy or human rights. While the war has weakened Iran’s military and economic capacity, it has also strengthened the hardliners in an Iranian regime that is now more military-led, ideological, and contemptuous of international law.Footnote 60 The war has undermined U.S. legitimacy and credibility and alienated domestic Iranian opponents of the regime who understandably believe that they have been abandoned by a lawless superpower.
The Iranian regime has violated international law at home as well as abroad. As 2025 ended, popular protest in Iran against economic conditions had evolved into nationwide political protest demanding an end to Ayatollah Ali Khameini’s Islamic regime, which spread to more than two hundred cities across the country. The Iranian regime responded with a brutal crackdown that included an internet blackout, thousands of arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and mass shootings of thousands of civilian protesters by state security forces.Footnote 61 Once the U.S. and Israeli military strikes began, Iran resorted to retaliatory attacks in violation of international law—including on commercial shipping vessels in the Strait of Hormuz—and repeated bombing of such civilian targets as hotels, airports, and residential buildings in neighboring Gulf states and Israel.Footnote 62 There have been credible reports that Iran has deployed banned cluster munitions in striking civilian infrastructure using explosive weapons in densely populated areas in violation of international humanitarian law.Footnote 63 Thus, continued rule by the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khameini, his successor, or their military handlers bodes poorly for Iran’s future compliance with international law, much less the likelihood that Iran will abide by the terms of the MOU.
In sum, massive uses of force by the United States in violation of international law have strengthened, not weakened, the hand of a regime deeply contemptuous of international law. The on-again/off-again ceasefire has produced a flimsy memorandum of understanding that achieves significantly less for the United States than the peaceful JCPOA from which President Trump walked away. The MOU’s failures reflect in part the mutual law-breaking that preceded it. The agreement lacks the stability that would have been provided by sound drafting with careful reference to international law, and the buy-in brought by including international law-abiding guarantors.
The Iran war is reportedly costing U.S. taxpayers between $1–2 billion each day. Defense Secretary Hegseth recently asked Congress for $67 billion in supplemental funding.Footnote 64 Estimates of what the war will ultimately cost reach into the trillions.Footnote 65 But this spiraling cost has ensured no greater security to the West, moderate Middle Eastern states, or the Iranian people. Instead, the Iran War and MOU have led to the straining of long-term U.S. alliances. Despite President Trump’s pleas, the United States’s key European partners have refused to participate in his international law violations. Even the U.S. alliance with Israel has been strained by its pointed exclusion from the discussions that led to the MOU. Because the MOU’s vague wordings have essentially invited each side to try—after the fact—to impose its preferred interpretation by force, it hardly surprises that the claimed ceasefire has not ended the violence.
At this writing, exchanges of fire in Iran are happening almost daily, leading President Trump to declare the Iran-U.S. MOU “over,” threatening Iran with “complete decimation” if he is targeted.Footnote 66 In analyzing why the Iran-U.S. MOU has apparently failed, the International Crisis Group concluded that the deal
stopped the war without settling the contest that produced it … [,]deferred the most challenging issues—notably Iran’s nuclear program … [and] left burning matters … essentially unresolved, including the future management of the Strait of Hormuz, the relationship between the Iranian and Lebanese theatres, and the conditions under which Iran might have access to its frozen assets …. [S]uch constructive ambiguity can quickly become destructive when the vagueness affects the core bargain of the deal, and when both parties retain the means and inclination to forcibly impose their preferred interpretation, especially given the utter lack of trust between them.Footnote 67
This is why warring parties need international law to resolve disputes, even when they ignore it to wage war. In the long run, a hasty diplomatic “deal”—unguided by international law and driven by illegal force on both sides—will not likely achieve either peace or justice.Footnote 68
Comparing Ukraine
Like President Trump’s war in Iran, Russia’s war against Ukraine began with preliminary illegalities—in the Donbas and Crimea starting in 2014—culminating in a massively illegal offensive war of choice in February 2022.Footnote 69 Like President Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin has dismissed global rules as a meaningful constraint. Yet despite their resort to illegal force, both Russia and the United States were forced into negotiations after large-scale military campaigns failed to achieve their goals on the battlefield. At this writing, the parties in both conflicts are simultaneously fighting and talking.Footnote 70 In neither case does a durable peace arrangement yet appear within reach.
Both conflicts began with the attacking nation’s over-optimistic expectation of quick military victory. Over time, each has devolved into what may be called “performative war followed by performative diplomacy.” This is an anomalous situation where acts of war causing grave human costs lead to shaky ceasefires and peace processes that then proceed on largely decoupled tracks.Footnote 71 Historically, ceasefires are usually reached after lengthy confidence-building and pre-negotiation processes that set the stage for the warring parties to talk—with international mediators—in search of common ground for a durable settlement. But in both Ukraine and Iran, talks have been repeatedly punctuated by temporary truces—seemingly more designed to manage media cycles or oil prices than to bring about a durable peace.
In Ukraine, President Trump initially opened diplomacy by trying to bully Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy into making concessions to President Putin. President Trump’s thin initial proposal focused narrowly on what could be called “peace only,” pushing Ukraine simply to accept many of President Putin’s demands without meaningful guarantees about territorial integrity, future security, reconstruction, or criminal and civil accountability.Footnote 72 But President Zelenskyy countered with a more robust proposal, seeking instead what could be termed “a just and lawful peace”: a durable peace with substantive elements designed to ensure Ukraine’s long-term political, military, and economic future.Footnote 73
Can International Law Facilitate Peace in Both Ongoing Wars?
In Ukraine, Western democratic allies and international institutions have supported President Zelenskyy by de facto implementing what Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called “a third way” in his highly publicized 2025 Davos speech.Footnote 74 This diplomatic approach seeks to avoid on one hand, the “rupture” that plagues the now-fragile post-World War II framework, and on the other, regression to a barren world of great-power spheres of influence. In Prime Minister Carney’s words, like-minded democracies and non-governmental groups and individuals committed to “value-based realism” can humanize emerging peace processes by drawing upon “a dense web of [transnational legal] connections across trade, investment, [and] culture” to build “coalitions that work issue by issue with partners who share enough common ground to act together.”Footnote 75 Simply put, successful peace processes demand transnational legal process.
Similar “international law signposting” characterized the complex U.S.-brokered multilateral peace accord for the Balkans that still endures three decades later. In 1995, force and the threat of force brought the Bosnian protagonists to a diplomatic resolution at Dayton. The Clinton administration deployed what I have called the “Holbrooke Method” to marshal elements of American hard and smart power to secure a settlement with the force of law, including meaningful provisions to promote human rights and accountability. While negotiations and fighting continue in Ukraine, Prime Minister Carney’s “third way” approach could similarly encourage the United States to back a plan that deploys hard and smart power to push toward a settlement that is more acceptable to both Ukraine’s strategic interests and international law.Footnote 76
Unlike hard-power approaches, smart-power strategies use international law as a “content-provider” to flesh out otherwise empty negotiating frameworks. Biologist Stephen Jay Gould called this a “Panda’s Thumb”: an ad hoc second-best device developed by nature to fill evolutionary gaps. In the case of Ukraine, the notion of international law as a content-provider can inject law, democracy, and human rights considerations into an emerging collective effort to move past “peace only” to the higher goal of a just and lawful peace.Footnote 77 Within the contested issue areas of complex negotiations, law-abiding states can use international law rules as signposts to mark paths to more lawful, enduring peace settlements. They can infuse legal content into empty diplomatic frameworks to bind conflicting parties not to commit future violations, or be held accountable for past violations, including those sketched above.
In Ukraine, Ukraine’s allies—including Prime Minister Carney’s Canada—have applied the “Panda’s Thumb” approach to push back on Presidents Trump and Putin; they have instead demanded a more durable peace that infuses the existing negotiating framework with meaningful rule of law content. This pressure has been coupled with aid and vocal support for Ukraine, which in turn has given it breathing room to push back militarily against Russia. Over time, these factors have helped force visible changes in the U.S. approach. After telling President Zelenskyy in March 2025 that he “does not have the cards” to win against Russia, by the July 2026 NATO summit, President Trump had turned around, approving Ukraine’s drone strikes deep inside Russia and promising to provide Ukraine with more Patriot missiles.Footnote 78
Many have offered particular proposals to advance mediated Russia-Ukraine negotiations to end the war and settle the dispute.Footnote 79 I have elsewhere argued that whatever the U.S. administration does, other transnational actors can help infuse legal, human rights, and humanitarian content into the diplomatic framework that houses the Ukraine Peace Process.Footnote 80 Since the Ukraine war began, international law and lawyers have advanced that goal by developing a substantial international architecture for resilience and recovery that would provide legal content for the evolving negotiating framework.Footnote 81 Thus, Ukraine’s broader lesson for Iran is that, even after an illegal war, international law can both provide substantive and procedural rules, to signal the way toward a more law-friendly outcome.
The same approach could be pursued to move beyond the Iran-U.S. MOU toward a better, more durable Iranian peace process. As the MOU’s preliminary terms are overtaken by events, the negotiators will struggle to stay on a path to a final, binding agreement of the same broad scope. In the negotiations to come, the parties could expand the negotiating parties to include many of the parties to the JCPOA and the key Gulf States that border the Strait of Hormuz. In any final agreement, they could correct the MOU’s substantive defects by widening its aperture to correct ambiguities and create annexes, such as those in the JCPOA, to address complex contested issues.Footnote 82 Throughout the final-agreement negotiations, they could reference international law rules to set baselines, clarify expectations, and help private stakeholders more accurately to calculate risk.Footnote 83
Peace treaties endure when their terms are clear, comprehensive, and settle the core contested issues to match and channel the warring parties’ future incentives. Thus, the negotiating parties should recognize that no durable U.S.-Iran peace agreement can survive unless both sides credibly agree to foreswear illegal uses of force; abide by commitments regarding nuclear enrichment and development and accompanying sanctions relief; create mechanisms to promote accountability and resolve disputes peaceably; and agree to monitoring and verification of compliance by neutral international parties, such as the IAEA. To address the pivotal navigation issue in the Strait of Hormuz, both Iran and the United States could commit to follow UNCLOS rules regarding rights of transit passage through international straits, and to use the IMO to monitor both sides’ compliance with the language in the MOU’s Paragraph 5 requiring action “in accordance with international law.”Footnote 84 As a procedural matter, such a treaty would work best if it were carefully drafted by trained international lawyers, followed settled legal forms, involved all key stakeholders, used agreed-upon defined terms, enlisted objective and credible guarantors, and were subjected to meaningful congressional and UN review. Over time, such a process would enhance the agreement’s durability by building mutual assurance and confidence, awareness of positive-sum solutions, and the beginnings of long-run trust.
In sum, despite the many grave insults visited upon the fabric of international law during the Iran-U.S. War, international law’s key principles remain crucial measuring rods for what the world should recognize as lawful settlements going forward. The naysayers who warn that this war will kill international law forget that international law rules grow out of painful historical experience, not naive utopian aspiration. Long after the Trump administration has become history, “international law-signposting” will mark a way to end conflicts that international lawbreaking has begun. This signposting serves as a central tenet of what I have called the “Yale School of International Law”: “[a]ffirming that America is part of one international legal system … [that] sees international law as a constitutive process through which free states can build frameworks of law within which they can cooperate to achieve peace” and the advancement of human dignity.Footnote 85 It also advances a core commitment of the American Journal of International Law.
