Every Veblen scholar is well aware of the major contributions to the field made by Rick Tilman. With several books and dozens of journal articles it seems safe to say that Tilman is one of the preeminent experts in the field. In his most recent book, Thorstein Veblen and the Enrichment of Evolutionary Naturalism, Tilman makes another addition of quality work exploring how Veblen's ideas fit into the general atlas of knowledge within the social sciences.
The book itself contains a series of essays on widely divergent aspects of Veblen's work and demonstrates how a clearer understanding of these aspects can be attained by looking at them through the prism of Evolutionary Naturalism. Tilman includes discussions on cultural lag, atavistic activities (such as sports, gambling, and religion), aesthetics, as well as discussions about the impact of Veblen on areas of the social sciences outside economics. The criticism could be made that such a divergent number of topics do not fit organically together within a single book. Yet such a criticism would miss the main point made by Tilman, which emphasizes that Veblen's epistemology, ontology, and axiology all arrive out of an evolutionary naturalistic vision of the world.
As an economist, I have little experience with the concept of Evolutionary Naturalism. A quick search in Econlit calls up no references to the concept in the extensive database. Yet the student of Veblen finds little new or unsettling in this primary concept that Tilman uses throughout the book. As Tilman describes evolutionary naturalism he writes, “Two aspects of Darwinism that greatly influenced Veblen were that in nature no finished and fixed essences exist. Thus useful knowledge of nature, which is always changing and developing, is obtainable without regard to eternal forms, which are fixed and final” (p. 18). Out of this concept of the fluidity of the human condition arose Veblen's epistemology, ontology, and axiology. How we think about things, what are the relevant facts, and what is right and wrong are all set in relation to the social and environmental conditions faced at a given place and time. As the time and places change the epistemology, ontology, and axiology need to evolve to reflect the relevant circumstances. This definition of evolutionary naturalism, as described by Tilman, seems to be an apt way of describing Veblen's thinking.
After defining evolutionary naturalism and showing how this concept is embedded in Veblen's thought, Tilman uses it to explore and explain some issues that still remain controversial in Veblen's thinking. Space here allows discussion of only a couple of these issues and I have chosen the two I thought most interesting: the issue of Veblen's views on aesthetics and the criticism of Veblen about his structural-functionalism.
One of the biggest criticisms of Veblen's thinking is that there is no place in it for artistic or cultural experiences. Such a criticism arises out of the satirical descriptions Veblen made in The Theory of the Leisure Class with regard to the artistic and cultural apparatus that was dominated by the vested interests. As Tilman writes: “To Veblen the meaning of ‘value’ is not personal or individual in a private or exclusive form” (p. 142). Rather what is valuable is determined by what advances the continuation of society and humanity. Those activities that were destructive to these goals, such as invidious activities, were dysfunctional and Veblen thought they should be discarded. A simple analysis of Veblen's work demonstrates his clear criticism of the aesthetic form as it existed and there is little in his work that rehabilitates the purpose of aesthetics in some other form. Yet Tilman is able to show that when looked at from an evolutionary naturalistic position Veblen was not anti-aesthetic but rather his criticism was directed at invidious aesthetic forms. Tilman clarifies an aesthetic form that seems to fit well within the perspective of Veblen's work. Tilman writes: “Did Veblen aim at the democratizing and egalitarianizing of an elitist culture by substituting for its present aesthetics based on invidious display, waste, and status enhancement, a naturalistic aesthetic? He never said this explicitly but it was in keeping with his outlook and intent” (p. 160). Tilman's exploration of Veblen's aesthetics seems to give a more balanced interpretation of Veblen's thoughts than a simple dismissal because of Veblen's lack of coverage.
The disparate nature of Tilman's new book can be seen in the second topic chosen to be explored in this review. Veblen's use of modern anthropology within his work is recognized by Veblenian scholars yet some big names have attacked Veblen's work as being flawed. In particular Talcott Parsons dismissed Veblen's work because he believed that Veblen did not understand the structural–functional nature of social institutions. Tilman correctly and concisely demonstrates how Parsons misses a key point within Veblen's work. Structural–functional theory argues that institutions arise in certain structural ways in order to fulfill a function within society. Parsons's main critique of Veblen's work argued that Veblen held a utopic vision of an idealized world that ignored the important ‘functional’ roles played by key institutions within U.S. society. To Parsons there was no way a key institutional structure, such as private property, could arise unless it served an important function within society. Veblen's call to eliminate absentee ownership demonstrated to Parsons that Veblen suffered from a severe lack of understanding about the world around him. Tilman clearly demonstrates that Parsons is wrong in his critical analysis of Veblen. Tilman argues that Veblen, basing his axiology out of evolutionary naturalism, analyzed the institutional structure of private property and demonstrated that it was not ‘functional’ with regards to the betterment of society. Tilman then goes on to show that the major point of critical contention arising out of Parsons is that he disagreed with Veblen's use of normative evaluations. As Tilman states it, “In short, Parsons … [was] very skeptical of his social theory because it does not incorporate the requisites of their paradigm in terms of explaining the positive role of social order and government, religion, sports, and politics” (p. 286). Tilman then goes on to argue that Veblen was not a structural–functionalist but rather he did understand the issues involved with a structural–functional paradigm. Tilman argues that Veblen's recognition of outdated institutions (structures) was equivalent to anthropologists looking at forms of structures in other societies and demonstrating how they exist but may not better that society. Veblen was simply doing the same thing when looking at modern society.
Tilman's book is a great work. Its scope and detail could only come from a person who has been studying Veblen for 35 years. The coverage of literature and ability to flow between such incredibly diverse topics demonstrates a mastery that is enviable.
