In his book, Scott Radnitz offers a thoughtful and well-argued theory of elite-led mass mobilization in semiauthoritarian regimes. And it comes at an opportune moment—arriving as it does in the wake of the Arab Spring and its still-unfolding political dynamics. Given both the broad optimism in the potential for “people power” that mass mobilization across the Middle East and North Africa inspired and the rapid appreciation (and sobering understanding) of its limits that followed, Weapons of the Wealthy provides a useful theoretical perspective for those hoping to better grasp both the possibilities and constraints of mass mobilization.
Radnitz applies his theory to the cases of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The former has seen just sporadic, short-term, and, ultimately, unsuccessful instances of mass mobilization since independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, has witnessed several sustained and broad-scale mobilizations. Indeed, two of these—first in March 2005, then just five years later, in April 2010—resulted in the overthrow of successive Kyrgyzstani regimes. The former occasion, the so-called Tulip Revolution, forms the cornerstone of the author's argument. As with the Arab Spring, many analysts at the time suggested that Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution represented a turning point in the country's history—the moment in which a previously passive demos awoke and demanded change. The Tulip Revolution followed on the heels of Ukraine's “Orange” and Georgia's “Rose” Revolutions, making it particularly easy for commentators to interpret Kyrgyzstan's development as part of a propitious democratic trend.
Rather than a hopeful example of people power, Radnitz suggests, the Tulip Revolution was actually an instance of what he terms “subversive clientelism.” He argues that subversive clientelism is one of several strategies available to wealthy elites in semiauthoritarian states who worry that their rent-seeking practices may be endangered by a predatory regime. Where credible threats of capital exit or alliances with the regime itself are either improbable or have failed, wealthy elites may seek to create “a social support base by making material and symbolic investments in local communities,” and, if challenged, “mobilize loyal supporters in their defense” (p. 5).
Radnitz suggests two primary reasons that subversive clientelism has produced sustained mass mobilization in Kyrgyzstan but not Uzbekistan. First, independent Kyrgyzstan's first president, Askar Akiev, promoted economic privatization and opened the country to foreign investment, whereas Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, kept economic power firmly in the hands of the state—meaning that the former developed a relatively autonomous class of business elites who could realistically compete with the state while the latter kept the wealthy strictly beholden to the president's whims. Second, this relative degree of independence among Kyrgyzstan's business elites allows them to form alliances of convenience with one another and against the regime. Thus, Radnitz contends, when the regime's actions threaten a limited number of elite interests, mobilization is likely to remain relatively isolated. But when the regime threatens several elite actors at once, they are easily able to cobble together short-term coalitions and coordinate subversive clientist actions that produce much more widespread mobilization.
There are, ultimately, some instances of overreach in Radnitz's analysis and conclusions. For one, I believe he overstates the degree of control that the Karimov regime exerts over the elites in Uzbekistan. There have certainly been times when regional elites have posed credible challenges to Karimov. Perhaps more importantly, however, I found the author's analysis of the alliances of convenience among elites in Kyrgyzstan lacking a bit of nuance. Kyrgyzstani elites compete as much with one another as they do with the executive—even in the face of common interests. This intraelite competition undoubtedly harms the potential for the diffusion of mobilization as frequently as, if not more often than, common threats might support that potential. Thus, it would be useful to more clearly unpack the mechanisms that allow elites to set aside differences and promote widespread collective action.
Yet these are relatively minor points in a work with much to praise. Beyond developing a useful and generally well-documented theory, Radnitz masterfully avoids some of the pitfalls that frequently trap scholars examining patron–client relations (both inside and outside Central Asia). Most notably, he escapes the reductive language of “clan” and “tribe,” choosing to focus instead on the broader socioeconomic forces that create links between patrons and clients in the region.
Moreover, in Weapons of the Wealthy, Radnitz offers us a true model of comparative politics research. From his carefully selected, comparable cases to his well-justified use of mixed methodologies, and from his in-depth Kyrgyzstani case studies to his concluding arguments for the theory's generalizability, he provides an example of comparative research that is at once instructive and refreshing.
Radnitz knows his cases well. And it shows. However, this book deserves to be read by many more than those specifically interested in Central Asia. It has important implications for our understanding of protest dynamics in semiauthoritarian regimes more broadly and could be of use in informing our discussions of those dynamics as they unfold before us right now.
