This book by Yuan-kang Wang will certainly stir discussion among researchers of contemporary Chinese politics, and likely force reflection on classical scholarship of the Chinese state. Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics has two undeniable strong points. In reference to scholarship on Imperial China, it defies commonly shared understanding of the logic behind political decision-making; in relation to contemporary China, it provides a suggestive reading of her international political practice today.
What makes Wang's account of China's Imperial politics so unorthodox is his allocation of motives behind political decision-making. He claims they should not be interpreted as resulting from Confucian non-belligerent culture, an assertion made by Chinese historiographers which has been subsequently accommodated by Western scholars. Rather, he sees them as evidence of realpolitik thinking among Chinese elites, in which case current claims of China's uniqueness as a historically pacifist polity cannot be sustained.
Wang arrives at this conclusion through considering the problem of Chinese strategic choices in Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) dynasties and testing it against two theories. “Confucian pacifism,” the predominant cultural explanation, depicts the Imperial state as advocating “reluctant, reactive, and defensive” use of force (p. 4). In contradiction stands structural realism, which claims that an anarchical international system forces states to act in accordance with their relative power position, effectively increasing the likelihood of offensive strategies and coercion. These two theories are applied against three features: grand strategy, war justification and war aims.
If indeed China's strategic decision-making in the Song and Ming was guided by Confucian precepts, then wars would have been fought solely in self-defence, and would have been discontinued as soon as the primary war aims were achieved. The grand strategy would be unanimously non-coercive and non-expansionist, focusing on practising virtues rather than practising warfare. However, Wang's findings provide a convincing argument for the predominance of structural realist considerations, not Confucian pacifism. Whether it was the Northern Song fighting against Jurchens or the Southern Song driving away attacks by Mongol tribes, the grand strategy indicates realist logic: accommodation of conflict in times of lower material capabilities, and offensiveness in times of military potency. When in positions of strength, strategic military goals would be expanded, as exemplified by the early-15th century annexation of Vietnam, or the late-16th century attempt to invade Japan as punitive action for a Japanese assault on Korea. Furthermore, Wang claims that the Ming tributary system was as much a political as an economic mechanism supported by military muscle, with Confucianism playing the role of a “unique type of Chinese expansionism.” Even the Great Wall was not a “product of a cultural preference for defense,” but a result of “China's assessment of its military capability” (p. 133).
The value of Wang's book lies not only in what he tests, but also in how he tests it. Among numerous contemporary publications focusing on China and Confucianism, what makes this book refreshing is its formula of hypothesis testing. Using a methodology of “structured, focused comparison,” Wang tests for “congruence of the fit between the theory's predictions and the historical evidence and process-trace the decisions leading up to the adoption of a particular military strategy” (p. 6). The focus on the process of decision-making, rather than its outcomes, allows for an ultimate answer to whether cultural or strategic motives stood behind the decisions of Song and Ming leaders. Wang includes possibly the widest range of variables studied: periods of varying degrees of institutionalisation of Confucianism, or China's greatness as well as weakness, all supplemented with “interdynastic comparison” (p. 8) to provide more informative results than single dynasty cases.
This methodological approach has its consequences in terms of research materials. Wang has successfully avoided possible biases, informing his research with a good selection of primary resources, and cross-referencing both authoritative and unauthoritative documents. Sifting through official accounts, he excavates seemingly residual indications which more accurately reflect the actual processes of decision-making.
The author's conscientiousness in research design is evident in the well-structured theoretical framework. He acknowledges that Confucian pacifism and structural realism are easy to test against each other as they envision contradictory results. But he is also aware that theories of such high level of generality are insufficient, and acknowledges the necessity for “fine-grained theories” (p. 187) and “nonstructural factors” for explaining cases of lower analytical levels.
Implicit in Wang's theoretical approach is his belief that Confucian pacifism and structural realism constitute the extremes of a wide spectrum of explanatory theories. In so doing, Wang engages in discussion with Alastair Iain Johnston, whose theory of cultural realism claims the existence of China-specific “realpolitik strategic culture” (p. 4). In contrast to Johnston, Wang sees material (power) premises, not cultural precepts, as the founding strategies of the Imperial state, and subsequently subsumes Johnston's cultural realism under structural realism.
Wang's book provides an accessible, historically well-informed and methodologically well-constructed account of an important phenomenon of Chinese history. Its high quality will be apparent to general readers and researchers alike, with neither methodology nor substance overriding the other. What creates a sense of discontinuity, however, is Wang's attempt to engage in discussion of China's current strategic goals. As China's global status grows, potential explanations of its behaviour are urgently sought. It seems hard to resist expanding one's argument, originally aimed at a historical context, onto current discussions. Wang's book is no exception. As a result, the last chapter on “Chinese power politics in the age of U.S. unipolarity” seems to lack the book's previous clarity of argument. “Confucian pacifism” as an explanatory model has unexpectedly given way to “idealpolitik,” a new strategic model supposedly developed as a result of China's socialisation to international institutions. Even more baffling is a complete exclusion of ideological factors from considerations of the PRC's post-Cold War strategies. Such an omission can hardly be analytically justified, let alone defended historically. Moreover, in effective absence of Confucian socialisation since the early 20th century, and lack of “ideopolitik” in Wang's equation, his analysis of contemporary China seems less convincing. Absence of a competing theoretical approach leaves Wang testing only structural hypotheses. This might leave readers who expect a similarly innovative approach to contemporary problems as to historical ones, inevitably disappointed. It also accounts for another problem: leaving a strong suggestion, but not an answer, to the question of China's political strategy and potential offensiveness today.
Despite this weakness, this book provides an absorbing attempt to shed new light on the role Confucian tradition played in power politics historically. In so doing, it uses a precise methodological and theoretical model for hypothesis testing, which adds much value to the book. The book as a whole provides readers with a powerful realisation of how much knowledge of China's past and present is still missing.
