One obvious value to be considered when we assess the quality of our lives concerns how well the activities of which our lives consist get us what we want for ourselves. Another, sometimes competing, value has to do with how well these activities satisfy our moral obligations. But considerations of self-interest and morality, Wolf argues at the beginning of this engaging contribution to the contemporary meaning of life literature, do not exhaust the domain of life-assessment value, for there is another fundamental value to which we not only might appeal, but often (at least implicitly) do in assessing our lives, viz. meaningfulness. The recognition that our lives are fairly self-satisfying or fairly moral can still leave us reasonably wondering whether they are to any significant extent meaningful, whether they have a worthwhileness that boosts their overall quality beyond what we can get from the merely self-interested or the merely moral.
Wolf’s case for this third life-assessment value is an intuitive one: she asks us to consider various particular activities that seem to contribute to the worth of an individual’s life, but neither because they increase the individual’s happiness nor because they are morally obligatory (e.g. visiting a family member in the hospital, helping a friend move, adopting a severely disabled child, writing philosophy, practicing the cello, baking a fabulous dessert). What is characteristic of such activities, she argues, is that they involve “loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way,” (8) i.e. a subjective sense of fulfillment that is fittingly responsive to what is objectively worthy of pursuit.
Contrasted with this “fitting fulfillment view” of meaningfulness are three views that Wolf respectively calls the “fulfillment view,” the “larger-than-oneself view,” and the “bipartite view.” The fulfillment view holds meaningfulness to consist simply of “find[ing] one’s passion and go[ing] for it” (13); the central idea is that meaning in life is exclusively a function of finding the activities in one’s life fulfilling, of being emotionally engaged or gripped by them. (Such fulfillment isn’t identical to happiness in the conventional, self-interested sense, as it may go hand in hand with a great deal of “pain, disappointment, and stress.” (14)) The larger-than-oneself view, which counsels us to find what is evaluatively “larger than” ourselves and pursue it (18), takes meaningfulness rather to be just a function of the activities’ contribution toward something of objective value—something, in other words, whose value is at least partly independent of the evaluative attitudes of those engaged in the activities. The bipartite view has it that meaningfulness is partly a function of what the fulfillment view holds it to be exclusively a function of, and partly a function of what the larger-than-oneself view holds it to be exclusively a function of; but, unlike Wolf’s fitting fulfillment view, the bipartite view places no restriction on the way in which the two must relate to each other so as to ground meaningfulness. (20) The fitting fulfillment view requires that the two be connected in a fitting way—presumably, by the right sort of causal or supervenience relation, by an appropriate “because.” (Compare the epistemological view that knowledge involves true-because-warranted belief, not merely warranted true belief. On the fitting fulfillment view, meaningfulness involves fulfilling-because-objectively-valuable activity; mere objectively valuable fulfilling activity, contrary to the bipartite view, isn’t enough.)
If we take meaningfulness in a life to consist of the meaningfulness of the activities within the life, then we won’t be too far off the mark to distinguish the three competing views along the following lines:
The fulfillment view
S’s Φing is meaningful to the extent that S feels fulfilled in Φing.
The larger-than-oneself view
S’s Φing is meaningful to the extent that S’s Φing has objective value (i.e., S’s Φing is or promotes something with a value that is at least partly independent of S’s evaluative attitudes).
The bipartite view
S’s Φing is meaningful to the extent that (1) S feels fulfilled in Φing and (2) S’s Φing has objective value.
The view Wolf defends might then be characterized this way:
The fitting fulfillment view
S’s Φing is meaningful to the extent that S feels fulfilled in Φing because (S recognizes that) S’s Φing has objective value.
Provided we are willing to allow that moral, epistemic, aesthetic, etc. values are objective in the minimal sense that Wolf defends—their status as values is not wholly dependent on the evaluative attitudes of the relevant agent(s) (40-48)—the fitting fulfillment view, no less than its competitors, yields a satisfyingly pluralistic approach to meaningfulness. On that view, there is a clear sense in which there is no one single meaning in life; meaningfulness may be found in the pursuit of a wide variety of activities, from (say) human rights activism, to the pursuit of science, to art, and beyond.
Wolf argues convincingly that the fitting fulfillment view can overcome serious intuitive difficulties that afflict its three main competitors. (15-25) But why should meaningfulness on her view matter? Centrally, she suggests, because it answers to a deep-seated need that comes with our social nature as humans—the need to see ourselves as connected to others in positive ways. (27-30) If one’s activities are meaningful, then one at least has the capacity to see oneself as doing something that connects oneself positively with others: what one enjoys doing can be viewed from an external perspective—a perspective of others—that endorses it. Moreover reflection on meaningfulness as a third fundamental life-assessment value can help prevent us from selling our activities short. What otherwise might seem to be merely self-interested activities, because they are not plausibly viewed as activities with any special moral value, can upon such reflection properly appear to us as being considerably more valuable. (50)
Meaningfulness under Wolf’s characterization also matters morally, because its recognition can provide a plausible justification for our common practice of cutting people moral slack for non-moral activity with a certain kind of character. (53-54) In an intriguing discussion of Bernard Williams, Wolf further suggests that there can be cases not only in which meaningfulness and morality clash but also in which meaningfulness trumps morality. (54-62) The consonant, general axiology she presents seems to go roughly as follows: Self-interest is a source of value, but morality and meaningfulness are always sources of greater value; hence whenever there is a conflict between self-interest and morality or meaningfulness, self-interest loses. Morality is not always a source of greater value than meaningfulness; hence in at least some cases where morality and meaningfulness clash, meaningfulness may win.
Included in the second half of the book are commentaries by John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly, and Jonathan Haidt. Wolf’s responses (102-132) are careful and perceptive, and help the reader to see more clearly the powerful resources that can be brought to bear in defense of her basic account.
Unpretentious and accessible in style, yet rich with reason and insight, this book is a must-have for anyone seriously interested in value theory.
