In narratives of Turkish history, the period between 1945 and 1960 has typically been treated as a “transitional” period, positioned between the foundational single-party regime and the politically intense 1960s. For this reason, in comprehensive accounts of Turkish history, this period often occupies the shortest section. The military coup at the end of the period created a significant rupture in defining the preceding historical process. The key figures and events of the era have been regarded less as primary determinants than as a “moment” that should be mentioned. Over the past decades, however, comprehensive studies focusing on this period have emphasized its decisive influence on modern Turkish politics, gradually shifting the narrative both discursively and empirically away from the axis of the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. As highlighted in many of these studies, the 1950s exerted a more decisive influence on the formation of political culture than earlier periods, shaping contemporary political culture significantly. Reuben Silverman’s work constitutes an important contribution to this line of inquiry, advancing our understanding of both historical knowledge and interpretation.
Silverman’s study carefully evaluates much of the existing scholarship in the field and incorporates sources that had previously been insufficiently utilized, including Turkish, British, and US archival documents and national and local newspapers. Particularly with respect to the early Cold War years, the study presents historians with a considerable amount of new information, especially regarding Turkey’s economic relations with the United States, Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the trajectory of international politics through institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Through this valuable documentation, the book’s primary attempt to analyze how Turkey, with the Democrat Party (DP) in power, adapted to the Cold War international conditions, and how this integration was challenged in domestic politics, finds a strong stand in argumentation.
A further notable contribution of the study lies in its departure from previously preferred periodization frameworks, offering a new perspective for analyzing the political behavior of actors of the era. The first three chapters repeat the general periodization followed in most of the early accounts on the period. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 expand the remaining years of the DP in power, namely the period from 1954 to 1960, and analyze how the DP governments tried to cope with the escalating economic crisis. This kind of periodization became useful to maintain the transition of the DP politics from “liberal” to “illiberal” state. Another important contribution emerges in the analysis of local political organizations. Understanding how the DP succeeded in organizing alliances and networks of relations at the local level is crucial to grasping this period. In this respect, Silverman’s use of Balıkesir and Malatya as case studies in provincial politics is a productive methodological approach for tracing both local actors and the local manifestations of broader political developments. Although the two provinces are discussed in a separate section at the beginning of the book, this distinction remains integrated into the broader narrative throughout. The text might have been clearer, and the two cases easier to compare, if this regional differentiation had been maintained in separate sections throughout the rest of the study.
Silverman employs a modernist, elite-centered historical narrative that builds on the dominant sociological and anthropological approaches of the 1950s and 1960s, drawing on the widespread availability of biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs. By following a classical prosopographic approach, Silverman invites readers to analyze the seemingly complex world of the political elites who influenced the postwar political landscape. While this method is valuable for understanding the period, it also produces certain limitations in explaining the broader political climate. In the broadest sense, the ideological differences and the impact of political discourse often remain relatively invisible outside elite struggles. However, as recent scholarship using the tools of social and intellectual history has shown, the 1950s were not shaped solely by DP elites and international creditor institutions, but constituted a dynamic arena of political struggle involving workers, peasants, and intellectuals (see Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık (1946–1967), İstanbul: İletişim, 2010; Barış Alp Özden, Working Class Formation in Turkey, 1946–1962: Work, Culture, and the Politics of the Everyday, New York: Berghahn Books, 2024; Cangül Örnek, Türkiye’nin Soğuk Savaş Düşünce Hayatı: Antikomünizm ve Amerikan Etkisi, İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2015; Sinan Yıldırmaz, Politics and the Peasantry in Post-War Turkey: Social History, Culture and Modernization, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016). It is important to note here that, in discussing rural-to-urban migration in the 1950s (p. 145), Silverman reiterates older assumptions about a direct relationship between mechanization, understood in terms of tractorization, and migration, without adequately engaging the relevant critiques raised in recent scholarship.
A similar methodological issue arises in the analysis of the section in which Sıtkı Yırcalı identifies himself and several other DP deputies as “the Yaylacılar,” an analogy to the Montagnards in the French Revolution (pp. 96–98). With reference to Theda Skocpol, Silverman interprets this term as referring to the social origins of parliamentary elites. This reflects his significant focus on the social backgrounds of elites from the DP and the Republican People’s Party (CHP), particularly in discussions of their political outlooks and ideological differences. However, Yırcalı employs the term to describe a consistent oppositional stance within parliament or the party group, rather than an elite background.
The book also leaves two fundamental political questions – why the transition to multi-party politics was preferred in the postwar period, and why the military coup occurred in 1960 – underexplored. Although these questions might seem secondary in a study centered on international economic relations and elite interactions, discussing them in light of Silverman’s extensive data would greatly enhance the debate on “liberalism” and “illiberalism,” which is highlighted in the book’s subtitle. While Silverman emphasizes that the United States, as an ally during the Cold War, did not have significant concerns about whether Turkey’s political system was democratic, his discussion of why the CHP chose to transition to a multi-party regime remains rooted solely in the historical, individual, and conjunctural objections of the DP opposition elites. Similarly, although growing social unrest and reactions against the DP’s illiberal practices are mentioned in explaining the coup, their impact is evaluated as less significant than that of military interventions in neighboring countries. The reactions of DP elites to coups in other countries are analyzed effectively, yet domestic social unrest receives comparatively less attention. For example, the student protests of April and May 1960 and the 555K demonstration in Ankara appear somewhat peripheral. This reflects the book’s broader conception of politics as the management of outcomes produced by elite struggles. A similar approach is evident in its analysis of the elections. While changes in central and local elites are examined, the political participation of broader social groups through elections is not fully incorporated. However, the elections of May 14, 1950 represent a significant political milestone, as they marked the first instance in Ottoman–Turkish political history in which power was transferred through a popular vote – a precedent that would not be repeated for a considerable time. This alone warrants discussion of the roots of electoral politics in Turkey.
Another underexplored issue in the book is constitutional debates, which were arguably among the most decisive political discussions shaping the period. Allegations of constitutional violations, which later became central to the Yassıada trials after the coup, formed the core of CHP opposition rhetoric and contributed to legitimizing the coup. The CHP’s 1959 Declaration of Primary Objectives (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi) also outlined principles for the post-coup constitutional order. Silverman neither addresses this issue nor engages in a more concrete discussion of illiberalism through critiques of constitutional practice (see Sinan Yıldırmaz, 27 Mayıs Darbesi Sonrası Türkiye’de Yeni Rejimin Oluşturulması: Yassıada Mahkemeleri ve Anayasal Siyaset, Mülkiye Dergisi, Siyasal Rejim Özel Sayısı, 2025, 55–82).
Finally, it should be noted that the book’s discussion of illiberalism remains rather limited. Apart from a brief footnote distinguishing authoritarianism from illiberalism (p. 7), readers might expect a more extended theoretical discussion. Given the extensive contemporary literature on illiberalism and authoritarian regimes, it would have been useful to clarify which conceptual framework best explains this period. In a study that begins and ends with references to the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey, a clearer explanation of how the concept of illiberalism functions historically would have strengthened the book’s relevance for understanding the present.
In comparison with the CHP’s post-1945 reforms to adapt to the Cold War context, the extent to which the DP can be considered liberal remains debatable. This point is subtly acknowledged by Silverman. In this sense, DP liberalism appears less ideological and more pragmatic, which can be defined largely as an anti-CHP liberalism. Considering the book’s detailed analysis of economic policies, it is difficult to argue that the CHP and DP differed significantly in economic terms beyond conjunctural variations. The same applies to international relations: the CHP did not present a comprehensive opposition to developments such as Korea, NATO, and CENTO. Both parties largely agreed on the necessity of adapting Turkey’s politics to Cold War conditions. Turkey underwent structural transformation in parallel with global developments, but the persistence of older institutional structures, particularly the constitutional and administrative ones, created barriers, necessitating the emergence of a new and dynamic power bloc by 1950. That being the case, the comparison of negotiation skills involving the CHP and the DP with Cold War actors, presented in the book’s concluding paragraph (p. 275) within differing contexts, strikes the reader as an instance of presupposed partiality.
Every study on Turkey’s Cold War period advances historical knowledge and analysis, and Silverman’s work makes a significant contribution. In particular, the detailed examination of DP economic initiatives in the Cold War context and their local effects makes the book a valuable contribution. For readers working on or interested in this period, the study also encourages new questions and engagement with previously underutilized sources, thus exerting a meaningful impact on the field.
