In their book, Ralph Carter and James Scott join a growing number of scholars in proclaiming the need to reevaluate the conventional wisdom of presidential dominance in foreign affairs. An exclusive focus on the executive, the authors contend, misses the important roles that members of Congress have played in shaping American foreign policy, from the beginning of the Cold War through the War on Terror.

Choosing to Lead makes three main arguments. First, it asserts that a new picture of robust congressional engagement of foreign policy emerges when the focus of analysis shifts from the actions of the institution as a whole to the individual maneuverings of its constituent members. While not all members engage foreign policy concerns, many do. Moreover, members interested in foreign policy are not simply reactive participants in the policymaking process who merely respond to events as they arise. Rather, members act as “foreign policy entrepreneurs” (FPEs) who proactively engage foreign policy issues of concern in an effort to shape policy in accordance with their ideas of good public policy. Second, the book argues that congressional FPEs rely on maneuvers other than simply endeavoring to write their preferences into law. While direct legislative strategies are important, FPEs engage in a range of tactics, from raising issues with executive branch officials to holding hearings to writing op-eds in an attempt to influence the conduct of foreign policy. Finally, the book argues that by means of a combination of legislative and nonlegislative strategies, FPEs have exerted substantial influence over many aspects of foreign policy, from questions of war and peace to foreign aid priorities to the structure and operations of foreign intelligence and policy agencies within the executive branch.

To test these claims, Carter and Scott create an impressive original quantitative data set of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship. By scouring 25 years of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac they identify more than 2,600 instance of foreign policy entrepreneurship, and they code each instance for the nature of the policy change advocated, the characteristics of the entrepreneur, and the means used to pursue the policy goal. The authors then use this data to test a series of hypotheses about variance in entrepreneurship activities, both over time and across individual members. The data are mostly consistent with hypothesized over-time trends in entrepreneurship. Similarly, cross-tabs from the data—for example, comparisons of the percentages of entrepreneurship activities originating in the House versus the Senate or within the majority party versus the minority party—also largely support the authors' hypotheses. A more robust empirical analysis, such as an event count model of entrepreneurial activity across members, would strengthen this component of the book. It would allow the authors both to investigate the relative influence of the hypothesized factors in driving variance in entrepreneurship and to assess additional hypotheses raised in the book, but not tested in the existing analysis (such as the hypothesized relationships between seniority or constituency characteristics and entrepreneurship). Nevertheless, the quantitative data clearly demonstrate that instances of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship are far from rare occurrences and that FPEs have engaged a diverse range of policies, including important strategic debates over the nature of the nation's foreign policy goals and the proper instruments for achieving them.

To illustrate more concretely the full range of strategies and access points that congressional FPEs have used to pursue their policy goals and to assess the influence of such efforts on policy outcomes, the book continues with three case study chapters. The first examines the prominence of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship even in the period of the Cold War consensus. The second examines the changing nature of congressional foreign policy engagement in the post-Tet period of Cold War dissension during the Vietnam War (1968–1989). And the third examines the role of FPEs in the post–Cold War world. Each chapter begins with a quick overview of some of the most important examples of entrepreneurship in the period and then continues with case studies describing the careers of individual FPEs who made an important mark on the foreign affairs of the period. The book concludes with a brief quantitative and qualitative analysis of congressional entrepreneurship in the war on terror.

The case studies excel in showing readers the full extent of congressional involvement in major questions of foreign affairs over the past 60 years and in highlighting the wide range of tactics that FPEs have used, particularly those aside from direct legislation. However, the case studies are less successful in demonstrating conclusively the causal influence of many examples of congressional entrepreneurship in effecting concrete changes in policy outcomes. While some legislative efforts, such as Pat McCarran's (D-NV) channeling of aid to Franco's regime in Spain or Charlie Wilson's (D-TX) tireless efforts to fund the mujahideen in Afghanistan, undoubtedly influenced policy, the linkages between other legislative provisions and significant policy changes are less clear. For example, the case studies frequently emphasize how FPEs attached amendments to funding measures requiring various presidential certifications or reports, with the authors asserting that such provisions hamstrung executive authority. Yet, Barbara Hinckley and other scholars reviewed in the book have argued that such certifications and reporting requirements represent merely the illusion of struggle and yield little substantive influence (e.g., Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye, 1994). Carter and Scott clearly disagree; however, the case studies often do too little to convince skeptics that such restrictions really did influence the president's decision calculus. Additional evidence, including perhaps archival materials from presidential libraries and other sources, would greatly bolster the authors' claims.

Skeptics will likely also remain unconvinced by the book's many assertions that members' nonlegislative activities, such as writing op-eds and holding press conferences, have systematically influenced the direction of foreign policy. While the underlying argument is compelling, demonstrating policy influence from such activities is exceedingly difficult. This difficulty is only exacerbated by the authors' decision to emphasize breadth over depth in the historical analysis. While the resulting substantive and temporal scope is impressive, this strategy limits the ability of any individual case study to trace carefully the causal pathways through which specific actions of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship altered the political calculations of the president and, in turn, caused the president to adopt policies different from those he would have pursued in the absence of congressional involvement. Although some of the cases asserting congressional influence through nonlegislative means (such as the discussion of House Speaker Jim Wright's personal diplomacy in Latin America) are quite convincing, for others, skeptical readers will almost certainly demand more evidence that the actions taken by FPEs are genuinely influential and not instances of mere “position taking.”

Despite these concerns, Choosing to Lead offers an important challenge to those who dismiss the legislature's continued importance in shaping the course and conduct of American foreign policy. It will be of interest to scholars of Congress, the presidency, and foreign policy alike.