There is one thing that Taiwan scholars want: for Taiwan to be taken seriously on its own terms, for its political complexities and democratic development to be recognized, and for Taiwan to exist beyond just a foil to post-1949 PRC history. Revolutionary Taiwan: Making Nationhood in a Changing World Order convincingly shows how and why scholars and citizens around the world ought to do so.

There is one central thesis of this book: people in Taiwan want to maintain their de-facto sovereignty, and they do not want to become part of the PRC. For those who live in Taiwan, making such a point feels almost monotonous, since according to public opinion research, such a desire has become a lived reality in Taiwan for years. However, for those outside Taiwan, claiming that people in Taiwan do not want to be part of the PRC is, as the book claims, revolutionary: “[w]hile Taiwan’s nationhood remains a radical position from the perspective of the post-World War II international system, this nationhood is normal to Taiwanese people and already broadly accepted by them” (p. 5).

Rather than writing a pop-introduction or deeply academic investigation of Taiwanese identity or history, Revolutionary Taiwan strikes a tone somewhere in-between. While this book is not an act of original research, it summarizes works by Taiwan-studies scholars in a way that becomes accessible for other academically minded readers. Over four chapters that function as stand-alone essays in support of the main thesis, the authors argue a number of connected points about Taiwanese identity, why Taiwan is marginalized in the world today, and how we ought to see this complex state in today’s international system.

The first chapter explores the idea of the “Two Chinas” who claim Taiwan – the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). The authors make the argument that it is the PRC that keeps the ROC in place today. They further argue, however, that it is the combination of both PRC and ROC that keeps Taiwan and any notion of a unique Taiwaneseness marginalized, despite civil society’s desire for normalcy. In the second chapter, they offer four different versions of Taiwanese history, each exemplifying Taiwan’s unique development. While at times intertwined with China, these retellings of history go far beyond any notion that the PRC and Taiwan have “since ancient times” shared one cohesive history. Their emphasis on Indigenous history, something often missing from any study of Taiwan, is particularly welcome. In their third chapter, they present the story of “Chinese Taipei,” a novel look at how the awkward name Taiwan must use at the Olympics and the various names Taipei and Taiwan have had to use depending on the regime in power. Finally, chapter four articulates how in today’s global order, Taiwan is seen as a “problem” or an “issue” rather than a place in the world where people have demands for meaningful self-determination.

There is a normative dimension to the book’s argument, one that the authors wholeheartedly acknowledge throughout their writing. In the first pages, the authors note that their writing is political, and that to advocate for a Taiwanese nation and Taiwanese nationhood is a necessity to their main message. At times, the authors’ references to public opinion data and use of the concept of “Taiwanese people” assumes a shared common understanding of what Taiwanese people mean when they identify as “Taiwanese,” what they want for their shared future, and how they relate to the ROC and PRC.

For example, like most studies of Taiwanese identity, this book regularly references two public opinion graphs from National Chengchi University, one that shows how Taiwanese people identify, and one that shows whether people in Taiwan support independence, unification or the status quo. Political scientists widely accept, based on these graphs and numerous other studies of public opinion, that when given a choice between Chinese, Taiwanese, or both, most people in Taiwan identify as Taiwanese, or Taiwanese and Chinese. Hardly anyone identifies as exclusively Chinese. We also know, however, that the vast majority of people in Taiwan do not want unification with the PRC. Instead, they want the status quo – an ambiguous moniker that infers no major change to Taiwan’s current de-facto sovereign status.

While certainly a large swath of Taiwanese people would endorse how these authors’ frame what it means to be Taiwanese and what it means to be pro-status quo or pro-independence, at times the language of the book infers perhaps broader support than either public opinion data or voting results would indicate.

The normative undertone, however, does not detract from the book’s main point: that Taiwanese nationhood is real, and that the world ought to recognize it to be as legitimate as any other national identity. At a time when more ink is being spilt fearmongering about Taiwan as simply a “flashpoint” or place stuck between the PRC and the United States, this book feels particularly cathartic to read. It will become an important resource for both Taiwan and China scholars respectively.