Compton's theoretical analysis is developed from a central empirical finding that party systems in the democracies of East and Southeast Asia are systematically different from those in the industrial societies in Europe, North America, and Oceania. In particular, the analysis focuses upon “competitiveness” and is based on an index that has two distinct components: (1) the fractionalization of the system as measured by the partisan dispersion of seats in the national parliament and (2) the variety in the system as measured by the difference in the proportions of seats controlled by parties representing the “power elite” of business, the military, and the bureaucracy and by those representing other, nonelite sectors of society. Statistical analysis demonstrates that the party systems in Asian democracies are considerably less competitive than in other industrialized nations. Moreover, increasing levels of industrialization and urbanization do not bring greater party competitiveness in Asia, thereby controlling (at least crudely) for their status as late developers.

One easily discernible explanation for these findings is that the emphasis in Asian cultures on respect for authority and community solidarity, as opposed to the assumedly paramount Western values of individual freedom and autonomy, shape political parties that differ significantly from their Western counterparts. Compton's theoretical model, however, goes far beyond such a simplistic static comparison. Instead (and almost certainly appropriately so for cultural analysis), the author takes a much longer historical perspective and views political development in these nations as an integral consequence of their economic development strategy. During the postwar era, first capitalist East Asia and then Southeast Asia cast their fates to the winds of the international marketplace. Their development strategies, however, were far different from Anglo-American laissez-faire practice and reflected instead a “Confucian” or communitarian capitalism led by developmental states that were generally authoritarian. The stupendous success of exportled Confucian capitalism ultimately challenged these political regimes by expanding the educated middle classes, who pushed for political reform. The governmental elites, in turn, eventually responded with a “top-down” form of democratization that differed significantly from Western democracy.

In the developmental state model, as adumbrated by Compton, Asian governments, especially the economic and financial bureaucracies, created their developmental states by melding modern and traditional components in a very creative manner. In the economic realm, they were quite modern as they created internationally competitive industries. They essentially turned to the traditional culture, however, for their political legitimacy, which was based on a combination of three sources in Asian cultural values: (1) respect for authority and for government officials, who are seen as a “guardian class''; (2) patron-client relationships that are part of paternalistic authority patterns; and (3) a greater concern for community and family than for the individual.

The political cultures in East and Southeast Asia were largely constructed by the elites in these developmental states—bureaucrats, the military, corporate leaders, and (where elections were permitted) electoral politicians. Compton, to sum up, conceptualizes the economic and political development of Asian democracies as going through a series of stages defined by the relative power of these four elite segments. He then applies the model to three case studies—Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. The first two, despite significant differences in the ability of their developmental states to gain popular legitimacy, fit the model quite well. The fit is not quite so good for Thailand, but the hypothesized developmental stages can be discerned there, too.

This analysis also has implications regarding the quality of Asian democracy. Elites success in leading economic development and the nature of the prevailing political culture combined to limit participation in the Asian democracies that did evolve, in particular by continuing the near exclusion of labor, students, women's groups, and environmentalists from positions of influence. In addition, the emergence of strong parties was prevented by several factors, including the strength of government bureaucracies, the prevalence of patron-client ties, and the marginalization (even after democratization) of groups outside the traditional power elite. Consequently, Compton challenges both sides in the democracy versus Asian values debate. On the one hand, the assertion of conventional modernization theory that Western-inspired capitalism and democracy are spreading around the world is clearly invalid; rather, economic and political development in Asia constitutes modernization without westernization. On the other hand, the fusion of economic and political elites based on Asian values creates problems as well. Corporate leaders have used economic power to subvert democracy, and the pursuit of economic gain by politicians delegitimizes the state.

Overall, Compton's model is a valuable heuristic tool that should make us think more deeply about important aspects of the political economies in East and Southeast Asia. It needs to be extended in several important regards, however. First, the book provides very little direct description and analysis of democratic politics in the region. For example, the scores of the individual countries on the two components of the party competitiveness index are not given; and the case studies of South Korea and Thailand overwhelmingly treat the predemocratic era. Second, as Compton's treatment of Thailand suggests, the nature of the state and its relationship to the economy vary widely in the region. Third, this also suggests that a much more nuanced use of Asian culture would be valuable. For example, Lucian Pye's Asian Power and Politics (1985) presents a typology of political cultures that appears well suited for differentiating the political and economic structures in the region.