The memoirs of Direk Jayanama, the former Thai foreign minister and wartime ambassador to Japan, have been essential reading for students of Thailand's role in World War II for more than forty years. Publishers recently released a revised English edition to mark the one-hundredth anniversary of Direk's birth. The most obvious alteration involves the editor's decision to change the book's title, inserting “Thailand” in favor of the original “Siam.” This is somewhat ironic, given Direk's preference for the more traditional “Siam,” but reflects the editor's desire to conform to modern standards. Also new is a tribute penned by writer and activist Sulak Sivaraksa, who laments that current Thai leaders lack Direk's “moral courage and gentleness in refusing to serve dictatorial regimes” (p. ix).
Since its original publication, Thailand and World War II has been a critical source for shaping how historians have understood Thailand's role in the conflict. Direk intended his memoirs to serve as a record for future generations, so that they “could learn how Thailand was brought into the war, the part it played in this world conflict, and how we managed to avoid being thrown in turmoil and disaster following the defeat of Japan” (p. 133). The book is divided into three sections. Part I describes conditions in prewar Thailand, focusing on its foreign relations with France, Britain, and Japan. Part II discusses Thailand's situation during the war, including its alliance with Japan and the Free Thai movement. The final section examines Direk's role in Thailand's attempt to reestablish its international credibility following Japan's defeat and the return of the Allies to Southeast Asia.
Although he carefully avoids passing judgment on people or events, Direk structures his memoirs in order to establish a clear narrative on the war. Thailand appears as a small, neutral country forced to choose sides in a battle of global superpowers and, in the end, escapes serious harm because of the skillful diplomacy of its leaders. Direk explains how his country became the target of “economic warfare” long before the outbreak of hostilities in Southeast Asia, and he implies that Thailand was dragged into the war with no agenda other than the preservation of its independence. Most of the prewar section supports this conclusion, but the detailed account of the events of the 1940 Mekong border conflict raises critical questions. Direk describes the diplomatic process by which Phibun Songkhram attempted to strong-arm French Indochina into acknowledging Bangkok's claim over the “lost-territories,” but he fails to acknowledge that Thailand's expansionist efforts actually compromised national sovereignty by making it dependent on Japanese intervention.
In his middle section on the wartime era, Direk's memoirs offer an important perspective on the confused status of uncolonized Thailand within the Co-Prosperity Sphere. On the one hand, the country remained independent and an equal partner in the effort to drive Western imperialism from Asia and establish the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese forces in Thailand constituted a “guest army” rather than an occupying force. On the other hand, Direk distances himself from Phibun's embrace of Japan and includes only a paragraph on Thailand's declaration of war against the Allies. He also describes Bangkok's annoyance at being relegated to the purview of the Greater East Asian Ministry, a move that effectively placed Thailand on par with Indochina or the Philippines in Japan's estimation. Two essays by former Seri Thai members also provide background on domestic opposition to Phibun, including Pridi's clandestine cooperation with the United States and Great Britain.
In the final section on the war's aftermath, Direk assumes that Thailand has successfully retained its independence and avoided the fate of a defeated power. He points out that Thais harbor no resentment over the war, remembering how its citizens showed kindness to Japanese prisoners after the war, just as they had done earlier with Allied prisoners. He does not, however, directly address the question of whether postwar Thailand fits the category of a “defeated” or “occupied” nation, stating only that the thousands of British troops stationed in Thailand “were not invited” (p. 258), as opposed to the Japanese “guest army” that resided in the country from 1942 to 1945.
The book contains rich material on Thailand's postwar negotiations with the Allies (not including the Soviet Union), particularly the successful effort to avoid Britain's attempt to impose harsh reparations. Likewise, Franco-Thai diplomacy is presented as a triumph because it removes the final obstacle blocking Thailand's admission to the United Nations. There is no discussion of the nation's collective sense of humiliation and outrage when the four provinces (including the Preah Vihear temple, the focus of recent Thai-Cambodian tensions) must be returned to French Indochina.
During the past thirty years, scholars of Thailand have moved away from the perpetual independence narrative toward a discussion of the war within the context of Thai expansionism. Despite this shift, Thailand and World War II remains a critical milestone in Thai historiography, and it should be a starting point for any student interested in Thai foreign policy. Its continued publication will undoubtedly be welcomed by all scholars.
