Duncan Andrew Campbell, in English Public Opinion and the American Civil War, joins a growing number of British and American historians in search of an elusive historical prize. English opinion toward the American Civil War is elusive because opinions and attitudes differ dramatically from region to region and between classes. Many of these opinions stem more or less from economic circumstances and the often delayed war news from America. Traditionally, historians studying and writing about the American Civil War touch peripherally and often indirectly on the British response to the Civil War, but only recently have historians reactivated the search for a full understanding of this complex subject. Campbell's research examines a variety of new printed sources. He joins such noted historians as Richard Blackett (Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001]) in contributing significantly to our understanding of this involved topic.
Campbell explores the major events occurring in the United States that have direct impact on the English people. His study is divided into three major sections containing, respectively, the Morrill tariff and the blockade, the “Trent Outrage,” and Emancipation. Primarily using newspapers, periodicals, and editorial commentary, he explores the British response to most major occurrences that directly impact foreign policy decisions. While this is interesting and helpful, it fails to unwrap the prize. The prize remains only partially exposed. We need more research and interpretation of personal correspondence and privately published pamphlets, particularly from labor organizations and special interest groups. Public discourse provides a valuable insight but is only part of the quest for the elusive prize.
Perhaps Campbell's most significant contribution is a “brief synopsis of the literature” (3). In his analysis of the literature, Campbell defines the historiographical arguments in three categories: “the traditional interpretation, a revisionist critique, and a counter-reaction against the latter” (38). Historians throughout the years have referenced British public opinion in monographs on the Civil War, in diplomatic history text, and in studies of international relations, to mention only a few categories of historical inquiry. Campbell returns to many of these studies and extracts references to place various writers into one of his three categories. In many cases this sampling may be insufficient for accurately classifying the opinions of one or the other of these writers. However, the process is helpful and provides a backdrop for analyzing English public opinion in a larger context.
Campbell relies heavily on these secondary sources and draws conclusions about specific events and English opinion toward those events. This technique often results in oversimplification. For example, in referring to Secretary of State William H. Seward's response to the British ultimatum on the Trent incident, Campbell said, “He was not, unfortunately, to make a good job of it” (87). He fails to support his position that Seward's communiqué affected English public opinion. It likely affected the opinions of cabinet members who were privy to the correspondence and may in fact have affected public opinion at large. However, Campbell fails to identify any shift or change in public opinion resulting from Seward's flawed effort. Campbell further fails to include the opinions of Norman Ferris, who claims in The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977) that Seward's communiqué was an extraordinary response and conveyed subtle, but permanent, meaning. Moreover, Campbell relies overwhelmingly on published editorial comments and primarily those contained in London newspapers to support his position.
Campbell correctly calls our attention to the circumstances, other than the war in America, that affect English opinion toward a “most disagreeable people” (96). Neutrality in the American conflict was the ultimate goal of the English people. He argues that this opinion is not only reflected in official policy but was the consensus opinion of the public. The “Trent Outrage” is no exception. He rejects the traditional view that public opinion bordered on “hysteria” in favor of a more subdued, however concerned, public attitude toward this international event.
Campbell, in developing his arguments, frequently resorts to hyperbole. He continually uses parenthetical statements that may prevent the reader from focusing carefully on his point. When describing a visit by a group of British dignitaries to the United States and the possibility that they might have been influenced by a friendship with the Adams family, he claims that Massachusetts is “the most militant abolitionist state” (235). The citizens of New York might take issue with defining Massachusetts as the most abolitionist state. In any case, such statements are arguable and have little to do with the continuity of the argument. However, these are minor points. Campbell's research is helpful, and his analysis of English public discourse provides valuable contributions for those in search of the elusive prize of English public opinion and attitudes toward the American Civil War. Campbell, with his valuable inquiry, has joined scholars who understand the importance of public opinion in a free society. English Public Opinion and the American Civil War emphasizes a need for an expanded inquiry into this very important area of historical study.
