In the course of its 53 Stephanus pages Plato's Protagoras uses the verb διαλέγεσθαι 32 times: a frequency considerably greater than that of any other dialogue. The next largest total is 21 occurrences in the Theaetetus (68 Stephanus pages). In the vast bulk of the Republic διαλέγεσθαι occurs just 20 times over 294 Stephanus pages. The ratios are striking. In the Protagoras the verb turns up on average once every 1.65 Stephanus pages; in the Theaetetus once every 3.25 pages; in the Republic only once every 14.7. The statistics reflect a fact evident to any reader of the Protagoras and Theaetetus, that the first of these dialogues is Plato's most sustained treatment of the comparative merits of the many different forms of διαλέγεσθαι, the second his most ambitious exhibition of the type of dialectic (as he has taught us to call it) with which Socrates there wins his contest against Protagoras. It is the former dialogue that interests me here.

The verb, and hence the question of merit, comes up in Protagoras' very first speech in reply to Socrates' approach and introduction of young Hippocrates: Πότερον, ἔϕη, μόνῳ βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; (316b3). It is hard to find a translator who renders this right.Footnote ¹ W.K.C. Guthrie's ‘Do you wish to speak to me alone or with the others?’ can be matched over and over again.Footnote ² But see how Socrates will formulate the same question at 316c2–4: ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἴει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους, ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. Socrates employs the present infinitive διαλέγεσθαι where Protagoras had used the aorist infinitive διαλεχθῆναι. In the second passage Guthrie translates, ‘So now it is for you to decide whether you think this calls for a conversation between ourselves or with others’. Wrong again. ‘Do you wish for a conversation between ourselves or with the others?’ would have done for Protagoras' original question. But not for the later passage where Socrates throws the question back at him to decide. Let me explain.

In the dependent moods of a Greek verb (subjunctive, optative, infinitive, imperative) the contrast between aorist and present generally has nothing to do with time. It is a difference in aspect.Footnote ³ The aorist has perfective meaning, the present imperfective meaning. That is to say, the aorist views an event as a complete whole, whereas the present focusses on the internal stages leading up to completion. A good way to illustrate for Anglophone readers the difference between perfective and imperfective meaning is to compare ‘Next year I will write a book on Plato’ (perfective) and ‘Next year I will be writing a book on Plato’ (imperfective). The first assumes completion, the second does not. It could matter quite a lot which form you used in your grant application.

Now look at Protagoras 310e2–3: καὶ νῦν ἥκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῇς αὐτῷ. Guthrie's ‘… I have come to you, to persuade you to speak to him on my behalf’ is not wrong, but it hardly conveys the urgency of the aorist subjunctive (perfective). What Hippocrates wants Socrates to do for him is best put into English as ‘I have come to you to get you to have a word with him on my behalf’. The speaker is interested in the result, not the process. His impatience has been manifest since the very start of the dialogue, where he bursts into Socrates' bedroom to get himself taken to Protagoras NOW, even though it is not yet daylight and Protagoras will certainly not be up and about for a good while. The nuance is the difference between ‘speak to him’, which might go on and on, and ‘have a word with him’, which foresees a quick closure. We can convey the perfective aspect in English (as, conversely, French can do our imperfective continuous future by ‘je serai en train de …’). But it often takes a conscious effort which, sadly, Plato's translators have been reluctant to launch upon.

I say ‘sadly’ because aspect is part of Plato's rich vocabulary of dramatic characterization. Protagoras' perfective διαλεχθῆναι shows him foreseeing an end to the conversation before it has even begun; it will in fact end when he bluntly announces that it is time to stop and do something else (361e6).Footnote ⁴ Socrates' διαλέγεσθαι, by contrast, focusses on the ongoing process of discussion, which he is still anxious to continue at 361c–d, shortly before Protagoras calls a halt. Socrates can be translated ‘It is for you to decide whether we should talk alone or with others’. But Protagoras needs something like ‘Do you want us to have our talk alone or with the others?’Footnote ⁵

Eventually, at 317c4–5 Protagoras gives his decision:

This time Guthrie scores a triumph:

‘Say my say’ is brilliant. Yet the infinitive is present, i.e. imperfective. What now foresees closure is the definite article in τὸν λόγον. Guthrie can respond to that because it is closer to the way English expresses aspect (compare ‘have our talk’ and ‘have a word with’ above).

Another character-revealing aorist from Protagoras is 333b8–c5:

For which Guthrie produces the following translation:

Again, this is not exactly wrong, but it does not do justice to the perfective meaning of the aorist imperative. In effect, Protagoras is saying, ‘If you wish, get done arguing with the many first, and then come back to me and my views’. I read this as yet another expression of the aloof disdain for the masses that he exudes at several points in the dialogue (317a4–6, 352e3–4, 353a7–8).

Finally, an intriguing passage at 336b–c, where Alcibiades supports Socrates in his protest at Protagoras' insisting on his right to make long speeches:

For which Guthrie writes,

Close comparison with the Greek shows that Guthrie is no literalist. He will write in a word like ‘frankly’ if it brings out the tone of the original, and he is not afraid to use the most idiomatic English he can find. All he needs to convey the force of the aorist διαλεχθῆναι here is a change at 336c3–4 from ‘beats him in discussion’ to ‘beats him in a discussion’. What matters is that Plato has Alcibiades represent what Protagoras might agree to by repeating the contrast we first met at 316b–c between the sophist's perfective infinitive and Socrates' imperfective. These aspects are clearly part of the drama.

Socrates' focus on the ongoing process of discussion does not mean that he values discussing solely for its own sake. One unusual feature of this dialogue is that discussing is said to have a goal:

The imperfect διελεγόμεθα has imperfective meaning (‘we were discussing’), yet it is here said to have agreement as its goal or τέλος: ἵν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελὴς γένοιτο, where note the aorist optative with perfective meaning, i.e. ‘in order that the discussion should not turn out incomplete’; compare the perfective συνωμολογήσαμεν in line 7. The idea of a τέλος recurs at 347c2 and 348a9. At the close of the dialogue they have failed to reach agreement on the question of the teachability of virtue when Protagoras calls a halt, saying it is time to do something else. Socrates, however, would have preferred to see it through to the end: συνδιασκοποίην (361d6; cf. 349a8). In this compound the imperfective meaning of the present optative combines beautifully with the prefix διά to express the idea of an ongoing process directed towards a definite goal. Protagoras is plainly relieved to break off, but Socrates is sorry they have not reached agreement. From his point of view the discussion was an incomplete failure.

Yet he did have one striking success that day, and we were able to read him doing it. This was the opening discussion with Hippocrates in which Socrates queried the thoughtless haste with which the youth wanted to rush off to study with Protagoras. By the time they arrive in the doorway to Callias' house, Hippocrates is no longer in a rush. He is a model of calm who shares Socrates' desire to reach agreement on whatever it was they were discussing along the way. And the last word of the dialogue is first person plural: ‘we went away’, implying ‘we went away together’.Footnote ⁶