Emilian Kavalski takes a theoretical and conceptual approach to security governance in Central Asia and the normative powers, which he defines as the EU, China and India. In so doing, he aims to “uncover the dominant perceptions, cognitive structures and practices that guide the regional agency of Brussels, Beijing, and New Delhi” (p. 25). While he is successful in this endeavour, certain gaps remain uncovered or opened, with the book proving most useful for those interested more in theoretical and conceptual approaches on the subject. It offers an intriguing and broad overview of three emerging actors in Central Asia and the normative impact they have there. The biggest contribution, and it is significant, is that the security governance of Central Asia is viewed from a normative angle and not only from the ordinary actors. This makes the study both provocative and opens up a new way (in the Central Asian context) of analysing the region and the interest (and lack of interest) in it.
However, while Kavalski's theoretical rigour and discrimination is commendable, his case selection omits what potentially could have illuminated some interesting results. For instance, the US and Russia are disqualified as normative powers in this study, as apart from the selected cases “no one else seems intent on influencing conceptualizations of the ‘normal’ in Central Asia” (p. 8). Yet, arguably, the most normative power in Central Asia is Russia; a state that influences all states in the region in all aspects of society and is the single most important actor in the region, even if China has quickly emerged on the scene. While it has been more successful than the EU, China has nonetheless had some problems in terms of normative impact due to issues such as the “over usage” of Chinese workers in its projects in Central Asia as well as xenophobia on the part of local populations. With the potential exception of the EU (but not its member states), all states focus on short-term interests regarding their own security in terms of natural resources, economic development and combating extremism.
Moreover, China and India more often than not define their foreign policy in Central Asia against the emergence of other actors, not least the US and Russia. The failure to mention emerging states such as Turkey is also problematic, as arguably Turkey could have more impact on the security governance than India and even the EU. Russia, for its part, has been reluctant to see the SCO emerge as too strong a regional structure lest its own preferred structure, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), be threatened. It would have been interesting to see the difference between the normative impact of CIS and SCO.
The author provides an insightful analysis on how normative powers view the region, and the discrepancy between the regional agencies of the three cases are striking. However, an element not weighted into his analysis is the extent to which the Central Asian states seek to define and distinguish themselves from their neighbours, being reluctant to be grouped together in a Central Asian porridge. This, therefore, has an impact on the normative influence the external actors have had and could have. Furthermore, Central Asia as a region is also seen as secondary in importance by all the relevant states, not least China, and this is something that influences the potential normative impact in the region by leading the actors to adopt a realist perspective.
Indeed, the author does not mention the very realist policy that drives the respective foreign policies of China and India (and also the Central Asian states themselves), even if the EU could arguably pursue a more normative foreign policy. While China's normative influence in Central Asia has been growing, not least through the SCO (in competition with other regional mechanisms), the driving force behind its foreign policy is a realist perspective that overrides all other aspects.
Further open to question is whether the definition of Central Asia as limited to the five Central Asian republics is accurate in terms of security governance. The inclusion of Afghanistan would have been more useful (as a Greater Central Asia of sorts) as the Central Asian states define their security in terms of domestic stability and stability in Afghanistan. Similarly China views Central Asia in terms of internal security (Xinjiang) and the stabilization of the region at large, something that is, again, closely related to Afghanistan. India also views Afghanistan as a crucial component in its own security discourse (and relations with Pakistan). This would also have provided a more accurate historical connection as Afghanistan, including other parts of the region, are inextricably linked as part of an extended region.
Kavalski has made a valuable conceptual and theoretical contribution; it is the first study to adopt the approach used here. It is a refreshing and thought-provoking book that reveals the differences among three different emerging foreign policy actors.
