This excellent and informative book sheds new light on a set of classic questions about China's post-Mao political economy: with the legitimization of private capital, have private entrepreneurs developed group cohesiveness? If so, how has private capital sought to influence the state in the group's interest? Have such efforts succeeded? At base, what is the relationship between private capitalists and the state?
To answer these questions, political scientists Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert argue that entrepreneurs have indeed developed a shared identity (Bourdieu's “common field position”) and interest. As such, they constitute a “strategic group,” bound together by a desire to maintain access to material resources, power and status, as well as to solidify the place of private capital. The authors conclude that, in their actions, “private entrepreneurs pursue manifold strategies to pursue their interests, which go far beyond parochial rent-seeking or individual protection by party state cadres” (xix). The book's title plays on James C. Scott's concept of “weapons of the weak”; even those without formal position or status maintain considerable sources of power. Heberer and Schubert's formulation contrasts with much of the extant literature arguing that private entrepreneurs are largely co-opted by the state and as a group remain politically weak, even as their economic clout has grown considerably.
Heberer and Schubert have spent portions of many years in various locations in China carrying out interviews and other fieldwork related to private entrepreneurs. The empirics centre on private capital's connections and influence at the local level. Such intrepid pursuit by non-Chinese scholars, using qualitative interviews that they quote extensively, is increasingly uncommon and probably will become less so in future years, given research restrictions. This aspect of the research, as well as the extensive use of Chinese language sources from journalists and scholars, should not go unnoticed. Nor should the fact that, even as political scientists, they draw usefully on theory developed primarily in sociology to assess group behaviour.
The two core empirical chapters examine channels through which entrepreneurs seek to influence the state. Chapter four, on formal channels, lodges its argument in the observation that the success of much government policy depends on the actions of the private sector. This mutual dependence allows entrepreneurs access that they can then use to shape the relationship with the state. The analysis focuses considerable attention on how entrepreneurs actively seek positions in – and, as a result, make up substantial portions of – formal “representative” institutions at the local level: people's congresses and people's consultative congresses. Much of their activity in these bodies comes in the form of submitting proposals. A significant conclusion with regard to participation in these bodies is that large firms are more likely to seek changes on behalf of the private sector as a whole, rather than for parochial interests. Business associations are yet another channel; their influence depends largely on the quality of guanxi with officials. To the chagrin of association leadership, various 2015 government rules sought to distance associations and officials by halting the revolving door between party-state officials and private associations.
On informal channels, the book focuses on strategic actions in the form of clubs and alumni associations, as well as – in a novel form of what the authors term “connective” action – WeChat and other online social fora. The mechanism for influence is the mobilization of members to express views and otherwise use informal connections to the state.
While there is very much to like about this insightful book, I note three issues that deserve consideration in future work. First, influence is a notoriously tricky concept to operationalize and prove. As noted, the authors delineate multiple ways in which private entrepreneurs strive to exert influence. But exactly when and the degree to which they have shifted policy or outcomes to suit their interests in a non-random fashion is not clear. To their credit, Heberer and Schubert are aware of this problem and do not try to obscure it. The actual influence of the capitalist class remains an issue ripe for creative research.
Second, has the crackdown on private investment in some sectors that emerged especially strongly in 2021 (directed against tutoring and e-commerce, among other areas) affected the core properties of entrepreneurship? Interviewees quoted in the volume, particularly smaller-scale entrepreneurs, make it clear they are aware of the risks of pressing “too hard” against the state, and the punishments that such action may elicit. The sense of insecurity they express appears to have deepened, and it warrants asking how this weighs against the confidence that is often portrayed in the book.
Finally, the landscape of private entrepreneurship is changing rapidly. Policy to create a “mixed” economy has meant that in many sectors the government has encouraged cross-investment between state and private firms. While SOEs may take only small stakes in private firms (and vice versa), it is plausible that control of business decisions in the private sector is now more infused with political agendas. The authors discuss the pros and cons, from the viewpoint of entrepreneurs, of having Party cells in private firms. Their findings can be updated with information on new types of financial stakes by SOEs, and whether and how such trends affect the identity and “strategic actions” of entrepreneurs. Elsewhere, I and co-authors Meg Rithmire and Kellee Tsai (“Party-state capitalism in China,” Current History, 2021) have noted how these emerging features of China's political economy foster the blurring of lines between private entrepreneurs and the state. These features suggest possibly new constraints on deployment of “weapons of the rich.”
