The need for an absolute manifested itself in many different ways, assumed different disguises, and found different solutions. Its function within the political sphere, however, was always the same: it was needed to break two vicious circles, the one apparently inherent to human law-making, and the other inherent in the petitio principii which attends every new beginning, that is, politically speaking, in the very task of foundation.
Hannah ArendtFootnote 1Arendt, Memory Studies, and the Postwar Dilemma
For Hannah Arendt the “crisis of authority”—the fact that “authority has vanished from the modern world”Footnote 2—was the defining characteristic of the modern era. The disappearance of authority, a concept “once fundamental to political theory,”Footnote 3 was the background condition that overdetermined the modern political malaise. This crisis was made manifest in the modern era's two novel political creations: revolutions and totalitarianism. Revolutions, for Arendt, were attempts at reestablishing the realm of political freedom which had been lost to the world with the hope of founding a new authority. Inversely, totalitarianism was defined as a new regime type that functioned and flourished in the destruction of human plurality, and through the negation of authority.Footnote 4 Successful revolutions, understood by Arendt as the constructions of polities with an authority capable of allowing and fostering political freedom, are contingent on the nature of the absolute from which their constitutions take a referent. In On Revolution, Arendt depicts two paths taken in the modern era. The American path took as its absolute the historical act of foundation itself in which, in turn, the authority of the constitution could be anchored. Here, Arendt asserts a direct relation between the positive political act of founding—of acting in concert on the basis of mutual promise, of new beginnings—and the authority which the deed itself, manifest in the constitution, ultimately held in anchoring the legitimacy of the republic. By contrast, the French revolutionaries took as their absolute referent the abstract figure of the nation—a figure which presupposed a homogenous political voice and its sovereign status and which loomed ever-presently over the political sphere, thereby inviting the perpetual and tumultuous refoundation of the regime.
These preliminaries, to which we will return, allow us to frame the puzzle of postwar Germany: how are we to explain the fact that Germany, the locus of Nazi totalitarianism, could, in a matter of four decades, realize what can only be called a new authority productive of political stability? How is it possible that this new authority can take as its point of departure and constant point of reference the negative absolute—indeed, for Arendt the antipolitical absolute—of the Holocaust? Finally, what does this case tell us about the relationship between authority and the absolute?
The key to explaining this perplexity, we will claim, is to be found in an idiosyncratic feature of postwar German politics. Although Arendt has appeared as a subject of interest in the highly productive field of “memory studies,” Arendtian approaches to understanding politics are rarely directly applied to the analysis of memory politics. This is unfortunate because the Arendtian lens, as we will try to show, allows us to understand many of the particularities behind failed and changing memory regimes in Germany. Inversely, memory politics can be productively understood as addressing questions of the absolute and authority. Indeed, Arendt is quite insistent on the centrality of memory politics to her understanding of authority and the absolute. Conceptions of a negative absolute in the German and European contexts have been proposed by observers like Lothar ProbstFootnote 5 and Helmut DubielFootnote 6 and are especially evident in theoretical elaborations on constitutional patriotism,Footnote 7 in which the collective memory of the Holocaust was presented as the motivational background from which notions of political belonging could be thought anew. They have also been widely debated in public, and, in turn, historically analyzed.Footnote 8
However, we argue that the full political function of Holocaust memory in the German case is not only evident in the commemoration of the genocide and the political conclusions taken from it (i.e., constitutional patriotism, negative nationalism), but also found in a recent reflective phase in which the process of “working through the past” itself is remembered, internalized, politicized, and reflected upon. As we will show, Arendt's account of authority and its relation to an absolute provides a rich conceptual background against which to think through this dynamic in the German context. We argue that an authority in the Arendtian sense only fully emerged in recent German discourses about the memory of the Holocaust.Footnote 9
Authority, Foundations, and the Absolute
For Arendt, authority establishes a hierarchy of rule and measures for moral evaluation and political judgment. Authority does not violently subordinate the weak to the strong, instead it only exists where both parties share an understanding of the legitimacy of the hierarchy itself.Footnote 10 Like politics, authority is antithetical to violence.Footnote 11 Authority, however, is defined by its prepolitical nature insofar as it functions outside the realm of discursive contestation, persuasive speech, and political action. Instead, authority sets limits, guides actions, and demarcates goals. Politics functions in the present and projects itself forward, authority functions from the past to shape the present.Footnote 12
In Arendt's account, the political concept of authority was invented by Plato and later realized in practice by the Romans.Footnote 13 The impetus for the invention was to find a form of rule that would enable the continuity of the philosophical life in the body politic: to guard philosophy and philosophers from the demos.Footnote 14 Plato's attempted solution to the problem was to circumscribe the political sphere in transcendental moral categories with a concomitant ideology for nonphilosophers, exemplified by the “myth of the metals” in the Republic.Footnote 15 For Arendt, the failure of Plato's model of authority was made evident in its ultimate reliance on violence in the creation of a regime safe for philosophical pursuits.Footnote 16
The crucial Roman revision to this project was to shift the source of authority from the realm of the philosophically real and ideology to the realm of the mythical past.Footnote 17 Thereby the Romans could stake political authority in worldly apparent and political actionable myths as opposed to the philosophical abstractions and ideological systems of Plato.Footnote 18 This had the subsidiary effect of stemming the normality of new foundations typical of Greek politics and replacing it with the singular foundation of Rome, “the central, decisive, unrepeatable beginning of their whole history, a unique event.”Footnote 19 Arendt describes the “conviction of the sacredness of foundation” which reflectively and retrospectively attributed to the foundational myth a power that would remain “binding for all future generations.”Footnote 20 Politics for the Romans, Arendt tells us, was always backward looking; indeed politics was understood as a returning to, and augmentation of, the foundation itself.
While the modern “crisis of authority” was apparent in its fullest in the twentieth century,Footnote 21 intonations of the coming crisis were already politically manifest in the revolutions of the eighteenth century. Machiavelli, however, presaged the crisis of authority much earlier, and for this reason reintroduced the concept of new foundations to the political theoretical tradition. Against the torpor of medieval politics and the politically emasculating weight of Christianity, Machiavelli set out to recover the historical-conceptual grounds for founding new republics. “The greatness of his rediscovery,” Arendt writes, “lies in that he could not simply revive or resort to an articulate conceptual tradition, but had himself to articulate those experiences which the Romans had not conceptualized but rather expressed in terms of Greek philosophy vulgarized for this purpose.”Footnote 22 Unlike Leonardo Bruni, for example, who set out to write the history of Florence as continuous with the history of Rome in order to reclaim Roman authority,Footnote 23 Machiavelli recognized that the break had been made, and the memory of Rome's greatness could no longer serve to enable and direct political action. Instead, Machiavelli used the ancient histories as tactical guides for a revolutionary new foundation.Footnote 24
This brings us to what Arendt understood as the essential dilemma inherent to Machiavelli's thought: the integral feature of Roman politics which Machiavelli sought to rediscover—the politics of new foundations—was not availed in the histories, instead it was garbed in myth. The myth of foundation became the central impediment for those wanting to found new regimes exactly because its status as myth occluded the actual politics of new beginnings. Without an understanding of how to establish a new worldly authority and with alternative myths of fratricidal beginnings misleading him,Footnote 25 Machiavelli turned to violence as the only means for building new foundations. Therefore, “like the Romans,” Arendt writes, “Machiavelli . . . felt founding was the central political action, the one great deed that established the public-political realm and made politics possible; but unlike the Romans, to whom this was an event of the past, they [Machiavelli and Robespierre] felt that for this supreme ‘end’ all ‘means,’ and chiefly the means of violence, were justified.”Footnote 26
For Arendt, it was the revolutions themselves that revealed the fallacy of Machiavelli's approach: new authority, it was discovered, could not be constructed ex nihilo, authority required a reference to an absolute in order to break the spells of relativism and positivism inherent to new foundations. Violence could not suffice, as violence imparted no prepolitical credence to the institution it created, just the opposite. The use of violence in founding a regime only lent credence to those who would use violence to achieve their goals.Footnote 27 The discovery of the requirement for an absolute was surprising for the republican revolutionaries because they understood themselves to be acting exactly against the monarchical claims to legitimacy in reference to divine right. Nevertheless, it was made politically inescapable when the threatening relativity of the constitutional beginnings necessitated that the founders identify an absolute from which to posit the legitimacy of the constitution itself. The foundational myths of Rome concealed that even democratic republics required an absolute referent.
Which brings us to the second discovery: all absolutes are not created equal and different absolutes entail different political outcomes. For Arendt, the different absolutes finally subscribed to by the American and French revolutionaries would come to define and differentiate their success and failure. In the American case, Arendt argued that in the midst of creating their constitution, in light of their shared common-law inheritance and tradition of political action, and having won the War of Independence, the Americans found their absolute in the existential “world-revealing” act of political foundation itself. Arendt writes,
The very fact that the men of the American Revolution thought of themselves as “founders” indicates the extent to which they must have known that it would be the act of foundation itself, rather than an Immortal Legislator or self-evident truth or any other transcendent, transmundane source, which eventually would became [sic] the foundation of authority in the new body politic. From this it follows that it is futile to search for an authority to break the vicious circle in which all beginning is inevitably caught, because this “authority” lies in the very act of beginning itself.Footnote 28
That is, the “positive” absolute to which democratic foundations could be anchored was to be found in the revelatory nature of political action itself—most spectacularly in the very act of foundation—and, post facto, in the memory thereof crystallized in the constitution.Footnote 29 Whereas the Roman republican tradition enabled the institutionalization and constitutionalization of power, for Arendt it is the Grecian elements of politics—the rudimentary capacity for new beginnings inherent to all political action—which would provide the absolute referent of authority in the American case.Footnote 30 The constitution was informed by practiced politics and was anchored to the ancients through the political-philosophical interests of the Founding Fathers, but the absolute to which it made reference was found in the act of foundation itself. Thus, in the American case, the beginning itself contained the seed of political action, of promise, and the promise of acting in concert.Footnote 31 Foundations are to constitutions—to use Arendt's language from The Human Condition—as action is to speech, and without the latter the former would, Arendt tells us, “lose it revelatory character.”Footnote 32
Arendt sometimes appears to hold that the foundation of Rome and the foundation of the American republic were two instances of the same phenomenon.Footnote 33 Hence, Arendt concludes the long quotation above writing that:
In a way, this has always been known, though it was never fully articulated in conceptual thought for the simple reason that the beginning itself, prior to the era of revolution, has always been shrouded in mystery and remained an object of speculation. The foundation which now, for the first time, had occurred in the broad daylight to be witnessed by all who were present had been, for thousands of years, the object of foundation legends in which imagination tried to reach out into a past and to an event which memory could not reach.Footnote 34
Perhaps because of the determining weight that Arendt ascribes to beginnings, she implies that systems that are similarly productive of conditions which allow for political freedom must have shared a similar founding.
In the French case, by contrast, the absolute referent was found in the abstract notion of the nation. Here Arendt turns to Sieyès. In What Is the Third Estate, Sieyès lays out why the representatives of the third estate should hold all sovereign rights of the nation and become the basis of the new constitution. The nation, for Sieyès, stood as the voice of the natural laws, always unitary, unerring, and looming over and threatening the legitimacy of the positive laws.Footnote 35 The nation, first presented as the reason for claiming the political space in the name of the people, becomes in the second moment a singular political actor; it becomes sovereign. Arendt believed that the nature of the absolute that the French Revolution took as a referent indelibly harmed the capacity to realize political liberty in practice. The sovereign nation was a democratically garbed version of monarchical sovereignty insofar as both were defined by political homogeneity and the concomitant exclusion of public disclosure and moral and political perspectivism. Similarly, allowing economic necessity to define the will of the nation meant focusing on the biological life and turning away from the public sphere. Hence, Sieyès's extension of the notion of sovereignty to the populace functioned to scuttle the revolutionary attempt at restoring a realm of human freedom, dignity, and greatness.Footnote 36 Thus, for Arendt, the French Revolution was a failed revolution—a palace revolution replacing one sovereign with another—which did not establish a public place of political freedom.Footnote 37 Under these conditions authority could not be established, instead the revolution would be continually repeated.
The Postwar Dilemma
In light of Arendt's analysis, one would have to note that the prospects for establishing authority in Germany following World War II were dim. Arendt certainly held this to be the case. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, where Arendt spoke of the “perpetual-motion mania of totalitarian movements,” she asserts that “in a certain sense this very impermanence is a rather flattering testimonial to the dead leaders insofar as they succeeded in contaminating their subjects with the specifically totalitarian virus.”Footnote 38 Arendt understood the peace of the immediate postwar years—which on first appearance looked like the antithesis to the perpetual revolution of Nazi totalitarianism—as, in fact, symptomatic of the totalitarian virus insofar as it was evidence of yet another radical reorientation of moral and political life. Elsewhere Arendt used the memorable metaphor of the desert to describe the postwar condition when she wrote that “the greater danger is that there are sandstorms in the desert, that the desert is not always quiet as a cemetery where, after all, everything remains possible, but can whip up a movement of its own.”Footnote 39 The postwar condition, for Arendt, was the condition of being perfectly authorityless.
The dilemma of the postwar years, according to Arendt, was that the Holocaust stood as a historical denial of political authority tout court at exactly the moment when it was most urgently required. In the German “desert,” there was no tradition, republican or otherwise, political or moral, to reliably fall back upon. Even Arendt's few hopeful claims in the postwar years regarding “what remains”—“the language” and the “great tradition” of Western political thought finally unencumbered by philosophyFootnote 40—were found moot compared to the consuming negativity of the Holocaust and to the “general silence with which the questions posed by the camps were met” in Arendt's view.Footnote 41
The determining elements of the immediate postwar political situation were essentially negative when seen from the perspective of the question of creating authority. Germany received a constitution from a foreign power that was neither invited nor homegrown. Instead, it was the outcome of considerations of realpolitik, according to which the allies decided to rebuild (West) Germany in a way that would ensure a division of power and as such prevent further attempts of aggressive expansionism more easily. Germany did not experience a foundational moment, and it was perfectly lacking in any established political authority in Arendt's sense of the term. What Germany did have, however, was an absolute—an essentially negative one—which it could not but make reference to. This was the salted earth from which postwar German authority was to be established.
That Germany lacked those attributes that Arendt understood as indispensable for the establishment of a new authority did not mean that it was without any resources for its reconstruction. Regional and subnational identifications, new political structures (most notably a strong constitutional court), and most importantly, the “economic miracle” of the postwar years,Footnote 42 would all prove essential in the reconstruction of the German sensus communis; “West German nationhood,” Maier writes, “meant production,”Footnote 43 and it meant support for the Basic Law (tellingly not referred to as a constitution).Footnote 44 In this sense, the memory politics of the immediate postwar years were concerned with short-term memory at best. However, although affluence may impart present constitutional legitimacy, it is tenuous and obviously reliant on economic conditions; it does not impart authority. With these theoretical reflections in hand, we turn now to consider the peculiar case of postwar German memory politics.
German Memory Politics
Germany's memory politics have been extensively analyzed, discussed, historicized, criticized, and justified across a variety of academic disciplines.Footnote 45 The German path of “coming to terms with” the Holocaust is often seen as the quintessential case in attempts to reflect on the ethical and moral dimensions of collective memory more generally.Footnote 46 In this section, we sketch the trajectory of Germany's memory politics in the wake of the Holocaust with a specific focus on the conceptual tensions raised by the relation between absolutes and authority in the absence of a foundational moment. Following and extending the analysis of sociologist Jeffrey Olick and other observers, postwar German memory politics can be schematized in four phases: a first phase in which the German state agreed to pay reparations, with the motivation of leaving the past behind; a second phase that saw a more critical engagement with the past, fostered by generational rifts and new transnational discourses about the Holocaust; a third phase in which conservative forces attempted to stop this critical engagement with the past in an effort to “normalize” Germany's historical trajectory; and a fourth phase—particularly important to our argument—in which the development of memory politics itself is the subject of public reflection. Let us consider each in turn.
The direct aftermath of the war is often described as a period of simple consensual silence. It is generally believed that in the midst of rebuilding a widely destroyed infrastructure and economy, memories of the failures and crimes on both the individual and collective level were consciously and unconsciously repressed, silenced, or downplayed. However, as Jeffrey Herf has shown, the struggle over memory in the years immediately following military defeat was not one between “silence and memory,” but one in which the discussion quite explicitly addressed “which of Germany's pre-1933 traditions were most deeply implicated in the disaster, and which formed a basis for postwar renewal.”Footnote 47 That is, questions of political continuity in light of collective crimes were addressed as early as 1945. In Arendtian terms, it was an attempt at reclaiming the past following a historical rupture which attempted to negate all authority.
The first phase of postwar memory politics saw different political forces attempting to tap into the prewar German cultural repertoire to find a framework for the process of refounding. Herf has called this period, consequently, the period of “multiple restorations.”Footnote 48 Depending on the specific political outlook, the contextualization of the “moral bankruptcy”Footnote 49 of the Nazi regime took strikingly different turns for the leadership of the Social Democratic, Communist, Liberal, and Conservative parties. Of these, the conservatives' view—that Germany needed to go back to its Christian roots but also to rethink its relationship with state authority—struck a rather complex chord between continuity and change, one that gained increasing traction in German society. What all of these attempts shared, however, was a return to prewar interpretive frameworks for a new moral and political order. Both the prewar resources and the crimes of Nazi Germany were presented, at least in part, as specifically German.
In terms of the policies stemming from these memory politics, Olick has described the topos of this era—or the “legitimation profile”—as that of the “reliable nation.”Footnote 50 Specific constitutional provisions (most notably those ensuring the federal character of the republic) as well as the reparations paid to Israel ensured to the rest of the world that Germany would accept accountability for the past and draw conclusions for its new political system. It was also implied that the new reliable Germany had little to do with its predecessor regime and that the memory of war crimes and crimes against humanity could be safely left behind. In the eyes of those at the center of this new profile, Germany had now refocused on those parts of its history conducive to the protection of human rights.
In the 1960s, the topos of the reliable nation came under attack. This marked the second phase of postwar memory politics. This attack was multifaceted in its expression and in its causes, but two general developments dominated: the generational change and the new centrality of the Holocaust in transnational WWII narratives.Footnote 51 The former refers to the fact that Germans were forced to face their past when those born in the postwar years started to question their parents' generation, not just about the extent of the societal involvement in the genocide,Footnote 52 but also about how far certain traits of the political culture of Nazi Germany were still alive in the new Federal Republic. As for the latter, while in the direct aftermath of the war the genocide of the European Jewish population was still widely considered one crime among many, roughly two decades later the Holocaust had become what J. C. Alexander has called a “‘sacred-evil’ myth.”Footnote 53 This development fostered an increasingly abstract view of the Holocaust as “radical evil,” that is, as an abstract signifier of systematic violence against ethnic groups, often detached from its time and context. In Germany, however, the new centrality of the Holocaust meant, above all, a need to return to a very particular crime that many had thought to be buried by the payment of reparations and the prosecutions in Nuremberg.
Emerging from this reopening of the past, yet often under quite conflictual conditions, emerged a new pattern of legitimation, one that Olick has referred to as the “moral nation,” characterized primarily by a willingness “to confront and draw more radical lessons from the past.”Footnote 54 Acknowledging the central role of the Holocaust for German memory and identity increasingly “constituted the very core of Germany's political culture and its self-image as a nation.”Footnote 55 In public debates, the figure of the “non-German German” was born, a figure defined by drawing a specifically antinational conclusion from the particular German memory.Footnote 56 The Holocaust was seen as the very “thorn in the flesh that provokes critical reflection and the dissolution of the national ‘we.’”Footnote 57 Thus, the Holocaust assumed a direct role of a negative absolute for the first time.
In direct opposition to this discourse of “negative nationalism,”Footnote 58 one prominent emerging counterstrategy in the German context was normalization as relativization. This marked the third phase of postwar memory politics. If each nation carried its burden—its founding violence, its crimes against minorities—in the processes of nation building, then Germany was no exception in having to face its own specific crimes. Germany was to be “normal in the statistical sense.”Footnote 59 The topos of the “normal nation” arose under chancellor Kohl. This sidelining of the Holocaust was particularly aggressive, “embodied in an ideological program for cultural change, which included pride in German history, the celebration of heroes . . . and a distancing of past misdeeds.”Footnote 60 The backlash to this attempt was considerable, especially in the international terrain.Footnote 61
Most importantly for the questions raised in this essay, however, is a subsequent fourth phase, arguably one that most appropriately describes the current memoryscape of Germany. Here we would like to draw from a recent approach that has begun thinking of European memory cultures in comparative terms.Footnote 62 Christian Gudehus, in a comparison of German and Polish memory discourses, has isolated two specific features in current German memory politics: the postheroic element—which, in many ways, reflects a continuation of the “moral nation”—and the “metadiscursive” element, “a discussion about the discussion itself.”Footnote 63 This latter observation is particularly important for our analysis.
In this last phase, the postwar period of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust is now itself the object of collective memory.Footnote 64 Discussions about history or memory increasingly address the role of history and memory; they have departed from the questions of what to remember and moved to questions of how to remember. Olick arguably detected these tendencies first, introducing the term “the memory of memory” for the German context to describe “the recursive commentary not only on the past but on the way the past has been remembered.”Footnote 65 This trend is visible in historiography as well as in educational paradigms and public debates. In the discipline of history, memory politics itself has become the subject of historical inquiry.Footnote 66 In other words, historians not only “correct” the often distorted and politicized interpretations of the past circulating in public, they historicize and analyze (and often normatively evaluate) the coming about and the political relevance of these interpretations themselves, similar to what the French historian Pierre Nora has described as the practice of a “history of a second degree”Footnote 67 and others as a movement from history to memory, or from history to the history of memory, both in the German and the larger European context.Footnote 68 In education, this development finds its counterpart in the teaching of an attitude toward history rather than a focus on a specific context.Footnote 69 It emphasizes the nature of historical knowledge as “constructed,” i.e., mediated by the interest and worldviews of those interpreting and transmitting it for the public, be they historians, teachers, or politicians. Inevitably, this approach to history leads to a general skepticism that “does not necessarily correlate with heroic narratives.”Footnote 70
By way of example, consider the debates surrounding the efforts to construct a Holocaust memorial in the center of Berlin. As James Young has observed, ultimately this memorial was as much a memorial to German memory politics itself (“self-reflexive”) as it was to the victims of the Shoah.Footnote 71 Visitors are encouraged to look at the memorial not just as a reminder of the murder of the European Jews, but also as a reminder of Germany's willingness to fully acknowledge its past. The memorial has found its way into the symbolic center of the new postheroic German narrative. In a similar vein, consider also the tendency to “layer” inscriptions on former GDR memorials to the Holocaust not only to commemorate the initial event but also to remember the use and abuse of memory throughout German history, seen for instance in the case of the new commentaries added to the memorial for the antifascist and communist Herbert Baum in Berlin in 2000.Footnote 72
In the context of our concern with absolutes and authority, the final phase is key, and allows us to link back to the Arendtian questions outlined above. The trajectory we sketched creates the interesting and peculiar constellation in which current German memory politics is increasingly concerned with remembering its own history of postwar memory efforts. We have re-entered a discourse that echoes the famous Spartan slogan about temporal continuity, “we are what we were”Footnote 73—namely, postnational—but that upholds the postheroic ethos that emerged in the 1960s. Conceptually, in distinction to “negative nationalism,” Germany's current discourse is probably best described as a national postnationalism: Germany can claim to be—somewhat paradoxically—particularly postnational. Here we enter the possibility of a new authority, a memory of a common shared experience, one that can be returned to, and in being returned to, regrounds the authority of the state itself: Germany now remembers its past struggles for a postheroic attitude. This being so, Gudehus asserts that the “narrative of learning from a ‘negative past’ of not constructing a heroic, potentially nationalistic version of the past . . . delivers a model for a positive, even heroic narrative on how well Germans have dealt with their problematic history.”Footnote 74 Corresponding to the Roman concept of authority and its attendant understanding of politics as augmenting the foundation, in this fourth phase the question of political authority is, albeit critically, “associated . . . as much with improvement (augere—to augment and increase) as with conservation.”Footnote 75
Simultaneously, it is a process of “disassociating from the past” in the sense once described by F. R. Ankersmit,Footnote 76 through which “a previous ‘consciousness’ has now become ‘an object’ for the new ‘consciousness.’” Even the collective past that cannot be historicized will undergo attempts of incorporation (Ankersmit talks about myths in particular, which are outside of history, whereas in our case the incorporation and historicization of the past is precluded for other reasons), yet, in case of the inevitable failure to incorporate, “the result will then invariably be a historicization of how [the civilization] dealt with these myths”Footnote 77 or nonincorporable pasts. Consequently, the ineluctable negativity of the Holocaust is not included in the political sphere directly, instead it is the core from which reflection, new self-images, and the political can circulate. In terms of establishing a new authority, the implications of this new departure are highly significant, especially when approached with the Arendtian dilemmas in mind.
Authority without Foundations
Schematically we can summarize what we have seen as a development from a general attempt to contain the memory of the crime,Footnote 78 through (1) modest performances of institutional reliability, with a tactical attempt at laying claim to a historical line of authority, to the express exclusion of the Nazi regime, to (2) the “moral nation,”Footnote 79 one that accepted full responsibility, marked by an unstable direct incorporation of the negative absolute and a rejection of the claims of continuity with prewar sources of authority. This period saw the drawing of postheroic and even postnational conclusions from its past. This was followed by (3) attempts to normalize the past, to present Germany as one nation among others, and to simultaneously relativize the Holocaust in an attempt to reclaim authority and expel the absolute. And recently (4) in the wake of backlashes to this strategy, we have entered a phase of metamemory politics. In itself, this sequencing suggests that any notion of “closure” with regard to the Holocaust seems inadequate.
Arendt allows us to clearly frame our initial problem of postwar foundations in Germany, but that same set of concepts provides an incomplete guide to fully understanding the mode in which this problem would be politicized. A constitution was given to Germany by a foreign country, and the historical memory from which authority speaks from the past to the present was established incrementally, all of which took decades to unfold. The rise of postheroic memory politics in Germany, and perhaps beyond,Footnote 80 provides a fascinating response to the paradoxical challenges of establishing an authority in postwar Germany.Footnote 81 We have suggested that German memory politics, in their latest configuration, have created an authority not on, but against and around the negative absolute of radical evil.
For Arendt, the theoretical paradox of new political beginnings was overcome in practice by extraordinary moments of action (i.e., the foundation itself),Footnote 82 which were, in the American case, institutionally stabilized by the authority given to the constitution.Footnote 83 This stabilization, however, also occurs in the extra-institutional realm. Barash echoes these sentiments when he calls attention to Arendt's focus on “organized remembrance in the political quest for temporal perdurability.”Footnote 84 The fundamental problem of the Holocaust in regard to the establishment of authority in its wake is that the Holocaust negated the American option and all conceivable variations on it. The totalitarian ideology had functioned to corrupt all preceding traditions and authority.Footnote 85
The Arendtian understanding of the relationship between politics and the absolute, and politics in the absence of authority, allows for an apt characterization of the difficulties of the strained political dynamics of the first three stages of memory politics in the postwar years. Arendt, as we have noted, understood authority as “defined by its prepolitical nature, functioning outside the realm of discursive contestation, persuasive speech, and political action.” As was made evident in the first three phases of German memory politics, it was impossible to establish a stable authority when the Holocaust was ever present and contested.
Arendt's analysis sheds understandably less light on the process of “overcoming” these boundaries. The novelty in the German case was that, having been forced to address a negative absolute that was a wholly inadequate ground for direct foundations, an active discursive regime emerged that presupposed the negative absolute like a “placeholder . . . enabl[ing] the system but . . . illegitimate from its vantage point.”Footnote 86 The peculiarity of the fourth phase of memory politics is that it takes exactly that discourse as the basis of authority.
It was only in the process of continually reflecting on its own failures—the failure of reclaiming a past authority, followed by experiencing the impossibility of a direct incorporation of a negative absolute, and finally the impossibility of simply rejecting it—that Germany could indirectly incorporate the negative character of the “radical evil” of the Holocaust,Footnote 87 while still associating with its own political continuity. Only after having struggled with the problem could the struggle itself be used as the fodder for an authority that speaks from the past to guide the present. Whereas the relationship between the absolute and authority was direct and linear in previous cases, the relationship between a negative absolute and authority is indirect in the German case. Authority does not stem directly from the absolute, but revolves around it. This constellation serves the functions of the political authority discovered by Romans and Americans, while avoiding some of the cultural-political problems of incorporating the Holocaust directly.Footnote 88
Arendt concludes her analysis of the importance of new beginnings by quoting Plato (“For the beginning, because it contains its own principle, is also a god who, as long as he dwells among men, as long as he inspires their deeds, saves everything”) and Plutarch (“The beginning is not merely half of the whole but reaches out towards the end”), and argues that the “identity of principium” was the determining factor in the identity of the political community.Footnote 89 In contrast to Machiavelli's presupposition that new political communities had to be wrought through violence, and against the French reference to the nation, Arendt argues that the American foundation teaches us another principle: that the act of foundation itself and “the interconnected principle of mutual promise and common deliberation”Footnote 90 which was its constituent element were the true foundations from which a political community could be ensured. Beginnings, Arendt often claims, have determining effects that correspond with the absolute from which they stem. For Arendt, it was not conceivable that politically antithetical absolutes could ground anything other than politically destructive consequences.
What the case of Germany and German memory politics shows is that Arendt's insistence on the determining nature of beginnings is misplaced. More important than the content of the beginning is the mode through which the absolute is addressed. The case of Germany is the most extreme version of this: the absolute negative of the Holocaust delegitimized all standing sources of authority, and itself could not be taken as a source of authority. However, in addressing the history of addressing the Holocaust through time, the absolute could be incorporated indirectly.
For the Romans, authority was based on the foundational act constructed as something “untouchable” and absolute. The authority derived from that foundation spoke from the past by framing and guiding the politics of the present. Those politics, in turn, were understood as backwards looking. The purpose of politics was to augment the foundation itself. Regarding the status of the absolute, the Holocaust has a similar standing in Germany today. Where these cases differ fundamentally is in the question of authority and augmentation. Authority is derived from having attempted to address the Holocaust as an absolute crime. These attempts have to be constantly addressed, rehearsed and reproduced. We see exactly this in present German memory politics. Young, for example, has developed the notion of the “countermonument” as one example of this new ethos: memorialization is not the end of debate, but its starting point—the location for a discussion about a shared past as much as about a shared present and future.Footnote 91 Importantly, however, though the nature of the absolute is different, its link to authority is the same. Authority is always grounded in the past, and it was only after Germany had a history of trying to address the negative absolute that it could in turn derive its authority from that very practice.
In contrast to what Arendt believed was the great oversight of the Founding Fathers,Footnote 92 the German case entails that the absolute is never fully neglected. The memory of the Holocaust is by definition a “frustrated remembrance,” but this frustration is also “an experience with implications that can be thought about,”Footnote 93 in other words, the impossibility of direct incorporation can engender a sphere of reflection. In doing so, the authority emerging from German memory politics can enable a measure of perspectivism, as Steve Buckler claims. However, Buckler warned that “by blocking narrative articulation of the past, the Holocaust compromises the reproduction of cultural norms and criteria for reflective judgment that substantiate a public realm.”Footnote 94 Instead he argued that “we are conscious that no appeal can be made, in order to establish the authority of such standards [of judgment], to anything metaphysically or temporally transcendent of their actual communicative enactment and acknowledgement. In this respect, we can say of the contemporary situation that the possibility of culture is now irrevocably tied to the possibility of politics.”Footnote 95 In contrast, we have suggested that the Holocaust works as a temporally transcendent event which grounds the enactment of political judgments. Moreover, in line with an Arendtian understanding of authority, this negative absolute is itself not subject to political dispute but has the status of a prepolitical measure.Footnote 96 The Holocaust became, to quote Arendt's depiction of the foundation of Rome and its importance for Roman politics, “the central, decisive, unrepeatable beginning of their whole history, a unique event.”Footnote 97
Dirk Moses's seminal analysis of the rival memory projects in postwar Germany posited “two modes of legitimacy and temporality” against each other.Footnote 98 “Integrative republicanism conceives of politics in terms of institutional continuities, whereas the other ascribes to society as a whole a sacred . . . origin.”Footnote 99 We have argued here that the latest phase of German memory discourses incorporates both logics described by Moses. The specific political outcomes of these developments are, however, far from determined. Despite its seemingly “postnational” character, one could also claim that this peculiar constellation has created new discourses of superiority within Europe and beyond. In some accounts, Germany is perceived to be at the heart of a new European memory paradigm.Footnote 100 In this case this generates the peculiar constellation in which the category of “Europe” allows for comparison, new hierarchies, and a new sense of national particularity: the discourse on Germany's postheroic memory regime fosters the notion that Germans may be better Europeans than their European neighbors. It can hook into the German commitment to the European cause, but it can also create a German “uniqueness” (and hence new and old hierarchies within Europe) where others see simply an “exit strategy.” In other words, this new self-image does not exclusively entail a cosmopolitan version of German identity.
Ulrich Beck's recent discussion of Germany's current position in the financial and political crisis in Europe is insightful in this regard: “After the Second World War and the Holocaust, Germany lay in ruins both morally and physically. Now, after barely seventy years, it has advanced from the status of eager pupil to that of schoolmaster of Europe.” And yet, for the schoolmaster “the word ‘power’ is still a dirty word, one that they like to replace with the word ‘responsibility.’”Footnote 101 That this position of responsibility is closely related to memory discourses both in Germany and beyond becomes clear in this remark on Germany's perceived failure to save the Euro, by Eugenio Scalfari, the Italian writer, quoted in Beck: “That would be its fourth crime after the two world wars and the Holocaust. Germany must now accept its responsibility for Europe.”Footnote 102 These new discourses of Germany's postnational identity consequently establish and sustain both old and new hierarchies within Europe, often producing a complex economy of guilt and responsibility that paradoxically puts Germany at the center of Europe once again. Like Rome's, Germany's new authority may be projected beyond its borders.
