The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes is another in a series of studies that address the issue of third-party mediation. The main theme of the book is that in any mediation effort, a formal settlement does not necessarily mark the end of the conflict. The underlying social tensions that triggered the conflict in the first place still remain, even after an agreement; these latent tensions can cause renewed violence which, in turn, can undermine the agreement and restart the conflict. Accordingly, mediators must be mindful of the dangers of recrudescent violence and undertake measures to prevent it.

A series of general chapters, authored by the editor, John Darby, comprise half the book; these are by far the most useful parts. There are also several case studies of conflict mediation, written by separate authors, with chapters on Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Israel-Palestine, and South Africa. The case studies are somewhat superficial: Several contain little information that goes beyond what one might find in the New York Times. They are poorly integrated with the more analytical chapters and add little to the overall volume.

The analytical chapters by Darby are clearly the main contribution, and these offer useful insights for both professional mediators and academics. The key issue for Darby is not simply achieving an initial agreement but making the agreement last, in order to permanently settle the conflict. And he offers the sobering observation that in the large majority of cases, negotiated settlements tend to fall apart: “Of the thirty-eight formal peace accords signed between January 1988 and December 1998, thirty-one failed to last more than three years” (p. 8). The return to violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the apparent failure of the Oslo Accords offer yet additional reminders that settlements can and do fall apart. The book analyzes ways to prevent such failures and offers many small insights.

A special strength of this book is the recognition that in any conflict, none of the parties can be treated as a cohesive whole. Any militia force, for example, contains a variety of different factions with diverse interests; the same is true for governments. Darby identifies several categories of players: First, there are the Dealers, who are willing to compromise certain of their goals in the interest of achieving a compromise settlement. Second, the Zealots stick rigidly to their core demands and are, accordingly, resistant to settlement. The Opportunists may shift their loyalty between the first two groups, adjusting their position as circumstances change. Finally, there are the Mavericks “who once committed violence for the cause but who now carry out unauthorized crimes for personal gain” (p. 49), and these often degenerate into criminal gangs. Mediators must win over the Dealers and the Opportunists, on both sides of a conflict, and maintain their loyalty to the peace process, despite the various challenges that will inevitably test the viability of that process. At the same time, the mediators must seek to isolate the Zealots and the Mavericks.

Darby offers sensible suggestions for achieving these objectives. Where governments are major parties to conflicts, he recommends that the security and police forces be reconstituted and depoliticized. The police force, it is hoped, will form the basis for an impartial and fair policing of the initial cease-fire agreement. The regular army, in contrast, should be reduced in size and restricted in function. Alternative employment must be found for military and police personnel who are dismissed in order to ensure that these do not present a new threat to stability. More generally, the security forces must undertake symbolic changes in order to advertise their new and impartial role. In general, Darby emphasizes the importance of “confidence building measures,” whereby both sides make concessions to establish mutual trust, and to lay the basis for a long-term resolution.

The main drawback to this volume is its unambitious nature. This is basically a “how to” manual for prospective diplomats involved in conflict resolution. However, it fails to consider conflict resolution in a broader context. Certain key assumptions are never considered in detail: For example, it is assumed that external mediators can be relied upon to act impartially, without biases toward one side or the other, or any selfish interests of their own. It is also assumed that the “Zealots” who resist compromise agreements are unreasonable and are the main villains in civil conflicts. Darby fails to consider that the Zealots may at least in some cases have good reasons for resisting compromise; their need for justice instead of peace may be well reasoned and sound. There is no a priori reason to assume that compromise is always and in every case the best outcome. This possibility is again unexamined, reflecting the narrowly technocratic approach that undergirds—and limits—the analysis. The historical context in which mediation takes place, and how it has been influenced by larger world events, is unexamined.

Overall, The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes is a useful if unspectacular contribution to the growing literature on international conflict resolution.