In this magisterial account, Fred Wehrey goes a long way in demystifying and dissecting the issue of sectarianism in the Gulf, which has been the talk of the town in policy and think tank circles over the past few years. Wehrey's account is particularly refreshing for bringing scholarly gravitas to a subject that it is all too often discussed in glib and superficial terms. The author makes use of an excellent array of primary sources, chief among them an impressive series of interviews with both policymakers and opposition figures in the Gulf. His study thus brings nuance and texture to the subject, and offers an objective perspective on both sides of ongoing political conflicts.
The structure of the book lends itself well to an accurate analysis of the phenomenon. First, the book deals with a confined time period that runs from the Iraq War of 2003 to the immediate aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011. This allows Wehrey to focus on the interplay between sectarianism and both domestic and regional politics at a specific moment, thereby eschewing timeless generalizations and Orientalist tropes. Even more significant, the author focuses on the dynamics of sectarianism in three particular Gulf cases—Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—and discusses the evolution of the phenomenon in each one, thus bringing to the fore the crucial differences and subtleties that distinguish one country's milieu from the other.
What emerges is a diverse picture in which sectarianism is utilized alternatively by governments and oppositions in order to enhance their credentials vis-à-vis their respective domestic constituencies, as well as among regional and global powers. As Wehrey aptly puts it in his conclusion: “sectarianism is not an inescapable facet of political life in the Gulf,” but “rather it arises from a combination of exclusionary policies at home and regional shocks abroad” and is “ultimately a bellwether for the deeply entrenched problems of governance in the Gulf” (p. 219).
Sectarian Politics in the Gulf is buttressed by a sophisticated analytical framework that helps the reader to understand the conditions in which sectarian tensions became a feature of domestic political life in each of these three countries. The author correctly identifies the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran as a key regional event that reverberated in the domestic politics of each of these countries. And yet the most valuable contribution of this study lies in the wealth of primary documentation that is brought to bear in describing the evolution of sectarianism in domestic politics. This allows the reader to gain a sophisticated understanding of how the politics of sectarianism varies from country to country and gets filtered through diverse political systems.
For example, the discussion of Kuwait clearly demonstrates that sectarian tensions in that context are shaped by the vibrant parliamentary and tribal life. In the words of one of the many brilliantly selected interviewees, “[t]he Sunni hadhar in Kuwait are afraid that the badu will overwhelm them eventually. The badu, on their part, are telling the hadhar to watch out for the Shi’a. The Shi’a are telling the hadhar: ‘We have to watch the badu’” (p. 163). The discussion of sectarian politics in this particular context is interwoven, as it should be, with a wealth of material on electoral dynamics, and illustrated by helpfully constructed maps and tables.
The situation is quite different in Saudi Arabia, where in the absence of parliamentary life the government has adopted a policy of divide and rule that tries to prevent effective cross-sectarian dialogue between Shiʿi and other reformers. Wehrey cogently recounts how even relatively bold initiatives, such as the National Dialogue initiated by King ʿAbd Allah, have ultimately petered out, returning the kingdom to a climate of stark confrontation.
Finally, the salience of sectarian mobilization in Bahrain is thoroughly examined with the help of a wide array of primary and secondary sources that prove instrumental to fulfilling the book's larger aims. The intervention by military units from the other GCC states, hastily branded the “Peninsula Shield Force,” when in fact that original formation had earlier been disbanded, is correctly identified as a factor that further exacerbated sectarian tensions. The deployment of foreign troops into Bahrain substantially diminished Bahraini national sovereignty vis-à-vis its bigger neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and, by inflaming sectarian divisions, prevented a fruitful dialogue between the broad array of forces that continues to push for political reform in the country. Wehrey makes a convincing case that far from being an immutable characteristic of Gulf politics, sectarian tensions stem from a fundamental lack of transparency and reform at the domestic level. Identity entrepreneurs have exploited the accountability deficit in each country to seize political space from their adversaries.
Sectarian Politics in the Gulf is a must read that offers a fresh and innovative contribution to the literature in international relations and comparative government. It is extremely well written and clearly laid out. The rigor of the scholarly apparatus makes it suitable for a university audience, but it is at the same time highly relevant for a policy audience. The book belongs on the syllabus of any class dealing with Gulf security, and on the desk of policy planners and decision makers around the world.
