The aim of this article is to determine the EU's effect on British–Irish and Greek–Turkish cooperation. The Northern Ireland case and the success of the British–Irish relationship have been heralded as examples of the EU's cooperative influence. It has been argued that the EU created a consensual framework that shaped perceptions and created opportunities for British–Irish cooperation.Footnote 1 In this article, the EU's actual and potential role in fostering British–Irish and Greek–Turkish cooperation are examined, as well as its policies towards Northern Ireland and Cyprus themselves. Kinship state cooperation and cooperation within conflict zones are assumed to be positively correlated.Footnote 2 Kinship states are those states regarded as exerting authority over their diaspora and potentially acting as guarantors.Footnote 3 Therefore, examining the EU's role in increasing bilateral state cooperation is essential if we are to understand its role in conflict resolution generally. Domestic bureaucratic capacity and institutional design can be seen as factors explaining the success of the British–Irish relationship. In the case of Cyprus, it is argued that increased bilateral cooperation with respect to disputed territory is unlikely to occur in the absence of faster bureaucratic change in both Greece and Turkey. EU membership is not a causal factor in the evolution of cooperation and conflict resolution.
RATIONALE
Arguably, the British–Irish and Greek–Turkish relationships are incommensurable as the UK and Ireland both joined the EU in 1973, whereas even though Greek Cyprus is a member of the EU, Turkey and Turkish Cyprus are not. There are, however, two key justifications for comparing the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus and their kinship states.
The first justification is that Northern Ireland has been held as a model of EU involvement in conflict resolution and as a model peace process.Footnote 4 The evolution of British–Irish cooperation was seen as core to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, and EU membership was seen as central to the evolution of cooperative relations. The legacy of British colonialism and the eruption of conflict in Northern Ireland exacerbated the poor British–Irish relationship, and various diplomatic crises occurred before the 1980s.Footnote 5 British–Irish cooperation was very limited historically, and initially the outbreak of conflict in Northern Ireland further aggravated that relationship. In 1969, the then Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, made an historic address, stating that his government could not ‘stand idly by’,Footnote 6 calling for UN intervention, an end to partition and announced the movement of troops and field hospitals to the border. The suggestion of UN intervention was rejected by the British government, because it felt that it would erode British sovereignty. Traditionally, British and Irish preferences with respect to Northern Ireland reflected unionist and nationalist constituencies respectively. Differences between the two governments about the appropriate means of solving conflict in Northern Ireland arose. In particular, differences about the use of British security forces to stamp out conflict, about human rights issues in Northern Ireland and about Irish demands that it should play a stronger role in policy to Northern Ireland led to strains in the British–Irish relationship.
Despite historical animosity, a British–Irish joint strategy evolved from the 1980s onwards. This policy entailed providing incentives for power-sharing, as well as the threats that if unionists did not cooperate with nationalists they could lose even more policy-making influence in the future.Footnote 7 This carrot-and-stick approach created and curtailed choices for both nationalists and unionists, and provided incentives for them both to cooperate and compromise. Twelve years after the failed Sunningdale Agreement (1973), institutionalized British–Irish cooperation began in 1985, with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA). The AIA signified the need for a ‘three-strands’ approach to resolving conflict in Northern Ireland. Three relationships, or strands, were integral to the conflict: the relationship between both communities in Northern Ireland; the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (ROI); and the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the ROI. The AIA attempted to enshrine an Irish dimension that was seen as a safeguard of Irish nationalist identity in Northern Ireland. This element fell short of what the Irish government demanded, which was joint authority. In retrospect, the AIA can be seen as the first step towards enshrining an Irish dimension in Northern Irish policy. It also reflected and caused increased British–Irish cooperationFootnote 8 and arguably spawned the Belfast Agreement of 1998 that provided a framework for power-sharing in a devolved administration.
In the Greek–Turkish case, the Cyprus issue, the Aegean disputes and other territorial issues have impeded Greek–Turkish cooperation.Footnote 9 The links between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and the development of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism are evident from the nineteenth century, when Cyprus was a British colony. The Cyprus issue contributed to a fraught Greek–Turkish relationship during this period and strong Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ‘motherland’ nationalism. Greek Cypriots ‘increasingly saw their destinies as linked to a Hellenic past of Cyprus and their future to its revival through unification with Greece’.Footnote 10 In 1960, under the Treaty of Alliance signed with the British government, Turkey and Greece became guarantor powers over Cyprus, backed by a military presence.Footnote 11
The de facto partition of Cyprus following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Greek Cyprus is at the centre of competing ideological demands. Turkish Cypriots see the border as a protection of identity, but for Greek Cypriots it is a means of Turkish oppression and curtailment of Greek identity.Footnote 12 Clearly, although both parts of Cyprus have their own independent governments and while motherland nationalism has waned since 1974,Footnote 13 Cyprus has been closely intertwined with Greece and Turkey and has had a strong impact on the Greek–Turkish relationship. In 1990, Greece opposed Turkish membership of the EU. In 1994, following the Greek veto of Turkish membership of the EU's Customs Union, the Turkish prime minister stated: ‘We have a word to Greece. Our friendship is reliable, but they should fear our enmity.’Footnote 14 Turkey declared a casus belli against Greece in 1995 because of its possible extension of territorial waters.Footnote 15 In 1996, a cargo boat accident triggered a conflict over the status of the Imia inlet in the Aegean Sea, culminating in the arrival of Greek and Turkish troops to the region and bringing Greece and Turkey ‘to a near-war situation’.Footnote 16 Again, in 1997, Greece and Turkey threatened war over Cypriot purchase of missiles.Footnote 17 Clearly, therefore, the Greek–Turkish relationship has often been less than cordial. Comparing the Greek–Turkish relationship with the British–Irish relationship helps shed light on the causes of bilateral cooperation.
The second reason for examining the EU's impact on conflict resolution and, more specifically, bilateral cooperation is that in 2001, following criticism of its failure to act in Rwanda and other cases, the EU's Crisis and Conflict Management Unit was established under Commissioner Chris Patten. Its foundation and the creation of the Directorate General (DG) for External Relations (RELEX) to contribute to policy formulation with respect to civilian aspects of security in conflict zones (now subsumed under the new External Action Service) marked a transition from a technocratic-based Commission to a more overtly political one. Both the Council and the Commission became increasingly involved in highly politicized areas of foreign policy. Conflict resolution became a core area of EU activity from the late 1990s and the EU began to strengthen its foreign policy arm. The key question is how far the EU influences its members and its non-members in domestic foreign policy formulation.
There is a burgeoning literature on the EU's role as a conflict manager, where the role of state preferences and bilateral cooperation in an EU context is relevant. In all accounts, EU state preferences and specific bilateral historical tensions have impeded effective international intervention. Most notably, Whitman and Wolff have provided an excellent analysis of the EU's policy to Georgia in 2008, arguing that ‘the most fundamental obstacle on the EU's path towards a more effective conflict management role remains the absence of a coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy to which all the Union's institutions and member states subscribe.’Footnote 18 Similarly, Cordell and Wolff illustrate how Russia's policy preferences have had significant influence over the Kosovo–Serbia relationship, at different times impeding or facilitating international intervention.Footnote 19 These analyses highlight the role of state preferences of key actors in determining political outcomes. Likewise, Diez's edited collection highlights the limits and opportunities offered by Cypriot membership of the EU and the role of Turkish and Greek strategic concerns.Footnote 20 For example, Stivachtis highlights how Greek policy towards Cyprus and the EU is governed by its fear of Turkey, its competitor in the power struggle.Footnote 21 In contrast, the EU has been commended for facilitating the successful British–Irish relationship that underpinned the peace process in Northern Ireland.
In this article, an attempt is made to determine the sources of British–Irish cooperation in the EU and to identify whether these sources are present in the Cypriot case. Thus, the focus of this article is slightly different from the above studies of EU conflict management: the key concern here is whether the EU alters bilateral intergovernmental cooperation and, if so, what process is involved. Examining the process of bilateral cooperation necessitates an examination of domestic foreign policy-making machinery, specifically the role of foreign ministries and national governments in formulating policy and the determinants of their policy preferences. If the EU is a factor in bilateral cooperation, then the EU and its preferences will be shown to influence domestic actors' preferences in foreign policy. This article is not about EU foreign policy or conflict management policy outcomes in cases of conflict such as Northern Ireland, or Cyprus, but is more focused on whether the EU influences, or potentially influences, member state preferences in situations of historical conflict, thereby having an indirect influence on conflict management.
Theoretically, the Europeanization literature is particularly relevant to this question, suggesting the ‘domestic adaptation of foreign policy as a result of EU membership’.Footnote 22 In general, however, the Europeanization literature has been more concerned with domestic economic and social policy adaptation rather than domestic foreign policy adaptation with foreign policy coordination remaining the preserve of national sovereignty. As Featherstone observes, Europeanization is more commonly interpreted as meaning that there is a common EU foreign policy, or that the EU has a coherent foreign policy, rather than as a study of domestic institutional adaptation.Footnote 23 Given the evolution of EU involvement in conflict resolution, it is useful to examine the British–Irish/Northern Irish case: is it an example of Europeanization? and what are the implications of the findings for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus? Specifically, a core question derived from the Europeanization literature is whether ‘ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic…discourse, political structures and public policies’Footnote 24 occurred in the British–Irish foreign policy case and could occur in the Greek–Turkish case.
The more specific implications of Europeanization as a process causing changes in bilateral state relations or in conflict zones in the EU is rarely included in the swath of Europeanization literature (Featherstone's work on Greece and Turkey is a rare exception here). Yet, assertions are made about how the EU would provide a cooperative framework if Turkey joined. In short, the extent to which the EU actually influences foreign policies of states with histories of conflict has been under-examined, yet the British–Irish case has become a classic case for those who argue that EU membership increases levels of state cooperation. This article fills a gap by dissecting the British–Irish/Northern Irish case and by highlighting the inhibiting role of domestic constraints.
In the next section, the EU's role in the British–Irish/Northern Irish case is examined. An overview of the EU's role is provided, first its financial role in Northern Ireland and secondly its role as providing a consensual framework for Northern Ireland and the British–Irish relationship. The section ends by analysing the causes of British–Irish cooperation and highlighting domestic bureaucratic institutional capacity as a key factor in British–Irish cooperation rather than EU membership per se.
THE EU, BRITISH–IRISH RELATIONS AND NORTHERN IRELAND
EU Aid to Northern Ireland and British–Irish Cooperation
One of the key ways in which an EU role sponsored by the Commission was hoped to help conflict resolution in the British–Irish/Northern Irish case was by encouraging cross-border cooperation between Ireland and Northern Ireland through EU regional aid. While EU aid was targeted at Northern Ireland, the formulation of programmes and their implementation involved intense British–Irish coordination, lobbying and leadership. Cross-border cooperation was heavily politicized in Northern Ireland: moderate nationalists and by 1988 extreme nationalists supported it, as it was connected to the erosion of the meaning of the border between Northern Ireland and the ROI. Unionists opposed cross-border cooperation as they viewed it as a ploy to achieve a united Ireland.Footnote 25
In the late 1980s the key principle that emerged in Commission policy towards Northern Ireland was that of conditionality to attempt to advance cooperation between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland and cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland and the ROI. Economic aid packages through EU Structural Funds became the pillar of EU policy towards Northern Ireland and towards achieving peace and reconciliation. If either community failed to cooperate, then money would not be granted – a carrot-and-stick approach to achieving cooperation. For the period 1988–94, although the Commission provided economic incentives through regional policy, it did not otherwise play a proactive role in encouraging the conflicting groups to cooperate. The creation of the Peace package programme in 1995, following lobbying from John Hume, then leader of the Northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party, and British and Irish governments, signified a change in Commission perceptions and behaviour with respect to Northern Ireland and was innovative in representing the EU's commitment to alleviating ethnic conflict. Peace I (1995) provided approximately €500 million; Peace II (1998) provided €500 million; and Peace III (2007) provided €224.8 million.Footnote 26
Not only did the Peace packages signify a greater financially targeted EU commitment to conflict resolution, it also precipitated greater awareness among Commission officials of the significance of the Northern Ireland case and its possible lessons for other cases of conflict. In practical terms, however, the EU's impact on cross-community and cross-border cooperation has been negligible,Footnote 27 but its symbolic importance has been highlighted. For example, whereas until the late 1980s the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein (SF) spoke vehemently against EU influence and cross-party cooperation, by the 1990s there was cross-party consensus in favour of lobbying for EU aid and using it according to EU conditions.Footnote 28 EU aid programmes to Northern Ireland also precipitated and reflected close British–Irish cooperation. Moreover, the EU's framework has been praised for providing lessons to British–Irish policymakers.
The EU's Consensual Framework
Institutional changes in Britain and Ireland coincided almost perfectly with preparations to join and eventual gain membership of the EU. Many authors have emphasized the role of EU membership in changing the British–Irish relationship. First, at a basic level, EU membership meant that British and Irish politicians and bureaucrats met more frequently and discussed issues unrelated to their joint history. Frequent informal and formal communication in a neutral EU environment is believed to have improved British–Irish relations.
Secondly, EU membership altered the status of Irish governments vis-à-vis the UK in bargaining with respect to Northern Ireland. Membership created greater equality in the British–Irish relationship. Where before Ireland and the UK were perceived to be ‘unequal sovereigns’,Footnote 29 after they gained EU membership, for one British Commission official at least, there was a gradual change in how British officials viewed their Irish counterparts.Footnote 30
Thirdly, the EU provided a consensual model of decision-making that lent ideas to both governments about their relationship, and about methods of resolving Northern Ireland. The new institutions established under the 1998 Belfast Agreement bore similarities to the EU's institutional framework. For example, the North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC), set up to govern areas of cross-border cooperation, operated in the same way as the European Council.Footnote 31 In addition, the conditionality principle used by the EU was based on a similar logic to British–Irish strategy – unless specific actions occur, incentives would be withdrawn. In sum, for some observers: ‘Without the embedding of both states in the wider system of European integration and without the model of politics offered by the EU, it is unlikely that both states and other political actors could have found the political capacity and the institutional models to craft the Good Friday Agreement.’Footnote 32 As the next section shows, though, it is difficult to verify this argument and it is clear that British–Irish cooperation preceded EU intervention.
The EU and Causes of Cooperation
The above section has illustrated the EU's evolving role in British–Irish relations and in Northern Ireland since 1988. It does also over-simplify the context of conflict resolution at this time. As regards Northern Irish inter-party cooperation and cross-border Irish/Northern Irish cooperation, responses to EU aid packages can be seen more as a response to the evolution of the peace process itself, rather than an example of EU conflict resolution.Footnote 33 The Peace packages were heavily influenced by British and Irish governments and John Hume, rather than signifying an independent EU impact.Footnote 34 Previous research has shown that the EU followed British–Irish preferences with respect to Northern Ireland and not vice versa.Footnote 35 Before the peace process, the EU's role was very limited, but during the 1990s, at the request of both governments, it became more proactive. Neither is there evidence that EU membership caused British and Irish aims to converge with respect to Northern Ireland.
A striking feature from 1969 is the growth of a highly institutionalized regime between British and Irish governments, accompanied by the increasingly prominent roles of the Anglo-Irish Division in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Taoiseach in Dublin, the Cabinet Office in Westminster and the Northern Ireland Office in Belfast.Footnote 36 This process pre-dates EU membership, but it spawned high-level bureaucratic involvement in British–Irish policy to Northern Ireland. Separating this domestic influence from the EU's influence is essential to understanding the EU's role in the peace process.
The AIA in itself increased bureaucratic cooperation. It provided for an institutionalized British–Irish relationship and was an international treaty that could only be revoked by mutual consent. It obliged British and Irish representatives to meet at least twice a year in the formal inter-governmental conference. Apart from the regime created by an international treaty, the AIA and subsequent agreements created layers of institutional engagement between both governments, further embedding their cooperation and altering their decision-making processes. Participants have observed that after the AIA British–Irish policy became more consensual, less adversarial and more based on a problem-solving approach, whereby problems were solved jointly.Footnote 37 Formal ministerial meetings increased and over time, the number of informal ad hoc meetings at short notice also grew. Indeed, for one civil servant, the greatest change in the conduct of relations after 1985 was their increased informality, whereby the Irish Taoiseach now meets with his British counterpart at short notice and with very little preparation, compared to prime ministerial interaction in the 1980s.Footnote 38
Issues that before led to ‘megaphone diplomacy’ were now dealt with through the AIA's framework, and rhetoric became more conciliatory. In contrast to British–Irish responses to crises in Northern Ireland from the 1960s to the early 1980s, by the 1990s any crisis met with a swift and joint British–Irish reply. For example, in the early 1980s, following the IRA hunger strike and the Irish response to the Falklands war, British and Irish prime ministers did not meet for sixteen months. In contrast, in 2003, following the suspension of the new devolved government in Northern Ireland, a high number of prime ministerial and bureaucratic meetings took place.Footnote 39 The crisis precipitated by spy allegations in 2003 and the failure of the IRA to decommission led to close intensive cooperation and intervention, rather than overt disagreements about the appropriate means of dealing with each crisis.
Civil servants' accounts of the British–Irish policy-making process highlight how in the early stages of negotiating the AIA there were clearly opposing sides.Footnote 40 As negotiations continued, however, trust increased between both sides and gradually the Irish delegation ceased to advocate a purely Irish set of preferences on the bargaining table, but would take on board British approaches and vice versa. Thus, misperceptions diminished throughout the whole bargaining period. Similarly, another official has observed that by the 1990s the bargaining process was very much an intellectual exercise, whereby officials on both sides met to resolve a current issue and approach the problem with a common view in an effort to conceptualize the core of the problem together.Footnote 41 Policies were more likely to emerge jointly from British–Irish discussions. Again, while the very signing of the AIA reflected cooperation, the bargaining processes precipitated by the AIA's institutional framework had a multiplier effect on levels of cooperation. The policy agenda was also tightly controlled by officials in the Anglo-Irish Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin and in Westminster. Conflicts of interest about issues not related to the conflict in Northern Ireland did not spill over into the British–Irish regime. Issues related to EU economic aid and cross-border cooperation were tightly controlled by and channelled through the Anglo-Irish Division.Footnote 42 Thus, a specific domestic institutional design was related to strategic planning and increased cooperation in the British–Irish case. This institutional evolution began just before EU membership, in response to the outbreak of violence.Footnote 43
Indeed, a fundamental problem in determining EU influence is that the decision to join the EU coincided with the beginning of violent conflict in Northern Ireland in the 1960s, and membership itself coincided with the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973. In other words, it is difficult to determine the EU's effect on British–Irish cooperation when a key British–Irish common interest to end violence and restore stability to Northern Ireland emerged at the same time. The AIA and subsequent agreements reflected a growing perception that only joint British–Irish intervention would resolve conflict in Northern Ireland.Footnote 44 Failure was illustrated starkly by the IRA's assassination of Lord Mountbatten while he was fishing in Ireland in 1979 and by the rise in violence in the 1980s and the decision of Sinn Fein to enter electoral politics in 1982. The increase in electoral support for Sinn Fein following the death of ten nationalist hunger strikers in 1981 and the IRA bombing of the Conservative Annual Conference in Brighton in 1984 most obviously accelerated British–Irish cooperation and its resultant institutionalization in the mid-1980s. Fundamental policy shifts from 1985 onwards were closely associated with a small core of British and Irish senior civil servants working within the AIA's framework. Indeed, the case of British–Irish policy highlights the key role of bureaucracy in the evolution of cooperation.
The Role of Bureaucracy
Key British and Irish civil servants in both administrations enjoyed close collegial relations that deepened over time. British and Irish civil services shared similar operating procedures and structures, having once been one civil service before the foundation of the Irish state. Both civil services are highly meritocratic in recruitment and promotion procedures and the aim is to achieve a degree of policy-making stability over time, regardless of government turnover. While Irish civil servants were criticized for having clear sight over short distances but lacking a strategic long-term planning focus, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs has been praised for its professionalism and focus.Footnote 45 In the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Anglo-Irish Division, responsible for Northern Ireland affairs and relations with the UK, has become respected for its policy analysis and the calibre of its staff. Similarly, the team of British civil servants involved from the Prime Minister's Office and from the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) adopted a strategic and analytical approach to conflict resolution.
The agenda was controlled by officials in the Anglo-Irish Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin and in Westminster, and senior civil servants had significant advisory and consultative positions vis-à-vis governments and prime ministers. Senior Irish civil servant Dermot Nally and Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong have been shown to have played a key role even in the tentative early stages of cooperation in 1979.Footnote 46 For example, Nally recalled placing a short list of key points he had prepared into Jack Lynch's hand as Lynch departed to meet Margaret Thatcher to discuss Northern Ireland following Mountbatten's death.Footnote 47 In the prelude to the AIA, British and Irish senior civil servants met for two-day sessions approximately every six weeks between 1984 and 1985,Footnote 48 and these meetings were a key influence on the final agreement. The core principles of British–Irish policy can be detected in this elite group in both civil services. The basic idea of incorporating and institutionalizing an Irish dimension as a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland has been traced back to an informal conversation between Michael Lillis, then head of the AID, and Sir David Goodall during a walk in Dublin.Footnote 49 Similarly, accounts of why Margaret Thatcher negotiated the AIA in 1984–85 often emphasize the role of Sir Robert Armstrong in influencing her position and altering her bargaining approach.Footnote 50
Thus, two clear findings from the Northern Irish case are that domestic factors, particularly highly skilled bureaucracies and wide and deep institutionalization were central to British–Irish policy and the consequent peace process. The EU bolstered British–Irish cooperation and the peace process, but it did not cause cooperation.
THE EU, GREEK–TURKISH RELATIONS AND CYPRUS
This section provides an overview of EU policy to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. First, a description of EU political and financial policy to Cyprus is described and then the role of the EU's consensual framework is assessed. Finally, the role of more limited bureaucratic capacity in Greece and Turkey is identified as an inhibiting factor in the Greek–Turkish relationship and in the realization of any potential EU cooperative influence.
EU Aid to Cyprus
Two key periods can be identified in EU policy to Greece: 1990–99 and 1999–2010. In 1990 the Greek community in Cyprus voted by referendum to become a member of the EU in 2004.Footnote 51 As in Northern Ireland, conditionality formed a major part of Commission policy towards Cyprus and towards Turkey and, arguably, the EU dimension at this stage was potentially far stronger than in the Northern Ireland case: ‘The accession period for all EU states is the crucial one for the Commission to exert its influence, whereby the threat of not being a member is a crucial incentive for domestic change.’Footnote 52 Turkish membership was made conditional on the resolution of the Cyprus issue: ‘Cyprus’ integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question…and that as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process.'Footnote 53
It was hoped that the EU's provision of economic incentives would precipitate increased Greek–Turkish cooperation and improved Greek-Cypriot/Turkish-Cypriot relations. To bolster the incentives, as in Northern Ireland, various aid packages were provided by the EU for Cyprus and also for Turkey. In 1999, however, the carrot-and-stick approach altered, with the decision that resolving the Cyprus conflict should be separate from Cypriot and Turkish accession negotiations.
This policy reversal rested on a Commission assumption that if the Cyprus issue continued to be a part of accession negotiations, Turkish membership in particular would not be agreed. Turkish–Greek cooperation was assumed to be vital to resolving the Cypriot issue and more generally Turkish ‘Europeanization’ and democratization could be solidified by Turkey joining the EU. In line with conditionality principles, the Commission pledged €259 million to Northern Cyprus if a solution was reached. When the referendum to establish a federal bi-communal Cyprus was rejected in 2004 by Greek Cypriots, however, the money was made available anyway, weakening the conditionality rule.Footnote 54 Thus, various aid packages were agreed for both parts of Cyprus. For the period 2007–13, €492 million in Structural Funds were granted to Cyprus.Footnote 55 Overall, as in Northern Ireland up until the 1990s and because of the Commission's assumption that Cyprus is an inter-governmental matter, Commission rhetoric and approaches were not proactive in convincing Cypriot actors of the incentives to cooperate. Thus, while the Cypriot issue is not ignored in various documents on enlargement, references to it are rhetorical.Footnote 56
EU Framework and Greek–Turkish Cooperation
The previous section cited arguments that the accession period itself is believed to be highly influential in policy behaviour. So, although Turkey is not an EU member, its candidate status gives the EU leverage to influence Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, Greek membership of the EU may have ameliorated its foreign policy towards Turkey. In spite of this, there are limits to the EU's impact on Greek–Turkish cooperation.
On the one hand, the Greek–Turkish relationship has become more cooperative and more institutionalized since the 1990s and is governed by various sets of legal regimes. Following agreement to cooperate in dealing with terrorism, Greek–Turkish joint committees were established to initiate a process of consultation and joint work on bilateral issues in wider areas – tourism, environment, culture, trade and regional development.Footnote 57 Similarly, when both states were faced with the devastating consequences of earthquakes in 1999, both governments at the UN co-sponsored a joint UN resolution to establish a Joint Standby Disaster Response Unit.Footnote 58 According to the Turkish Embassy, high-level contacts between Greek and Turkish leaders have helped maintain momentum in the rapprochement process.Footnote 59 In 2007 both governments agreed to cooperate in energy by inaugurating a gas pipeline.Footnote 60 By 2008, 24 confidence-building measures had been adopted by both governments with respect to the issues covered by the 1999 working groups, including the Aegean issue, and 31 agreements had been signed.Footnote 61 Thus, in some ways Greek–Turkish cooperation is institutionalized.
However, unlike in the British–Irish relationship, the various regimes that have been established do not emphasize Cyprus. Most of the agreements have related to functional practical matters. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, whereas in the British–Irish case functional cooperation occurred after the establishment of a British–Irish regime dedicated to Northern Ireland, in the Greek–Turkish case functional arrangements have occurred in the absence of a Greek–Turkish regime dedicated to Cyprus, and they exclude Cyprus from their agenda.
Indicative of the weakness of Greek–Turkish cooperation with respect to Cyprus is the fact that in 2006, despite the positive developments that had been made, Greek and Turkish ministers met only twice and informally to discuss confidence-building measures.Footnote 62 In January 2008 the Greek prime minister made the first official visit to Turkey in 49 years.Footnote 63 In contrast, on average British–Irish officials dealing with Northern Ireland had six formal meetings a year, rising to 15 at times of crises and, in addition, informal meetings took place.Footnote 64 Moreover, ‘good relations are a matter of style, while the unresolved issues and latent tensions surrounding them still persist in substance’.Footnote 65 Even the style of Greek–Turkish relations is less cooperative than British–Irish relations, despite rapprochement from 1999. Thus, the Turkish foreign ministry's website summarizes the Greek Cypriot bargaining approach as ‘lacking momentum…back-tracking…rejecting frequent meetings’,Footnote 66 but describes the Turkish Cypriot side as ‘negotiating in good faith and constructive attitude’Footnote 67 and according to UN principles. While these comments are directed at Greek Cyprus, as opposed to Greece, the language used adopts an adversarial and strong kinship approach to the Cypriot issue.
Likewise, the Greek Foreign Ministry, in response to the US assistant secretary of state's reference to Turkish troops in Cyprus as a ‘presence’ rather than an ‘occupation’, replied: ‘There is an occupation on Cyprus and the international community recognises one government, the government of the Cyprus Republic.’Footnote 68 Again, unlike the British–Irish approach, rhetoric lacks diplomatic nuance and there is no evidence of the joint conceptualization and joint problem-solving approach that came to typify British–Irish policy-making.
Moreover, Greece has formally complained about alleged Turkish airspace violations.Footnote 69 Again, while Greek–Turkish relations have improved, the carefully coordinated and orchestrated British–Irish governmental response to tensions and crises is absent in the above Greek–Turkish examples. More recently, following the election of hard-line Derviş Eroğlu as president of Northern Cyprus in April 2010, Greek and Turkish governments issued separate statements.Footnote 70 While relatively low key, each statement placed the onus on their rival kinship groups to produce a settlement. Furthermore, in contrast to the British–Irish relationship's characteristics, no joint statement was issued.
A key question is why there is no strong Greek–Turkish regime dedicated to Cyprus. A major factor is the absence of common Greek–Turkish interests relating to the Cyprus conflict. Violence persisted until 1974, but partition in 1974 ‘put a permanent end to inter-communal fighting on the island’, while not resolving the underlying conflict between the two communities.Footnote 71 Equally, tension in Cyprus did not spill over into violence in Greece, or Turkey. In contrast, in Northern Ireland, violence continued in England and Northern Ireland until the 1990s, and there are still security concerns, despite the ceasefires, creating an incentive for British–Irish cooperation. In the Greek–Turkish case, any shared common interests do not relate to the Cypriot issue. Indeed, common interests led to Greek preferences excluding Cyprus from the bargaining agenda and not making Turkish membership of the EU conditional on resolving the Cyprus issue. In other words, common interests undermined conflict resolution in Cyprus, and domestic bureaucracies did not provide necessary impetus for change.
Role of Bureaucracy
As in the Northern Ireland situation, in the Greek–Turkish case there are bilateral sections in both bureaucracies dealing with Cyprus, but they are less prominent than in the British–Irish case. Senior civil servants are not as involved in providing the continuity and inventiveness that characterized the British–Irish policy-making environment. Moreover, Greek and Turkish bureaucracies are quite different from their British and Irish counterparts. In Turkey, strong military influence and conservative tendencies in the Turkish Foreign Ministry mean that the bureaucratic environment is quite distinctive. For example, the Foreign Ministry was opposed to Turkey forming a customs union with the EU, because the EU has allowed a divided Cyprus to join the EU in the absence of Turkey. The Turkish government ignored its ministry's concerns and sealed the customs union deal with the EU: ‘It is indicated in journalistic accounts that the government, resolute in initiating the Customs Union, bypassed the foreign ministry through various bureaucratic manoeuvres.’Footnote 72
While this governmental control may indicate that a civil service is not necessary in successful bilateral governmental intervention in conflict, the perceived need to bypass the Foreign Ministry would not constitute the stable policy-making environment necessary for long-term strategic planning. Periodically, the Foreign Ministry and military in Turkey share a conservative consensus, and their influence has held sway over potential modernizers among the political elites.Footnote 73 This influence has been blamed for causing a foreign policy vacuum in Turkey and an absence of strategic planning.Footnote 74
While this situation is markedly different from the case of British–Irish policy-making, there is also evidence of change. In particular, business opinion and some sections of society are modernizing and in favour of EU membership.Footnote 75 In tandem with this, it was observed that the military had lost some influence on the National Security Council (NSC). In 2001, the number of civilian members increased and in 2003 a civilian was appointed as secretary general of the NSC for the first time.Footnote 76
Furthermore, despite the military's attempt to prevent then foreign minister Abdullah Gül from becoming president in 2007 – on the basis that he was a Muslim and therefore allegedly undermined the Turkish secular state – it failed to do so.Footnote 77 Whereas in the past Turkish governments have resigned in the face of military warnings, in 2007 the government spokesperson reacted strongly against the military's ‘inappropriate’ behaviour, and Gül was eventually elected president.Footnote 78 More recently, Turkish citizens voted in favour of constitutional changes to increase secularization and protect human rights and democracy in order to ease the path to EU membership. Thus, while the conservative influence on bureaucracy is stronger than in the British–Irish case, these influences have waned. A cautious interpretation is required in assessing the implications of these changes. In the Balkans, for example, the EU was criticized for mistaking ‘ticking boxes’ in order to meet EU rules for fundamental changes in understanding – the so-called ‘battle for hearts and minds’.Footnote 79 Similarly, constitutional changes with respect to democracy do not necessarily lead to joint Greek–Turkish problem-solving with respect to Cyprus.
In Greece, the public policy process of the 1970s and 1980s was described as being: ‘Structured hierarchically around “heroic” leadership, typically by ministers, supported by close personal advisers, with weak civil service support…making political initiatives vulnerable to conflicting, or changing interests within government’.Footnote 80 Likewise: ‘Foreign policy-making lacks institutionalisation and is constrained by a domestic populism, emphasising a nationalist discourse on regional issues and disturbing international attempts at stability.’Footnote 81 The Greek higher civil service has an abundance of political appointees, normally holding authority for policy formulation.Footnote 82 The Greek prime minister generally takes decisions without consulting with the civil service. In other words, Greek civil servants were seen ‘to play a minor role compared to their counterparts in other European countries’.Footnote 83
In assessing whether Greece has become ‘Europeanized’ by EU membership, it is notable, though, that ‘change is evident…in the domestic policy process. Use of policy expertise and rationalisation in policy-making in specific policy areas has occurred.’Footnote 84 In the Foreign Affairs Ministry, it was observed that a ‘wholesale pragmatic reassessment of the style and strategic goals of Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis Turkey and the Balkans’ occurred from 1995 onwards.Footnote 85 The head of the Foreign Ministry from this period onwards had more liberal leanings.Footnote 86 While this may well reflect party influence as before, it is noteworthy that this shift perhaps reflects the EU's normative pressure, creating ‘the belief that deepening democracy, by protecting human rights and minorities enhanced rather than undermined security’.Footnote 87
Despite change, clientelism continues to undermine efficiency.Footnote 88 For example, in international comparisons of government effectiveness, Greece scores relatively low, limiting its ability to ‘adapt and enact reform consistent with the EU pressure’.Footnote 89 While policy experts have a higher profile, there is little evidence of policy-learning and ‘the dominance of party over process has not been removed’.Footnote 90 Overall, while change has occurred in both Greek and Turkish bureaucracies since the 1990s, the role and approach of senior civil servants involved in a bilateral policy to Cyprus is less conducive to the joint learning and problem-solving processes that occurred in the British–Irish case.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the argument that EU membership increases cooperation in cases where there has been historical animosity. It compares the case of Cyprus, Northern Ireland and the Greek–Turkish and British–Irish relationships, and argues that domestic factors, specifically domestic bureaucratic capacity, constitute a key difference between the two cases. Therefore, in the absence of increased bureaucratic capacity, Turkish and Cypriot EU membership would be unlikely to cause increased levels of Greek–Turkish and Cypriot cooperation. Moreover, a high-functioning domestic bureaucracy and the joint perception of highly salient common interests preceded British and Irish entry to the EU, so it cannot be assumed that EU membership would cause cooperation to emerge in Turkey and Cyprus. For example, despite improvement, conducive domestic bureaucratic factors have not yet emerged in Greece, an EU member since 1981.
This article has highlighted the logical flaw in assertions that EU membership alters states' normative framework and induces cooperation, despite historical animosity. The British–Irish case and Northern Ireland illustrate that strong bureaucratic capacity and institutionalization were not caused by the obligations and norms of EU membership, but that they and British–Irish cooperation emerged from domestic sources in the first place. In the absence of these bureaucratic domestic factors, the EU's influence on cooperation and domestic capacity is more limited. While ‘politicians, academics and journalists alike very often expect results overnight or within unrealistic time frames’,Footnote 91 these findings imply that the carrot of EU membership alone, or eventual membership itself, are not sufficient conditions for more substantial Greek–Turkish cooperation and conflict resolution in Cyprus.
These findings also highlight the benefit of addressing some issues raised in the Europeanization literature. For example, following a rational institutionalist logic, the importance of domestic capacity if domestic states are to exploit EU opportunities is stressed: ‘…quite irrespective of the pressures for adaptation, each member state has a different set of institutions and actors facilitating or inhibiting change.’Footnote 92 Hence, domestic skills and bureaucratic evolution in the UK and Ireland have lent themselves to policy-learning and revaluation in a way that has not yet emerged in the Greek–Turkish case, despite improvements in the latter case.
This article also reveals a gap in the literature on Europeanization and in conflict management literature. Given increased EU involvement in conflict resolution and the evolution of a stronger EU foreign policy, there is only limited research on how domestic capacity interferes or encourages EU cooperative endeavours in various conflict situations.Footnote 93 The connections between the Europeanization field of study and the more narrow conflict resolution field are rarely made at all and never in comparative perspective. The EU has been increasingly involved in conflict management and peace-building policy: for example, in the Balkans, as well as regions farther afield from Europe's borders. The European External Action Service and the new policy-making procedures under the Lisbon Treaty seek to improve EU policy-making towards conflict situations. The cases in this article illustrate that the EU's efforts to resolve conflict in conflict zones will be greatly hindered by the varying levels of bureaucratic skills across different regions, particularly where mass migration or forced expulsion of specific ethnic communities has created a dearth of skilled experts in given fields, or where bureaucrats' ethnic identities in divided societies dominate their approach to policy. Capacity-building and root-and-branch change, whereby deep policy revaluation occurs, presupposes a certain level of skills in the first place. While EU efforts are made to increase capacity in conflict and post-conflict zones, the above case highlights the vicious circle that exists in attempting to do so and the need for a very consistent and assertive EU strategy if such obstacles are to be overcome.
