This book is slim but ambitious. In it, Paul Sniderman, Michael Bang Petersen, Rune Slothuus, and Rune Stubager seek to build a nuanced theory of Westerners’ tolerance toward Muslim immigrants. But perhaps even more important than its general scope and ambitions, Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy is both incredibly thought provoking and timely. As I write this review, the horrific attacks on France’s Charlie Hebdo magazine dominate international news headlines. At a time when most Western commentary is either defiant (“We will not be intimidated!” “We stand together!” “Je suis Charlie!”) or despondent (“The clash of civilizations is at hand.” “Multiculturalism is dead.”), Paradoxes provides a measured, but much-needed, sense of optimism. On the basis of original survey experiment data, most of which were collected during the height of the 2005–6 Muhammad cartoon controversy in Denmark, Sniderman and colleagues find that Danes remained incredibly tolerant, showing a remarkable willingness to extend basic civil rights, including freedom of speech, to Muslim immigrants.
How is this possible? How is it that even as the cartoon controversy roiled—even as many Muslims called for limits on freedom of speech in Denmark; indeed, even as clerics in the Middle East and South Asia placed bounties on the heads of the Danish cartoonists for exercising that right—an overwhelming majority of Danes would still support extending freedom of speech to Muslims?
One interpretation might suggest this as evidence of the consistency of Danish values. The commitment to basic civil liberties is so strong that Danes are willing to grant these rights even to those who do not respect them. This is not the authors’ interpretation, however. Instead, they argue that Danes draw a distinction between Muslim immigrants writ large and Islamic fundamentalists more specifically, and, as their data show, though Danish citizens are willing to extend freedom of speech and other basic civil rights to “Muslims,” they are not so willing to afford these rights to “fundamentalists.”
This is the crux of what Sniderman and his colleagues call the “categorization hypothesis,” which lies at the heart of their theoretical project. The categorization hypothesis suggests that people “draw a sharp distinction between the claims to political rights” of those considered merely “out of the mainstream” (e.g., Muslim immigrants) and those believed to be more seriously “transgressive” (e.g., Islamic fundamentalists) (pp. 17–20). In other words, people remain tolerant toward those perceived to present a challenge to basic societal norms but express intolerance of those perceived to genuinely threaten such norms through aggressive behavior.
If the distinction between “out of the mainstream” and “transgressive” categories seems a bit unclear, it unfortunately remains so throughout the book. Although the authors provide a number of real-world cases, suggesting, for example, that born-again Christians and the “Far Right” are out of the mainstream in Danish society, while certain biker groups and neo-Nazis qualify as transgressive, these examples do not go far enough to clarify this key conceptual demarcation. The use of violence, which the authors do emphasize, seems the clearest criterion for distinction. Yet the “fundamentalist” Muslim groups discussed do not all qualify on this account. For instance, as evidence of transgressive behavior by the Copenhagen-based Islamisk Trossamfund, the authors recount only that “during the Cartoon Crisis, leading figures of the . . . organization . . . won media exposure by taking part in a delegation traveling to the Middle East to whip up popular anger” (p. 18). The representatives of Islamisk Trossamfund have consistently countered this characterization, arguing that they were not trying to “whip up popular anger,” but instead were hoping to place diplomatic pressure on the Danish government after it categorically refused to meet with any Danish Muslim leaders. However, even if Danes agree with the authors’ depiction of Islamisk Trossamfund’s actions, it is not clear precisely how or why either venue shopping or public opinion campaigns—strategies employed among Western activists every day—are fundamentally transgressive.
What is more, it is the scholars who make the distinction between out-of-the-mainstream and transgressive actors, not the survey respondents themselves—leading to some basic concerns about the operationalization of the authors’ categories. To be sure, the researchers employed a strong survey experiment design in which each respondent was randomly assigned a set of questions that referenced only one group, and thus, those who were asked about the rights that should be afforded to “Muslims” had no way of knowing that others were asked about “Islamic fundamentalists” (and vice versa). However, because the surveys did not provide a definition for any of these groups, we cannot know who or what each respondent used as a reference category. Did those answering questions about the free speech rights of Islamic fundamentalists consider a very narrow class of individuals or groups? Or might they have had a much larger swath of Muslims in mind? Does simply using the term “Islamic fundamentalists” prime respondents to think of Muslims as a whole more negatively? Unfortunately, there is no way to answer these questions on the basis of the data detailed in Paradoxes.
Still, the data do support a genuine degree of optimism, particularly in light of the social and political dynamics engendered by both the Danish and French cartoon controversies. One especially strong concern forwarded by the cartoons’ critics is that the offending depictions make no bright-line distinctions between “good” and “bad” categories of actors. Instead, cartoons that portray the Prophet Muhammad himself, whether with a bomb on his head or naked and in pornographic poses, imply that Islam itself is corrupted. That is, the “transgressive” elements are the essence of Islam, and the essence of Islam is transgressive. Moreover, the intense media focus placed on violence carried out in the name of Islam following both cartoon controversies can only further blur this boundary.
Yet the findings of Sniderman and his colleagues suggest that even when the Danish controversy was at its height, Danes did not instinctively lump all Muslims into the same category. Although we do not know precisely whom Danes thought of when they considered the rights of either “Muslims” or “Islamic fundamentalists,” we do know that they saw a difference. And that difference offers, at the very least, a kernel of hope for relations between Muslims and non-Muslims living in the West. Though the conclusions drawn in Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy require further testing and refinement in future research, in the light of both the defiance and despair felt in the wake of the recent attacks in Paris, such research has never been more important.
