Late in the afternoon of Friday, 6 October 2006, the White House released the unclassified summary of a new National Space Policy. President Bush had signed the policy on 31 August, more than five weeks earlier. Why would the White House delay announcement of the policy and then release it after the daily news cycle at the beginning of the long Columbus Day weekend?
Professor Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the Department of National Security Decision-Making at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, knows why. The Bush space policy marked a decided turn toward confrontation and militarization, when compared with the 1996 policy promulgated by the Clinton administration. In an election year, it could well be construed as another indicator of the Bush administration's “proclivity toward preemption and unilateralism” (244). Worse still, according to Johnson-Freese, the Bush manifesto continued a misdirection of United States space policy that had been under way since the Reagan administration, if not since the end of the Apollo program. Johnson-Freese believes that space is a vital national asset of the United States – an asset that is being squandered.
Johnson-Freese conceptualizes American space activity in four broad categories: intelligence, military, civilian, and commercial. She does not, however, organize her book around these topics. Rather she builds her argument around national “ambitions” in space, arguing for a U.S. national policy of cooperation, not competition. For her, “space is a subset of foreign policy” (257), and it should be pursued accordingly. She therefore examines manned spaceflight, the militarization and weaponization of space, dual-use technologies and their impact on U.S. export controls over aerospace technology, and the space programs of China and the European Union. Surprisingly she pays little attention to the Japanese and Russian space programs.
She has least to say about American intelligence activities in space, suggesting that America's broad array of space-based reconnaissance technologies successfully exploits the strategic asset of space. Of course, this is also the category of space activity that is the most highly classified, so it is the most difficult to know and critique. Still, an extensive literature has grown up around the spy satellites that constantly monitor the activities of our friends and enemies alike. Johnson-Freese might have explored this topic in greater depth, if only to illustrate how space activity can serve national needs.
She devotes the greatest attention to the militarization and weaponization of space, the realms in which the Bush National Space Policy departs most markedly from its predecessor. Johnson-Freese has little concern with the militarization of space, which she understands to be the activities in space that support military operations on earth. These are the communications, reconnaissance, navigation, and other satellites that give America's soldiers, sailors, and airmen an informational edge over their adversaries.
The weaponization of space is something else, a new phenomenon in American space policy. The notion of death rays from space has been around since before the space age began, but the United States and other space powers were always cool to the prospect of turning near-Earth orbits into a battleground. President Reagan flirted with the idea as part of his Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Air Force began arguing in the late 1980s that weaponization might become necessary to protect the space-based support assets on which our national security had come to rely so thoroughly. President Clinton resisted such pressures in his 1996 National Space Policy. President Bush has not.
Manned spaceflight, in Johnson-Freese's view, dominates civilian space activity. She believes it should be pursued as it was during the Apollo program, as a strategic objective, not just under the rubric of exploration. “Manned space activity represents the future,” she says (55), and the United States should not cede its dominance in this field to Russia, China, or any other would-be great power. She has no confidence that the current administration or its successors will fund President Bush's 2004 “Vision for Space Exploration.” Failing that, she believes, some more realistic program must be developed to sustain America's historic dominance of manned spaceflight capability.
In the realm of commercial space activity, Johnson-Freese believes that the United States has already ceded its leadership in launch capability to the European Space Agency's Ariane launch vehicle and risks erosion of its other commercial strengths to a misguided and counterproductive technology-export policy. Because 95 percent of aerospace technology is dual-use – it has both military and civilian applications – the United States severely restricts sharing and exporting many technologies that other countries can, if necessary, replicate. The worst excesses of these restrictions flowed from the Cox Committee Report of 1998, the result of a congressional investigation into the transfer of secrets and technology to Communist China. The controls, says Johnson-Freeze, have not only stymied cooperation with China but have complicated the export of all American aerospace technologies to nations around the world. Other countries are stepping into the market vacuum left by the constraints on American commerce.
Johnson-Freese characterizes the Bush administration as captured by a classic security dilemma, in which it sees any advance in space by another country as a threat to America's position. Even the Europeans are not exempt from American suspicions. The result is an aggressive and threatening program to weaponize space, a suffocating limitation on aerospace commerce, and a failure to invest in manned spaceflight, where the United States still enjoys the strategic advantage it won in the Apollo program.
In place of these paranoid and self-defeating policies, Johnson-Freese recommends communication and cooperation. Instead of seeing space as a zero-sum game, she says, the United States should leverage its unquestioned preeminence in space to achieve its legitimate international objectives. Weaponization is not the best way to protect our assets in space. The United States would be better served by cooperating with other nations in the development of agreements that would guarantee the security of everyone's space assets. Manned spaceflight, which has no apparent military utility, should be pursued cooperatively rather than competitively. Export-control rules should be reformed to emphasize transparency and efficiency, allowing the United States to protect its legitimate national-security concerns without eroding the country's competitiveness in the international aerospace market.
Johnson-Freese makes a persuasive argument. Her book reviews the field thoroughly and speaks authoritatively to the position in which the United States finds itself. Perhaps the book's greatest weakness is that Johnson-Freese assumes and asserts that space is a national asset worth the investment the country is making. According to the authoritative 2006 Space Report of the Space Foundation, the United States now spends in space almost five times as much as all the rest of the world combined. Almost 80 percent of that United States spending is for national security: for intelligence and military activities. Most of the rest is for NASA. Nowhere does Johnson Freeze explain the metric by which the United States determines if it is getting its money's worth for this investment. As valuable as Johnson-Freese's analysis is, it would have been still more useful had she explained how to zero-base the total American space budget and measure the value of this asset against its cost.
