Capping a multi-year run of innovative single-authored and collaborative publications, Lindsay Driediger-Murphy's new monograph is an energising read. Jerzy Linderski's 1986 monograph-article on ‘The Augural Law’ retains the force of a classic, not least because it refused to reduce augural episodes to legal or political machinations; more recently, books such as Federico Santangelo's Divination, Prediction and the End of the Roman Republic (Cambridge 2013) and Yann Berthelet's Gouverner avec les dieux (2015) have widened the scope of investigations into Roman divination's cultural significance. D.-M.'s book elevates the conversation by teasing out of the history of middle and late-republican augury an internally consistent theology of exceptional richness and rigour.
Many modern and contemporary students of Roman augury see its protocols as resting on a mostly unqualified assumption of human control. At the end of the day, the thinking goes, human beings ran the show, not the gods. Whenever Roman auspice-takers — magistrates or their assistants — communicated with the divine, it was understood and largely taken for granted that the only valid signs were those recognised by human beings as valid. From this assumption, it is only a hop, skip and jump to the now well-worn claim that Roman leaders would and could manipulate and falsify auguries and auspices in the service of military and political expediency. Manipulation did not have to rise to the level of impiously chucking chickens into the water; something as simple as shuttering carriage blinds, as the five-time consul Marcus Claudius Marcellus reputedly did on his travels ‘so as not to be hindered by the auspices’ (Cic., Div. 2.77: ‘ne impediretur auspiciis’), was enough to obtain a preferred outcome.
D.-M. shuts the door on the manipulation theory, and on the jadedness that underpins it. Those ancient texts that have been tapped to support this line can, she proposes, be re-read otherwise: as expressive of the belief that augury's notionally human-centred protocols were grounded in a deep and abiding recognition of Jupiter's freedom and control. No one man could have all the power; but Jupiter did, and it was his free exercise of that power that imposed constraints on humans, not the other way round.
The book presents its case in a meaty introduction (50 pages and 186 notes), three core chapters, and a conclusion. All of these are carefully segmented and signposted, and the argumentative thread is generally easy to follow, even in the midst of demandingly close readings and prolific citations to earlier scholarship — which D.-M. wields with a Linderskian touch (witness the reference to a 1721 dissertation defence on 130–31). The introduction crisply sets out the four ‘guiding principles’ according to which the book organises its arguments: that augury's purpose was to solicit guidance from Jupiter on ‘how and when to act’; that augury was structured around some basic and repeatable rules, as well as sign-interpretations, that were known to most practitioners; that augury relied on consensus to secure compliance and acceptance, even among elites who might not have been comfortable with or were actively inconvenienced by specific outcomes; and that religion at Rome, while ‘embedded’, held independent meaning and power (24).
Ch. 1 steadily chips away at the idea that the rules of Roman augury tolerated or incentivised the fabrication of auspices. The unravelling of a knotty fragment from Cato the Elder's speech De sacrilegio commisso, a description of (private?) auspice-taking potentially interrupted by farting (ORF 8.12 fr. 73), is a highlight. Ch. 2 moves straight to the controversial instances of augury supposedly bent to the service of political ambitions, most infamously the technique of ‘watching the sky’ (servare de caelo) through which M. Calpurnius Bibulus sought to stymie Julius Caesar's legislative efforts during their fateful year as consular colleagues. Here D.-M. cleverly, and in my view correctly, argues that ‘proceeding with public business while sky-watching was going on, whether or not it had yet produced a result, would be to proceed inauspicato, with incomplete or neglected auspices’ (132). On this reading, sky-watching (ought to have) commanded respect and deference, not because it was the prequel to the receipt or falsification of a desired sign, but because in and of itself ‘it represented an open-ended attempt to communicate’ with Jupiter, in the course of which the god could make his wishes known at any time (155). Finally, with just the right mix of incisive correction and imaginative reappraisal, ch. 3 lays out what comes into view if we restore to augury its integrity as a channel for genuinely open communication with the divine: a world in which augury, ‘as unpredictable and refractory as it was convenient and enabling’, supplied ‘religious motives for behaviour even to the detriment of self-interest’ (201).
Not one to overlook the details, D.-M. has buffed this book to a high degree of polish. And the book's clear and spirited prose is complemented nicely by its ecumenical range of reference: it is rare to read a monograph on Roman religion that glides from Star Trek to orthopaedic shower mats (27 n. 97; 50 n. 186). Of course, as with any outstanding book, not everything comes up aces. The book has not entirely sloughed off its (accoladed) dissertation skin: some of the action in the footnotes should have been migrated to the main text, or else pruned; and the sorting of predecessor interpretations can be rather Procrustean at times. Turning to more substantive matters, D.-M.'s psychology of Roman religious practice left me wanting more. I wholeheartedly agree with her that ‘we have not paid sufficient attention to emotion and affect in motivating the behavior of ancient people’ (21 n. 78, teeing up a reference to Ramsay MacMullen). Her representation of Roman magistrates is flavoured with an almost Kierkegaardian fear and trembling, not without reason: Jupiter and his signs were awesome, when not downright terrifying. But other states of interiority will have jostled for space in Roman minds: what about edge-of-your-seat excitement, or even elation? On reentering Rome in late 82 or early 81 b.c.e. after liquidating his opposition, will the rapture that Sulla described in his memoirs (see H. I. Flower, ‘The Rapture and the Sorrow,’ in R. Ash et al., eds, Fame and Infamy (2015), 209–23) have suffused his auspice-taking?
In any case, it is well past time to shake the habit of setting Roman augury and auspice-taking as one more cornerstone for a quasi-secularised ‘architecture of obstruction’ (the phrase: A. Lebovitz, ‘Obstruction and Emergency in Late Republican Rome’, History of Political Thought, 2015). D.-M. has shown us where and how to begin.
