THE JEWS TRY FORD! screamed the headline of a New York city tabloid in the spring of 1927. It was a vivid reminder of the dilemma American Jews faced in responding to the anti-Semitic fulminations of the automobile magnate: how to combat Ford's sponsorship of anti-Jewish propaganda without appearing to be bullying one of the nation's most admired men. That, as Victoria Saker Woeste shows in Henry Ford's War on Jews, was no mean feat.
In the early 1900s, America was engulfed by “an ocean of polite antisemitism,” Prof. Woeste notes (3). Unflattering literary references, discrimination in hiring and school admissions, and exclusion from clubs and resort hotels alarmed American Jews, although this kind of abuse was a far cry from the mob violence which they or their parents suffered in Europe. The danger that a man of Ford's wealth and fame represented was that he would use his riches to promote anti-Semitic activity and his stature to legitimize anti-Semitism, perhaps ultimately helping to pave the way for genteel stereotyping to graduate to brutal pogroms.
As a devout pacifist who blamed “the German-Jewish bankers” for causing World War I, Ford was eagerly receptive when his right-hand man, Ernest Liebold, introduced him to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion (31). The notorious Czarist screed, first published in Russia in 1903, presented itself as the minutes of a secret meeting of Jewish leaders plotting to take over the world by controlling international finance, instigating wars, and manipulating gentiles to do their bidding. The Protocols supplied Ford with a ready explanation for an array of frustrations, from the horrors of the world war to the rise of communism in Europe to his own inability to secure a $75-million loan from Wall Street financiers. Ford decided to use his weekly newspaper, the Dearborn [Michigan] Independent, to spread this gospel of hate.
Beginning in May 1920 and continuing for the next two years, the Independent serialized, and sometimes embellished upon, the Protocols in ninety lengthy installments called “The International Jew: The World's Problem.” American Jews were horrified but divided. Attorney and Jewish leader Louis Marshall wired Ford to protest his publication of “palpable fabrications” that had “deeply wounded” three million American Jews (54). But Marshall's colleagues at the American Jewish Committee, the leading Jewish defense organization, reined him in. They feared that noisy protests would simply draw more attention – and sympathy – to the Protocols. Others disagreed with that strategy. In separate actions, two Jews named in the Independent's series filed libel suits against Ford. Journalist Herman Bernstein, whom Ford claimed had leaked the Protocols to him, filed suit in New York but ran into numerous obstacles trying to serve the papers on Ford. Meawhile, Aaron Sapiro, an organizer of agricultural cooperatives, sued over articles in the Independent accusing him of a Jewish plot to subvert America's farmers. Sapiro took the fight to Ford's home turf. The trial opened in Detroit's federal courthouse on 15 March 1927.
Thoroughly researched and ably written, Henry Ford's War on Jews traces Sapiro's valiant attempt to defend not only his good name but that of the Jewish people. Early on, Judge Fred M. Raymond ruled existing law made no provision for group libel and therefore the case would have to focus on whether Sapiro himself had been libeled. Nonetheless, the frequent mention during the trial of the Jewish angle (of which the defense attorney's declared confusion as to whether it was “Sapiro” or “Shapiro” was just one crude example) ensured the public would view the case as a fight over the reputation of Jews in general.
The most anticipated segment of the trial, however, never took place. The day before he was to testify, Ford was involved in an automobile accident that Prof. Woeste suggests was staged. The ensuing delays set off a chain of events that caused a mistrial. Before a new trial could begin, Ford arranged for Louis Marshall to draft for him a statement of apology to the Jewish people. The irony, Woeste points out, is that since the apology “expressed contrition to the Jewish community in general and no one in particular” – Sapiro was not mentioned by name – Ford had “apologized for the one thing the trial had established that he would never lose on: group libel” (283).
Sapiro, feeling Marshall had pulled the rug out from under him, decided he had no choice but to declare victory and accept a modest settlement to cover his legal costs. Bernstein did likewise. From Marshall's perspective, it was a resounding victory: Ford appeared to have recognized the error of his ways; anti-Semitism had been discredited. And the apology included a pledge to destroy remaining copies of the offensive text and prevent overseas publishers from reprinting it.
But it was actually Ford who was the true victor, Woeste contends. The wording of the apology enabled Ford to claim (implausibly) that he had been unaware of what his newspaper had been publishing. He avoided the witness stand and the public embarrassment that might have followed. Moreover, there was no way to compel Ford to fulfill his promise to act against foreign publishers; his staff stalled on Marshall's requests, and when Marshall passed away in 1929, any hope of enforcement died with him. “Ford simply went underground with his antisemitic views, quietly supporting the platforms of other public intolerants,” Woeste points out (323). For example, he subsidized a radio program hosted by one of his editors that was based on the Protocols, and he provided financial assistance to the anti-Semitic radio preacher Father Charles Coughlin.
Prof. Woeste believes that Marshall let Ford off too easily. Seeing Sapiro's suit through to a successful conclusion would have put the legal system's official stamp of disapproval on Ford's anti-Semitism. Marshall's rush to announce the apology in effect stampeded Sapiro and Bernstein into settling out of court and thereby “permitted Ford to evade a more lasting judgment” (334). Woeste also faults Marshall for failing to “use the apology to instill group libel in American law … along the lines of New Jersey's 1935 pathbreaking hate-speech law” (332). But as Prof. Woeste herself notes, the state's courts overturned that law six years later because it infringed upon free speech. More recent attempts by universities to curb hate speech on campus likewise have been struck down. European laws against racist incitement and Holocaust denial would not pass Constitutional muster in the United States. American Jewish strategies for combating anti-Semitism have to take this into consideration.
