The road leading to the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq was paved with deception. Whether one fell victim to that deception has much to do with how seriously one chooses to take evidence. These two books offer starkly different approaches to the issue of Iraq and serve to illustrate the importance of simple facts.
Raphael Israeli's The Iraq War: Hidden Agendas and Babylonian Intrigue, researched and written in 2003, sets out “to analyze what kind of nation Saddam is bequeathing to his successors and to speculate on what kind of future awaits the new Iraq in the new Middle East” (p. 11). No doubt an admirable project, considering the dearth of understanding and rational discussion of Iraq prevailing before the March 2003 invasion; unfortunately, Israeli's project is clearly part of that problem rather than any sort of corrective. Giving some indication of the level of ideology that clouds his analysis is the following: Israeli concludes that, after the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, “[t]here can be little doubt that … a new era has dawned in the Middle East, an era that one hopes is not a false dawn” (p. 237).
Israeli opens with an entirely undocumented chapter, “Iraq under Saddam.” Beginning in 1975, Israeli deals with Saddam's rise, the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88, and the Gulf War of 1990–91 in just eleven pages without a single citation. Conveniently for the rest of his narrative, Israeli spares his readers any mention of the American role in supporting Saddam Hussein throughout his worst crimes. The Americans are part of a list of the “various foreign quarters” that “Saddam drew support from” in his war with Iran (p. 6), but no more detail is offered. Readers are informed that “Saddam achieved much of his weapons program objectives via collaboration with European and South American firms and governments” (p. 4), although the details of U.S. involvement were hardly obscure at the time Israeli was writing.
Israeli's brief treatment of the Gulf War is no more insightful. For Israeli, it was “the pressure exerted by the Arab coalition partners” (p. 10), wielding their apparently decisive influence, that persuaded the United States to allow Hussein to remain in power in 1991. The chief diplomatic correspondent at Israeli's favorite source, the New York Times (NYT), had a rather different—not to mention much more plausible—analysis: the Gulf War was “fought to restore the status quo,” Thomas Friedman wrote on 7 July 1991. “And, as every American policymaker knows, before Mr. Hussein invaded Kuwait, he was a pillar of the gulf balance of power and status quo preferred by Washington. His iron fist simultaneously held Iraq together, much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia…. It was only when the Iraqi dictator decided to use his iron fist to dominate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that he became a threat. However, as soon as Mr. Hussein was forced back into his shell, Washington felt he had become useful again for maintaining the regional balance and preventing Iraq from disintegrating.”
The reasons behind Hussein's survival aside, Israeli further asserts that, “[a]s a result of his escape from heavy defeat,… Saddam returned to the development and proliferation of weapons” (p. 10). As we know from General Hussein Kamel, the former director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation in charge of Hussein's weapons programs: “All weapons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear—were destroyed” in 1991. Kamel had defected along with crates of documents on 7 August 1995, and the details of his testimony were publicly available before the March 2003 invasion—and, therefore, at the time of Israeli's writing. It is obvious that Israeli reads the NYT—his chapter on the Sunni region of Iraq draws more than 85 percent of its support from the NYT, and, of his chapters that have citations, a majority of them are to articles in the NYT (and all from 2003). Nonetheless, he ignored information in the NYT that was not in line with his own beliefs: Nicholas Kristof's 6 May 2003 column, for example, which mentioned Kamel's admission and the February 2003 leak of the transcript of his interview with weapons officials after his 1995 defection. Kamel has been selectively cited many times in the media in support of claims that Iraq still had chemical and biological weapons, even after the leak of his full testimony. Israeli is among those who cite Kamel to bolster his claims about Iraq's WMD (pp. 167–68), although in the course of doing so, he is paraphrasing without citation Secretary of State Colin Powell's 5 February presentation to the United Nations.
Therein lies the problem of uncritically relying on a handful of sources to write an entire book. Virtually Israeli's entire bibliography consists of NYT articles from 2003. However, to say the least, the 2003 NYT could not be characterized as a bastion of critical reporting on Iraq. Another source favored by Israeli is the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), an Israeli/American organization that distributes translations of the Arab media to thousands of reporters, politicians, and activists around the world. Although its translations are accurate enough, it is MEMRI's selection of material that is misleading. As the veteran Middle East correspondent David Hirst has correctly pointed out in The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (pp. 75–77), the Arab politicians, columnists, and preachers MEMRI chooses to publicize range from rabid to outrageous. Its “tendentious choice of material casts the Arab world in a much worse light than their discourse, taken as a whole, could reasonably justify.” MEMRI is acknowledged in a majority of Israeli's citations for his chapter “Arab and Muslim Fears: Images, Loyalties, Wishes, Delusions.”
Israeli's shallow research and bias also result in a great number of factual errors that could have been prevented with more editorial attention. Although Israeli attests to having been a student of the Middle East for many years (p. ix), Imam Ali was not “the father of the Shiעa” (p. 57); Hilla is not a sensitive place in Shiעite history (p. 62); the Talabanis are a Kurdish family, not a clan (p. 89); Prince Faysal assumed the Iraqi throne in 1921, not 1922; and Najaf was not founded by Ali (p. 203). These are examples of the many basic facts Israeli got wrong, and reflect fundamentally flawed research at best, and at worst a “facts don't matter” approach to research. They alone are ample reasons to take this scholar's conclusion that “re-creating Iraq into separate, ethnically homogeneous states… may provide an answer to the country's problems” (p. 232) with a mountain of salt. As a member of the steering committee of Israel's hawkish Ariel Center for Policy Research, perhaps Israeli's analysis offers more insight into the thinking of Israel's right wing than it does into reality.
In Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation, Loretta Napoleoni deals with evidence quite differently. Napoleoni's volume is narrowly focused on Abu Mosעab al-Zarqawi, a bit player in postinvasion Iraq or a singular threat to U.S. foreign policy interests, depending on whether or not one considers facts important. Like Raphael Israeli, Napoleoni does not read Arabic, but unlike Israeli, she makes excellent use of the translations provided by the U.S. Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Napoleoni's use of a wide range of sources, from dissident journals such as Z Magazine to hawkishly right-wing outlets such as National Review online, as well as sources in French and Italian, allows her analysis to challenge many of the myths propagated by the official sources that Israeli uncritically accepts as fact. Accordingly, Napoleoni makes a far more significant contribution to our present knowledge of Iraq than Israeli.
A brief comparison of Raphael Israeli's treatment of Zarqawi with Napoleoni's illustrates the difference in their approaches and the stark contrast in the contribution of their analyses. Zarqawi receives a single paragraph worth of attention in Israeli's book, in which his group is attributed with facilitating the murder of American diplomat Lawrence Foley in Amman, Jordan in October 2002 (p. 54). As Napoleoni reports, although Jordan was quick to blame Zarqawi and the United States focused its investigation on him, there is no proof that links Zarqawi to the assassination (pp. 112–13). In fact, at the end of April 2004, an organization by the name of the Honourables of Jordan claimed responsibility for killing Foley and denied any involvement by Zarqawi. The shells that had been fired at Foley accompanied their message (p. 123).
The real reason for Zarqawi's inclusion in Israeli's narrative is as part of his long and tendentious attempt to link Saddam Hussein's Iraq to al-Qaءida—a key plank of U.S. propaganda leading up to the March 2003 invasion. Israeli concludes that “all experts concede” that the medical treatment Zarqawi supposedly received in Baghdad in October 2001 “could not have been offered to such a high-level terrorist without Saddam's personal agreement” (p. 54). When one turns to the evidence Israeli offers in support of this claim, we find a reference to “Threats and Responses,” NYT, 6 February 2003. “Threats and Responses” is not the headline of any news report but rather the title of a reoccurring section within the NYT. On the day and pages cited by Israeli, that section consisted of the 11,000+ word transcript of Secretary of State Powell's long since debunked 5 February presentation to the United Nations on Iraq's alleged threat. Even without a cursory evaluation of their credibility, one can fairly ask whether the pronouncements of a government official are worthy evidence on which to base one's analysis. Obscuring one's reliance on such proclamations raises further questions about academic honesty.
In sharp contrast, Napoleoni remains properly skeptical of official claims, preferring to rely on a careful weighing of the evidence. For example, Napoleoni scrutinizes Powell's claim that “[t]he ricin [poison] bouncing around Europe now originated in Iraq” (p. 115)—a reference to a camp in an area of northern Iraq controlled by Ansar al Islam and supposedly run by Zarqawi. Napoleoni quotes a similarly skeptical British journalist who concluded “the Americans used” the investigation into the supposed “ricin ring” to prove that “there was a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaءida and for this purpose they came up with al Zarqawi” (p. 116). In the end, there never was any ricin, although that was not revealed until long after Iraq was under occupation. By then, the unsupported claims offered by American and British officials, and dutifully parroted by the press, had served their purpose. As Napoleoni points out in the introduction: “The response of Western countries to the 9/11 attacks, especially Bush and Blair's ‘war on terror’ has greatly contributed to the evolution of terror. In a series of propaganda campaigns directed at their populations, Western governments have hidden the truth, manipulated the facts, and vigorously published fictions to justify their policies” (p. 20).
Although Napoleoni focuses on “their most extraordinary creation,” “the myth of al Zarqawi” (p. 20), her analysis obviously has much wider implications. Her short study deserves a wide audience as opposed to Israeli's stenography of official propaganda, which can serve as little more than a case study in academia's service to power.
