Shubhankar Dam’s Presidential Legislation in India: The Law and Practice of Ordinances examines the notionally exceptional, but in practice routine, process of legislation through Executive Orders (called ordinances). An ordinance has the ‘force and effect of an Act of Parliament’ but is temporary in nature.Footnote 1 It can be promulgated when at least one House of Parliament is not in session and the Executive believes that there is need for immediate action, such that it cannot wait for Parliament to reconvene.Footnote 2 An ordinance must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within six weeks of Parliament reconvening. Otherwise, it lapses.Footnote 3
In a work of painstaking scholarship, Dam traces the history of ordinances from the corridors of power in medieval England, all the way down to their transplant into the Indian colonial and post-colonial constitutional frameworks. Through an empirical analysis of the practice of ordinances in independent India, Dam paints a detailed picture of the use of this power by successive governments. He finds that ordinances account for a sixth of all legislation up to 2009 (p 7). Through this analysis, Dam offers insights on why a power once thought exceptional became not only routine, but also the preferred legislative route. Dam provides what he calls ‘historical, empirical and attitudinal’ reasons for the routinization of ordinance-making power in India (p 111). He posits that the availability of precedents for the exercise of the power made every subsequent invocation of the power less costly in terms of political capital (p 111). Empirically, he shows that the ordinance-making power is more likely to be used when Parliament is functioning for fewer days or sitting for shorter durations (p 113). This suggests some correlation between how well Parliament is functioning and the impetus towards ordinances. Finally, Dam persuasively argues that the frequent resort to ordinances betrays a distinct attitude of the Executive towards Parliament: first, one that is marked in equal measures by irritation with the cumbersome nature of parliamentary processes and the ‘constraints’ of scrutiny and deliberation; and second, by utter contempt for parliamentary processes, such that the government feels free to side-line Parliament when convenient (p 114).
Building on the insights from the first two segments, in a thickly analyzed final part Dam takes to task judicial interpretations of the ordinance power which he faults for incentivizing governments to use the ordinance route even when approaching Parliament directly is a feasible alternative (pp 121-166). In particular, he criticizes the judiciary for understanding the ordinance-making power as a parallel form of legislation, having the same force and effect as laws passed by Parliament (p 122). In explaining why this approach is problematic, Dam offers his own views on why the Supreme Court has misinterpreted and misapplied the relevant provisions of the Constitution, and how the Court should in fact understand the provisions in question (p 121-166).
Presidential Legislation is a one of a kind book on a topic that is rarely discussed in India. Apart from one previous work,Footnote 4 there has been little engagement in Indian scholarship with the Executive’s ordinance-making power. As Dam shows through his meticulous research, this lacuna has allowed a widespread phenomenon of great political significance to go practically unremarked. The breadth of scholarship on display is noteworthy, combining as it does, deep historical research into the origins and history of the ordinance-making power, empirical analyses of its use (including through regression analysis) in post-Independence India, and a detailed legal analysis of judicial dicta and their impact on several questions that have, and may, come before the Court. Through these, Dam makes a compelling case that this understudied subject needs greater evaluation. This book is therefore a welcome and much needed addition to the study of law and of India’s public institutions.
I CONCEPTUALIZING PARLIAMENT
The aspect of Dam’s scholarship that stands out and shines throughout the book is his constant questioning of why the practice of promulgating ordinances has become so routine and normalized (pp 111-118). Combining theory with description, Dam is rightly wary of drawing simplistic causal connections or locating the practice in trite claims of the Executive’s will to power. Rather, he argues that the reason for the rise and invocation of this power relates to historical reasons, the ‘ease of doing business’ in Parliament, and most interestingly, in the Executive’s attitude towards the institution of Parliament (p 111).
This last claim is particularly interesting, but it is unfortunately underexplored in the book. Dam argues that the Executive resorts to ordinances in a routine manner both because it sees Parliamentary processes as cumbersome (and therefore to be avoided) and because it has contempt for the institution – in the sense of not caring for the opinion of Parliament (p 114). Why is this so? In a tantalizing footnote in the introductory chapter (p 21, fn 85), Dam offers a possible response: the attitude of the Executive towards Parliament is explained in part by a general failure in Indian public life to view Parliament as a legislative space as opposed to only a representative one. In other words, Parliament derives its popular legitimacy as a body of representatives and not primarily as a body tasked with the making of laws. As such, so long as parliamentarians are seen as representing the interests of their constituencies, be it in Parliament or outside it in backroom deals, TV debates, or wrangling with party bosses, they judge themselves (and are presumably judged by their constituencies) to be effective. Their task as legislators is incidental to the task of representing the interests of their constituencies.
Dam unfortunately does not build upon this insight. Data on the functioning of the Indian Parliament suggests that it spends roughly equal amounts of time legislating and engaging in general oversight of governmental activities.Footnote 5 Therefore, in purely quantitative terms, Dam’s observation appears to be mistaken. However, I argue that his larger point of locating the rise of ordinances (and the lack of interest in the exercise of this power) in distinct conceptions of the role of Parliament does have significant explanatory potential.
Theories of democracy posit at least two bases, amongst others, for the legitimacy of democratic forms of political organization and the consequent role of legislators in a democratic polity: first, the representative ideal of government through the consent of the governed carried out by those acting in the interests, however defined, of their constituents; and second, the deliberative ideal of rule by reason and justification, not by fiat. In a parliamentary system like India’s, where both the Executive and the Legislature have representative credentials, Parliament is uniquely positioned as a deliberative space. The deliberative ideal requires a discursive orientation to democracy. Ongoing public and reasoned discourse and justification for the making of laws is a central facet of the legitimacy of the rules promulgated through this process.Footnote 6 Crucially, deliberation signifies not only debate but also a culture that emphasizes reason, argumentation, and openness to persuasion. Deliberation, then, is not the same as defending one’s position, but requires active engagement with various sides of an argument.
The deliberative conception of Parliament might appear idealistic and impractical within a political culture that ‘portrays legislative activity as deal-making, log-rolling, interest-pandering, pork-barrelling, horse-trading, and Arrovian cycling – as anything, in short, except principled political decision-making.’Footnote 7 However, only with some coherent conception of the function of the institution can one examine its functioning, critique practices that run counter to the ideal, and introduce design elements to shape that function. The ideal serves as an evaluative standard.
II THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT: DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DELIBERATION
How does the Indian Parliament measure up against this deliberative ideal? In the Indian context, deliberative ideals of democracy – the culture of public scrutiny, reason and justification – have not been entrenched within the popular conception of Parliament’s role, and as a result, public discourse allows for great leeway in rule by Executive fiat. Ordinances are part of a series of practices that illustrate this lack of a conception of Parliament as a deliberative space. For example, the Executive enjoys enormous rule-making power under existing legislations, which it routinely exercises with little or no parliamentary scrutiny.Footnote 8 Similarly, through an interpretation of Article 73 of the Constitution, the Executive does not need express legislative sanction to function or engage in any activity. So long as it does not violate the Constitution or any pre-existing legislation, or affect the rights of any individual, the Executive has all the power to act on an issue even without the authorization of Parliament.Footnote 9 The Executive, then, has limited incentive to introduce a law where none has existed before. Third, Executive tactics to limit discussion and debate are seen as part of legitimate government strategy rather than an attack on democracy itself.Footnote 10 Similarly, since the Executive controls the parliamentary agenda, it can and does refuse to allow debates on specific issues of concern to the Opposition, often resulting in parliamentary deadlocks.Footnote 11
Deadlocking Parliament by refusing to allow debates on the one hand, and the use of filibustering techniques by the Opposition to prevent the passage of bills or to voice its discontent on the other, might serve expressive functions but significantly limit Parliament’s deliberative potential.Footnote 12
Most crucially, the system of whips and anti-defection laws ensures that debate in Parliament is nothing more than an airing of views – of points and counter-points, with limited chance of any impact on the result of the discussion since parliamentarians are locked into voting along party lines rather than upon their conscience.Footnote 13 Deliberative processes derive their validity from the ability to reason and persuade, but if there is no scope for persuasion at all, parliamentary deliberation is reduced to staking positions.
Ordinances then, are not aberrations in the Indian Parliamentary system that can be cured by interpretative changes. Instead, it is symptomatic of a larger problem in the conceptualization of the role and legitimacy of the institution of Parliament, and of a culture of governance that privileges ruling by fiat rather than governing through persuasion. If this is the case, solutions to the problem lie not so much in interpretative exercises or rethinking the ordinance power alone – as Dam’s last segment suggests (pp 121-219) – but in reimagining the role of Parliament, and through institutional re-design that provides greater control of the Legislature over the Executive instead of vice versa.Footnote 14
III CONCLUSION
Shubhankar Dam’s seminal work on ordinances is a much-needed step towards a more holistic interrogation of the functioning of India’s political institutions. Given the breadth of research and analysis in his work, it would be unfair to expect Dam to have also taken on the task of examining and critiquing the system as a whole. However, locating the practice of ordinances within the broader context of parliamentary (dys)function can not only help us make causal linkages regarding the repeated resort to ordinance powers, but also shed light on possible reform strategies.
On the specifics of the ordinance power itself, Dam’s book is characterized not only by sound scholarship but also by its continuing relevance and timeliness. Though the data in the book ends in 2009, the trends he discusses have continued undiminished, despite the return of a single-party majority in Parliament after a gap of about three decades.Footnote 15 At the time of writing, a seven-judge bench of the Indian Supreme Court is hearing a case on the scope of the Executive’s ordinance-making power, the Court’s own scope of judicial review, and the effect of lapsed ordinances.Footnote 16 Shubhankar Dam’s Presidential Legislation in India is bound to be on the mandatory reading list of all parties to the case.
