The subfield of American Political Development, now well into the fourth decade since its founding by Stephen Skowronek’s (1982) Building a New American State, is now old enough to have its own signature lessons. The most familiar of these is that America’s institutions are developed not through the deliberate planning of conscientious architects but through a haphazard process of layering that encompasses a multitude of conflicting purposes. The resulting patchworks are messy, often inefficient, and always vulnerable to further institutional restructuring when the next political configuration looks to put its mark on the relevant policy area.
Two scholars hailing from quite different academic backgrounds productively elaborate on this theme in the books under review. In The Rise of Public Authority, urban historian Gail Radford tells the story of how quasi-public corporations charged with advancing specific public goals proliferated over the course of the twentieth century, not in pursuit of some grand progressive vision but “as the result of preexisting institutional arrangements, ad hoc choices, and political conflicts” (p. 9). Kathryn Lavelle, in Money and Banks in the American Political System, brings to bear her background as a student of international finance and her experience serving as a congressional fellow in the 110th Congress, just as the many-layered regulatory patchwork of early-21st century American finance was coming unraveled. Painting on a remarkably broad canvas, Lavelle attempts to piece together a comprehensive picture of the political economy of finance before, during, and after the crisis with an emphasis on the way that competition between coalitions of interests and distinctly uncoordinated groups of bureaucrats produces regulatory incoherence. Each work has much to offer, even if (or perhaps, because) neither quite succeeds in wrestling from its messy materials a clean resolution.
By design, Radford’s book is the more focused and tighter work. She extends the view of public authorities farther into the past than previous students of these puzzling hybrid creatures, presenting a series of carefully rendered portraits of early-twentieth century government experimentation with corporate forms: the eventually successful crusade of William McAdoo, Treasury Secretary under Woodrow Wilson, to create a Federal Fleet Corporation capable of providing credit and other forms of financial support to American shippers; the creation of Federal Land Banks, also during the Wilson administration, to support agricultural credit for farm improvements; the widespread adoption of public authorities by municipal governments to provide diverse services including water supply, gas, streetcars, cemeteries, and ferries; the many federal creations of Herbert Hoover as Commerce Secretary and then President, including the Food Administration Grain Corporation, the War Finance Corporation, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation; the veritable explosion of public authorities under the New Deal, both created at the federal level in the Roosevelt administration’s spirit of experimentation and promoted at the municipal level around the country; and a less detailed view of public authorities’ career in the post-War era. Especially intriguing is the book’s chronicling of the rise of revenue bonds (backed by revenues earned by issuing authorities rather than by any political entity’s taxing power) and their eventual securitization (p. 83, 129) and moral-obligation bonds (revenue bonds with legally unbinding support from states added in) (p. 147), both of which created opportunities to circumvent stubbornly fixed government debt ceilings.
This is rich and largely unfamiliar material, and Radford’s book is indispensable reading for any who seek to understand the whys and wherefores of American state-building in its formative years. In some ways, Radford provides an important sequel both to Skowronek’s classic and to William Novak’s The People’s Welfare (1996) by providing a perspective that links municipal and national developments together, and which illuminates connections between progressive-era innovations and the variegated and sometimes confusing panoply of government institutions that we now encounter as citizens trying to make sense of our local political worlds.
In all of her cases, Radford stresses that the institutional shapes ultimately adopted resulted from the interplay of political, legal, and financial constraints rather than from straightforward matching of form and function. McAdoo and Wilson sought to remake the shipbuilding industry through the Fleet Corporation’s guiding hand, but the law passed by Congress in 1916 after a protracted political battle was ill-suited to this purpose and ultimately pursued a more industry-friendly path (pp. 39–40). Lofty goals for land banks that would transform rural civil society through mutual aid among farmers were unrealized, largely because the final version of the Federal Land Banks legislation made it difficult for private investors to shoulder risks, and because subsequent changes to the structure favored Washington bureaucrats (p. 65). Municipalities spawned new corporate entities because they were eager to make use of any form that could alleviate immediate budgetary pressures, and later revenue and moral-obligation bonds took off because local governments found that bond investors were quite willing to tolerate the divergence of the letter and spirit of the law, for a price (p. 149). The Roosevelt administration’s breathless enthusiasm for new legal entities was motivated more by a desire to bypass Republican-staffed cabinet departments than by any coherent ideology (pp. 110–12). To Radford’s eye, all of these decisions about institutional structure made on the basis of short-term constraints are so many missed opportunities to put effective and accountable “activist government” on a more stable footing over the long-term (p. 28, 40, 114, 155).
Lavelle sees the same missed opportunities for institutional planning in her far more sprawling book, which is an interdisciplinary primer on the huge topic of the political economy of American finance. She repurposes Graham Allison’s (1971) Essence of Decision and its observation that we might think of “the government” as one unified entity, as “a loose alliance among semi-independent organizations, each operating according to its own internal logic,” or as the outcome of a complex bargaining process among incompletely informed and differently motivated units (p. 4). With an emphasis on the last of these, Lavelle offers readers capsule institutional histories spanning two hundred years of American government(s) involvement in finance; explanations of the particularistic perspectives of Congress, the executive branch, and the Federal Reserve; and synthetic chapters explaining the way the whole “financial political economy” reacts to business cycles, the financial crisis of 2008, and international challenges posed by a globalized economy and a whole extra layer of international policymaking institutions.
The book is meant to simultaneously transcend the limitations of economics, political science, and legal scholarship, while at the same time offering an accessible introduction to the general reader. This is a bigger ambition than Lavelle sometimes seems to realize, even if she avers that “the argument of this book is deliberately unfinished” (p. xiv). The effect is a volume that sometimes feels like it is bursting at the seams, with huge literatures (e.g., on policy change, bureaucracy) gestured at in passing.
But if there are perils in using a very wide lens, there are also rewards, and readers beginning their studies of the intersection between finance and government could do far worse than to dive into Money and Banking in the American Political System; among the profusion of financial crisis books over the last half decade, there is none that provides a similarly big picture overview of the whole system. Readers will be rewarded by a succinct and cogent explanation of the rise of the federal government’s involvement in housing finance (a subject one wishes that Radford had delved into more deeply, given the towering presence of the government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); an able introduction to disintermediation of commercial banks and the corresponding rise of the shadow banking system comprising securitization, derivatives, and money markets; and clear explanations of why America finds itself with so many financial regulators, what all these different entities do, and why their periodic fights for bureaucratic turf have often left holes in the regulatory fabric, including an especially well-handled discussion of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s thwarted attempt to regulate derivatives (pp. 126–30).
Lavelle’s lack of tidiness also ends up serving her well as she ends on a note of agnosticism about the prospects for future reforms. Because finance is generally a forbidding subject for ordinary people, when memories of crises fade they generally tune out other than vaguely hoping for easier provision of credit. Banks and others will be eager to provide this easier credit in search of profits, and risk-reducing regulations that stand in the way begin to seem superfluous and counterproductive. Following in the tradition of Hyman Minsky, Lavelle worries that financial regulation “is thus destined to be a victim of its own success” (p. 249). All we can hope for, realistically, is to elect politicians who are not insensible to the tradeoffs between apparent efficiencies and stability, and hope that in the constant push and pull of regulatory evolution they exert some modest effect.
Radford, on the other hand, follows the careful scholarly work of her book’s substantive chapters with some rather hollow-sounding optimism about the prospects for reform. She calls for a reimagining of institutional forms that will promote legibility, accountability, and democratic control over important public decisions better than our current mélange of public authorities generally does, specifically recommending that authorities be nested in entities with direct connections to voters rather than made independent legal entities (p. 158). Old forms, she concludes, “have become misdirected, not effectively preventing the evils they were intended to prevent, while hamstringing general-purpose government and propelling officials toward increasingly extreme escape strategies” (p. 162). Without a doubt, this condition (in another context dubbed “kludgeocracy” by Steven Teles) does seem to call out for conscious reform—but it is painfully difficult to locate a potent political constituency likely to see such an effort through, especially as forces pushing in the direction of circumvention persist. The patchworks of American political development do not get restarted; prior constraints always bind. That is not an especially happy lesson for an advanced democracy piled high with previous institutions—indeed, one can draw downright depressing implications from it, as Mancur Olson did in his The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982). But it is about as firm a conclusion as social science gives us.
