Isaiah Berlin and Isaac Deutscher did not like each other. They were almost exact contemporaries, Deutscher born in 1907, Berlin in 1909, from similar East European Jewish backgrounds. They were both immigrants to the United Kingdom, Berlin's family fleeing the Bolsheviks in 1921, Deutscher narrowly avoiding the Nazis in 1939. Both established reputations as leading public intellectuals. Their political ideologies, however, were completely opposed, representing the two sides in the Cold War. Berlin was a defender of Western liberal democracy, Deutscher a self-described “classical Marxist,” an admirer and biographer of Leon Trotsky. They met only twice but were well aware of each other. Deutscher reviewed Berlin's work in scathing terms; Berlin never referred to Deutscher in print but expressed a deep and abiding animosity toward him in private.
The conflict between the two men, and between the worldviews they represented, is the subject of David Caute's compelling book, Isaac and Isaiah: The Covert Punishment of a Cold War Heretic. Caute's immediate focus is Berlin's apparent scotching, in secret, of Deutscher's attempt to get an academic post at the University of Sussex in 1962–63. Unlike Berlin, whose career at Oxford spanned several decades, Deutscher lived wholly on his income from journalism and book publication. He applied for the Sussex position with the idea of gaining more time to concentrate on the latter—at the time he was researching a biography of Lenin to follow his earlier work on Stalin and massive trilogy on Trotsky.
It was not to be. Several academics at Sussex were keen to acquire the celebrated Deutscher, but the vice chancellor, Lord Fulton, consulted Berlin confidentially. Berlin's response was damning: “The candidate of whom you speak is the only man whose presence in the same academic community as myself I should find morally intolerable” (quoted at 279). Deutscher was not appointed. His supporters saw the decision as the exclusion of a Marxist scholar by the capitalist establishment, with the result that Deutscher had to struggle on as a journalist rather than find security in academia. He died suddenly in 1967, aged only sixty. Berlin went on to a distinguished old age.
Did Berlin blackball Deutscher and, if so, was he justified? There seems little doubt that the answer to the first question is yes. Although Berlin did not have anything like a formal veto, his view was surely influential if not decisive. Deutscher had received nothing but positive signals from Sussex until Berlin was consulted.
Whether Berlin was justified in giving the opinion he did is a more difficult question. He himself was uneasy about it. In his letter to Fulton he describes himself as being placed in “a cruel dilemma,” explicitly suspecting that his professional judgement may have become entangled with “personal feeling” (279). When his role in the affair was exposed in 1969 by the radical magazine Black Dwarf, he felt compelled to write a series of self-exonerating letters to Deutscher's widow, Tamara, claiming that he had never opposed the appointment. In a narrow sense this was true, because in the letter to Fulton he clearly declines the responsibility of urging any particular decision, for the reason given. On the other hand, Berlin's remarks seem to have effectively derailed Deutscher's hopes nonetheless.
In his letter to Fulton the specific reason Berlin gives for his dim view of Deutscher (apart from the dark hint of “personal feeling”) is that “there is a limit below which lack of scruple must not go in the case of academic teachers” (279). Berlin believed not only that Deutscher had ideologically repulsive views but also that he deliberately suppressed or ignored important facts of which he was well aware. While a liberal must put up with—even welcome à la John Stuart Mill—differences of ideological judgement, knowing falsification of evidence is something else. That this was Berlin's view of Deutscher was confirmed for Caute by a conversation he had with Berlin in Oxford in 1963, the dramatic opening scene of the book (reconstructed verbatim by the author, somewhat implausibly, after a gap of fifty years).
Here is the nub of the ethical issue: was Deutscher truly a dishonest scholar, or were Berlin's objections really personal or ideological? There is little doubt that what generally repelled Berlin was Deutscher's consistent judgment that the Bolshevik Revolution and its Leninist and even Stalinist sequels were on the whole justified as a regrettable but necessary price to pay for the progress promised by the Marxist account of history. For Berlin, this was a classic example of the inhuman historicist and revolutionary doctrine that eggs must be broken in order to make the postcapitalist omelette. The reality is that the eggs are real human beings with their own unique claims, and although they are broken the omelette of the perfect society never gets made.
Most people would probably now say that Berlin was in the right politically and Deutscher sadly deluded. But the question remains whether such a difference of political judgment justified Berlin's part in the Sussex affair. He himself would say not; the proper complaint was not ideological error but deliberate falsification. Is there evidence of that?
At various points in the book Caute shows that Deutscher really did suppress salient facts that did not suit his ideological purposes. For example, he acknowledged Stalin's purges of Party members but said very little about the Gulag system that destroyed so many ordinary people; he made no mention of Lenin's persecution of Gorky or of the Kronstadt rebellion against the Bolsheviks; he suppressed evidence of Trotsky's personal lust for power; and he was silent or evasive about Soviet anti-Semitism.
Were these omissions enough to justify Deutscher's rejection? Caute does not quite answer this question. In general he disapproves of Deutscher's treatment, although right at the end he argues that Deutscher was not really suited to the academic life anyway—reading lists (how balanced would they have been?) and marking would have got in the way of his political mission. So perhaps Berlin did him a favor.
Although intriguing, the Sussex aspect of Caute's book is only its entrance and exit, the bulk of the text following the various contrasts and overlaps between Berlin and Deutscher, and between the general systems of ideas they stood for. In this respect the work is really an intellectual history and analysis of Cold War ideas as exemplified by two leading opponents.
For those interested in Berlin, Caute provides a useful complement to existing book-length studies, which are mostly written by fellow liberals. By contrast, Caute brings out a more left-wing view of Berlin than is usual, one that is strongly critical of many Berlinian themes, such as his “two concepts of liberty” (negative and positive), his support for American foreign policy (including Vietnam), and his Zionism. The picture that emerges is of a rather comfortable intellectual celebrity who was, in spite of occasional protestations to the contrary, less interested than he should have been in the fate of the poor and dispossessed (e.g., the Palestinian Arabs). There is some truth in this. Yet Caute is sufficiently even-handed to recognize that Berlin was a complex person who was aware of, and not wholly at ease with, his own shortcomings and inner conflicts.
Deutscher receives a balanced assessment too, presented as both a brave tribune battling on behalf of the oppressed working class and opposing both capitalism and Stalinism, and also a vain, dogmatic authoritarian who was happy to take a “strategic” view of the truth and whose idea of democracy was a one-party state.
Overall, Caute has done a superb job of capturing the world of Berlin and Deutscher in readable and lively prose. Although politically he seems to sway rather more toward Deutscher than to Berlin, his open and questioning approach suggests that he has more of the spirit of Berlin after all.
