1. Introduction
In the long run, we’re all dead. Any account of what gives life meaning or value has to confront that fact, not just in the life of the individual but in that of the species. In the history of the universe, and even of the Earth, each of us is not even a blip; the species itself is barely that. Our sole lasting legacy is others’ all-too-brief memory of us, and soon enough, of course, that too becomes nothing. Again, the species as a whole is not far behind. For something so trivial, however, life seems extremely weighty.
To describe life in this way seems to issue a shot across the bow of any theory that finds meaning in objective values or lasting contributions to things or people that outlive us; for those values are ultimately as nothing, and the bearers of those values will not last either.
On the contrary, if we both value life and accept the eventual annihilation of everything we could possibly care about or contribute to, we might think of life as a kind of game. Games seem so important while we are engaged in them, yet they are ultimately trivial. It thus seems plausible to suppose that life might itself be a game. The problem seems to be that we cannot regard it that way; games are trivial pastimes even relative to the long-run triviality of life as a whole. Like hard determinism or moral nihilism, the doctrine that life is insignificant can be affirmed but not lived. We must at least act as though our lives mattered, if only for their effects on others. As Kant might have put it, there is no merit in regarding my neighbour’s life as a game.
I want to suggest that not only can we regard life that way, but that we should; it is a necessary condition of the best life. I aim to defend the thesis that the best life is the life that one plays as a ‘Suitsian’ game: one meeting the definition proposed in The Grasshopper by Bernard Suits.Footnote 2 More specifically, it is a nested, open, role-playing game where the life’s quality as a game partly depends on there being as many players as people. This thesis gels with prominent views of the meaning of life such as those of Susan Wolf and Antti Kauppinen, but the current thesis goes farther by explaining how such views could be true in light of ultimate annihilation.Footnote 3 I also do not make any claims about ‘meaning’ per se. The question at issue here is the best life, not the most meaningful one.
I believe that the current thesis is the thesis of The Grasshopper. Yet nowhere in the book does Suits explicitly state this thesis, and both times the book’s title character comes close to articulating it, he succumbs—literally—to a decisive objection. Moreover, the core of the book is about something else entirely. It is unsurprising, then, that Suits’s critics, including sympathetic ones such as Thomas Hurka,Footnote 4 should have misunderstood not just the thesis but the structure of the book and the relationship between its structure and its content.
My project here is to explicate that thesis and defend it from two related challenges. The first challenge is the Grasshopper’s ‘horror vision,’ which he lays out just before he dies for the second time. The horror vision follows from a crucial error in the reasoning of the Grasshopper and his interlocutor, Skepticus. The second challenge is Hurka’s proposal that, although the best life is not itself a game, it must include some quantity of game-play.
A feature of both these criticisms is that they are densely intertwined with the interpretation of The Grasshopper itself. This is because The Grasshopper is structured as a game that meets its own definition, and grasping the ideal put forward there requires understanding the book in some detail. Thus in order to defend this ideal against the book’s final challenge, as well as Hurka’s alternative, I must interpret the book itself at considerable length and show where Hurka’s reading goes wrong. This interpretive project also has intrinsic value since the book is deceptively readable; it is a dense and difficult text, as evidenced by the widespread failure to discern its core thesis.
Put simply, Suits’s thesis is that the best human life is not the life of game-playing, but rather, the life that is itself a game—Life—and that is at the same time part of a larger game. The book proceeds as the presentation and attempted resolution of several riddles. But it ends with a final riddle occasioned by the horror vision. One can understand the book’s thesis only by solving the Grasshopper’s final riddle.
2. Game On
The Grasshopper is a nested book. The ‘inner’ book, Chapters 3-13, comprehends a ‘flashback’ recounted by Skepticus, one of the main characters, to his interlocutor Prudence.Footnote 5 These chapters, which defend a conceptual analysis of ‘playing a game,’ purport to refute Wittgenstein’s famous claim that ‘game’ is a paradigmatic ‘family resemblance’ concept.Footnote 6 Yet this refutation is explicitly set forth as having only subsidiary value for the book itself; it is an effort to solve the problem of the outer book.Footnote 7 The outer book—comprehending Chapters 1-2 and 14-15—portrays an investigation and apparently unsuccessful defense of the Grasshopper’s thesis that game-playing is the ‘ideal of existence.’Footnote 8 ‘Grasshopper’s Ideal’ generates ‘Flashback’ because the Grasshopper’s death in Chapter 1 leaves Skepticus and Prudence to try to understand the meaning and justification of the ideal; Flashback is Skepticus’s attempt to do so. When they fail, the Grasshopper is resurrected, leading them to the required understanding by outlining an ideal of Utopia. But this ideal itself generates one final riddle, upon stating which the Grasshopper immediately dies again. Its riddle unsolved, the book ends.
Put briefly, the Grasshopper’s definition of ‘playing a game’ is “the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.”Footnote 9 More formally:
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude].Footnote 10
‘Lusory attitude’ is not enjoyment, but a particular orientation toward activity: the attitude such that one adopts the end and accepts the rules in order to be able to play the game. The sense in which the effort must be ‘voluntary’ is thus not the existence of alternative possibilities but the possibility of alternative attitudes. We should also note that, in addition to the prelusory goal, games also have a lusory goal, which is a redescription, in the game’s terms, of the state of affairs that constitutes the prelusory goal. Thus crossing the finish line first, for instance, is a prelusory goal, and winning the race is a lusory goal. A game-player thus has three goals: the prelusory goal, the lusory goal, and participating in the activity itself.Footnote 11 Lusory attitude just is having the third goal.
A paradigmatic instance of the Grasshopper’s definition is playing Chess. The prelusory goal—immobilizing the king—could be achieved efficiently by setting up the board in checkmate, but one voluntarily accepts rules requiring inefficiencies in order to be able to play the game. The Grasshopper itself displays numerous games meeting its own definition. The outermost game is Grasshopper’s Ideal. Its prelusory goal is understanding the role of game-playing in the best human life; its lusory goal is solving the riddles. The constitutive rule of Grasshopper’s Ideal is play Flashback—that is, explicate and defend a definition of ‘playing a game’ in dialogue form. Playing Flashback is then the lusory means of Grasshopper’s Ideal.Footnote 12 In turn, Flashback is a game in its own right. Its prelusory goal is to have an accurate definition of ‘playing a game’; its lusory goal is successfully explicating and defending a definition of ‘playing a game’; its constitutive rule is to recount a summer’s worth of dialogues on the topic of game-play, and its lusory means are stories, arguments, puns, and so on. Crucially, then, games can be nested: playing one game can be the lusory means of a second, larger game. The lusory goal of the inner game is a constitutive rule of the larger game.Footnote 13
Yet there is another essential layer to this nested game: the chapters of Flashback present the constitutive rules of Life—rules that people in the real world can and should live by. The game, Grasshopper’s Ideal, purports to actually result in understanding the ideal of existence, that is, the best human life. But the ideal is not to play Life as just any game. Rather, Life, the game, must have certain structural features, and what’s crucial to interpreting The Grasshopper is that the book presents the constitutive rules of Life. Once we read the book as structured in this way and for these ends, we can solve the riddles and attain the goal of The Grasshopper as a whole. One would then be playing the book as a game provided one adopted the lusory attitude—that is, set oneself the task of learning the ideal of existence by solving The Grasshopper, just because it makes possible this activity.
Before I can flesh out and defend this reading and the ideal of existence thereby discovered, I need to make two further essential points. These points serve to collapse what appear to be two distinctions that threaten to undermine the definition. The first is between role-governed and rule-governed games; as it turns out, there is no fundamental distinction there. The second is between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ games; again, both types fall under the definition. Take these in order.
The definition entails that all games are rule-governed and goal-directed activities. Yet role-playing games, such as games of make-believe, can be opaque to the point that it becomes unclear whether a given move is legal, and the players are unsure of the goal.Footnote 14 Notwithstanding this opacity, role-plays are games only if they are goal-directed and rule-governed; otherwise they would be performances or senseless movements. Moreover, rule-governed games, such as running races, involve roles no less than do role-playing games. Team Cycling, for example, is highly structured by both rules and roles, as is any game with positions. Maurice Richard changed roles from left-wing to right-wing when he joined the Punch Line for the Montreal Canadiens. Thus not all role-playing involves make-believe; some roles are ‘proprietary’ roles—that is, roles where we play ourselves.Footnote 15
We can now more clearly understand Flashback, the game that Skepticus plays in Chapters 3-13. Flashback is a role-playing game in which Skepticus variously plays Skepticus, Grasshopper, and nested characters including Grasshopper-playing-a-therapist, Grasshopper-playing-a-patient, Skepticus-playing-Smith, and so on. Because Flashback is a role-playing game, its rules are in some respects opaque. Hence the levels of nesting sometimes get mixed, as when Skepticus-as-Grasshopper-as-Heuschrecke the therapist causes confusion by calling Skepticus into his office, and Skepticus-as-Skepticus enters. Such problems are to be expected in role-playing games. But such problems are common even in games that we would not call ‘role-plays,’ such as the Tour de France. When team leader Alberto Contador crashed in the 10th stage of the 2014 Tour, his teammates were not immediately certain of their roles. Supporting rider Rafal Majka decided to contest the mountain stages in his own right, and won two of them.Footnote 16 Because role-play requires unscripted performance, it is more opaque—and, other things equal, more intellectually challenging—than fully rule-structured actions. This is the case no matter what context or type of game the role-play occurs in.
Connected to the discovery of the jointly rule- and role-governed character of games is the distinction between open and closed games. Competitive games, such as Chess or Monopoly, are closed in that the achievement of the prelusory goal ends the game, and the players aim “simply to win.”Footnote 17 But some games, paradigmatically children’s games, are open in that the prelusory goal is continuation. An open game is “a system of reciprocally enabling moves whose purpose is the continued operation of the system.”Footnote 18 Open games—Ping Pong Rally, Cops and Robbers—often involve withholding ‘winning’ moves, since deploying them would “defeat the purpose” of reciprocally enabling the opponent.Footnote 19 Role-playing games and open games are linked by frequent overlap, since role-playing games are often open games. They are also linked in virtue of being intrinsically cooperative, and the Grasshopper repeatedly remarks on possible cooperative societies that would put more focus on such games rather than closed competitive games. Further, in both open games and unscripted role-plays it is not uncommon for players to engage in rule-revision as they go, typically to make the game better—for instance, fairer, more or less difficult, or longer. If our paradigm of game-play is a well-designed and fully rule-structured closed game like Monopoly or Baseball, we lose sight of the fact that game-play can involve taking on the role of gamewright while playing, in order to make the game better.
3. The Riddles
We now have a clearer sense of the definition. But it is not at all clear how game-playing could possibly be the ideal of existence. To the contrary; games are pastimes, breaks from normal life. They seem to essentially involve play; or at least good games do, whereas life as a whole cannot be play.Footnote 20 It might be that the best life involves frequent and fulfilling breaks, and playing games might indeed provide this outlet. But to say this is to treat games as mere opportunities to discharge excess time or energy.Footnote 21 Life could not then be a game because it would be play, an intrinsically trivial activity that—precisely because it lacks instrumental value—vanishes into thin air as soon as it’s over. This hardly seems to be a source of meaning in life. Worse, there is also something inherently paradoxical or irrational about games. We stop playing when we achieve the lusory goal. But to give up playing for winning is to exchange the intrinsic value for something that is by definition not just arbitrary but instrumental to it. But once we do this, the game-play itself then looks like instrumental activity and hence inherits the triviality of its end. A life devoted to game-playing is a life frittered away. If at death we take stock of our lives, we will see that what remains from a life of game-play is nothing at all; all the value is past and gone, vanished into thin air. It seems, then, at best puzzling to suppose that games could provide a model of the best life.
This challenge amounts to the horror vision that sets up the Grasshopper’s riddle. That horror vision involves the Grasshopper’s discovering that everyone—carpenters, philosophers, everyone—is really, unbeknownst to themselves, a grasshopper in disguise. They are all playing games even though they seem to be working. Yet when they discover this, they vanish—they are completely annihilated.Footnote 22 Having stated the horror vision, the Grasshopper himself dies, leaving Skepticus and Prudence to work out its meaning.
The riddle is in fact a nested riddle—a riddle that contains another riddle, which contains yet another. The outer riddle is, as Skepticus wonders, “why should the quintessential grasshopper be a player of games rather than a doer of any number of other things which are valuable in themselves and which therefore count as ‘play’ every bit as much as game playing does?”Footnote 23 That is, even if we grant that the best life involves being liberated from work, why is the ideal specifically game-play rather than play in general, or playing something else like the trombone? This is the first riddle. But this riddle contains a second, namely:
Why should creatures … who have been playing games that they do not know to be games, suffer annihilation upon discovering that that is what they have been doing; and why, if they are playing games, don’t they know it?Footnote 24
The book begins with the first statement of the riddles; in Chapter 2, Skepticus and Prudence set themselves the goal of solving these riddles, and the constitutive rule of doing so by playing Flashback. Though successful in achieving Flashback’s goal of stating and defending the definition, Skepticus fails to solve the riddles. Fortunately, the Grasshopper is resurrected, and tries to help by articulating a model of Utopia in which the ideal of game-playing is achieved as a social reality. This model permits the interlocutors to solve the outer riddle—why game-play in particular—but brings back the riddle of annihilation as the Utopia collapses because people want to be “doing something useful.” Yet just before his second death the Grasshopper adds a final, outermost layer of the nested riddle: were his fears—his horror vision—“about the fate of humankind, or were they about the cogency of my thesis? Clearly they could not have been about both. For if my fears about the fate of humankind are justified, then I need not fear that my thesis is faulty, since it is that thesis which justifies those fears. And if my thesis is faulty, then I need not fear for humankind, since that fear stems from the cogency of my thesis.”Footnote 25 In other words, the horror vision arises from the conjunction
GI Game-play is the ideal of existence
and
WL A life of game-play is a wasted life.
What the Grasshopper fears is that GI and WL are both true. If GI is false, then WL is unimportant. If WL is false, then the truth of GI is no cause for fear.Footnote 26
The book ends with this aporia. To show that the Grasshopper’s ideal is not just a potentially horrible fact but something to be embraced, I must show that GI is true and WL is false or harmless. To do that I must rearticulate GI such that game-play does not collapse into play—i.e., wasted time or the discharge of superfluous energy—and such that the value of the life of game-play is evident to the player.
The Grasshopper and Skepticus are unable to do the latter; it is their account of GI that leads to the horror vision. Suits himself seems to have doubted that people could be convinced either of GI or of the falsity of WL; in his 1967 paper, “Is Life a Game We Are Playing?,” he claims only that the vision of life as a game is not “demonstrably false,” rather than that it is true; and he admits that some people who discovered it to be true might accept WL.Footnote 27
Hurka responds to the aporia by denying GI and denying that Suits intends to defend GI.Footnote 28 Instead, Hurka reads Suits as defending
GI* Game-play that is also play is the ideal of existence
That is, Hurka claims that the Grasshopper’s ideal is not game-play but game-play that is also play, or as Hurka calls it, “playing in games.” Hurka in turn rejects GI*, but endorses
PG Playing in games is an intrinsic good.Footnote 29
PG is entailed by GI*—though not by GI—and hence Hurka holds that Suits is committed to PG whether or not GI* is true. If Hurka is right, then GI* is false and WL is true, and the Grasshopper’s fear is well-founded indeed.
I agree that GI* is false; it is the apparent collapse of game-play into mere play that generates the horror vision. But pace Hurka, Suits does not accept GI*. Hurka gives two reasons for thinking Suits is committed to GI*. First, Hurka claims that Suits “starts the discussion of Utopia by saying he will defend the value of game-playing as a specific form of play, where he has earlier denied that playing a game necessarily involves playing.”Footnote 30 But the Grasshopper does not do this. He claims not that play is part of the ideal of existence, but rather that “play is necessary but not sufficient adequately to account for” it.Footnote 31 This accounting is merely philosophical; in order to understand the game-playing ideal, we must work out how to prevent its collapse into mere play. Play provides a constraint on the delineation of the ideal, not its content.
Hurka’s second reason for attributing GI* to Suits is that the Grasshopper putatively excludes professional players from his Utopia: “since no one would need to play a game as a means to anything, all players would be amateurs who chose the game for itself.”Footnote 32 I next refute this interpretation by explaining the nested structure of games in Utopia.
4. Life is a Game
In the Grasshopper’s Utopia, all social, economic, and political problems are solved. All required work is achieved by telepathy and self-maintaining computers. Work—activity that is valued only for its results—is no more. There is simply nothing that needs to be done. But this causes a problem: if there is nothing that needs to be done, then there is nothing worth succeeding at, nothing for which we can merit others’ approval. The only prospect of success lies in playing games. We need
some activity in which what is instrumental is inseparably combined with what is intrinsically valuable, and where the activity is not itself an instrument for some further end. Games meet this requirement perfectly. For in games we must have obstacles which we can strive to overcome just so that we can possess the activity as a whole, namely, playing the game. Game playing makes it possible to retain enough effort in Utopia to make life worth living.Footnote 33
The labels ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ do not imply that activities have some inherent character of instrumentality or intrinsicality. It comes down to lusory attitude: John Striver adopts the goal of building his own house not because he needs a house, but just so that he can play Carpentry.Footnote 34 Nonetheless, as the quoted text indicates, instrumental activity is necessary if life is to be worth living. Only game-playing meets this requirement. Play, in contrast, is just the discharge of excess time or energy. This is the solution to the ‘outer’ riddle—why game-play instead of play. Game-play is instrumental whereas play is not.
But, if life is just a series of games, then life itself has no point. One might play Chess in the morning, run some races in the afternoon, participate in an eating contest for dinner, have a poetry slam, go to bed having accomplished nothing in particular, and then do it all over again, running out the clock interminably until it stopped.Footnote 35
The error here is to adopt the life of game-playing instead of the life that is itself a game. If Life is a game, then it is not just a series of activities that have prelusory goals and constitutive rules; Life itself must have a prelusory goal the inefficient pursuit of which is valued for its own sake. The inefficient pursuit—the living—would be intrinsically valuable.
To clarify: earlier I characterized the Grasshopper as committed to
GI Game-play is the ideal of existence.
But it turns out this is ambiguous between
GIS Spending one’s life playing (a series of) games is the ideal of existence
and
GIL The life that is itself a game is the ideal of existence.
The Grasshopper’s thesis must then be GIL, and not GIS. For the GIS-life, taken as a whole, is mere play; it has no goal, and is not valued intrinsically. By contrast, the GIL-life is itself a game. It is, moreover, a nested game, not merely composed of a series of games but constructed out of them into a game in its own right.
Thus consider Skepticus’s game of Flashback. For our purposes, the crucial feature of Flashback is not its content—the defense of the definition—but its structure: it is a game Skepticus plays in order to play a bigger game, namely, Grasshopper’s Ideal. Flashback is a game within a game, and in turn contains games within itself. It manifests a nested structure of games. And this is a decisive clue to how GIL could be true. Nesting is what distinguishes the GIL-life constructed of games from the GIS-life that is merely a series of games. In the latter, each game is unrelated to the next except by having the same player. In fact there is not even a unified life: just an individual person who keeps on playing, like a child with too many quarters at an arcade. In the GIL-life, by contrast, the games are related in a particular way: each inner game is valued both intrinsically, for the game it is, and instrumentally, for the role the achievement of its lusory goal serves in a larger game. Attaining the prelusory goal of one game becomes a constitutive rule of a higher-order game, so that playing the lower-order game becomes a lusory means of the higher-order game. One plays the higher-order game by playing the lower-order game. This result corrects Hurka’s interpretation of Utopia. Just because nothing needs to be done, it doesn’t follow that “no one would need to play a game as a means to anything”; they need to play a game as a means to a higher-order game. This is just what Skepticus does in Flashback: tries to understand the Grasshopper’s ideal by recounting their summer together. So defining ‘playing a game’ is the prelusory goal of the inner book and a constitutive rule of the outer book. And this nesting structure appears to avoid the horror vision that we reached above: finishing a game is not paradoxical or irrational, for the game doesn’t vanish into the arbitrariness of the goal, since the goal has further value in virtue of partly constituting the larger activity of living.
Hurka might reply, however, that the person who plays nested games lacks a lusory attitude to the inner game. The lusory attitude entails adopting ends and rules just to make possible the activity of playing the game, but the nester does so in order to play a further game. Thus the nester is a special kind of trifler. Either one must play games in life, or one must play the game of Life, but one cannot do both.
To solve this problem, I must show that Suits’s restriction on Utopians is compatible with their being nesters. I will in fact go further, and show that Utopians must be nesters.
A nester is a special kind of Suitsian ‘professional.’ Professionals—those who play games for some further purpose—appear to violate the definition of game-playing by lacking lusory attitude in virtue of playing to make money or achieve some other goal to which the game is instrumental. Lusory attitude, recall, is “accept[ing] the rules of the game just because such acceptance makes possible such activity.” This ‘just because’ seems to be exclusive, but Suits insists otherwise: it is “the only reason he must have in playing a game, but it is not the only reason he may have”; other reasons for accepting the rules are admissible, provided they are also reasons for playing the game.Footnote 36
Suppose we understand an amateur as one who plays to win—that is, in order to achieve the lusory goal. The professional, by contrast, plays to take home the winnings. But this seems to make the professional a kind of trifler, using the game to do something else. What distinguishes the professional from both the amateur and the trifler is the commitment to try to take home the winnings only by playing and winning. That is, the aim of taking home the winnings does not replace the lusory goal of winning, but turns that lusory goal into a constitutive rule of a second-order game whose lusory goal is taking home the winnings and whose lusory means is playing the first-order game. One could have achieved this efficiently by cheating, or stealing the winnings, but instead one achieves the goal only by playing fair. This game—say, Professional Basketball rather than mere Basketball, or Professional Philosophy rather than mere Philosophy—may have its own rules of eligibility, pay scales, and so on. What’s crucial is that the professional’s second-order game is built out of successful plays of the first-order game, and the professional accepts the rules of the latter both in order to play the latter and in order to play the former. Thus the professional has a lusory attitude.
But this solution does not yet fully distinguish professionals from triflers. Consider a Baseball coach who puts in the third-stringers for a ‘meaningless’ game. While the players themselves might be doing their best, the coach is playing a long game, for instance to manage a path to the World Series. If the lusory goal of the long game overawes the lusory goal of the short game, even redefining the latter as ‘meaningless,’ then this coach is like the infamous 2012 Olympic Badminton teams whose members followed the rules but were trying to lose individual matches in order to manage their path to the gold medal.Footnote 37 Here, the short game is sacrificed to the long game. It is also possible to sacrifice the long game to the short one, as when a coach blows his team’s chances at the World Series by exhausting his best players in meaningless games. This game-winning but championship-sacrificing coach plays Baseball to the exclusion of Baseball Season. The Badminton teams, for their part, were playing Olympic Badminton Tournament to the exclusion of Badminton. But most coaches who play third-stringers in meaningless games or blowouts contrast with both of these. Such coaches normally remain committed to the lusory goal of the short game. Though they play the third-stringers, they are not attempting to lose, but, like the golfer with a handicap, putting themselves under certain restrictions, and then trying to win in spite of them. The short and long games can thus enhance each other, as for instance when one’s playoff hopes are riding on the outcome of a single game, a single at-bat, or a single pitch, each of which might be its own game-within-a-game—messing with the pitcher’s rhythm, shaking off the catcher’s call, etc.
In a well-constructed nested game, the inner and outer games enhance one another. The activity of playing an inner game is thus not instrumental to the outer game, but partly constitutive of it. Put otherwise: ‘in order to’ is ambiguous between instrumentality, which is how Hurka understands it, and constitution, which is how the Grasshopper intends it. In order to play Poker, one must (instrumentally) locate a deck of cards and some currency with which to bet. But in order to play Poker, one must constitutively play each hand. Thus the Grasshopper’s insistence that Utopian games not be instruments to any further end does not rule out nesting, but requires it. Nesting turns out to be a constitutive rule of a GIL-life—that is, a life that is itself a game, constructed in a mutually reinforcing way out of plays of inner games. To ‘play in games,’ as Hurka recommends, would then be inessential to our nested game of Life.
If I am right that GIL is Suits’s thesis, then Hurka’s reading of Suits as defending GI* is incorrect; if—irrespective of Suits’s intent—GIL is true, then Hurka’s assertion that ‘playing in games’ is an essential part of the best life is incorrect. Moreover, GIL seems to have the important virtue of being unchallenged by WL. Even if WL is true, it repudiates only the GIS-life of game-playing, not the GIL-life that is a game.
Yet GIL is impossible unless we can answer an obvious question: what is the prelusory goal of Life?
5. Death as the Prelusory Goal of Life
One constitutive rule of Life is to construct a nested game such that the highest-order game is composed of lower-order games, with each game’s lusory goal serving as a constitutive rule of a higher-order one. But what is the highest-order or outermost prelusory goal? One obvious idea is that the prelusory goal of Life is death, and hence its lusory goal is dying. It would be possible to die efficiently. But if we set ourselves constitutive rules requiring us to die inefficiently, in order that we may live, then living is intrinsically valuable. Importantly, inefficiency is not the same as slowness;Footnote 38 just as the best Chess match is not the longest one, mere extension of Life is not always an improvement.Footnote 39 But nor is the shortest Chess match likely to be the best. Be it Chess or Life, the best game realizes the optimal balance between trying and achieving; its constitutive rules make the lusory goal—checkmate, or a good death—into our crowning achievement, and the playing into a worthwhile challenge.
If the prelusory goal of Life is death,Footnote 40 we seem to have discovered the lusory goal—dying—and the lusory attitude, which is pursuing death inefficiently just so that one can live. Yet unlike, say, Monopoly, Life does not come with predetermined rules. Rather, one is both gamewright and player; one must devise one’s own constitutive rules. There is, then, no single best life. Nonetheless, whatever further rules one hangs on it, there seems to be something of a required skeleton:
i) Do not commit suicide; or, put otherwise, “take the long way home”;Footnote 41
ii) Nest—that is, live a GIL-life.
Insofar as one pursues death while observing these rules just in order to live, Life is a game and living is intrinsically valuable. We thus appear to have avoided the dissolution of Utopia by affirming GI (in the form of GIL) and declawing WL.
But there are two problems. First, in most games even if the lusory goal is arbitrary we at least understand ourselves to be pursuing it. We might “not want to win, let us say, too soon,”Footnote 42 but we do indeed want to win. And under normal circumstances, although inefficiency is built into the constitutive rules, we work to maximize efficiency within those rules. Yet we do not approach death this way: we do not consciously seek it, nor try actively to bring it about. It could perhaps be argued that we should approach death this way; but that seems a tall order.
A second problem is perhaps even more serious because it denies whether such a life would have any value at all, even if we could bring ourselves to want it. The problem is that, for all we have said, each of us might be playing his or her own one-player game. Once our game ends, it is nothing. We fade into oblivion, our lives spent pursuing the tiniest of tiny goals—our own deaths. This might not bother those who “are very keen on games,” but most people would
com[e] to the conclusion that if their lives were merely games, then those lives were scarcely worth living…. Life for most people will not be worth living if they cannot believe that they are doing something useful, whether it is providing for their families or formulating a theory of relativity.Footnote 43
As Wolf and Kauppinen both argue, there needs to be something beyond the subjective goods of a person’s own life to make that life valuable or meaningful. WL once again looks dangerously relevant, and the Grasshopper’s fear is well founded. We are back to annihilation.
6. Death is Not the End
This time, though, we have reached annihilation for a different reason. The problem this time stems from the basic fact that the best games have more than one player. On its own, the current interpretation—in which each of us has adopted death as our ultimate goal—is a solipsistic game. It would turn us into what the Grasshopper calls “Sneaks” and “Drags.”Footnote 44 A Sneak plays games amongst others but not with them; a Drag ropes others into his games against their will, playing off them but not with them. Both Sneaks and Drags play games that have more people than players; other people become devices or spectators rather than fellow players. Consequently, Sneaks and Drags play games that are only as big as themselves, games that have no value for anyone else and so necessarily vanish when the sole player stops playing.
To be clear, Sneaks and Drags are not loners or recluses. They live among others. But they do not play with others. Rather, they use others, playing games that have more people than players. In the role-playing games that Suits uses as examples here, the best games are those where others feed good lines because doing so is the way to get the best lines back, and thereby gain opportunities to keep on giving and getting better lines. Life would then be an open game: “a reciprocating system of role-performance maximization.”Footnote 45 Sneaks and Drags do not fail to play games, then, they fail at reciprocity. As a result, their own role-performance is unsatisfying even to themselves.
An open-game interpretation of the ideal of existence is compatible with the constitutive rules laid out above, but adds a third:
iii) Play games with only as many people as players.
It is worth noting here that, in playing Flashback, Skepticus risks becoming a Drag because he gives Prudence no role, and in playing Grasshopper’s Ideal, Skepticus and Prudence risk becoming Drags because they give the reader no role. By ending the book with a riddle, Suits draws the reader into the game as a player, not a spectator. Unlike the closed-game interpretation, then, the current reading makes sense of the Grasshopper’s deaths, both of which occur just in time to keep the game going: once for Skepticus and Prudence, and once for the reader. Such timing would be irrelevant on the closed-game interpretation. On the open-game interpretation, however, death is a move in the game. It need not be sought for its own sake, but it may and indeed should be chosen when it is the best move available. This solves the first problem confronting the closed-game interpretation, namely, that we do not pursue death as a goal. And the idea of Life as an open, multi-player game solves the second problem: the value of our participation can outlast us by contributing to the ongoing successful plays of others. Such value need not be objective, and it can be ‘lasting’ without fear of our eventual extinction.Footnote 46 It’s just that the game goes on, and even in death we can contribute to it.
In rejecting the closed-game interpretation, the open-game interpretation also gives new significance to the model of Utopia. The Grasshopper introduces it as a means of representing the individual ideal more clearly by magnification. But more importantly, Utopia presents the inherent sociality of an ideal whose purpose is both reciprocal throughout and conceived as contributing to a larger common project. Indeed, if anything, the magnification distorts the ideal in a way that brings back WL. The distortion has to do with reciprocity. The Grasshopper emphasizes that the games played in Utopia could include those that we think of as work, provided they are valued intrinsically; this would allow “any Utopian to enjoy the exertions of productive endeavor.”Footnote 47 Utopians can then participate in games like “business administration, jurisprudence, philosophy, production management, motor mechanics, ad, for all practical purposes, infinitum.”Footnote 48 But these games raise a problem that the interlocutors miss: they require other players if they are to be played well. A homebuilder needs a crew; a business administrator needs a staff; a jurist needs legislators. And one cannot simply pluck these others from a tree or have a computer generate them; they would then be devices, and the player would be a Drag. Instead, one must find others to play with. More pointed still is the previously noted worry that “most people” need do “something useful,” such as “providing for their families.”Footnote 49 Yet usefulness requires not only that the player care about the goal; it requires that others care about it. And if the players’ families are deceived into believing they need to be provided for, or bribed to pretend they do, then the Utopian is a Sneak or a Drag. Utopia might be paradise for the player, but a living hell for his family. Though in reality it would not even be paradise for the player; if his family members are not playing, the game will be dull.
The open-game reciprocal interpretation solves these problems. If each person’s Life is part of an open game, then it neither ends completely at death nor lacks a point. Death is a move in a larger game, its point given by the place of the individual Life in the larger game that we all play together through time. Just as the point of my doing philosophy is not to solve all the philosophical problems myself but to help push the conversation forward towards that common goal, so the person whose Life is part of an open game finds its point in helping to move us all forward. Each of us is both gamewright and player. The open game forms a kind of virtuous circle of mutual enhancement, the outer game being valuable partly because it makes possible the inner game, and the inner game because it partly constitutes the outer game.
Yet if Life is an open role-playing game where our purpose is to contribute to a collective enterprise, feeding good acts to others in hopes of getting good acts back, what larger collective enterprise—what highest-order game—gives the individual Life its point? As a placeholder, we might call it “Fate of Humankind.”Footnote 50 Our particular achievements have value because of their contribution to humankind as a whole, and the Fate of Humankind matters because it enables the particular achievements of individuals and groups. Inner and outer games are not sacrificed to one another but rather gain their meaning by their contribution to the other. If all the Utopians could abstain from using people as devices and embrace their role in Fate of Humankind, they would not think their lives wasted.
It may be objected that, if we are playing Fate of Humankind, it is hard to see where the principle of inefficiency emerges.Footnote 51 On the closed-game interpretation, we could die more efficiently by killing ourselves. But on the open-game interpretation, we cannot move humankind forward more efficiently than we do. One answer to this challenge is that we choose the open reciprocal role-playing game precisely because it is so hard; like Mountain Climbing, Fate of Humankind builds limitation of means into the selection of prelusory goal.Footnote 52 But another reply is that we could indeed pursue continuation more efficiently than we do. On an overtaxed ‘Lifeboat Earth’ we could make human survival more likely by sacrificing the biggest polluters and drastically reducing the human ecological footprint. To pursue continuation without sacrificing anyone makes for a much more challenging task. It might, of course, already be too late; the game might be impossible. And this is perhaps the real horror vision: that we have sacrificed Fate of Humankind—and with it, our own best lives—to a series of smaller games like Quarterly Earnings Report and Brand New Car.
Yet finally it might be wondered whether Fate of Humankind could really be an open game. One way or another the species will go extinct, even if, as seems unlikely, we hold on until the end of the Earth. While it is possible to imagine that Fate of Humankind is ultimately a closed game, however, it is hard to see what its prelusory goal would then be. Other than Dr. Strangelove, who would seek the extinction of the species? To say that a game is open, however, is not to say that it never ends. An open role-playing game ends when the players, having reciprocally maximized their role performance, deliver brilliant closing lines, thank each other, and go home. Perhaps that is the best end we could hope for.
Anyone can play the open game of Life, hence anyone’s life may achieve the ideal of existence. Yet it does not, of course, follow that most people will do so, or that all who try will succeed. Games can fail for any number of reasons, including poor design and interruption from without.Footnote 53 In any life, there are sure to be episodes that interrupt the game. But the likelihood of imperfection does not impugn the ideal.
7. Conclusion
I have argued that the best life is an open, nested, and reciprocal role-playing game—Life—whose value is in the living as well as in partly constituting larger goals that give the life as a whole a purpose, and that the best interpretation of The Grasshopper is as a game meeting its own definition with the goal of defending precisely this thesis.
Because my argument is built on the hypothesis that one should approach The Grasshopper as a game meeting its own definition, it may appear that my thesis depends on whether Suits’s definition of ‘playing a game’ is in fact accurate. Those who reject the definition may then infer from that the failure of the interpretive hypothesis or the proposed ideal of existence. But even if Suits’s definition of ‘playing a game’ is mistaken, that fact impugns neither the hypothesis that applying the definition to The Grasshopper is an illuminating interpretive strategy, nor the thesis that the best life meets that definition.
A fuller account of the game that Life is would need to show that moral rules can be derived from the constitutive rules of Fate of Humankind. It would not suffice to demonstrate a mere confluence between the two—though that would be significant in its own right—but that the moral rules were derivative upon the rules of the game. The Grasshopper suggests a link with sportsmanship.Footnote 54 Sportsmanship is external to the definitional structure of a game, but it is nonetheless an essentially lusory norm since it makes games better as games, rather than (merely) morally better. Yet sportsmanship nonetheless remains an indirect link between games and morality. I suspect that a more direct derivation is possible, and the open-game interpretation makes it more feasible than would the closed-game interpretation. The reciprocity of open games, and specifically the rule that one play with others and not use them as devices or spectators, seems well suited to generate plausible moral rules. This suggests one final reason to prefer the open-game interpretation of The Grasshopper.
Acknowledgements:
I am grateful to Karen Christopher, Matthieu Dalle, John Gibson, Thomas Hurka, Ralph Marshall, Cara Nine, John Russell, and the anonymous referees for helpful comments on various drafts of this paper, and to numerous students for lively discussions of The Grasshopper.
