From WikiLeaks disclosures to the revelations by former intelligence analyst Edward Snowden and the Panama Papers scandal, events in the first decades of the twenty-first century have stirred up debates about the tensions between secrecy on the one hand, and transparency and democracy on the other. For institutions relying on the sharing of data, the stated dichotomy is too simple. How can states, companies, and other information holders protect their data and share it safely with partners? Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson’s examination of such “disclosure dilemmas” provides a timely discussion of this issue. The questions of how and when actors share sensitive information in the international arena and how reluctant sharers can be convinced to cooperate (e.g., through a thorough classification system or a witness protection mechanism) are at the core of their research.
Secrecy studies is an interdisciplinary endeavor, but how and to what extent secrecy shapes international politics has been little explored by scholars of international relations (IR). Even today, many IR textbooks do not include a chapter on intelligence or secrecy and therefore fail to consider the secretive underbelly of international politics. This book sheds some light on the subject, directing our attention beyond the state level to examine how international organizations (IOs) gather, use, and share sensitive information.
IOs require data input for their daily work. The World Health Organization’s efforts to monitor and end the COVID-19 pandemic constitute a timely example. Its work relies on information provided by state authorities, public health bodies, disease surveillance systems, and so on. Depending on an IO’s mission and working procedures, the organization might require not only nonsensitive but also sensitive information. For Carnegie and Carson, the latter type “refers to private information whose wide dissemination would allow changes in the behaviors of other state and nonstate actors that are harmful to the discloser” (p. 3), whether that refers to secret intelligence (e.g., a photograph taken by a drone) or firm-specific data (e.g., company finance information). Confidentiality, privacy, and the protection of sources and methods are just some reasons why actors are protective of this data. To understand how and why sharing of sensitive information nevertheless takes place in global governance, this book poses two core questions: “First, what factors induce states and firms to disclose their sensitive information to address questions of compliance? Second, what impact does sensitive information have on the effectiveness of IOs and the cooperative goals they are designed to further?” (p. 2).
To answer these questions, the first part of the book establishes a robust theoretical framework. The authors identify three key independent variables. First, the creation of a confidentiality system, or secrecy capability, within an IO will allow actors to “disclose their information directly and exclusively to an institution” (p. 4). The second variable refers to incrimination benefits: the political or economic rewards actors will receive from sharing sensitive information. Third, adaptation costs are of importance, because the disclosure of information might mean that other actors change their behavior (p. 26). In short, the authors suggest that the more effective the secrecy arrangements of an IO, the higher the reward for sharing and the lower any costs for the discloser, the more likely the organization in question can prevent or mitigate the disclosure dilemma and foster smooth cooperation.
The theoretical framework is subsequently tested by exploring the disclosure dilemmas in the context of four strands of global governance: nuclear proliferation, international trade, war crimes, and foreign direct investment. This mix of security and economic matters allows for a wide-ranging analysis that takes into account state and private information holders and a variety of institutions. The analysis is based on thorough empirical research, including elite interviews, memoirs, archival materials, and official documents. To make claims about the reluctance by actors to share information, or their changing attitudes over time, the authors had to gain an understanding of what potentially could have been shared at any time. Regarding the examination of war crimes tribunals, access to declassified internal US records made it possible “to observe both disclosed and withheld intelligence” (p. 206), for example. The empirical chapters are rich in detail, though they vary quite a bit in length and focus. In examining intelligence, the exclusive focus on the United States is well-justified but nevertheless shows a clear limitation of the research.
The case study on war crimes is striking. Without evidence, suspects might not be identified or found, secret weapon depots or graves cannot be located, and secret negotiations or support might never be revealed. So how can institutions for war crime accountability ensure that they receive the information essential for their work and at the same time prevent any leaks that might undermine their efforts? Looking at the cases of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Carnegie and Carson show that the creation and subsequent tightening of confidentiality systems helped create a level of trust between those governments holding crucial intelligence, notably the United States, and the tribunals. Once the US government was satisfied that the ICTY would be able to protect sources and methods, it became more willing to share information. The example of the ICTR demonstrates clearly how other factors play into decision making about information sharing, however, because the United States followed its own geopolitical interests when it withheld intelligence regarding crimes by the Rwandan Patriotic Front while disclosing data that facilitated the pursuit of the Hutus.
Across the four themes, it appears that “confidentiality increases information disclosures and boosts IO’s effectiveness” (p. 264). The book suggests that there are “striking similarities in the type of confidentiality systems used” (p. 266). Yet reasons for not sharing information vary considerably, even within each domain. Regarding nuclear proliferation, the authors find “that states with intelligence about suspect nuclear activity often decline to share it due to fears of damaging their future intelligence collection abilities” (p. 148). Geopolitical interests are another important factor shaping information sharing. The significance of political relationships can also be observed across the cases. The book says much less about the importance of personal links, however.
The normative implications of the analysis are fascinating. The German sociologist Max Weber wrote in 1914 about the fact that secrecy is an in-built power-enhancing mechanism for any bureaucracy. Secrets in Global Governance demonstrates well how deeply engrained secrecy is in some IOs by now. How can such a rise in secrecy be squared with the demands for transparency and legitimacy regarding global governance bodies? The answer, the authors suggest, is complex, even within each IO. For example, whereas opaqueness might affect accountability negatively, effective secrecy mechanisms should lead to greater effectiveness and quality of performance (p. 270). Assessing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the authors find that “integrating sensitive information has likely decreased the amount of nuclear proliferation relative to a world without an intelligence-enabled IAEA, even though it may have done so unevenly” (p. 149). Yet, such an emphasis on output legitimacy cannot draw away attention from the fact that “building secrecy into IOs—even if it is narrowly tailored—creates an upper limit to the degree of possible institutional transparency” (p. 273). Moreover, being able to hold and withhold certain information can give actors an advantage over others. The chapter on nuclear proliferation shows that the IAEA receives little intelligence about some states and therefore does not target them. Thus, selective disclosure or the withholding of information might allow actors to shape actions and outcomes of an IO.
In sum, this book makes a fine contribution to the study of global governance and of secrecy in international relations. Moving the examination of secrecy issues beyond the nation-state level, the book offers considerable food for thought for further normative analysis of the shadow realms of international politics.
