In ‘Visible hand or invisible fist’ Professor Paton asks two specific questions; first, whether the new internal market is different to the one we experienced in the 1990s; and, second, given that the new market is not steered by anything approximating the invisible hand, is it an economic market at all, or some kind of political market instead?
In response to the first question, I would say that the 1990s internal market was an odd beast; it appeared grounded in a vogue idea of its time, principal-agent theory, suggesting that GPs and district health authorities – in the absence of patients being able to act as purchasers of care for themselves because of economic, information and knowledge constraints – could act as purchasers on their behalf in a marketplace for healthcare (Greener, Reference Greener2002). But there was never much of a market for healthcare because of the conservative nature of many referrals (West, Reference West1998) and the often local cartel-like behaviour they appeared to lead to. This was made worse, from the perspective of those wanting to introduce a market in healthcare anyway, by the government moving the architect of the reforms, Kenneth Clarke, away from Health, apparently to try and introduce them in a more conciliatory way (Ham, Reference Ham2000), leading to the eventual situation where, in Paton’s words, ‘the old market was abolished long before Labour made its 1997 promise to abolish it’. The whole language of health reform moved from competition to constestability (Sheldon, Reference Sheldon1990), and, by the end of the Conservative period in office, health policy appeared to have undergone a ‘becalming’ (Wainwright, Reference Wainwright1998). So, whereas the market was arguably underpinned by a more or less coherent set of ideas (with the caveat that coherent ideas don’t necessarily make for good policy), they were not matched by a set of structures that might have allowed them to work (or not).
The new market, as Paton describes, is an animal of an entirely different type. Whereas the 1990s version allowed providers to set their price, the new one has instead nationally set ‘tariffs’ for treatments based on the average cost of those treatments. We have a market with a fixed price (one can hear economists gnashing their teeth already). Trusts are meant to provide the maximum quality service commensurate with the tariff level set by the government. They also have the possibility of cross-subsiding services that are above tariff with other services in their portfolio (an appropriate word for the way Trusts appear to be asked to consider the range of services they offer – each being apparently expendible), but, of course, only if they can somehow make the whole financial edifice this creates come out more or less in balance because of the threat of what might happen if a deficit should appear in the Trust’s books.
Two elements, both identified by Paton, are key to understanding how the new market is meant to work. First, there is the patient choice agenda. In the 1990s, as we noted above, it was meant to be GPs and District Health Authorities that were meant to make choices. Now we have Choose and Book, in which patients apparently make choices of where and when they would like to be treated with either their GP or a separate patient choice advisor. It’s not clear on what basis these choices are meant to being made - price is clearly not relevant because of the tariff, but, from the first patient choice leaflets, the availability of car parking spaces does appear extremely important (Easington Primary Care Trust, 2006). If it is unclear how patient choice is meant to work (Greener, Reference Greener, Bochel, Ellison and Powell2003, Reference Greener, Dawson and Sausmann2005), then this places the entry of private and not-for-profits into the NHS at centre stage.
Of course, organisations such as the Nuffield and BUPA have long provided care to the NHS – the Conservatives used non-public-sector providers to clear long waiting lists in the 1980s – but now we have such providers being actively encouraged to compete for care in the new market. Treatment centres are springing up, and new not-for-profit hospitals being built. The capacity of the NHS is meant to be increasing, allowing waiting times to fall and a genuine choice to be offered to patients (although as we noted above, we are not clear how they are supposed to make it). As Paton identifies, this leads to public providers having an increased threat of public providers running deficits, both from the increased competition, but also from the problem that they cannot choose which markets to enter to and exit from, and which services they wish to provide and which not. They have both asset and geographic specificity.
By now it should be clear that the ‘new’ market for health is somewhat different from the 1990s version – on this I agree entirely with Paton. However, I would argue, perhaps in difference to him, that the reason for this is that Labour are attempting to respond to the problems of the 1990s in both ideological and pragmatic fashion. The ideological bit is that they appear to be unable to find any solution that does not presuppose that some kind of market is the answer. The pragmatic bit is that they seem to have tried to put in place a number of fixes to try and resolve the difficulties with the 1990s version of the market. So, the lack of choice for patients is rectified (in Labour’s eyes) by the entry of private and not-for-profit providers and the patient choice policy. The focus on quantity rather than quality that was alleged against the 1990s is rectified by the fixed tariff and increased performance information being published. And so on. The difficulty is that these piecemeal fixes end up creating an environment which is bordering on the anarchic in any major city because of the complexity of the local health economy they have created, and in which there is often a view that new entrants have a number of significant advantages over established public providers.
This takes us neatly onto Paton’s second question. Paton quickly identifies the paradox at the heart of the new market – on the one hand we have a rhetoric of decentralization and greater autonomy for providers of care (especially Foundation Trusts) (Peckham et al., Reference Peckham, Exworthy, Greener and Powell2005), but on the other hand greater central control through performance measurement, direct interference where ‘wrong’ decisions are made, and the government continuing to set the rules for engagement in local health economies to a remarkable extent.
In the meantime, local public providers, in a calculative frame in which they must regard services as being either over or under tariff, must adopt a portfolio-driven approach to considering their care in the name of creating greater competition. This may well lead to public providers exiting from above-tariff services, leaving the potential for private cartels to form in particular areas of treatment. We are told it does not matter whether the public or private sector provides care, but we may wish to revisit this thought where public provision has entirely disappeared and private providers decide they are not being adequately rewarded for their efforts. We might find the iron-fist being used right back at the public purse where local health economies lose public capacity for provision.
Paton briefly touches on PFI, but I think the situation has the potential to be far worse than he implies. PFI has given large numbers of public providers significant overhead problems for years to come because of the nature of the contracts they have signed (after being told by the government they had no choice if they wanted new facilities). This means the limited discretion of cross-subsiding against tariffs is reduced even further, and that services operating above the tariff level must be cut back to the bone or removed. We are led, once again, towards much more specialist provision, and having to rely upon non-public providers for a far greater range of treatments.
Paton suggests that the competition created by the new market may be a zero-sum game. Again, he is right, but I’d go further. I think it is a reducing-sum game. This is because, once waiting lists have fallen to a negligible level (and we are getting close in some specialities to this now) we may well find, with new entrants of provision, that we have excess capacity. Economic logic suggests that these resources be deployed to a different service, but again, asset and geographic specificity (especially for public providers) means this may not be possible. Either public providers or new entrants will disappear, unable to cover their costs. Competition is based on the premise of excess capacity – a luxury the NHS has never been able to afford. In all, this very political market may well end up removing substantial amounts of public provision leaving us in the hands of providers from other sectors. Is this really what we want?
Conclusion
It’s hard to argue with Paton’s analysis, but I have gone further, suggesting that both PFI and increased competition have the potential to end up removing public provision from the NHS and creating private cartels in their place. This is a depressing thought. What’s the alternative?
Briefly, I agree (again) with Paton that a more careful analysis of the relationship between choice and voice is needed. I don’t think that competition is necessary to improve care. The answer may lie in better management. Let me be clear, I am not in favour of grand theories of strategic management or introducing whatever theory of change is presently in vogue. Instead, I ask for far simpler things. Many of our public providers are careless with dignity, expect patients to wait without any clue as to when they will be seen, and are scorning of the complaints that patients make. All of these things are quite easily fixable, and do not require us to reinvent the governance structures of the NHS. I would say that they are the basics that all good private service providers get right, except that they often fail to as well. Patients don’t really want choice (Fotaki et al., Reference Fotaki2005), and I doubt the extent to which they actually want to be directly involved in the governance of services (Stoker, 2006). They want compassionate local services in a reasonable amount of time. It’s hard to see how the iron fist is going to make these happen.
