It is often tempting to reach a verdict on an academic book based on a cursory sampling of a few basic components, such as the introduction, conclusion, and bibliography. In the case of Reality Television and Arab Politics, the temptation is to devour the whole book. The depth of the author's research is partly reflected in his ability to craft a series of multifaceted narratives that prove nearly as compelling for the reader as the highly charged events narrated in the book seem to have been for their diverse protagonists. From the Kuwaiti wedding party guests glued to their mobile phones for news of a Star Academy contestant, to the finalists of Super Star 2 at the Libyan leader Muʿammar al-Qadhafi's soirée under canvas, to the Bahraini parliamentarian accusing the Big Brother format (adopted on Arab television as al-Raʾis) of imposing an imperialist nightmare on free people, Marwan Kraidy quotes voices emerging from the fracas over reality television to highlight the way it “touched a constellation of raw nerves” (p. 37) over what constitutes reality in Arab settings and how reality is represented. In doing so, he shows that reality television is far from a trivial subject.
Despite its vivid recounting of staged scenarios and unstaged conflicts that end up being mediated in print as well as on screen, Reality Television and Arab Politics steers clear of a positivist or linear approach to its subject matter. On the contrary, the author engages deeply with theories of modernity and its associated tensions, including the relationship between religion and state, nationalism, gender norms, and the development of representative forms of governance. Kraidy's argument is that the reality television genre has particular resonance in Arab contexts because it “violates boundaries of identity and authenticity” (p. 13), “stirring the public-private nexus” (p. 143) at a time when contestation over such boundaries has been stoked to fever pitch by foreign interventions and injustices across different parts of the Arab world. Driven by the business imperative of boosting income from telephone voting and from advertisers keen to reach affluent youth in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, reality television's routines for involving viewers have a particular impact. According to Kraidy, the genre's protracted weekly, or even daily, repetition of liberal practices habituates followers to expand public space and use it in new ways. The idioms of contention that viewers adopt as a result are part of the polemics and controversies associated with modernity. Thus, “reality TV is a social laboratory where various versions of modernity are elaborated and contested, a courtroom of sorts that hosts modernity's endless trial” (p. 18).
The controversies Kraidy investigates are all the more fascinating for the insights they provide on Arab countries with widely differing political systems and social mores, notably, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. In successive chapters he shows the links and divisions within and among these polities, including, importantly, an explanation of the marriage between Saudi money and Lebanese television production skills. Focused on the way “media institutions set the parameters for localizing modernity” (p. 204), Kraidy's treatment of the Saudi–Lebanese connection eschews analytical tools from the field of international relations, even though the concept of interdependence has cropped up in his past work. But his diligent probing of well-placed sources has produced an incisive account of elaborate maneuvers, such as Saudi investors’ alleged use of a Christian Lebanese channel in 2004 to broadcast messages in Saudi Arabia by the leader of Lebanon's Shiʿi Muslims with the aim of reaching and pacifying restive Shiʿa.
Reality Television and Arab Politics is not the first book to challenge the widely held illusion that the only significant political dynamics between Arab broadcasters and audiences are those generated by the Qatari news channel, Al-Jazeera. In Arab Television Industries (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Kraidy and his co-author, Joe Khalil, paid ample attention to entertainment and niche channels, looking closely at drama and comedy programs during Ramadan in particular. Ramadan serials have in fact long been the subject of respected reception and production studies. It is hard, therefore, to judge whether, in trumpeting his latest work as moving beyond the obsession with Al-Jazeera (p. 2), Kraidy realized the irony of opening his introductory chapter with a lengthy quotation of a diatribe by none other than Ahmad Mansour, an Al-Jazeera host, who devoted an episode of his talk show Bi-la Hudud (No Boundaries) in March 2004 to the topic of reality television formats. Indeed, if the book's index is to be believed, Al-Jazeera is mentioned on no fewer than 24 pages of a 220-page text. In other words, if what Kraidy describes as the “political earthquake” (p. 2) of reality television controversies reverberated so strongly, it was due in no small part to the ways in which news media feed off each other and off entertainment media.
It is to Kraidy's great credit that he offers up such a rich, colorful, and readable account of how these controversies echoed in newspaper columns and televised debates as well as online. His theory of the “hypermedia event”—a type of event made possible by the digital convergence of communication processes and seen in action in Beirut after the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005—makes a genuine contribution to the literature by capturing the way interactions between multiple media, from cell phones to satellite television, appear to create a “symbolic territory with multiple access points” (p. 187) where political communication is decentralized and avenues for public engagement are opened up. The theory is highly suitable for future researchers to test, especially those exploring media and changing power relations in the Middle East.
