The field of European Union studies is a hybrid of disciplines and approaches. Both of these books are important contributions in this field, but they also hold special appeal for scholars who are interested in policy, institutions, law, and bargaining. Both adopt a qualitative methodology and build naturally upon the previous research of the experienced scholars under the care of whom they were written. Moreover, they adopt analytical frameworks that span multiple levels of analysis, ranging from nation-specific interest group to supranational institutions and politics.

It is interesting to note that these books complement each other in terms of content. Experimentalist Governance in the European Union examines the mundane yet important day-to-day policymaking in the EU. The book looks at the processes by which EU actors interact on a regular basis to produce legislation and improve policy outputs and outcomes. By contrast, Ruling Europe tackles a more sensational subject: the conditions under which major policy shifts occur, and how these shifts are also linked to questions of effectiveness. Specifically Ruling Europe is concerned with the adoption in 1996 and the revision in 2005 of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was meant to install budgetary discipline among countries that adopted the European common currency, the Euro. Taken together, both present us with insights on the full range of big and small policy decisions made in the EU.

At the same time, the two books present a contrast in terms of the method they adopt in order to explain and interpret their subjects. On the one hand, Experimentalist Governance, as is typical of many edited volumes, applies one theoretical framework with consistency on a range of distinct EU policies. Ruling Europe, on the other hand, is a detailed case study of one policy, analyzed consecutively through the lens of four separate theoretical approaches. Hence, almost as a consequence of the method it adopts, Experimentalist Governance tends to put more emphasis on the discovery of general trends, while Ruling Europe emphasizes historical detail. It would be a mistake, however, to understand the difference between these two books as one of breadth versus depth. Within the limitations of the method each adopts, both books make important general inferences about the nature of policymaking in the EU, and both present the reader with an impressive wealth of policy and historical details. Let us now examine them separately.

One can read Experimentalist Governance in two different ways. The first is as an EU policy handbook. It examines 11 different policies in an equal number of chapters. They run the entire gamut of EU policy competences, from competition and consumer protection to internal security and external relations. Each chapter is written by an expert and includes important details about how each policy is decided and implemented, as well as a brief history. In this sense, the book is similar to well-known surveys of EU policies, such as the classic edited volume by Helen and William Wallace et al. (2010, 2005, 2000) Policy-Making in the European Union.

The second and perhaps more interesting way to read Experimentalist Governance is as an attempt to conceptualize a new model of decentralized governance, which challenges traditional notions of hierarchical government. In this sense, the book is part of a bigger trend in EU studies (e.g., Ingeborg Tömel and Amy Verdun, Innovative Governance in the European Union, 2009) and beyond (e.g., Richard C. Feiock and John T. Scholz, Self-Organizing Federalism, 2010). Specifically, editors Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin expand their earlier work (“Learning from Difference,” European Law Journal 14 [May 2008]: 271–327) and elaborate a model for EU policymaking, which consists of two components: one structural and one functional. In terms of structure, the model incorporates three categories of actors that all students of the EU can easily recognize: supranational institutions, national governments, and interest groups or other subnational entities. These actors are linked with nonhierarchical structures, such as networks, councils of regulators, and so on. In terms of function, all of these actors interact in a process of continuous policy feedback: Supranational institutions produce “framework policies,” which are implemented by national and subnational actors, who in turn share feedback on the effectiveness of the policy with each other and with supranational institutions, thus leading to revisions of the original policy frameworks.

Once in place, this continuous policy loop has a number of interesting implications. First, policy learning allows for the constant improvement of policy through revisions of framework legislation. Second, policymaking becomes open to a diverse multitude of actors, thus increasing transparency. And third, established legal and political notions of accountability are challenged, because in this governance mode actors explain their views and justify their actions in deliberative fora. Hence, both the input and output legitimacy of the EU's policymaking infrastructure improves.

How does the model apply to the policies discussed in the book? It is impossible to discuss every chapter in detail here, but certain general trends are possible to identify. First, the structural component of the model fits quite well with all of the policies covered in the book. Every author identifies some type of nonhierarchical institutional structure, which connects a diverse set of actors. A “cornucopia” of bureaucratic names across the chapters is clear evidence of these “experimentalist” structures. Terms such as the “the Article 29 Working Party” (Chapter 2) and “the Committee of Securities Regulators” (Chapter 3) appear in chapter after chapter.

The functional component of the model (i.e., the presence of a policy feedback loop) is a lot harder to fit across all policies equally well, however. On one side of the spectrum, one could single out Competition (Chapter 5) and Environment (Chapter 6) as two of the most successful illustrations of experimentalist governance. On the other side, however, for Anti-discrimination (Chapter 9) and Justice and Home Affairs (Chapter 10) the main function of networked structures appears to be primarily (though not exclusively) to help with the hierarchical implementation of common goals, as opposed to a genuine dialogue for the purpose of revising existing framework legislation. Still, even those policies that fit the model of experimentalist architecture less perfectly play an important role in the book, as they allow the reader to understand the limitations of the editors' model.

Ruling Europe shifts our attention to yet a different policy domain: fiscal and economic coordination in the Euro zone. Authors Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun deal with a current topic of great concern both in scholarly circles and among the public at large, due to the potential consequences of the Euro-zone crisis. The book may appeal to both an expert and a non-expert audience alike: It uses theory to analyze the empirical evidence collected, but it is written in a way that is accessible to nonexperts as well. In fact, the book is required reading for anyone who is interested in understanding the political sources of the current economic crisis in Europe.

Empirically, Ruling Europe focuses on historical events that shaped the nature of economic coordination in the countries of the Euro zone. Specifically it examines the negotiation for the SGP, which was concluded in 1996, as well as its implementation, which includes the negotiation for the pact's overhaul in 2005. The time period covered in the book begins in 1991, when the Maastricht Treaty officially gave birth to the common currency, and ends in late 2008, when the global financial crisis broke out. (The account stops about one year before the events in Greece triggered the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone). The authors collected the rich historical evidence that appears in the book from official documents (a long appendix includes relevant ones) and an impressive set of interviews with elite officials in key positions.

Heipertz and Verdun argue for an “eclectic, combined usage” (p. 14) of theory, and they employ four different theoretical approaches for the appraisal of the evidence. Each theory draws attention to different sets of actors and levels of analysis. Intergovernmentalism sheds light on the role of bargaining and the relative weight of national governments, while neofunctionalism stresses the importance of supranational elites and legal and economic spillovers for maintaining institutional path dependency. The domestic politics approach highlights the role of domestic political considerations by national political elites and the role of interest groups and other subnational actors, and lastly, the “expertocentric” approach (a term coined by the authors) examines the roles of ideas and experts in shaping the content of negotiations.

The relationship between theory and empirical evidence is structured differently in the two parts of the book. Part I examines the establishment of the original SGP. Each chapter is devoted to one of the four theoretical approaches, which is elaborated and applied to the same set of events. By contrast, in Part II, which revolves around the SGP implementation and overhaul, each chapter is devoted to a different set of events, and the authors use a different combination of the four theories to interpret them. Part II leaves the reader somewhat puzzled. The authors' main argument for an eclectic use of theory is well taken, but while it is well illustrated in Part I, where theories are applied and evaluated systematically, in Part II the authors reverse course (and depart from established practices in social science research) by applying the theories in a way that seems almost casual. In the concluding chapter, however, Heipertz and Verdun synthesize their book's theoretical insights and provide a coherent interpretation of the events.

Taken together, and despite any differences in policy focus and analytical method, these two books convey a common message: Whether we try to understand historical shifts or mundane day-to-day actions, policymaking in the EU is impossible to explain without taking into account the actions and preferences of both the politician and the bureaucrat.