While many countries define poverty in a relative manner, whereby poverty threshold is set at 40% to 60% of median income, some countries use absolute definitions, according to which being poor implies lacking the minimum amount of income for meeting some basic living conditions, e.g. proper nutrition, shelter, physical and mental health, access to clean water, and so on. Recently conservative politicians and parties have suggested that the relative definition of poverty should be abandoned and that absolute measures should be applied. Those promoting defining poverty in relative terms answer, quite rightly, that the most important reason for sticking to the relative measure is that it is more sensitive to inequalities in society. In that sense Living in dignity in the 21^st Century is timely and important as it relates to poverty and inequality as a single issue. Moreover, the authors also tie in the two with human rights as well. Therefore this book can be described as a non-neutral (although very objective) treatment of poverty, and should be of interest not only to students and researchers of poverty but also to NGOs and decision makers. It is written in a very accessible manner, and while the book is not jargon free, the authors explain all the concepts very clearly, using, among other things, comics.

The authors’ assumption is that the growing number of poor in Europe should not be taken as given. Their goal is therefore one of social policy: they believe that their recommendations are not exhaustive (211), and yet if implemented they are certain to yield substantial progress in peoples’ well-being. Why should we believe them? One reason is that they are far from being conformist in the way they define the problem. It is often the case with social policy that definitions constitute solutions. Poverty has always been defined as a material issue (lack of income) and therefore the solutions always involved transferring money to the poor. If policies differ from each other it was in the manner in which transfer should be conducted. But the authors here define the problem in much wider (including non-material) terms (53–61), relying, among others, on Sen and Nussbaum and their capabilities approach. Their efforts to think of innovative policies are therefore more likely to succeed. Second, they do apply a new ideological framework: shared social responsibilities and the recognition and defense of common goods. The latter (these common goods) are common because they are essential for ‘living in dignity’, a notion that goes back to Adam Smith in his The Wealth of Nations.

Thus poverty is not the problem of the poor – it is an issue that concerns the whole of society (35–36) and therefore the solution is in thinking of it in terms of ‘we’ and ‘us’. We need to move beyond the Western ethos of ‘individual freedom of choice’ (171–179) because it turns a blind eye to how individuals’ actions affect the common and to how much each one of us is responsible for the poor and their condition because we are all part of a commonality. We therefore think of tackling poverty as securing the well-being for all: neither the better off only, nor the least advantaged solely.

I am not sure that philosophers who are interested in the moral grounds for anti-poverty policies will be terribly satisfied with the book because sometimes moral positions sound more like assertions (we should do this or think like that) rather than arguments. Moreover, the general argument relies heavily on several moral and philosophical assumptions such as that democracy has to be ‘reinvented' (116–120) or that human rights are indivisible (77–80) which one might find too hasty and not very well argued for. In fact, if the point is not to preach for the converted, those who benefit from poverty and do not care too much also do not believe that anybody has a right not to be poor. So it might not be the best philosophical framework within which egalitarians should talk with right-wing libertarians, for example.

However, while the book does take philosophical justification seriously, its main goal is policy. And as for policy, this book is great news. Let me put it this way: assuming the reader accepts the general moral standpoint then s/he will find a world of novel policy ideas in the policy section. In fact, the book offers no less than a revolution – get rid of our economic motive (maximizing profit) as the essence of our economies and societies, and instead look at how we are all inter-dependent. If we do so we shall be able to aim at the well-being of all rather than the few. This section is indeed illuminating precisely because the authors don't leave their points as assertions: they explain what change is needed in public institutions (179–182), how to communalize public goods, and offer concrete proposals (183–210) in a very holistic way: they put together, in the same policy box, lots of economic, legal, social and political ideas, from basic income and minimum wage through introducing tax on waste, improving access to credit, spatial issues such as treating public space as a common good, and equal access to quality education and enhancing local democratic processes.

This book is therefore a must read not only to those who believe in utopia. It is also a must read for those who, whenever they smell something that reminds them of the welfare state, express skepticism. I doubt they will remain the same after reading this book.