I. INTRODUCTION
Jacques Rueff (1896–1978) has left a mark on twentieth-century economic history, both as a devoted servant of the State and as a close adviser to Henri Poincaré and Charles de Gaulle (Chivvis Reference Chivvis2010).Footnote 1 He is also known as a theorist who actively participated in the economic debates of the twentieth century (Bourricaud and Salin 1998), whether about the gold standard (see Mundell Reference Mundell1973) or inflation, and was engaged in a controversy with John Maynard Keynes (Autier Reference Autier2008). In all these debates, Rueff is known for having taken a liberal position. But what is meant by the term “liberal position” should be clarified, and this is precisely the aim of this article.
As is well known, the liberal doctrine has evolved over time. Jacques Cros (Reference Cros1951) and, more recently, François Denord (Reference Denord2007) and Serge Audier (Reference Audier2012) have placed Rueff within the context of these changes. They have identified two key periods: the first in the 1930s with the Walter Lippmann Colloquium,Footnote 2 and the second after the Second World War with the Mont Pelerin Society, founded in April 1947. However, things appear to be more complicated than this, since, contrary to the usual story of unity (Cockett Reference Cockett1939; Halimi Reference Halimi2004; Dixon Reference Dixon2008), Audier (2008, p. 28) stresses that “the history of neo-liberalism ... was carried by trends and deeply different individuals and even ... was sometimes a source of intense conflict.”
Three main trends were identified during the Walter Lippmann Colloquium: the Mancunian School, the Austrian School, and the Ordoliberal School. These schools were not equally influential when the Mont Pelerin Society was founded. Regarding them, Rueff’s position is relatively clear.
Rueff rejected Mancunian liberalism. This school of thinking stands up for a liberalism based on laissez-faire and free trade, wherein the State is used only for economic progress (infrastructures, legal framework, defence, etc.), and must not interfere in the marketplace and the social system (see Burdeau Reference Burdeau1985). As André Piatier (Reference Piatier1938) emphasizes, the competition that is the basis for a liberal economic system is a major pillar of the Mancunian School. But, according to him, left to function on its own, it tends towards disappearance and paradoxically leads to the advent of monopolies. Rueff is of the same opinion. Total liberalism leads to the “law of the strongest” and, thus, the establishment of a monopoly that would remove the price mechanism—the basis of freedom for Rueff. Therefore, he stresses the need for institutions in order to avoid this law of the strongest. Compared with the Austrians, and even though he points out that he “always find[s] [the] source [of all turpitude] in State intervention” into our regimes (Rueff Reference Rueff1934, p. 34), Rueff’s opposition to State intervention in economics is of a different nature from the Austrians’. He is not opposed to such interventions that do not affect the price mechanism, and neither does he reject the notion of the “general interest.”
In fact, his position echoes that of ordoliberalism, another key current in liberal thought, the central figures of which are Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, and Walter Eucken. According to Bernard Chavance (Reference Chavance and Chavance2007, p. 57), the ordoliberals differ from the Mancunian School in the importance they assign to the State as “the guardian of the marketplace.” Indeed, for them, competition cannot spontaneously maintain itself. They stress the role of the State in the establishment of institutional rules in order to maintain a liberal and competitive order. Consequently, the State plays the role of an “authorizing officer.” However, the ordoliberals were also not in favor of socialism or Keynesianism (and the welfare state). Moreover, according to Röpke (see Diemer Reference Diemer2014, p. 5), economists must be attentive both to economic problems and to their legal, sociological, moral, and political bases. He considers economic freedom to be necessary but not sufficient to ensure the liberal order and the freedom of society. Consequently, Rueff’s ideas are closer to the ordoliberals than to the Austrians. The link between Rueff and the ordoliberals’ position may be illustrated by the use of the term “left liberalism” (libéralisme de gauche) by Rueff in 1933 (Frobert Reference Frobert2010, p. 439). He prefers to refer to “left liberalism” instead of “neo-liberalism,” because it seems to him to be more representative of modern liberalism. This term gives a wider ambit to liberalism than economic freedom alone, and encompasses a more social approach. Indeed, while safeguarding the key pillar of liberalism—the price mechanism—the left liberalism of Rueff supports the idea of State interventions that are not maintaining property rights (see Denord Reference Denord2007 and Audier Reference Audier2012).
Rueff’s notion that the State has an extended role and that the property rights may under certain circumstances be called into question is unthinkable for the Austrians, the third trend represented at the Walter Lippmann Colloquium. This school drew on many traditions including the Salamanca School and French classical economists such as Jean-Baptiste Say or Frédéric Bastiat. Begining under the impetus of Carl Menger and his two disciples Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser, Austrian thought continued with Ludwig von Mises, then Friedrich Hayek, who participated in the creation of the Mont Pelerin Society—where the Austrian School imposed itself as a dominant view at the end of the 1950s.
But prior to this, the foundation of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947 itself marked a second step in the reshaping of liberalism. While Rueff was a member and belonged to the French section, the new institution was chiefly marked by the opposition between two main figures: Wilhlem Röpke and Friedrich Hayek. As François Denord (2002, pp. 16–17) emphasizes, Hayek and Röpke are “paradigmatic of the division that exists between Neo-liberals. Hayek[Footnote 3] and Röpke[Footnote 4] differ both on social and geographic points as well as on religious and political measures, which had a direct impact on their vision of liberalism.”Footnote 5 Following Albert Hunold’s caseFootnote 6 during the late 1950s (Hartwell Reference Hartwell1995, pp. 136–137), American domination prevailed with the resignation of a number of European members. Rueff himself did not quit, however, preferring to side with Hayek’s position in order to stand together against Keynesianism, which was in ascendance.
In the late 1960s, the Mont Pelerin Society was faced with a new division between the Austrians and the Chicago School (with Frank Knight, Jacob Viner, Henry Simons, Milton Friedman, and George Stigler) (see Audier Reference Audier2012). This time, Rueff positioned himself between the two, being close to the Austrians for their refusal of excessive formalization, but also deeply neo-classical, assigning a major role to the concept of equilibrium (Rueff Reference Rueff1927, Reference Rueff1945).
This new conflict was resolved in favor of the Chicago School. However, very quickly the first-generation Chicago School (Knight, Simons, Viner) gave way to the second generation (Friedman, Stigler), which was more libertarian and claimed to represent Mancunian liberalism (Audier Reference Audier2012)—a trend that Rueff did not follow. Rueff died in 1978, and did not live through the more recent shifts in the Mont Pelerin Society. Since the beginning of the 1980s there has been a gradual radicalization of the society. A new and more radical generation has emerged, including James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Vernon Smith, and the Public Choice School, but also with the thinkers of anarcho-capitalism and minarchism—with Murray Rothbard and David Friedman for the Americans, and Jacques Garello, Henri Lepage, Jean-Jacques Rosa, and Pascal Salin for the French. These trends are more or less strongly associated with anti-statism and market fundamentalism.
Perhaps the complexity of Rueffian liberalism and the fact it is impossible to classify Rueff according to only one trend of liberalism explain why commentators usually prefer to adopt a comparative approach when dealing with the issue of the nature of his liberalism.Footnote 7 However, this article does not occupy itself with such concerns, since its main aim is to examine the nature of Rueff’s liberalism on the basis of his vision of the social order, developed in his book of 1945.
Addressing this issue enables us, on the one hand, to confirm just how varied economic liberalism is, and, on the other, to contribute to a better understanding of Rueff’s economic ideas.
The distinguishing feature of Rueff’s liberalism lies in his belief that “Liberalism is not a degree of government but a method of government” (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 577) whose goal is to reach what he calls “collective ends.” In that sense, and as suggested by Yves Crozet (Reference Crozet and Dockes2000), Rueff’s liberal order is not spontaneous. However, the aim of this article is not to identify which institutions are needed for Rueff—State, property rights, money and the market, in particular (see Diemer Reference Diemer2010)—but to highlight how they delimit the scope of State intervention in order to achieve freedom and secure the “liberal social order.” This requires specifying the governance method that has thus to be implemented.
II. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATION OF RUEFF’S LIBERAL SOCIAL ORDER
Rueff refers to the notion of the “liberal social order” to designate what allows freedom to be secured. It seems to be close to Hayek’s social order (Hayek Reference Hayek1944), but, actually, it is more complex. Indeed, Hayek refers to two kinds of social order (Ege Reference Ege1992; Burdeau Reference Burdeau1985). The first is an artificial/exogenous order also named taxis or nomos/thesis. The second is a natural order also named kosmos or catallaxie. According to him, artificial order is not opposed by spontaneous order.Footnote 8 However, Hayek supports the idea that the spontaneous one prevails over, and should be the basis for, the establishment of an artificial order. In Rueff’s thought, social order—that which secures and maintains freedom—is not spontaneous. Rueff, in fact, borrowed this concept from Joseph de Maistre (Reference Maistre1795). It is, indeed, a built and governed social order rather than a spontaneous one.
From a theoretical point of view, two stages are required for its establishment: first, the establishment and safeguarding of property rights; and, second, government intervention in order to fulfill the “collective ends” (les fins collectives). These two steps can be illustrated by a concrete example: the “institutional market of the European communities” (Le marché institutionnel des communautés européennes).
The First Step: From the “Wild Order” to the “Pacified Order”
According to Rueff, at the beginning of the creation of society, the law of the strongest prevailed: “within a community, left to its fate, an order will be spontaneously established in which the strongest will submit all things to his will” (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 523). Rueff calls this situation “the wild order” (l’ordre sauvage); it is a spontaneous order. However, within such an order, even if social balance is maintained, people are not free because they have no capacity to freely dispose of their rights. Worse still, in this situation people have no rights at all. To illustrate this point, Rueff draws an analogy between this order and the system of slavery, in which only the strongest person is master and has access to property rights, while the weakest are dominated by the master—they are his slaves. Thus, Rueff explicitly rejects Rousseau’s idea that “man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau Reference Rousseau1762, Book 1, ch. 1).
In order to reach the stage of a “pacified society” (société pacifiée), the appropriation of wealth must be ensured. This is where Rueff introduces the crucial concept of property rights—“all systems that seek to impose peace on men are based on the same principle: the subjection of each thing to the will of one person. It is this exclusive right of enjoyment and disposition of things which is called a property right” (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 527). Thus, property rights confer “[t]o its holder, all freedom of action over the property; and for other members of the community, a requirement of complete abstention. … For the individual, it divides the world into two: the domain of possession, where he is sovereign, and the rest of the world where, except with the owner’s consent, he is without action” (ibid., p. 527).
This means that a property right defines an area of freedom within which the individual has the right not only to act freely (his will is not impaired) but also to dispose exclusively of all things that he owns. According to Rueff, this guarantee of private property, allowing movement from the “wild order” to the “pacified order,” can be carried out in different ways, depending on which type of society it is. In a theocratic society, divine will (via divine commandments) plays this role; in a moral society, it is the conscience; and in a police society, it is “the judges who order and the police who impose” (ibid.). Rueff concluded, “A high dose of religious, moral and social constraint” is necessary in order to leave behind the wild order (p. 523).Footnote 9
The Second Step: From “Pacified Order” to “Governed Order”
Securing a pacified social order is not enough “to make the world a habitable place” (un monde habitable) (Rueff 1967, p. 195). Indeed, the social configuration within a pacified order is dominated by individual interests:
The pacified world shall be shaped only by the will of the individual. Even those who shall impose their will upon it shall not belong to the community of men, but are those fortunate ones who have property rights, each of them exercising control over the fraction of the universe corresponding to the volume of his rights.... The world which has been pacified will become a world of homicide, lust and lies, a world of selfishness and hate, of extreme inequality and slavery (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, pp. 535–536)
According to Rueff, even if property rights are secured by the monopoly of coercive power, the pacified social order thereby established allows neither the spontaneous harmony of private interestsFootnote 10 nor the automatic realization of collective ends.Footnote 11 As he emphasizes:
Such a world will be rejected with horror by all those who think that a human society must not only give to some of its members the satisfactions that they consider the most desirable, but must head for the purposes which dominate it. … They would wish that human society is governed, as a vessel is driven by a pilot, by their desires, and, thus, are subjected to government intervention which is necessary to lead them. (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 536)
This idea of a “pilot” (government) who would “guide” the vessel (society) reflects an artificial approach (perhaps even a contractualist one) to social order, in which the transition from the pacified order to the liberal social order is accomplished only by governmental interventions. Indeed, institutions come about from the result of an intentional process of society;Footnote 12 they are established especially in order to carry out collective ends.
Finally, Rueff argues for an artificial and constructivist approach to the social order (in opposition to laissez-faire), which accepts and even encourages some State interventions. Thus, Rueff is not close to Hayek’s thought, despite the fact that he is sometimes associated with it. Admittedly, they do both address the notion of the social order; yet, even if Hayek does not refer directly to laissez-faire, the only legitimate State interventions are those that do not interfere in the free market. According to him, the social order is not perfect, but he considers that it is more dangerous to try exercising control on events and phenomena in order to obtain a more favorable situation.Footnote 13
In some of his works, Rueff gives concrete form to this theoretical view by the implementation of an institutional market. This market represents, in the final analysis, a social order, and, although it is geographically limited to Europe, it is the guarantor of freedom and of social harmony. But Rueff’s constructivist approach raises the issue of the implementation of the liberal social order: that is, of which method of governance needs to be developed to achieve the collective ends.
The Institutional Market of the European Communities: A Concrete Example of the Rueffian Liberal Social Order
Rueff’s proposal for an “institutional market of the European Communities” may illustrate his concept of a liberal social order, and may be seen as an attempt to apply his theory of a liberal social order to reality.
As a judge in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and a member of the French Council for a United Europe and the European League for Economic Cooperation, Rueff took part in the debates on the creation of the European Community and the common market. But he was already thinking of such projects before these debates, when he was Financial Attaché to the French Embassy in London, as proved by his speech delivered on February 27, 1933 (Rueff Reference Rueff1933). This speech, entitled “De quelques hérésies économiques qui ravagent le monde” (On several economic heresies which are ravaging the world), focused only on those aspects that stressed the economic benefits of cooperation, in contrast to protectionism, which had developed after the 1929 crisis. It did not receive support at the time; however, Rueff did not give up and he finally published his speech after the Second World War with a more evocative title: “Une proposition de marché commun vieille de vingt-quatre ans” (A twenty-four-year-old proposal for a common market) (Rueff Reference Rueff1957a). He also delivered a new speech on this topic in 1957 (Rueff Reference Rueff1957b) and published another article in 1958, entitled “Le marché institutionnel des communautés européennes” (The institutional market of European communities) (Rueff Reference Rueff1958), in which he evoked for the first time the issue of its social repercussions and political stability. Indeed, it seems clear that the Second World War raised his awareness of the importance of dealing not only with economic issues but also with social ones, and his 1945 book bears the mark of this conviction.
A few years later, the introduction of the social aspects in the two above-mentioned articles of 1957 and 1958 led Rueff to advocate the implementation of what he calls an “institutional market.” He does not clearly define this concept; however, it is a different market from the one usually described by economists. The institutional market would take the form of an overall institution, which would include at the same time the idea of the market as a place of exchange as well as a legal and regulatory framework with which to address political and social issues. Furthermore, according to Rueff, the implementation of an institutional market is not spontaneous and requires at least two government interventions—one to build it, and another to maintain it: “The ‘institutional market’ … sees in free trade, not the spontaneous state which is imagined by Adam Smith and the Mancunian liberals, but the product of a continuous intervention for establishing it, for making it possible, for making it acceptable and for ensuring its duration” (Rueff Reference Rueff1957b).
In the Rueffian project, these government interventions, necessary to establish the institutional market, are mainly implemented by the elaboration of a treaty. This treaty should specify the rules of conduct but also the intended purposes and the means with which to achieve them. The Treaty of Rome is a good example of the kind of treaty that Rueff imagined for the European common market: “it is essentially because it creates not only a common market, but an ‘institutional market’, that the Treaty of Rome is different from all those which had previously and unsuccessfully pursued the same goal” (Rueff Reference Rueff1958, p. 6). Indeed, the Treaty of Rome established the European Community, and in particular it specified the intended purposes of this union.
Rueff’s discussion of the aims of the Treaty of Rome reflects, in part, the features of his liberalism. Three goals are assigned to this treaty (ibid.): (i) reducing price disparities, which do not result from natural production conditions but from the implementation of quotas or an artificial price fixing (and even of an artificial fixing of production conditions); (ii) reducing the social and human consequences due to the introduction of such a market (via the establishment of the European Social Fund); and (iii) assigning to the community institutions the responsibility not only to create this common market but also to defend it, which implies an institutional framework (legal and regulatory) from which rights and laws will be enacted and will be enforced.
The two last aims illustrate two elements already mentioned by Rueff in 1945: on the one hand, that the market is not a natural institution but an artificial and built one; and, on the other, that later governmental interventions are necessary in order to establish and maintain the social order.
The second aim of the treaty shows how important the notions of well-being and collective interest are for Rueff; they directly refer to his idea of “collective ends.”Footnote 14 This all seems very far from the image of Rueff as an ultra-liberal thinker who defended individualist liberalism and considered the market as an institution where competition is free. Indeed, on the contrary, two reasons led him to reject pure laissez-faire. The first is that it can lead naturally to cartels and tacit collusions: he explicitly criticizes Mancunian liberalism, which found its fullest realization in the capitalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and resulted in a substantial increase of monopolies and cartels at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, which reduced competition and prevented prices from being established at a level determined by conditions of free competition. The second reason is that laissez-faire does not seem to be compatible with what is politically and morally acceptable, as explained in Rueff’s Reference Rueff1958 proposal:
The abolition of tariff barriers, applied for several centuries … would cause … perennial resistance, based on the fear of the transformations that it would impose and on the scale of their social implications. They thought that, to give some chance for the ratification of their project, it was necessary, by direct intervention, to mitigate them [transformations] as far as possible and to heal, as much as possible, the wounds that they [the social implications] could inflict. Experience has confirmed their wisdom: the project, the only one of its kind, has been ratified. (ibid., p. 7)
Thus, Rueff argues for a liberal social order, but one that would be fundamentally tempered by government interventions, both to establish it and to solve social issues. Far from being a mere market, the institutional market is the most appropriate societal organization to achieve “collective ends,” for it is the only form of market that enables us to maintain human freedom and social harmony: “The institutional market … is, in our political structures, the fundamental change which will unite tomorrow, in a common civilization, all individuals and people who want freedom without disorder, and welfare without servitude, while reducing, as far as is humanly possible, inequality and injustice” (ibid., pp. 9–10).
III. THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIETY
Rueff’s belief in the need for deliberate political intervention paves the way for a discussion of what he called the “governance of society,” which has two dimensions: first, the issue of “governance methods”—specifying the tools in the hands of government (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 546)—and, second, the “degree of government,” the level of government involvement in the achievement of collective ends (ibid., p. 555).
Methods of Government
In a society with private ownership of capital, it is quite unlikely that people will conduct themselves in a manner consistent with collective ends. Indeed, only the owner of rights has the freedom to dispose of the thing owned and, according to Rueff, as collective ends cannot give to people the maximum yield of their desirability,Footnote 15 individual interest does not converge towards collective interest (ibid., pp. 515, 541). Accordingly, to ensure their achievement (a necessary condition for building and maintaining social order), Rueff considers the definition of a sovereignty area for each individual as insufficient. Indeed, in order to go beyond the merely pacified order, it is necessary to intervene even within their property rights, by substituting a part of the individual’s will with the collective will (ibid., pp. 514, 541–542). Thus, according to Rueff, collective ends will be achieved only through mechanisms that influence the will of individuals.
These interventions, both within property rights and in the individual’s will, are characteristic of a specific approach to liberalism. Private property is a pillar of freedom in liberal thinking, but it is precisely this that Rueff would call into question in order to achieve the collective ends. In this sense, Rueff is far from the new generation of liberalism and the doctrine prevailing today in the Mont Pelerin Society, which is more libertarian (see Murray Reference Murray1984; Nozick Reference Nozick1974; and Rothbard Reference Rothbard1962).
Furthermore, by intervening within property rights, the will that is exercised is, according to Rueff, different from the one that was originally envisaged by the holder of rights (i.e., without any outside influence), for it integrates collective ends. This requires the establishment of a government that, in Rueff’s thought, has two methods at its disposal: the liberal method and the authoritarian (or socialist) method (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 546). Therefore, in Rueff’s thought, liberalism is not only a doctrine or an intellectual current but indeed a method and a real tool of governance.
The first method involves depriving the owner of a portion of his sovereignty by transferring a part of his rights to governmental authority; this dispossession is carried out through taxation, the amount of which depends on commodities or services that the government wishes to obtain for carrying out public expenditures. Contrary to what might be believed, people do not lose their freedom: “In the liberal world, laws or regulations do not prevent any usages allowed by the nature of things, once taxes have been paid” (ibid., p. 554).
The second method, the so-called authoritarian or socialist, involves maintaining the rights of the holder while ensuring that he himself chooses collective ends pursued by the government; in other words, this involves modifying, within the field of his rights, the range of acts that it is possible for him to perform. To achieve this, the government should act directly on the will of individuals (for instance, via laws). The individual becomes willing to cooperate once a sanction has been imposed (which would apply if the agent leaves the field of possibilities). Consequently, the authoritarian method involves a change in the definition of property rights, which thereby cease “to be a faculty to enjoy and to dispose of something in the most absolute way, to become a ‘faculty to enjoy and to dispose of something in the most absolute way, provided that one does not use it in a prohibited way by laws or regulations’” (ibid.). But freedom is maintained as long as people can exercise their free will (libre arbitre) to make a decision: “Governing is not to force a man to act against his will; it is to change, for him, the consequences of his acts, in such way that in the full freedom of his voluntary action, he wants what his government commands him to want. The man governed is thus always ‘in the hands of his own advice’. He remains a free man” (ibid., p. 515).Footnote 16
At this stage, two limits should be underlined. First, we do not know exactly what Rueff means by “collective ends.” We know only that they are not simply the sovereign functions (police, justice, and army), since these are already included within the pacified order (via the protection of property rights).Footnote 17 Therefore, it is obvious that Rueff is far from the libertarian trend and in particular from the Austrian School. Indeed, Rueff is not absolutely opposed to State intervention, contrary to anarcho-capitalism (the most radical branch of libertarianism). This latter trend of liberalism moves away from the classical British liberalism (John Locke, Adam Smith, or John Stuart Mill), which recognized the need for the State even if its interventions must be limited in its area and in its choice of procedure. On the contrary, according to anarcho-capitalism, the State is useless and illegitimate. Neither, we must stress, is Rueff following the same line as Hayek, or even that of the minarchism doctrine—a branch of libertarianism but less radical than anarcho-capitalism (which would appear later, after Rueff’s death). Both trends support a minimal State role in the economy. Second, there seems to be a problem of coherence: governmental intervention into property rights may conflict with the goal of the Rueffian liberal social order: namely, freedom. In both cases (whatever the method of government), a breach of owner privilege occurs, which has a quantitative nature with the liberal method and a qualitative one with the authoritarian one (ibid., p. 602). But, actually, Rueff sees no contradiction between government intervention and the freedom of the people. This is due to his concept of freedom. Through taxes, the individual voluntarily abandons a part of his rights in order to allow the achievement of collective ends that he knows to be essential for establishing social order. In a liberal regime (i.e., a regime where the liberal method dominates), if people are dissatisfied with expenditures incurred by the government, they can change and replace it with a new leadership. With the authoritarian method, individuals are restricted in their freedom of action by the sanctions and rewards that can be applied following the taken decision and the established law. But, according to Rueff, man is still free. Indeed, although the individual’s willingness to act can be substituted by governmental willingness to act, the freedom of everyone is not called into question—only the range of possible options is narrowed.
Degrees of Government
Apart from the distinction in terms of the method of government, Rueff also points out that there are different degrees of government. These two elements should be clearly distinguished, because the consequences of the method of government for freedom are different, depending on the degree of government: “The previous analysis [regarding the method of governance] shows that we might conceive, regardless of the method applied, two extreme kinds of government: one which subtracts nothing at all from the will of the individual, and the other which subtracts everything” (ibid., p. 555). The degree of government depends on the quantity of collective ends that the government wishes to provide.
According to Rueff, the first type of government (named “individualistic”) would be close to a wild order, in which an individual’s will is unconstrained: the full sovereignty of property rights is dominant and taxes are excluded. The second type of government (named “communist”) corresponds to a situation where only collective ends are imposed (ibid., p. 557). The communist government, associated with the authoritarian method, limits everyone’s freedom to dispose of, and enjoy, their rights (by laws and regulations), such that the only acts performed by individuals are those pursued by the government. When associated with the liberal method, it implies drawing on the whole resources of individuals (via taxes) solely in order to carry out the will of the government.Footnote 18 Rueff’s stance is clear; he is against communist government, which nullifies freedom. But this does not mean that he supports individualistic government.Footnote 19 There should be no mistaking his position: one can be liberal without being individualistic. He points out that no government adopts only one method of government, but uses, on the contrary, a judicious mix of both types. He re-emphasized the same idea in 1961 (Rueff Reference Rueff1961a).
We must highlight the fact that even though Rueff holds an intermediate position, his criticism mainly concerns the communist method of government. What Rueff calls into question is the removal of freedom that can be caused by an authoritarian government. This echoes his insistence that the ultimate goal of the social order is basically the defense of freedom. Moreover, if it cannot be ruled out that a communist government can use a liberal method, he thinks that centralized and autocratic planning will prevail in the long term.Footnote 20 As a result, only the authoritarian method will remain, thus leading to a loss of freedom (replaced by dictatorship and totalitarianism) (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 640). Rueff criticizes communist-style governance to the point of overlooking the drawbacks to individualistic government.Footnote 21
IV. SUPERIORITY OF LIBERAL GOVERNANCE
Rueff considers that both the liberal and authoritarian methods can produce the same result in theory: “We certainly do not claim that the two methods are interchangeable. … But, it was needed, in order to clearly specify the nature of government action, to show in theory that any collective, social or moral aims could be obtained through either of them” (ibid., p. 552). However, Rueff’s opinion would change in practice.
From a moral point of view, he is forced to acknowledge that the liberal social order needs the application of the authoritarian method. He gives an example: the proscription of lying. He shows that in a society using liberal governance, and which seeks to develop moral behaviors in order to ensure the social order, consideration must be given to applying the authoritarian method. Indeed, if one applies the liberal method in order to prohibit lying, the right to speak of individuals would have to be removed, which leads to controlling the gestures and thoughts of individuals, which establishes slavery (ibid., pp. 571–581). Consequently, a society that rejects slavery has necessarily to apply the authoritarian method: “Liberalism will escape from the state of nature, from the ‘law of the jungle’, only if it is aided by authoritarian constraints. … But, far from pushing them away, it sees them as necessary to its building. The liberal social order requires the support of morality. … Without this, it would be … a wild order” (ibid., p. 581).
But morality is the only criterion for which the authoritarian method appears to be indispensable; in all other cases, Rueff clearly supports the liberal method in practice.
Economic and Practical Superiority
To demonstrate the superiority of the liberal method, Rueff mainly focuses on two criteria: economic and practical.
As the authoritarian method results in a decrease of the free disposal of everyone’s rights, it creates a disincentive to productive effort: individuals are not pushed to produce more to obtain new rights (ibid., p. 635). Consequently, the authoritarian method necessarily implies a diminishing of overall economic performance.Footnote 22 The more a person’s rights are limited, the more production decreases. Indeed, if the government does not want a complete shutdown of economic activity, it will have to drive the productive effort by authoritarian methods. In this case, rights will be reduced as much as possible, in order to produce only what the authority wants—in other words, only the production targets set and imposed by the government. On the other hand, the liberal method gives a “maximum of desirability” to the holder of rights (ibid., p. 582): his freedom to dispose of his rights is affected neither by sanctions nor by rewards. Obviously, the maximization of desirability is reached after the governmental authority has levied taxes (which are then directed towards the achievement of collective ends). But, once these taxes have been collected, Rueff considers that the desirability of agents is no longer affected and their decisions are free of governmental influence. Thus, for him, the effectiveness of the liberal method is due to the division of labor between, on the one hand, the State, which is in charge of achieving collective ends (from taxes levied), and, on the other, the individual, who is concerned only with his own interests (from rights remaining in his possession after the levy) (ibid.).
Furthermore, the authoritarian method would also be a more rigid one (ibid., p. 635). Indeed, it implies that an individual’s willingness to act should be amended by laws and regulations; but this task comes up against three difficulties. The first one is practical: how can the authoritarian order, which has only human means, achieve what divine means cannot, Rueff asks. Indeed, he is forced to note that transgressions also take place in the field of religion, despite the supernatural means of sanction and reward affecting man for all eternity (ibid., p. 597). Consequently, according to him: “The wish to promote the authoritarian method, the wish to govern more and more extensively using such a method, is to forget the limitation of human faculties, is to want to give men the powers that only the gods possess, is to commit a huge sin of pride that always ends up condemned by inefficiency and disorder” (ibid., p. 598).
Second, the authoritarian method, which aims to amend the individual’s will by regulation, faces a difficult task since individual situations are continuously changing, whereas the law is generally fixed: “Governmental action by authoritarian methods is more complex when dealing with changing situations. … Its technique is therefore under various forms of commandment” (ibid., p. 596). And, third, the authoritarian method requires additional inspection costs, compared with the liberal method, but without necessarily ensuring complete effectiveness because only observed cases of deviation will be punished (p. 601). Indeed, with the authoritarian method, power is more diffuse and less controllable, and authority is in the hands of anyone who has the capacity to compel: “In an authoritarian regime [i.e., a regime where the authoritarian/socialist method dominates], any … person who is able to subject the individual’s will to his decisions … becomes a governmental authority” (ibid., p. 600). Thus, “trade unions, industrial agreements, cartels, organizing committees, whether they are imposed or spontaneously accepted, exert, as soon as their decisions are effectively applied, a governmental impact” (ibid.).
Consequently, one cannot limit oneself to controlling the actions of the State—every institution that enjoys the power to control individuals’ rights must be overseen. Contrariwise, in the liberal method, governmental authority is in the hands of only those who have fiscal sovereignty. According to Rueff, this allows the sources of expenditure and taxes to be more easily identified, and also makes State power more transparent and easier to control (ibid., p. 602).
Superiority in Terms of Social Justice
In his quest for “a habitable world,” Rueff cannot put aside the criterion of social justice. He addresses this issue in a different way, compared with the previous two criteria. Indeed, it is the only criterion where he goes beyond a comparative approach between the methods. His goal is basically to counter the common argument raised by the critics of liberalism, where a liberal government is a government that is not very active (or even not active at all) in the social field.
Rueff considers that the liberal method is just as well suited to carrying out social expenditures as the authoritarian method: “A liberal government can be as social as the authorities, who manage it, want it to be” (ibid., p. 577). Like every agent, the liberal government owns rights. Therefore, it can intervene in social matters as long as it does not spend more than it owns (i.e., the extent of its rights equals the amount of levied tax):
Liberalism is not a degree of government but a method of government. The magnitude of governmental intervention depends at all times, in a liberal regime, only on the volume of rights for which the State imposes its own aims. … Liberal intervention is thus limited only by the amount of taxes levied. … No initiative or generosity, no matter its size, is forbidden under the sole condition of carrying out the tax levy necessary to provide the necessary resources. It is in the amount of this levy, and only in this amount, and not in any transcendental ban, where one can find the limit of liberal intervention. (ibid.)
However, Rueff overlooks four elements.
i.) Even if social expenditure is limited only by the amount of resources levied, there is, however, a maximum tax level that is acceptable and that taxpayers are able to bear. Too many taxes are thus a brake on economic activity and on tax revenue.Footnote 23 In addition, in conformity with “left liberalism” (libéralisme de gauche), which he defends, Rueff considers that the State aims at improving the lot of the poorest in society, while maintaining the fundamental principle of liberalism (i.e., the price mechanism). The ordoliberals also support the idea that the State must act to improve the situation of the poorest, but their measures differ from those countenanced by Rueff. Indeed, even though Rueff does not propose any measures to improve current social issues, he explicitly rejects measures, such as unemployment insurance (Rueff Reference Rueff1925, Reference Rueff1931), that would improve the lives of the poorest but to the detriment of the price mechanism. On the contrary, the ordoliberals support measures that compensate for inequalities, such as social insurance, social housing, etc.
ii.) Rueff does not clarify the nature of State expenditure. It would seem to include the financing of sovereign functions (police, justice, and army) and also, most likely, public good expenditure, but he provides no further details, except that the level of expenditure has to be equal to the amount of tax revenue.Footnote 24 Conversely, as Röpke (1944, p. 65) underlines, the State interventions are based on “a substantial program of strict positive economic policy with an important list of tasks performed.”Footnote 25
iii.) Rueff never specifies the nature of taxation (whether progressive, regressive, or proportional), or the kind of tax—for instance, whether it is to be levied on incomes or property. Yet, this seems to be a central point in defining the level of permitted interventionism in Rueff’s liberalism. Indeed, there is no unanimity on the tax issue among liberals. Some, such as libertarians, condemn tax, which they consider unconceivable except for funding police and justice. Others do not oppose it except under certain conditions. Indeed, most liberals are for a proportional tax that does not modify the level between net incomes, but they are opposed to any progressive tax, which they consider confiscatory and illegitimate.Footnote 26 The only exception is the ordoliberals, who support a progressive tax with the goal of a more equitable repartition. This gap in Rueff’s thought is all the more regrettable, given that tax plays a role in the evolution of social inequalities in society, and its effect on social inequality is different, depending on the nature of the taxation itself.
iv.) Rueff does not discuss how to reconcile collective interest, social justice, and compulsory levy.Footnote 27 In the same line, the notion of justice social is introduced by Rueff, but he does not really specify it. However, this is an issue that is continually under discussion in liberalism. Indeed, although the Classic liberalism—such as Mill’s thought (1859)—refers to social justice, this notion is not supported by the Austrian School and the libertarians, but is a central point for the social economics of ordoliberals.
That he does not deal with this issue may be explained by the fact that, for him, as levies are concealed within the authoritarian method, a government that uses this method would be more susceptible to abuse through the wasteful use of public funds, without necessarily ensuring social justice. Indeed, contrary to the liberal method, where the levy is based on a quantitative basis (by a direct levy on property rights via tax), the levy of the authoritarian method is provided indirectly through limiting each individual’s actions within his own rights (via laws and regulations). This is why Rueff considers this levy as hidden: it gives the illusion that the government “governs without any levy” (Rueff [Reference Rueff1945] 1981, p. 600). Actually, this is not the case: “contrary to appearances, the authoritarian method does not provide the government with the secret of how to make an omelet without eggs. The number of eggs that it demands is exactly equal to the number that the liberal method needs” (ibid., p. 595). For both methods (liberal and authoritarian), the eggs of the Rueffian recipe are, by analogy, a levy on the property rights of individuals. Besides, the levy collected in the authoritarian method also exists in the liberal method; the only difference is that the nature of the levy changes (quantitative versus qualitative).Footnote 28 Accordingly, the authoritarian method is no less painless for the taxpayer, who incurs a cost that equals, in principle, the payment of a tax in the liberal method.
Moreover, as underlined above, the authoritarian method is less transparent than the liberal one, since in the former the levy is hidden; consequently, this method is more vulnerable to abuses, namely deficits and useless expenditures incurred by the State—deficits, because, as Rueff explains, the implementation of the authoritarian method comes from reformers who wish to govern using more than the amount of levy available (ibid., pp. 592–593); and waste, because it leads to “unprofitable investments, the interventions focusing on aesthetic rather than on economic considerations [that] are more easily carried out in the darkness of an authoritarian government, rather than in the full light of a liberal one” (ibid., p. 600). Consequently, the theoretical equivalence of results between both methods of governance (using an equivalent quantity of means) does not seem to be verified in practice. According to Rueff, the superiority of the liberal method over the authoritarian method rests chiefly on this point. Indeed, the advantage of the liberal method is that because the levy is raised in a direct and easily identifiable manner, as soon as the undesirability of levy becomes higher than the desirability of State expenditure, it can be readily contested (ibid., p. 599). In other words, the levy is open to criticism when the disutility resulting from the levy is higher than the utility caused by the achievement of collective ends. Accordingly, the amount of the levy is limited by public opinion.Footnote 29
Not only is the authoritarian method more vulnerable to abuse, but it is also, for Rueff, a less fair method (for the same amount of levy) (ibid., p. 599). In an authoritarian regime, the levy depends on legislation and regulation, which, according to Rueff, are more general and less targeted instruments than the taxation system of the liberal method. Consequently, in an authoritarian regime, the only solution for a more equitable allocation of the public burden is to introduce compensatory taxes (in addition to regulation). From the point of view of social justice, the authoritarian method appears to be insufficient and should be complemented by tools, which are part of the liberal method (ibid.): Rueff considers that compensatory taxes are the only way to restore equity in this situation. Laws may also focus on a specific part of the population, so as to promote social justice; however, Rueff never considered this possibility.Footnote 30
V. CONCLUSION
Rueff rejects Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of freedom. He refers to his statement that “man is born free but everywhere he is in chains” (Rousseau 1762); however, he reverses the terms and its meaning: “man is born in chains and only institutions can allow him to escape them” (Rueff Reference Rueff1977, p. 355). These institutions are essential in the establishment of the social order, and are also constitutive of it.
The social order promoted by Rueff is fundamentally liberal; in other words, it aims basically at ensuring freedom through the preservation of individuals’ sovereignty in their rights. This does not mean that the social order is spontaneous, but quite the opposite; Rueff’s social order requires governmental intervention in order to be established and to guarantee freedom. For Rueff, this requires two things: a governance method, mainly liberal in nature, in order to carry out “the collective ends” to “make the world a habitable place”; and an intermediary regime that is neither individualistic nor communist.
Rueff’s specific vision of liberalism originates in the constructivist and artificial view of the social order. Thus, in opposition to the analysis developed by many liberals of his time, but rather in line with the German ordoliberals,Footnote 31 he does not reject the intervention of the State in economics. This can be proven by his arguments in favor of the liberal method (via taxes), which involves and even advocates State intervention (Rueff [Reference Rueff1934] 1977, p. 334). Even more than this, Rueff supports an intervention at the heart of the property rights of each, in order to maintain a liberal social order where “collective ends” are carried out and freedom protected.
