In recent years historians have taken a great deal of interest in modernization theory and its influence on American foreign policy in the 1960s. For some, the body of theory that sought to guide postcolonial states through the perilous journey from tradition to modernity without succumbing to the temptations of Communism constituted nothing less than a Geertzian cultural system that created meaning for a generation of policymakers.Footnote ¹ Against such claims, Ben Offiler offers a fascinating study of modernization theory's non-influence on American foreign policy towards Iran (4, 30–34, 48). Offiler shows that the discourse of “modernization” was merely campaign rhetoric that was always kept at a safe distance from the actual making of foreign policy. While Kennedy-era officials spoke often and loudly in public about the need to promote economic development and political reform in Iran and elsewhere, in private they saw a direct trade-off between maintaining stability and promoting reform, and were much more concerned with the former than with the latter. In practice, this meant channeling resources into a military and internal security apparatus designed to exert influence in the region, and repress demands for reform at home. Moreover, Offiler shows that even if US officials had been sincere in seeking to “modernize” Iran, they had very little influence with the shah's regime, and what little influence they had gradually slipped away over the course of the 1960s.

Offiler demonstrates the validity of his thesis by showing that the true innovation of the Kennedy administration was not a policy of modernization, but rather one of “massage.” Upon entering office in 1961, the Kennedy administration found that the true problem confronting US policy toward Iran was not how the US could push the shah in a reformist direction, but rather how the US could, in the face of the shah's nervous and paranoid disposition, “stroke his ego to assure him of American support” (49). The Kennedy administration found that the best way to “massage” the shah's delicate ego was to sell his government large numbers of guns on credit.

This policy of massage through arms sales far outlasted the Kennedy administration. Offiler shows that this policy remained intact through the Johnson years and culminated in the Nixon administration's May 1972 agreement to furnish the shah's regime with any and all requested nonnuclear military equipment. Up to this point, there remained a few true believers within the administration who expressed concern that Iranian military spending was diverting resources from development projects and undermining the position of Iranian reformers. But as Henry Kissinger made clear to the foreign-policy bureaucracy shortly after the 1972 agreement, “it is not repeat not our policy to discourage Iranian arms purchases” (151).

In addition to demonstrating the centrality of arms provisions to the US–Iranian relationship, Offiler offers a useful corrective to the popular image of the shah as an American puppet. While the shah may have come to power through a CIA coup in the 1950s, by the mid-1960s he clearly had the upper hand in his dealings with Washington. Whereas American Presidents came and went, the shah remained. With each passing year, the shah's leverage over American foreign policy increased. This problem was only exacerbated by Washington's policy choices elsewhere in the world. As the Johnson administration waded ever deeper into the quagmire in Vietnam, the shah traded hard on his support for the war. Given the dearth of US allies, the shah “believed that Iranian support for the US war in Vietnam warranted a favourable response to his demands for further credit to improve his military” (93). The same dynamic held true with regard to American support for Israel in its 1967 war with its Arab neighbors. Whereas several Arab oil-producing states imposed a production cut and shipping embargo against Israel and the US, the shah allowed the multinational oil companies operating in his country to increase production and continue the flow of oil to Israel (116–22). Iranian public opinion ran strongly against this position, and the shah expected to be paid handsomely for his willingness to defy the general will of Iranian society.

Ironically, the shah's willingness to defy Washington was expressed most clearly in the field of economic development. While the Johnson administration continued to pay occasional lip service to modernization, the US stood firmly against the development of an Iranian steel mill project that would lessen Iran's dependence on US imports (96). After the US refused to help finance the project, the shah turned to the Soviets (102–3). US efforts to dissuade the shah from partnering with the Soviets on the steel mill resulted only in the Shah threatening to diversify his sources of military supply (102, 108). The US then reconciled itself to Iran's increasing independence and increased arms shipments to Iran in a futile bid retain influence with the shah's regime. In sum, Offiler provides a damning indictment of US policy during a pivotal decade in the history of US–Iranian relations.