Introduction
Prematurely born children who have underdeveloped lungs may suffer a potentially fatal condition called respiratory distress syndrome.Footnote 1 A U.S. company developed a drug, called Surfaxin, to treat such poorly functioning lungs. A placebo-controlled study was planned in four Latin American countries (Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru). At the time, in 2001, four treatments were already on the market, although not available to the research populations used in the study. This case is usually discussed as part of the standard of care debate or offered as an example of exploitation.Footnote 2 However, what concerns us in this case is rather the choice given to the parents of a prematurely born child under these circumstances: “You can give consent for your child's participation in this study. Half of the babies enrolled will receive sham air and are as likely to die as if they had not enrolled. The other half will receive an active treatment and are more likely to survive.” The parents can vastly increase their baby's chances of survival by participating in the study. Can the consent be voluntary? Do the parents have any meaningful choice?
Imagine a different example, a thought experiment.Footnote 3 A small tribe in Africa, confined to a few villages but with a strong identity, is found to suffer from an unusually high frequency of a terrible disease, which happens to be a fairly common cause of death in developed countries. A group of geneticists expects that a genetic study of the tribe will reveal a single gene, or a fairly small combination of genes, that is responsible for the disease. Finding the gene, or set of genes, is considered a key to developing a very effective and profitable treatment. Members of the tribe are approached by the geneticists, but they have various concerns about participating in the study. One concern is that they are poor and will never receive access to the resulting treatment. Another concern is that they may be stigmatized worldwide as the people with the terrible disease, even if only a minority of the tribe actually suffers from the disease and it is quite common in other populations. A third concern is that they are not quite sure what will happen to them otherwise, that is, what risks they are being exposed to. Their concerns, however, are dwarfed by the unrelated problem of land development. They are being asked to leave their traditional lands because it is very valuable to their country's government and a number of commercial companies. The geneticists are aware of the tribe's concern about participating in the study and offer all participants a handsome amount of money and their community a very large sum, which allows them to keep the developers away. The tribe needs the money; the geneticists need their biosamples. Even if the tribe is not quite sure about participating in the study, the money offered makes it impossible for them to say no under these circumstances. They are being offered inducements, which some would consider inappropriate or undue. The researchers might even be accused of exploiting the tribe's unfortunate circumstances, their vulnerability.
To be vulnerable has been defined as facing a significant probability of incurring an identifiable harm while substantially lacking ability and/or means to protect oneself.Footnote 4 In both above cases, individuals are vulnerable to exploitation when invited to participate in research in return for health care or monetary payments that they desperately need and would not get otherwise. Both cases seem to be paradigmatic for undue inducements, that is, excessively attractive offers leading to harm (more below). We argue, however, that in both these cases, and generally in health-related research in resource-poor countries, inducements are ethically wrong only if the research itself is ethically wrong. In every case where there is a claim of undue inducement, the research in question will still be unethical once inducements are removed. So-called undue inducements are always a secondary or an additional ethical problem, and removing them will not make any study ethical.Footnote 5 It follows that inducements, of any magnitude, are ethically unproblematic, provided that the study in question is otherwise ethical.Footnote 6
A Brief Look at the Guidelines
The problem of undue inducement is not new, and most international guidelines have something to say about it, with the notable exception of the Declaration of Helsinki. Essentially, international guidelines strongly warn against undue inducements. The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, prepared by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Science and the World Health Organization, warn:
Subjects may be reimbursed for lost earnings, travel costs and other expenses incurred in taking part in a study; they may also receive free medical services. Subjects, particularly those who receive no direct benefit from research, may also be paid or otherwise compensated for inconvenience and time spent. The payments should not be so large, however, or the medical services so extensive as to induce prospective subjects to consent to participate in the research against their better judgment (“undue inducement”).Footnote 7(emphasis added)
UNESCO's Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights warns that “benefits should not constitute improper inducements to participate in research,”Footnote 8 but does not elaborate or explain. A report entitled The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries, prepared by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, notes:
However, inducements can also change a prospective participant's mind in a less benign manner, so that their calculation of the costs and benefits of the research results in their decision that the benefit offered by the inducement outweighs all risks, however substantial. This could cause individuals to expose themselves to risks or potential harms that they would ordinarily view as unacceptable, and it is in such circumstances that the inducement would be inappropriate.Footnote 9
The report goes on to say:
The greater the inducement, the more likely it is to be inappropriate, because it may cause an individual to ignore or devalue his or her concerns about the risks involved in a research project.Footnote 10
The guidelines that warn against inducements use various phrases to indicate the reasons for their warning. Typically they claim that inducements may be inappropriate because:
• they jeopardize the voluntariness required for informed consent,Footnote 11
• the research subject might accept a risk that would not otherwise be acceptable,Footnote 12
• research subjects might participate in research against their better judgment,Footnote 13 and
• the entire practice of monetary rewards or inducements is alien to the noble ideals and altruistic intent of medical practice.
The literature on undue inducements contains a number of other reasons against inducements, but we focus here on the reasons given or referred to in the guidelines. We consider these claims individually in the next four sections and then come back to consider the examples given in the first section.
Can Inducements Affect the Voluntariness of Informed Consent?
The first argument against offering inducements is that it jeopardizes and invalidates the requirement of informed consent, particularly when the subjects are poor. Wilkinson and Moore relate an imagined case by Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp where a poor woman with five children is willing to undergo “risky and uncomfortable” medical experiments if paid for doing so.Footnote 14 The consent that she gives is thus dubitable.
Informed consent is a pivotal moral requirement for medical research because it is an expression of respect for the autonomy of people that, according to Immanuel Kant, is the core motivation for moral action. That people are autonomous means that they are free and are thus able to, on the basis of adequate information and understanding, decide for themselves. The objection raised in this respect suggests that incentives diminish that freedom. That is not at all self-evident. Why would the freedom of a poor research subject be diminished by offering her an inducement to participate in research, whereas the freedom or autonomy of a person in serious financial trouble who, for the sake of relief, chooses to sell his property is not (normally) regarded as being infringed?
Consider also the example of a gravely ill patient who is offered an operation as the only way to survive. The patient can understand the options (and nonoptions) and the risks involved and make a deliberate, informed, and autonomous decision to have the operation (by almost any standard of autonomous choice), even if it is seen, by him and by us, as his only available option. He does not have much of a choice, but he can still make an autonomous decision.Footnote 15
In short, “desperate need is not sufficient to undermine consent.”Footnote 16 The important question in this regard is whether the withholding of inducements really amounts to respect for autonomy if the latter concept entails the optimization of free choices. On this score, we tend to agree with Wilkinson and Moore when they claim that “on any view of freedom, denying people the option of taking inducements reduces their freedom, since it removes an option that they prefer to the alternatives.”Footnote 17
Inducements and Risks
The second argument is that incentives will induce people to run unnecessary risks. Risk taking is, of course, a seemingly inevitable part of life in general. It is necessarily implied by the exercise of human freedom. To take a risk means to do something in view of possible gain or profit (like investing in the stock exchange), but without any guarantee that the effort will be successful. This “lack of success” associated with risk taking can, in many instances, result in experiencing some form of harm.Footnote 18 Risk taking is therefore the active pursuit of gain by means of action that is deliberately undertaken in the full knowledge that it might be unsuccessful and harmful; it is the deliberate linkage of promise and uncertainty when embarking on action. In the case of alleged undue inducements, the argument is that the kind of risk, that is, one pertaining to one's health, is different from other risks and that incentives may induce people, particularly if they are vulnerable, to run greater risks than are conducive for their physical well-being.
This argument is only reasonable on the assumption that the decision about the nature and size of the risk that a potential research subject takes is entirely dependent on the judgment of the subject herself. However, that is and should not be the case when we are dealing with otherwise ethically justified research. Emanuel, in particular, has forcefully, and in our opinion correctly, argued that research can only be deemed morally appropriate when it has been cleared by an institutional review board (IRB) or a legitimate ethics committee (EC). These committees have a variety of responsibilities. One of their responsibilities is to assess risk in order to make an informed judgment on the risk–benefit ratio of a research project (cf. article 6 of the Nuremberg Code and article B.18 of the Declaration of Helsinki). The IRB thus represents the proper place and point in the research process where and when the appropriateness of risk taking is assessed. Research with unfavorable risk–benefit ratios is ethically inappropriate and should never be undertaken. Research that is deemed morally appropriate must, therefore, on the basis of expert judgment, be of such a nature that subjects, if properly informed, can participate without an excessive fear of harm, even though no guarantee against any form of harm can ever be supplied. If this argument is accepted—and we think it must be accepted—the alleged moral issue of inducements disappears. People are then justified in participating, whether as a result of incentives or voluntarily.Footnote 19
Participating in Research against One's Better Judgment
The third argument is that an excessive inducement could cloud the subject's judgment or that the subject would act against her better judgment because of the inducement offered. This argument may seem intuitively plausible, but it falls apart quickly when analyzed. First, we are usually not concerned about cloudy judgment when someone accepts a large amount of money, say, to play football for Manchester United, act in a Hollywood blockbuster, or record music. If you win the lottery jackpot, you need not worry about your judgment when you go to collect your millions. So what is the problem?
If we are concerned that the decision derived from our judgment is not voluntary because we are given an offer we find very hard to refuse, we are back at the first argument. If the concern is that because of the inducement we might be inclined to take excessive risk, against our better judgment, we are back at the second argument.
If we are worried that the excessive inducement will make us do something we would not have done otherwise, we are missing the point of inducements. Many of us would not go to work in the morning unless we were getting paid. Our salary makes us do things we would not have done otherwise. It just does not follow that money has clouded our judgment. No one suggests that we work for free, to ensure that we make our employment and career decisions with unclouded judgment. Incentives are offered exactly to make people do something they would not have done otherwise; in medical research they are offered to influence the decision to enroll in a research project.Footnote 20 This does not, in itself, make the inducement “undue” or in any way ethically problematic.Footnote 21
In addition to the conceptual issues above, empirical research suggests that incentives do not “cloud the judgment” of research subjects, at least not with regard to the evaluation of risk. Monetary payments do, however, make subjects more willing to participate in research.Footnote 22 In other words, inducements tend to work.
Incentives and Altruism
A final argument against offering incentives is to claim that the entire practice of monetary rewards or inducements is alien to the noble ideals and altruistic intent of medical practice and research. To induce people with benefits external to the inherent benefit that medical progress provides as a result of research, is to contaminate medical practice with materialistic values that alienate it from its original and authentic identity and intent. Insofar as medical research is therefore dependent on sample donation and clinical trials that involve subject participation, this participation ought to be wholly voluntary.
This is an argument that might have some cogency in an ideal world. However, the provision of healthcare as well as healthcare research is currently such a complex and expensive enterprise that the possibility of providing healthcare or doing research in a sphere void of market transactions is impossible in most modern societies. In addition, the scientific integrity of many research studies depends on an adequate number of research subjects. If the call for voluntary participation yields inadequate numbers and the research is to continue, incentives remain the only option, given the moral impermissibility and practical untenability of coercion in whatever form. In addition, participation in research does entail risks. On the reasonable assumption that these risks are not too great, that people are adequately informed about them, and that their right of choice is wholly respected, it is not clear why the risk taking that is unavoidably associated with healthcare research is better without incentives than with incentives.
With regard to health-related research in resource-poor countries, the altruistic ideal is clearly inappropriate, because the research subjects are not likely to enjoy the benefits of medical progress although they carry the burdens.
A Second Look at Our Examples
In the first example in the introduction, the parents of prematurely born children appeared to be given undue inducement to participate in medical research. If the company redesigned the study,Footnote 23 so that the children in the control group would get standard treatment rather than a placebo, the parents would still have the option of enrolling their prematurely born baby in a study that will significantly increase the chances that their baby will survive. The only difference is that instead of having a 50% chance of the child getting treatment, if he or she is enrolled in the study, the chance is now 100%. That seems to make the inducement even more undue, because there is now more to gain from participating in the study (namely, a higher chance of survival). Still, it does not evoke the same moral outrage. This is because, we believe, the ethically dubious aspect of the study was corrected and that was not the inducement.
The second example about our African tribe lists specific ethical concerns: lack of benefits (possible exploitation), stigmatization, and unknown or poorly understood risks. Let us suppose that a legitimate IRB had found the genetics research in this case unproblematic, given standard conditions of informed consent and privacy measures. The probability of stigmatization is considered low and, because the research protocol is in no way unusual, there is a very low probability of unidentified risks. There is no physical risk identified beyond collecting biosamples (relatively noninvasive sampling from the inside of the mouth). The study would be on most, if not all, standards ethical, save the concerns about undue inducement and exploitation. Is this a case of undue inducement? The tribe is in a difficult situation; it is poor and really needs money to hold on to its traditional lands. The individuals making the decision for themselves are also poor and need the money. We argue that, although this may be a case of exploitation (at least if the monetary payments do not amount to sufficient compensation), this is not a case of undue inducement. The members of the tribe may be in desperate need, but, as we have seen, that does not mean that their decision is not voluntary or autonomous. Their freedom has not been restricted by giving them an option, which they did not have before, of participating in research for a good deal of money. The risks are low and the study has been evaluated and cleared by a legitimate IRB. The tribe and its members are thus not taking any unnecessary or unreasonable risks. There is nothing to indicate that the judgment of the members of the tribe might be clouded by the prospect of saving their livelihood by participating in the study. Finally, expecting them to participate entirely for altruistic reasons would be inappropriate, because they would then carry the burden of the research and not enjoy any of the benefits.
Conclusion
The two examples considered above and our general arguments against worrying about inducements in developing countries show that any claims about undue inducement can only arise when the respective research is in some other way unethical. Correcting that other unethical aspect of the research will also remove any justified concern about undue inducements.
We have argued that, first, inducements do not reduce the voluntariness of actions, either in terms of freedom or autonomy. Second, inducements may lead research subjects to accept risks they would not have accepted otherwise, but that does not make inducements unethical unless the risk is unreasonable or in some absolute terms unacceptable. In that case the research is unethical because of the risk and should not pass ethical evaluation of an IRB. Third, there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to doubt that inducements “cloud one's judgment.” That charge only makes sense if one is in some way acting against one's interests, and that can only be the case if the research has an unacceptable risk–benefit ratio or is in some other ways unreasonably harmful to the research subjects. And, again, if that is the case, then the research is unethical and should not have passed ethical evaluation of an IRB. Finally, expecting research subjects to participate altruistically is inappropriate in developing countries and possibly problematic in developed countries. If proper ethical oversight can be ensured, there should be no concern about undue inducements. Where proper ethical oversight cannot be ensured, it would be wrong to let anyone participate, with or without inducements, and the research should not take place.
Poor people in resource-poor countries may be refused payments for participating in research (except for a minimum compensation), and even drugs and healthcare, because of an undue fear of undue inducements. International guidelines are mistaken to restrict inducements, to the detriment of those who would benefit the most: the poor and the vulnerable.
