This book examines Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution of 1971. One of the central provisions of Egyptian constitutional law, Article 2 (as amended in 1980) states that “the principles of the Islamic shariʿa are the chief source of legislation.” The provision, worded slightly differently, is found in many Arab constitutional documents and raises a whole set of issues. How does reference to Islamic legal norms affect the existing Egyptian legal system, the backbone of which is based on borrowed European principles? How does the modern judge, not necessarily trained in shariʿa law, deal with Islamic legal issues? How can the principle of people's sovereignty (Article 3 of the constitution) be reconciled with a “constitutional Islamization” (as Lombardi calls it)? What implications follow from a supremacy of Islamic legal norms with regard to international legal standards, in particular in the area of human-rights law?
In his comprehensive study, Lombardi discusses these issues in the broader historical context of the development of Islamic legal and constitutional thought. The first part of the book contains a general description of the evolution of Islamic legal and constitutional theory. Chapters 1 to 3 trace the formation of the classical Sunni legal tradition, its methods of interpretation, and the concept of the ruler's legitimacy. Chapters 4 to 6 analyze modernist legal theories that have evolved in Egypt since the late 19th century, associated in particular with the names of Rashid Rida and ʿAbd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri. Both scholars shared an agenda of reinterpreting the historical body of Islamic legal norms in a flexible way, consistent with present-day requirements, and ultimately codifying them in state codes (also referred to as “neo-ijtihād”). This, in terms of substance and method, marks a clear break from classical legal theory, in which legal rules were primarily administered by the jurists (as opposed to the state), who to a large extent were bound by historical rules (taqlīd).
The second part of the book is dedicated to an analysis of Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution and the way it is applied by the courts. Chapters 7 and 8 sketch the political currents underlying the “Islamization” of the Egyptian constitution in 1971, the further reinforcement of Article 2 in 1980 on the one hand, and the establishment of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) on the other, a court dedicated to the establishment of a liberal constitutional rule of law.
Chapters 9 and 10 are the key chapters of the book: Lombardi elaborates how the SCC has successfully claimed the competence to define Islamic norms and to scrutinize legislative enactments against shariʿa principles. In a landmark decision in 1993, the SCC for the first time entered into a substantive discussion as to whether a certain statute is in conformity with Islamic legal norms (p. 180). The SCC on this occasion introduced a subtle distinction between “definite” and “flexible” Islamic legal rules. Only the former curtail legislative discretion. In contrast, in the realm of the flexible rules the legislator has discretion and is free to exercise ijtihād in order to find an interpretation that fits “time and clime”—provided, however, that such interpretation is in line with the overall goals of the shariʿa.
The remaining two chapters, 11 and 12, investigate how these principles are applied by the SCC and lower Egyptian courts in concrete cases, as well as how different (Egyptian and foreign) lawyers have reacted to the jurisprudence of the SCC.
Lombardi's book is a good read. His broad contextualization of Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution makes the topic accessible to lawyers and constitutional theorists who are interested in Islamic constitutionalism but have no background in Islamic law. In addition, the author sets out in a compelling manner how the crucial issue underlying the discussions relating to Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution is the loss (or at least lack) of consensus of what Islamic legal norms consist of and how these norms are defined under the modern nation–state. It is Lombardi's particular merit to have further elaborated the relationship between the legal principles applied by the SCC and the ideas of Rida and al-Sanhuri, thus suggesting a genealogical link between modernist Islamic thought and the legal theory underpinning the SCC case law (p. 267).
Underlying Lombardi's approach is the assumption that constitutional jurisprudence in the Muslim world can best be explained by reference to Islamic history, searching for certain historical theories and concepts that determine today's jurisprudence. (He assumes also that the respective references are not merely a legitimizing strategy.) Whether this is correct will be for the reader to judge—not to mention that one may question whether a court has to adhere to a specific and consistent method of legal interpretation at all.
As Lombardi mentions (pp. 2 and 264–68), there is a range of interpretations of existing jurisprudence relating to Article 2. Most interpretations, however, share the analysis that over the past two decades the SCC has claimed the authority to interpret Islamic law and, in doing so, has promoted a (fairly) flexible understanding of historical Islamic legal norms that, in turn, has permitted the court to uphold most legislative provisions under attack. The differences in interpretation, therefore, may well be less radical than Lombardi suggests. Other approaches would nevertheless put more emphasis on comparative legal or theoretical issues, which are both neglected by Lombardi, and would situate the jurisprudence of the SCC in more general terms in the context of contemporary debates, such as the ones on constitution and tradition or law and social change.
All in all, this book can be recommended to anyone interested in Islamic constitutional thought and its application today.
