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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2005
There are advantages to focusing a single analytical lens on a complex and multidimensional historical event. Lines of causation can be drawn clearly. Intention, action, and consequence can be isolated and explored in depth. This is what Daniel Kryder has done for federal policy toward African Americans during World War II. A political scientist, Kryder looks at African Americans in war production industries, the army, and southern agriculture in the context of two overriding imperatives of officials of the federal state: maintaining wartime production and gaining reelection. He moves to the heart of what states do in wartime. They mobilize industry and people. They suppress dissent. They contain social unrest. Given these demands it is not surprising, Kryder argues, that reform of federal racial policy between 1941 and 1945 was so limited in scope, despite widespread black protest, calls for more progressive measures, and the popular “Double V” campaign. But there are also pitfalls to the single analytical lens, and Kryder encounters these in his conclusion. From one point of view, “the war contained rather than facilitated movements for black liberation” (243), as Kryder argues, but from another vantage the war told an entirely different story.
There are advantages to focusing a single analytical lens on a complex and multidimensional historical event. Lines of causation can be drawn clearly. Intention, action, and consequence can be isolated and explored in depth. This is what Daniel Kryder has done for federal policy toward African Americans during World War II. A political scientist, Kryder looks at African Americans in war production industries, the army, and southern agriculture in the context of two overriding imperatives of officials of the federal state: maintaining wartime production and gaining reelection. He moves to the heart of what states do in wartime. They mobilize industry and people. They suppress dissent. They contain social unrest. Given these demands it is not surprising, Kryder argues, that reform of federal racial policy between 1941 and 1945 was so limited in scope, despite widespread black protest, calls for more progressive measures, and the popular “Double V” campaign. But there are also pitfalls to the single analytical lens, and Kryder encounters these in his conclusion. From one point of view, “the war contained rather than facilitated movements for black liberation” (243), as Kryder argues, but from another vantage the war told an entirely different story.
Historians will find much of this territory familiar, but Kryder makes important and often creative contributions to the literature on race in wartime. The familiar parts, especially the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) and the trouble black troops encountered in southern white communities near training facilities, Kryder handles well. But this is not a social history of black protest nor an investigation of movement politics or even a thorough examination of race as a concept. It is strictly an effort to understand the federal government's response to the social disruptions of wartime America: African American migration to urban areas and to the North and West, the decline of black labor in southern agriculture, the drafting of thousands of black men into the military, and demands for reform made by black leaders. As such, the book adopts a “racial management” framework in which the state is seen as manipulating racial politics to serve its ultimate wartime aims.
Franklin Roosevelt, the master of political calculation, had drawn into his administration in the 1930s the so-called “Black Cabinet.” Put in place to co-opt black protest, insulate Roosevelt from criticism by vocal black leaders, and win black votes for the Democratic Party, these officials were given little leverage to enact far-reaching reform. After 1941, Roosevelt and his racial strategists found themselves caught between mounting African American dissatisfaction with Black Cabinet tokenism on the one hand and the clamoring of southern white politicians that the war not threaten segregation on the other. The Democratic Party's efforts to navigate between these sets of demands accounts for the particular twists of federal policy during the war years. Roosevelt's Executive Order creating the FEPC, for instance, was designed entirely to prevent A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington and, subsequently, to deflect and contain black protest in critical war production centers. The decision to train and station virtually all African American draftees in southern states, regardless of their states of origin, was a sop to the southern military elite and their political patrons in the Democratic Party.
The last thing Roosevelt wanted was for the war to become a stage for civil rights. A thorough investigation of discrimination in railroad employment would have threatened the nation's vital transportation industry—thus Roosevelt instructed the FEPC not to hold hearings. When William Hastie refused to back down from his insistence that Army training not be segregated, Henry Stimson wrote that “his usefulness is limited,” and Hastie resigned from the War Department with the administration's blessing. Even very circumscribed reforms, such as desegregating army theaters, were resisted and only implemented by the administration when such reforms were seen as necessary to prevent either black protest or continued low morale among black troops. In the end, Kryder notes, the government determined that the simplest way to prevent agitation for more far-reaching changes within the army was to send black troops overseas.
Circumscribed as federal policy toward African Americans in wartime industry and the army was, it nonetheless provided progressive openings at the local level. The same could not be said of the third arena Kryder investigates: southern agriculture. Here, where southern whites had the greatest economic interest and the Democratic Party the largest number of votes, Roosevelt and his racial managers did everything they could to satisfy the planters. With a rural labor shortage caused in no small part by the out-migration of tens of thousands of African Americans, southern planters, large and small, faced severe wage inflation. The administration responded by exempting farm produce from the nationwide price freeze and ceding control of farm labor to local draft boards, who would be sympathetic to landholders' labor needs. The federal Agriculture Extension Service also expanded its corps of black agents, who were deployed into rural communities as a conservative bulwark against the spread of militant civil rights messages. The end result for rural black laborers was an intensification of supervision and exploitation by white planters and their allies.
One of the most interesting contributions of Divided Arsenal is Kryder's sensitivity to the intent and timing of particular federal actions. The political scientist's mind is at work here, as Kryder tracks policy initiatives designed to placate black leaders and co-opt black protest with the various election cycles between 1941 and 1945 as well as with major events in the European and Pacific theaters. What he calls “Executive and national security imperatives” drove every major policy innovation: the administration's attention to domestic racial issues would heat up with each critical election and overseas development, while flagging at most other times. In all, this is a fascinating study of how the federal state prosecuted a different sort of propaganda campaign on the home front during World War II. Roosevelt and his staff “managed race” to ensure domestic peace—and thus white supremacy—when many in the African American community hoped the war would become a vehicle for destroying Jim Crow.
As accomplished as the book is, Divided Arsenal has some limitations. Foremost is Kryder's overemphasis on the regressive nature of the state during the war. His exclusive focus on federal actors and high policy means that he misses what may be one of the war's most important legacies: despite efforts by the federal government to contain and co-opt black protest, African Americans from San Francisco to Detroit, St. Louis to New York organized, pushed for change, and joined local left political coalitions and union caucuses that became enormously important both during and after the war. The state could not contain everything, and to suggest that it could represents a miscasting of an entire chapter of the modern civil rights movement. Second, he frames the book with discussions of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma, but he does not historicize Myrdal, does not investigate Myrdal's black critics, and does not offer a strong connection between Myrdal and federal policy in this period. This makes the introduction and conclusion strangely divorced from the argument in between, which is entirely about politics and the state. Furthermore, the book's structure is oddly weighted. The FEPC and other labor issues receive almost three chapters, the army two, and agriculture only one. This may reflect a prioritizing related to the demands of writing a book in political science, but it struck this historian as unbalanced. Finally, one of the central issues in the book, segregationists' control of the Democratic Party, is not fully addressed or explored. It deserved a chapter of its own and a more systematic treatment, given its singular importance to the shape of federal policy in this period. These shortcomings aside, this is a well-researched, successfully argued, and interesting book.