Introduction
The global contradiction of the modern stage of world development involves a sharp intensification of the competition of powers at various levels and fields in terms of a general increase in the objective need for concerted action, the cooperation of all international actors and, above all, the great powers. The combination of the crisis phenomena in the fields of politics, economics, diplomacy, culture, and so on, can generate uncertainty and unrest for international stability and global security.
Global uncertainty is a constant companion of foreign policy. As noted by the French politician and diplomat Cambon (Reference Cambon2006), ‘there is no other place in the world where success would depend so much on the game of chance as in world politics’. The fundamental feature of such changes is an increase in the number of events that affect the immediate foundations of world development. Their depth and scale compel the international relations researchers to revise most theories and analytical tools radically.
Representing an accumulation of a bundle of shocks, the global problems of the world and the uncertainty associated with their spread result in a risk increase in the existing world architecture, as well as in the foreign policy activities of international actors. According to the American political scientist Rosenau, the presence of conditions of ‘international turbulence’ and global problems can be considered desirable, since in the long run mass political activation of individuals is a manifestation of the increasing role of the subjective factor and contributes to the impetus of world development (Selwyn Reference Selwyn2020).
Nevertheless, the question arises: does such an interpretation justify such modern shocks of the world order as the massive spread of coronavirus (COVID-19), officially recognized by the WHO as a pandemic (Zarocostas Reference Zarocostas2020)? This research is an attempt to answer the following questions: will the fear of a global epidemic make countries overcome differences and unite in the fight against a common threat, and how can the nature of globalization change in the grip of the COVID-19 pandemic? The study methodology involves an interdisciplinary approach: along with the use of historical analysis methods, the research subject analysis is carried out using key categories of political realism, in particular, national interest and balance of power. The novelty of the study is determined by a comprehensive author’s analysis of the impact of pressing global shocks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on the international system.
Results
At the moment, it is clear only that a pandemic destroys the usual life, introduces destructive changes in the economy, and demonstrates the competence (or lack thereof) of the world governments. All these factors will subsequently lead to permanent changes in the political and economic environment, although they will become clear only in due course.
The current model of globalization has finally taken shape at the turn of the last century. As Turvalds (Reference Turvalds2010) noted, it is based on the idea that the old market economy countries will be able to simultaneously transfer their own productive capacities to China and maintain the economic balance of the Western system through financial operations. The crisis of 2008–2009 vividly demonstrated the illusory nature of such an approach to smoothing out ‘the imbalances in world economic development’.
First of all, the author considers it appropriate to study some expert points of view regarding possible forecasts about the future world order that will form after the end of the pandemic. For example, a professor of international relations at Harvard University, Walt, notes that a pandemic can strengthen state power and nationalism. This leads to the fact that all types of states will take extraordinary measures to overcome the crisis and many of them will be against waiving their new powers after the pandemic ends (World Health Organization 2020). COVID-19 can accelerate the transfer of power and world influence spheres from West to East (for example, this can be seen from the fact that such countries as South Korea or Singapore responded best to the outbreak, but China began to respond after a number of mistakes at the beginning of the development of the dangerous situation; the Western countries, in comparison, reacted extremely slowly and not so thoughtfully, which has undermined the so-called ‘Western brand’).
Based on the foregoing, the author believes that under such a scenario of global change, the nature of world politics, controversial at its core, will not be affected. According to historical experience, the epidemics of the twentieth century slowed down globalization but did not terminate the rivalry between the great powers, and a new era of global cooperation was not anticipated. It can be supposed that this will not happen even after the end of the COVID-19 pandemic. Most likely, a further retreat from hyperglobalization will begin, as civil societies continue to hope for protection from their national governments, while the states and global companies seek to eliminate future vulnerabilities. In other words, the coronavirus is able to form a less open, less successful, and less free world, because the combination of the virus, poor planning, and a low level of competence of all the world’s leadership has put humanity on a new path.
According to the Director of the British analytical centre in the field of international relations, Chatham House, Niblett, the coronavirus pandemic ‘can become the straw that will break the back of the camel of economic globalization’ (Tooze and Schularick Reference Tooze and Schularick2020). According to the analyst, the increased economic and military power of China has already led to the fact that the leading US parties have firmly decided to push the Chinese away from American high technology and intellectual property and to try to achieve the same from their allies. Supposedly, this is about increasing social and political pressure, since coronavirus forces states, companies, and societies to strengthen their survival potential in conditions of prolonged self-isolation. One can assume that in the context of such a scenario, the world is unlikely to return to the idea of mutually beneficial globalization, which became a hallmark of the beginning of the twenty-first century. Accordingly, in the absence of any incentives to protect common achievements within the framework of interrupted global economic integration, formed in the twentieth century, the architecture of global economic governance is likely to atrophy. This will require enormous endurance of political leaders to maintain international cooperation and not to change over to fierce geopolitical rivalry.
Moreover, the point of view of an expert at the National University of Singapore, Mahbubani, who notes that the coronavirus pandemic is not able to radically change the direction of global economic development, is of great interest. The researcher concludes that the pandemic will only accelerate the ongoing changes; in particular, it concerns moving away from globalization that focuses directly on the United States and the transition to globalization that focuses exclusively on China (Stiglitz et al. 2020). From the point of view of this theory, this trend may persist due to the fact that the US population has lost its faith in globalization in the context of international trade (Trump’s economic policy is not so beneficial for economic globalization, the US withdrawal from many trade and economic cooperative societies under the last Administration inflicted irreparable damage). At the same time, the situation in China is different from the one in the USA for deep historical reasons: the leaders of the PRC are aware that a self-confident line of that time and the futile attempts to isolate the country from the external world resulted in the years of ‘humiliation’ of China (until 1949). At the same time, the last decades of rapid economic growth of the country are the result of ‘reforms of openness’ and active international cooperation.
In this vein, the United States does not have so many choices: if the country’s main goal is to maintain world domination, then it will have to continue pursuing a policy of antagonistic geopolitical rivalry with China in the political and economic spheres. However, if the goal of the United States due to the influence of a pandemic is reoriented to increase the welfare of the American people, whose living conditions are getting worse, then they will have to actively cooperate with China (Mahbubani Reference Mahbubani2020). Indeed, from the author’s point of view, common sense suggests that cooperation is the best choice in such conditions, but due to the US hostile attitude towards China and the ongoing rivalry policy, common sense is unlikely to prevail.
From the point of view of Princeton University professor of international relations, Ikenberry (Reference Ikenberry2011), in the near future, the crisis caused by the coronavirus can increase the activity of all the parties to the debate about the ‘great strategy of the West’. The author believes that nationalists and anti-globalists, opponents of China, and even liberal internationalists – all of them – will find new evidence of the relevance of their views (Allen et al. 2020). In the framework of this scenario, taking into account the economic damage and the social collapse caused by the pandemic, one can expect a gradual increase towards nationalism, rivalry between the great powers, strategic disunity, etc. The researcher is convinced that, the same as in 1930–1940, nowadays a counter-current will gradually appear, similar to the sober and stubborn internationalism of the interwar and wartime years, which Roosevelt and other statesmen began to formulate and promote in their time. The collapse of the world economy in the 1930s showed how interconnected modern international society was and how prone it was to what Franklin Roosevelt called a ‘chain reaction’. The United States at that time was less threatened by other great powers than by the deep forces of modernity and their Janus-faced nature (Ikenberry Reference Ikenberry2020). The internationalists supposed that the post-war order would be able to rebuild an open system by enriching it with new forms of protection and a new potential for interdependence. The United States could not simply hide behind its borders; it was important for it to act in an open post-war order, but for this, it was necessary to build a global infrastructure and a multilateral cooperation mechanism. In the context of this theory, the United States and other Western democracies can go through the same historical sequence of reactions triggered by a powerful sense of vulnerability. If, initially, such a reaction can be nationalistic, then later the democracies ‘will get out of their shell in order to find pragmatic and protectionist internationalism of a new type’ (Democracy Digest 2020). In this vein, based on this theory, one can say that based on the restoration under the leadership of the United States after the depression of the 1930s, the intensification of rivalry between the great powers in a world destroyed and damaged by a pandemic can really become a prospect for the future of the twenty-first century.
As WHO Director-General Gebreisus stated, ‘we are not just fighting the epidemic, we are fighting the infodemic’ (Boniface Reference Boniface2020), thereby legitimizing the new term that describes the modern reality. An ‘infodemic’ is a raft of misinformation, an escalation of pseudoscientific advice and interpretations, and intimidation due to the desire of the mass media to raise their own ratings. Society has long been faced with the challenge of false information, fake news and provocations, the rapid spread of which – via social networks and the media – can lead to tragic events in society. Now, in the face of the real threat from the coronavirus pandemic, this problem looks especially acute, raising panic and complicating areas of work to combat the epidemic.
The point of view of the Latin American expert in foreign relations, Shannon, who claims that, first of all, COVID-19 undermines the basic principles of world production, is also noteworthy. In modern conditions, large companies have the opportunity to rethink their strategy and reduce the multi-stage and multinational supply chains that prevail in production today (Ronchi Reference Ronchi2020). Global supply chains have already come under fire from economic criticism due to rising labour costs in China, Trump’s trade war, and new advances in high technology, as well as a raft of political criticism due to job losses, especially in the mature economies of the world. Coronavirus has severed most of these bonds. In the areas most affected by the epidemic, large industries closed, while other manufacturers and retailers lost their stocks and products. Nevertheless, starting from the rhetoric of the author, one can say that there is a ‘reverse side of the coin’ of the pandemic. At the moment, more and more large and transnational companies want to know in detail the origin of supplies and, most likely, they will increase their safety margins, even to the detriment of efficiency. The states will also intervene in this activity and force strategic industries to develop additional plans and form reserves. With this approach, although the profitability of enterprises will decrease, the stability of strategic supplies will have to increase.
It is appropriate to note the point of view of the Brookings Institution diplomat, Menon, who notes that, although it is too early to judge the consequences of the pandemic for the world order, two points are nevertheless obvious. First, the coronavirus pandemic will change all policies, both internal and external. All societies, one way or another, are forced to turn to the power of the state. States in overcoming the pandemic and its economic consequences will directly affect security issues and polarization within societies (Frank Reference Frank2020).
Second, according to the researcher, the pandemic does not mean the complete end of the interconnected world. In support of this theory, it can be emphasized that the pandemic itself is already proof of the countries’ interdependence, the need for cooperation, and a testament to how fragmentation can harm the international order. However, in most states, the so-called ‘turn-in’ policy (Ronchi, Reference Ronchi2020) has been observed from the beginning of the pandemic: the search for autonomy and the control of each state over its own destiny, without taking into account the interests of its environment. This emphasizes the possibility of moving to a more divided world.
Nevertheless, positive trends are also observed in the world community, although they should be considered as common sense. For example, India has taken the initiative to convene an online conference of leaders of South Asian countries to develop common regional measures in response to the threat of a pandemic. Based on such an example, one can make a rather unequivocal conclusion that if the coronavirus forces the states to understand the benefits of multilateral cooperation on the important global issues, it will also benefit the future.
At the same time, Harvard University professor Nye, the author of the ‘soft power’ concept, also supports the above theory of the need for cohesion: ‘even if the United States prevail as a great power, they cannot protect their security by acting alone’ (Association of Accredited Public Policy Advocates to the European Union 2020). The US National Security Strategy 2017 pays great attention to the rivalry of great powers, and the coronavirus has demonstrated the shortcomings of such a strategy (Ronchi Reference Ronchi2020). As for transnational threats, such as a pandemic or global climate change, it is not enough to think about the strength and power of the United States over other countries, since the key to success also lies in knowing the importance of power in the cooperation of other states. One can agree with the opinion of the author that each country puts its own national interests above all else, but the important question here is how broadly or narrowly each country defines these interests. It is the coronavirus pandemic that demonstrates that states are unable to adapt the strategy of disunity and imaginary leadership to the new world.
Former US Marine General Allen says: ‘those who win the coronavirus pandemic will write the history’ (International Rescue Committee 2020). As the author notes, every country, and now every person, is increasingly feeling the severity and impact of this disease on society. Those countries that will persevere and stand up due to the advantages of their unique political and economic systems, as well as their health care systems, will claim success to the detriment of those whose results will be other, more harmful and destructive (Walt Reference Walt2020). It can be believed that the researcher is right in that, for some, it will look like a great and irrevocable triumph of democracy, adherence to the priorities of the principle of multilateral relations and general healthcare, and for others it will be a demonstration of the advantages of decisive authoritarian power. One way or another, the current crisis will completely reformat the structure of international power: a pandemic will suppress the economic activity and increase the tension between the states.
It can be believed that, in the long term, the coronavirus pandemic can significantly weaken the production potential of the global economy, especially if companies and jobs are closed. Accordingly, the risks of economic problems are especially severe for developing countries and for the economies with a large number of economically vulnerable workers. The international system, in turn, is already under heavy pressure, which is likely to cause instability and can lead to numerous internal and international conflicts.
From the point of view of the economic order, it can be considered that powerful shocks in the global financial and economic system are evidence that global economic chains are highly prone to destabilization and disruption. Therefore, the coronavirus pandemic will not only cause long-term economic consequence but also lead to more fundamental changes. Globalization has enabled companies to relatively evenly distribute production around the world and deliver products to markets, in a timely fashion, avoiding the need for downtime. Supplies traditionally had to be carefully prepared and carried out in a timely manner, harmoniously, at the global level. Nevertheless, coronavirus has proved that the epidemic can not only infect humans but also ‘poison’ this entire supply system with its clear schedule. Given the scale of losses in the financial market that the world has been facing since February 2020, upon the termination of the pandemic the companies are likely to start abandoning the just-in-time model, as well as the global distribution of production (Mair Reference Mair2020). In this context, a not optimistic new stage for global capitalism may begin when the creation of large-scale stocks of products begins, in order to protect against future interruptions. Of course, this will negatively affect the profits of companies, but it will also make the entire global system more viable and resilient to shocks.
The President of the Foreign Relations Council, Haass, notes:
I believe that as a result of coronavirus, most countries will be engaged in purely domestic politics for at least a few years, focusing rather on domestic, than foreign affairs. I foresee more active steps towards selective self-sufficiency (and, as a result, the steps towards weakening the external relations), taking into account the vulnerability of the international order. (Mair Reference Mair2020)
It can also be believed that the consequence of the above theory will be the fact that more stringent resistance to large-scale immigration may arise in the world community. Countries will weaken their desire and willingness to tackle regional and global problems (including important pressing problems of the world community, for example, global climate change), because they will constantly feel the need to devote resources to rebuilding their economies and eliminating the economic consequences of the current crisis. In addition, one can say that it will be difficult for many countries to recover from the crisis. State power in a number of developing countries will weaken, and there will be correspondingly more failed states.
It can be supposed that the crisis may lead to a deterioration in bilateral relations, as well as to weakening European integration. In addition to the very specific steps associated with the need to produce medical equipment and supplies, or the trends associated with the closure of the Schengen Area, and isolation of certain regions, as well as closure of the borders of individual states, quite large problems may be associated with the need to resolve the economic consequences of this virus by minimizing the volume of trade interaction and stopping the economies of the EU states. Under these conditions, given the fact that each of the European states has faced this epidemic, the issues of coordination of the efforts at the pan-European level (health programmes financing, collaboration with the WHO, bilateral interaction) are faced with a wide range of systemic problems – the impossibility of resolution of which could lead to rhetoric politicians pointing to the inability of EU states to solve complex problems quickly. Another negative trend is associated with attempts by EU states to resolve issues of counteraction on their own, while ignoring requests for help from the most affected states (Italy, France), which could also lead to rhetoric related to the so-called ‘imaginary cohesion of the European Union’. These trends pose direct threats to both the existence of the European Union as a whole (the so-called ‘crisis of European confidence’) and the interaction of states at the European level (‘the crisis of EU integrity’) (Íñiguez Reference Íñiguez2020).
In this case, the EU can only strengthen the cooperation at the pan-European level by positioning each individual state as an intermediary interested in ensuring European stability and a state that is attracting a system of European interactions to solve a common problem for the whole of Europe, as well as for the whole world, in the field of healthcare. The main tools for the interaction in this case may be the initiative to create new political forums, to attract specialists from the healthcare sector (doctors, epidemiologists) to develop a unified EU pandemic counteraction technique (similar to the model of the ‘Asian association’ proposed above by India). Moreover, some positive aspects are possible. In particular, one can expect a certain strengthening of the global health system and its governance structures. However, in general, the coronavirus crisis will still weaken the willingness and ability of the world to overcome it.
The theory of the Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shake, noting that the United States will no longer be considered a world leader because the country’s government has extremely narrow, selfish interests, and that the US government suffers from inability and an incompetence of cohesion, is also of interest (Chaudhry Reference Chaudhry2020).
One can also agree with the author’s fair opinion that the global consequences of this pandemic could be seriously weakened if international organizations provided more support to each other and carried out a high-quality exchange of information at an early stage of its development. It can be assumed that, in this case, countries would have had more time to prepare and mobilize resources in those areas where these resources are most in demand and, most of all, in healthcare and the economy. The United States could have done such work, thereby showing that, despite its own interests, it is not guided only by them. Nevertheless, Washington failed the leadership test, and this made the whole world community worse.
However, one can say that, in modern conditions, established international cooperation is no longer enough. If the strong countries of the world, which are the USA and China, do not give up their verbal war about which of them is responsible for the crisis and who can manage the world more efficiently, then their authority in the world could seriously suffer.
Of great interest in this regard is the point of view of the Director of the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), Pascal Boniface. He rightly observes that among the many lessons that can be learned from this coronavirus crisis, the Western world must certainly learn to be humble (Boniface Reference Boniface2020). According to Boniface:
We thought that such a pandemic could happen only in Africa or Asia, but we, the Westerners, are safe and that our health care system and our wealth guarantee our safety. At first, we observed in a condescending manner, how Beijing was dealing with this epidemic, being convinced that China had a degree of backwardness, which explains why it faced such a health crisis again. Then we discovered that our own effective healthcare system was overloaded. A few weeks later, mass graves were dug in New York. The whole stunned world realized that the Westerners were not protected from this, and we ourselves realized this fragility. (Boniface Reference Boniface2020)
Discussion
In this vein, based on the above opinions, it is worth saying that the pandemic will affect several aspects of globalization at once. First of all, under the broad quarantine and restrictive measures applied by the governments of most countries of the world, as well as taking into account complex geographically distributed production chains and the requirements for high mobility of labour, goods, and resources, all this has become the ‘Achilles heel’ of financial globalization as the dominant vector in the development of the system of international relations in the last 30 years.
In the author’s opinion, with the reassessment of the threats of new pandemics and other similar challenges by the global players, the fragmentation will become an equally important vector in the development of the global market. Perhaps, one will be able to observe a dynamically changing world: the return of a rigid border regime, the strengthening of national statehood and neo-etatism as the dominant idea (Biscop Reference Biscop2020).
Given this and the high degree of integration of China and these countries into the global supply chain system, a reliable forecast of epidemic losses for the global economy will still be the subject of serious research by international organizations and powerful research centres. However, nowadays most representatives of the expert community think that few of the countries in the world will be able to fall outside the ‘zone of defeat’ of the economic consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak and these consequences will amount to hundreds of billions of US dollars, and the question how quickly will the world economy recover remains a problem.
Indeed, the figures and the analysis of political reactions are equally important for the evaluation of the impact of the new epidemic on the world economy and the system of international relations. First of all, the tendency to the rapid and as completely as possible closure of borders between countries is noteworthy; accordingly, stricter measures replaced the tightened control, and the spread of the epidemic is accompanied by the increasingly widespread use of border ‘cutting-off’ practices.
In particular, as mentioned above, such a situation could be a serious blow, perhaps even more powerful than illegal migration for the common customs space of Europe (Bradley Reference Bradley2020). Gradually, based on the reaction of the authorities of neighbouring countries, it will be possible to understand how sustainable the freedom of movement in the EU will be, as one of the main declared values of the European Union. In the case of failure to obtain a centralized reaction to this challenge at the European Commission level, the positions of isolationists and Eurosceptics in many European countries will be seriously strengthened (Wallace-Wells Reference Wallace-Wells2020).
However, despite the situational quarantine isolationism of the states, the Italian philosopher Ronchi sees coronavirus as a failure of traditionalist populism, tuned to the local context: ‘probably, the most impressive is the sudden collapse of the “wall ideology”’ (Rosenau Reference Rosenau1990). This point of view is relevant in that the virus appeared at a time when the world would seem to share a common belief that the only answer to the threats from globalization was to redefine armed borders and strong identity. The author is convinced that the border is only a symbolic wall that people have to maintain, observing the distance in the queues, in public places, so as not to become infected, and the author considers this fact as a denial of ethnic and economic boundaries: each person has turned into ‘someone’ outside of division, and a new way of communication eliminates signs of exceptions. This creates a new outlook on society: ‘indeed, what seemed to be an unrealistic statement a few weeks ago now becomes a slogan: politics should take precedence over the economy’ (Rosenau Reference Rosenau1990).
It should also be noted that, in recent years, globalization has accelerated not only due to flows of investments, goods and services. The cross-border infrastructure has become the backbone of the world. A vivid example of this can be found in the Chinese ‘Belts and Ways’ initiative, which was, until recently, considered by many politicians and experts as the main driver of further globalization (Mikheev and Shvydko Reference Mikheev and Shvydko2016). The construction of a network of railways, highways and pipelines, the facilitation of cross-border trade, the creation of joint zones of trade and economic cooperation, and the increasing use of Chinese currency in international payments should strengthen China’s leadership, as well as the support of globalization processes, the resistance of which has grown significantly after the financial crisis of 2008 and the waves of instability associated with conflicts in the Middle East, migration, and the Ukrainian crises. What will be the prospect of implementation of the project in which a lot of money has already been invested in terms of the current situation? This question remains open. Apparently, China will need to make additional efforts to prevent the collapse of its global initiatives.
One more important problem is strengthening the political positions of the opponents of globalization. The spread of the coronavirus will obviously strengthen the position of the supporters of building up the presence and role of the national state and opponents of globalization. The first signs of growth in their support appeared at the time of the acute phase of the global financial crisis and depression of 2008–2009. Then, for the first time, the question was raised about the danger of excessive interdependence and interpenetration between countries, the need for state control over financial markets was voiced, the problem of combating offshore zones and tax evasion was raised (Tisdall Reference Tisdall2020).
Later, the growth of isolationist sentiments was triggered by waves of migration: from the Middle East, as a challenge to Europe, and from Latin America, as a threat to the United States. To date, the advocates of ‘tight borders’ and economic self-sufficiency have added arguments: for example, the spread of the virus enhances the effect of previous crises, ‘arming’ those who advocate abandoning complex labour division systems in favour of localizing the largest number of industries and protecting the domestic market. It can be supposed that these processes of isolation will objectively be followed by increased economic competition for the presence in foreign markets, as well as increased geopolitical tensions as a consequence of the increasing importance of gaining spheres of influence for the economic growth of countries that claim to be new centres of power in the world.
If the current crisis drags on and the shock is not quickly stopped, then one can talk about a further increase in the support of isolationists in most countries, the strengthening of tendencies to tighten protectionism, the closure of economic spaces, and the formation of new systems of division of labour (if not at the country level, then at the level of individual regions).
It can also be supposed that the pandemic and its consequences can be a turning point for poorer countries with limited resources and means of recovery, as well as for refugees and people in areas of modern conflict. As noted in the report of the International Crisis Group (2020): ‘a global outbreak of coronavirus can harm fragile states and cause riots; if the disease spreads in densely populated urban centers, then it is almost impossible to control’. A sharp slowdown in the global economy will disrupt trade flows and create unemployment in poorer exporting countries. Accordingly, the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic are especially serious for those countries that are in the thick of international and local conflicts, since the pandemic disrupts the flow of humanitarian aid, restricts peacekeeping operations, and ‘postpones the diplomacy’. Moreover, it can be assumed that unscrupulous world leaders can use this pandemic to achieve their goals in such a way as to aggravate internal or international crises – to suppress dissent or aggravate conflicts with competing states, provided that it goes unnoticed while the world is occupied by a pandemic. In the context of the foregoing, it can be concluded that COVID-19 fuels geopolitical friction with global players.
In connection with the above, it is appropriate to mention the opinion of the head of the International Rescue Committee, Miliband: ‘The pandemic is a powerful reminder of two things: the common problems of our global security and the deep inequality that we must fight to fight pandemics’ (Thompson Reference Thompson2020). However, whether the international community listens to this and other similar calls will be a key test for the world of the 21st century.
Pascal Boniface (Reference Boniface2020) notes that the crisis of COVID-19 clearly illustrates the disappearance of the Western monopoly on power for some time. Over the past five centuries, the West has managed to establish the rules, the international agenda and got used to the rest of the world obeying and following their views.
Since then, Boniface (Reference Boniface2020) notes, Westerners have continued to consider themselves the centre of the world. However, they are only part of it. Too often, the Western community is confused with the international community: from the moment the West decides something, the rest only need to follow. Westerners too often think that their values are superior to others. However, if the West tries to impose these values again by injunction and coercion, it is going to face serious disappointment. Westerners are too inclined to think that the point of view of the other is not taken into account and that when the West opposes someone, the West supports not its national interests, but the universal values that the other must embody and promote. Finally, Westerners regularly overestimate the consistency of their own point of view, while at the same time underestimating the fact that the discrepancy most of the time is observed outside the western lens.
Therefore, one must recognize that ‘non-Westerners’ do not have the same point of view and that this is not necessarily because they are less virtuous, less intelligent, or less developed. This is simply because they have other strategic DNA. They developed different points of view, and to take their point of view into account does not necessarily mean to give up or abandon what Westerners are. On the contrary, this would be evidence of a desire to move towards common solutions and no longer impose decisions on others (Nye Reference Nye2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the weaknesses of the West. Always wanting to lecture others, to not value the rest of the world highly, the West somehow contributes to its own weakening, and this attitude is now unacceptable to the rest of the world (Nye Reference Nye2020).
In this regard, it can be supposed that the importance of humanitarian support and diplomacy cannot be underestimated, since the world is struggling, first of all, to cope with the consequences of COVID-19 in all developed countries, so one should not forget about the needs of the most vulnerable segments of the population or forget about the poor. In particular, the lives of millions of people, including those who have left their homes due to conflicts and natural disasters, are now in even greater danger, and if the world community ignores those most vulnerable to threats such as COVID-19, it will remain at risk of escalating the virus and its new strains.
Conclusion
In general, the global balance of forces may not change as much as relations between powers that are unlikely to become friendlier (at least until the change of leadership at the centres of power, such as Washington). If world actors want the crisis associated with coronavirus to lead to changes for the better, then they will have to actively create these changes by themselves. In other words, the international community will have to contribute positively. This may be a chance to strengthen global governance in fields such as healthcare and to organize interdependence on a more rational basis.
Thus, the current global world configuration is at the risk of ideological helplessness. Now, it looks completely impractical, and elementarily dangerous in the technical sense of the word in the event of new global cataclysms, whether humanitarian, technological, or climatic. Obviously, globalization will continue to evolve, both ideologically and in an applied manner. The formation of ever new ties between people and countries can hardly be stopped completely. However, the forms of globalization will undoubtedly change, and the international community will have to find a new balance between the tasks of national and global development.
The pandemic has exposed the instability of the global world system to shocks and cataclysms. The modern configuration of the global world will be developing an ongoing globalization, within the framework of which a harmonious balance between the tasks of global and national development should be found. It is advisable for the international community to take advantage of a weakening world order scenario as a chance to create new global governance with the main emphasis on the interconnectedness and interdependence of world actors.
About the Author
Andrey Volkov is a PhD student in the Department of Global Social Studies and Youth Studies, Faculty of Global Processes, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russian Federation.
