Most edited volumes are a mixed bag; this one is an exception. In general, the essays fit together extremely well and they are almost invariably of very high quality. The structure of the volume is a bit unusual. It starts with a provocative and stimulating theoretical treatise from Anders Stephanson on the historical genealogy of the idea of the “Cold War.” Subsequent essays then riff off Stephanson's piece to a greater or lesser extent.
Stephanson's agenda is to historicize the concept of the Cold War by treating it as a distinctively American discursive framework (rendered here with the adjective “coldwar”). In the introduction, the editors make the interesting observation that the term “Cold War” is far more imbricated in the history it is meant to describe than other epochal labels, such as the “Industrial Revolution” or the “interwar years.” It has been naturalized to the point where the existence of a bipolar rivalry between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, is simply a given. Stephanson argues, instead, that US officials effectively declared “Cold War” (almost immediately elevated to the status of proper noun through capitalization) in order to put the United States “into the world once and for all” (26). Baked into the cake was the assumption that America's erstwhile ally, the war-ravaged Soviet Union, presented an existential threat to US security. Although the term “Cold War” was actually popularized by the American pundit Walter Lippmann in a series of 1947 essays criticizing US policy, Stephanson argues that the reality Lippmann described – that US policymakers had identified the Soviet Union as a rival force that must be opposed at any cost – gave the highly misleading impression that US policy was simply a response to conditions outside America's control.
John A. Thompson and Ann Douglas explicitly embrace these propositions in essays that examine, respectively, how US officials constructed the “myth of an outmatched USA” and rewrote (with a substantial assist from popular culture) the history of World War II to minimize both the Soviet Union's contribution to the defeat of Germany and its suffering at the hands of the Nazi war machine (91). For the United States, Douglas suggests, the very notion of a Cold War constituted an “explanation in which an assumption masquerades as a conclusion” (134).
Odd Arne Westad, meanwhile, offers a spirited dissent from Stephanson's effort to frame the Cold War as a US project. Calling for a “pluralist” approach reflective of his own distinguished scholarship, Westad criticizes Stephanson's approach as parochial and “reductionist,” reflective of an outmoded strand of leftist scholarship that treats the United States as “the root of all evil” (53). Westad is particularly concerned that, by “centering” the role of US officials in constructing the Cold War, Stephanson's paradigm will relegate everyone outside the United States to a secondary – and solely reactive – role in a predominantly American story. I leave it to the reader to determine whether framing “the Cold War” as a US discursive endeavor in which others merely participated necessarily minimizes the agency of those other actors. The question, to paraphrase Marx, is who created the circumstances in which people made history? The answer, as it so often does in the historiography of the Cold War, ultimately comes down to deciding who bears ultimate responsibility for the conflict.
Most of the other contributors adopt some combination of Stephanson's and Westad's positions – typically accepting Stephanson's effort to analyze the Cold War in ideological terms, while also heeding Westad's call for pluralism. Philip Mirowski, Steven Belletto, and Peter Mandler all explore the impact of the Cold War on US academic disciplines, focussing respectively on intellectual history, literary history/criticism, and anthropology. Andrew Preston and Paul S. Boyer consider religious and ethical reactions to various Cold War signposts – whether policies like détente, or technological innovations such as the atomic bomb. Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi also focusses on technological innovation in a fascinating essay on the way that “man-machines” like radar altered language and perception (269). Daniel Matlin's essay on African American intellectuals Ralph Ellison and Albert Murray and Moshik Temkin's essay on the resuscitation of the debate over the 1920s anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti come the closest to classic studies of “Cold War culture.” Both Matlin and Temkin explain how culture itself became a battleground over the meaning of America in an intensely polarized intellectual atmosphere.
Some of these selections are better than others at accomplishing what I take to be the central objective of the volume: explaining how “the idea of the Cold War” shaped American history (see the book's subtitle). In my view, the most impressive work here uses its subjects to interrogate the concept of the Cold War itself, not just describe events that took place in the United States between 1945 and 1991. The pieces that do the latter are still fine contributions to the study of the Cold War, albeit from a more traditional perspective.
I have only two concerns. The first involves the title, Uncertain Empire, which is more than a little misleading. Although there has been a resurgence of scholarship in recent years that seeks to locate the United States within an imperial framework, these authors are not primarily concerned with that effort; moreover, none of them deals directly with the “uncertainty” of that proposition whatsoever. While one can certainly draw some conclusions about the Cold War as a US imperial project from these essays, they do not explicitly grapple with that subject in a theoretical way. In the end, the subtitle is a far more apt description of the contents of the book than the title.
More significantly, I was shocked at how little economics factors in any of these analyses. Particularly in the chapters that focus on high policy, one looks in vain for an argument as to why US officials were so dedicated to propagating America's influence in the world. The extensive scholarship that frames containment in terms of political economy – that is, as the solution to the widespread fear among US officials of a return to the economic autarchy of the 1930s – gets little more than passing mention here. To be clear, I am not calling for a sort of crude Marxist analysis in which all ideological formations are ultimately rooted in identifiable economic interests. William Appleman Williams famously located economic ideologies at the heart of America's Weltanschauung. One need not resort to reducing all of US policy to a quest for economic domination to see that when the authors of NSC-68 spoke of their “determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper” they were not concerned solely with geopolitical strategy.Footnote 1
I suspect that these authors would not, of course, disagree with me on this point, but it is hard to understand how a volume on US ideology in the Cold War could ignore economic ideologies. That said, the material that is here is immensely valuable and should be read carefully by anyone writing about the Cold War in the United States or the United States in the Cold War.
