Many introductory courses on ancient, or indeed modern, philosophy begin from the observation that the word ‘philosophy’ itself describes a ‘love of wisdom’. Christopher Moore's wide-ranging, original, and fascinating new book sets out to examine the value of that etymology.Footnote ¹ He argues persuasively that philosophos does not, in fact, originate as a label applied respectfully to pick out a ‘lover of wisdom’ for emulation. Rather, the term is appropriated and developed from its origins as a pejorative name applied to those perceived to be striving too hard and in the wrong way to achieve the status of sophos, a ‘sage-wannabe’ as Moore has it. As he is careful to emphasize, his history of the origins of philosophos and philosophia does not and need not coincide with the origin story of ‘philosophy’ as a certain kind of discipline involving a certain way of talking about specific questions. Nevertheless, by scrutinizing the origins of these terms and their application in the sixth and fifth centuries bce, Moore sets himself up to offer some further enlightening discussion of the fifth- and fourth-century development of the discipline of ‘philosophy’.

A useful introduction (‘Introduction: The Origins of Philosophia’) sets out the overall argument of the book. By looking at the first philosophoi, rather than the first ‘philosophers’, we see an origin story and development rather different from the widely assumed and repeated claim that the first philosophoi established the discipline of philosophy in their pursuit of wisdom and intellectual cultivation. In building the foundations of his argument, Moore considers the purported origins of the name in the story of Pythagoras’ act of naming himself a philosophos, versions of which are preserved in several sources from antiquity. He suggests that this story may well represent Pythagoras laying claim to a name that had been applied to him by others in a less than approving tone.

Following this introduction the book is divided into three parts. The first two treat the origins and development of the term philosophos (and sometimes philosophia – it is notable, and fits Moore's argument, that philosophia starts to edge out philosophos as the key term as the book progresses). The third and final part takes the development of the term in Plato and Aristotle as its focus.

In the first of three chapters dedicated to the origins of the label philosophos (‘Heraclitus against the Philosophoi’), Moore offers a detailed and persuasive reading of Heraclitus B35, which, if genuine, represents a reference to philosophoi andres more or less contemporary with Pythagoras. Scholars have challenged the authenticity of the fragment, on the grounds that it seems inconsistent with the critique of polymathy found elsewhere in Heraclitus. As Moore persuasively argues, this problem falls away if we recognize that Heraclitus is not using the term philosophos in a positive sense, but rather as part of a critique of the misguided epistemic ambitions of the Pythagoreans. On this reading, Heraclitus B35 fits both the pejorative and the Pythagorean origins for the term that Moore seeks to establish.

Chapter 3 (‘What Philosophos Could Have Meant: A Lexical Account’) offers a ‘lexical account’ of early uses of philosophos via a careful consideration of the meaning and usage of a variety of comparative phil- terms across a range of sources. Moore emphasizes the fact that these terms tend not to be as transparent in meaning as they, and certainly philosophos, are often assumed to be. He demonstrates too that they tend to be applied by others, rather than self-appellations, and that they often express negative judgements, sometimes indicating an excessive interest rather than a neutral or even positive ‘love for x’. Moore suggests that there is good reason to think that the origin of the term philosophos lies in its use as a term applied, with a sense of bafflement, to those perceived to be aspiring to the social and political authority of sophoi, without understanding the realities of such success. In Chapter 4 (‘Pythagoreans as Philosophoi’), Moore argues that it is the Pythagoreans themselves who are plausibly regarded as the primary targets of this assessment.

Having established an origin story and nuanced understanding of the likely early meaning of philosophos, Moore goes on to survey a variety of sources in order to see whether their uses fit the model that he has sketched. In Chapter 5 (‘Fifth-Century Philosophoi’), he turns to fifth century uses of philosophos etc., as found in Aristophanes, Herodotus, Gorgias, and others. He demonstrates that here, too, we find no evidence of the use of philosophoi to mean ‘intellectual cultivators’ or ‘lovers of wisdom’. Rather, insofar as it is used with a positive connation, it seems to refer to those who engage in practical reasoning about a broad range of questions. In Chapter 6 (‘Socrates’ Prosecution as Philosophos’), Moore notes how infrequently the label is applied to Socrates across the writings of both Plato and Xenophon. He makes the interesting suggestion that Socrates may have been negatively labelled philosophos through his association with Anaxagoras, before proposing that Xenophon, in particular, may have sought a nuanced position, seeking neither to defend Socrates’ status as a philosophos, nor to distinguish him from the philosophoi. Moore suggests that Plato's hesitation to apply the term philosophos to Socrates may result from his awareness that ‘Socrates died because he was deemed a philosophos’ (193). This is an intriguing suggestion which, it seems to me, would be enhanced by comparison with the representation of the relationship between Socrates and the Sophists. Given that Plato is more than happy to labour the distinction between Socrates and the Sophists, why is the relationship between Socrates and the philosophoi treated so obliquely? Turning to philosophoi and philosophia in the broader philosophical tradition of the fourth century bce in Chapter 7 (‘Non-Academic Philosophy’), Moore notes a plausible and repeated connection between philosophia and a practice of self-improvement, as opposed to a specific interest in the discovery and communication of truths.

The third and final part of the book offers three chapters that treat Plato's and Aristotle's use and influence on the meaning of philosophia. In Chapter 8 (‘Plato's Saving of Apperances’), Moore sets out to challenge the idea that Plato completely redefined philosophos and philosophia, arguing that, while Plato certainly did seek to develop these ideas, we must also recognize the degree of continuity between his use and that of the fifth century. Plato, Moore suggests, is not simply ‘defiantly adopting a dubious name for an obscure practice’ (222). In fact, his own use of these terms maintains a significant continuity with the earlier idea of ‘making people better through conversation’. Chapter 9 (‘Aristotle's Historiography of Philosophia’) turns to Aristotle's influence in shaping both the discipline of philosophia and its history. Indeed, as Moore neatly argues, philosophia can only become a discipline once it has a history. Aristotle calls philosophoi those with whom he can share opinions about matters central to his own concerns. He moves philosophia beyond its previous sense of self-improvement through conversation – and, by presenting the history of philosophia in terms of diachronic conversations, he models the practice of philosophy as a discipline.

In Chapter 10 (‘Ambivalence about Philosophia beyond the Discipline’), Moore notes that the ambivalence towards philosophoi and philosophia in the later fourth century bce indicates that the negative origins of philosophos terms are not completely elided. He ends by offering an epilogue on the relation between modern philosophy and the history of the philosophia he has set out, arguing that philosophy remains the ‘practice of talking with the goal of becoming a better person’. I would have liked to have seen this section expanded to consider to what degree the bafflement of those who dismissed ancient philosophoi might also be found in the modern world.

Moore has produced a hugely enjoyable history of the origins of philosophia that will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of philosophy and intellectual history more broadly. He covers a lot of ground, and at times his narrative is slightly harder to follow through the detail of his account than is ideal. But the results of the pursuit are enlightening and challenging in a positive way.

Thinking about the origins and development of philosophy will be encouraged in different directions by two substantial new works on early Greek philosophy. With the first, Xenophanes von Kolophon, Benedikt Strobel and Georg Wöhrle present a monumental new edition of the evidence for the sixth- to fifth-century bce philosopher-poet Xenophanes.Footnote ² This is the third volume in Wöhrle's Traditio Praesocratica series, following those on Thales, and Anaximander and Anaximenes. At present, only the Thales volume has a companion edition with English translations and apparatus, but further such translations are promised. The aim of the Traditio Praesocratica series is to provide complete editions of the testimonia for individual early Greek thinkers. These volumes therefore tend to go far beyond what has generally been incorporated in previous editions, including material from the Latin, Syro-Arabian, and Armenian traditions and from as late as the thirteenth century ce. The sheer volume of evidence collected here speaks to the huge potential of this edition to inspire new directions in the study of Xenophanes. In keeping with the series as a whole, the focus is on the reception and development of accounts of Xenophanes, rather than on an attempt to reconstruct his own thought. All of the ‘fragments’, generally treated as ipsissima verba, are presented in context, with testimonia organized chronologically (and accompanied by a German translation), including even those testimonia preserved only by report in later sources. So, for example, Strobel and Wörhle's ‘Xen 1’ is listed under Epicharmus and notes a claim reported in Aristotle that Epicharmus discussed Xenophanes. It is also referred to as ‘Xen 8’, listed under Aristotle, which gives us the relevant evidence from the Metaphysics. The editors have sought to minimize notes and commentary on the texts themselves but have enhanced ease of reference through a series of appendices, including the extremely useful Similienapparat, which enables searching and cross-referencing via key terms and themes. New editions of early Greek philosophy often try to set themselves apart via a new system of organizing more or less the same material (sometimes with some novel inclusions). The Traditio Praesocratica volumes set themselves apart, and render themselves indispensable to scholars of early Greek philosophy, by adopting the simplest of orders (chronological), but incorporating an invaluable pool of new evidence. No scholar of Xenophanes will be able to ignore this work, and we can look forward to future volumes in the series.

Alongside the Traditio Praesocratica series, De Gruyter has established a monograph series, Studia Praesocratica. The most recent publication in the series presents another monumental work of scholarship in the field. Edited by Christian Vassallo, Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition offers a collection of chapters developed out of an international workshop held in Trier in 2016.Footnote ³ It presents eighteen varied and individually fascinating engagements with both published and unpublished papyrological evidence for early Greek philosophy, including the Herculanean sources, and the Derveni and Strasbourg papyri. The individual chapters, authored by leading figures in the fields, demonstrate an enormous range of perspectives on and potential in the papyrological evidence. They are divided into seven sections, presented in more or less chronological order. Following a brief introduction by the editor, four chapters treat aspects of the Orphic tradition, with two (by David Sedley and Richard McKirahan) focusing on the Derveni Papyrus. McKirahan (‘Some Controversial Topics in the Derveni Cosmology’) offers a survey of several questions which continue to vex interpreters of this enigmatic but enriching text, arguing for the sensible methodological point that we should keep an eye on the degree to which our expectations inform our interpretations of the evidence. In the final chapter of the Orphic section (‘Pherecydes of Syros in the Papyrological Tradition’), Marco Santamaría uses evidence from Oxyrhynchus and Herculaneum to reconsider the status and interests of Pherecydes of Syros. We are given an insight into the content of Pherecydes’ book, possibly the first prose book in Greek literature, and, on the basis of the Herculanean evidence, we are given reason to question the Peripatetic tradition that treats Pherycedes as a theologian rather than a philosopher of nature. In the first of three chapters on the Pythagoreans (‘The Papyrological Tradition on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans’), Leonard Zhmud provides an enormously useful survey of the papyrological evidence for Pythagoras, along with some suggestions as to the implications of considering the evidence as a whole. Aldo Brancacci (‘Music and Philosophy in Damon of Oa’) takes us beyond the Pythagoreans in considering the evidence for the thought of this musical theorist, particularly the question of his Pythagoreanism and his credentials as a Sophist. On the basis of evidence from Philodemus’ On Music, Brancacci argues for the significant connection between music and ethics in Damon's thought. In one of two chapters on Heraclitus (‘Column IV of the Derveni Papyrus: A New Analysis of the Text and the Quotation of Heraclitus’), Gábor Betegh and Valeria Piano present a fascinating re-evaluation of this section of the Derveni Papyrus, significantly informed by Piano's recent edition of the first columns. Betegh and Piano demonstrate how this material enhances our understanding of both the Derveni Papyrus and the apparently familiar Heraclitean material with which is engages. On the basis of careful argument, they conclude that the Derveni author is probably closer to the original in his quotation of Heraclitus B3 than the standard source for the fragment (Aëtius). In contrast, Plutarch is probably closer to the original than the Derveni author in his rendering of B94. In the first of three papers on Empedocles (which treat the evidence in the Derveni Papyrus, the Strasbourg Papyrus, and the Herculaneum papyri respectively), Mirjam Kotwick (‘Aphrodite's Cosmic Power: Empedocles in the Derveni Papyrus’) investigates the possible influence of Empedoclean physics on the Derveni author, his tendency to be aligned with Anaxagorean ideas notwithstanding. Kotwick presents an enlightening argument in favour of an Empedoclean influence in the Derveni cosmology, specifically in its explanation of the formation of compounds. Giuliana Leone turns to the underexplored evidence for Empedocles in the Herculaneum papyri to provide an up-to-date status quaestionis (‘Empedocles in the Herculaneum Papyri: An Update’), indicating the value of these testimonia for our developing understanding of the text of Empedocles’ verse, and hinting at the further potential of this evidence for helping us to understand its influence on the Epicurean tradition. In the first of two chapters on Anaxagoras and his school (‘Anaxagoras from Egypt to Herculaneum: A Contribution to the History of Ancient “Atheism”’), Christian Vassallo sets out to collect the relatively extensive papyrological evidence for Anaxagoras in the Graeco-Egyptian and Herculanean sources. Vassallo demonstrates particularly well how consideration of the papyrological evidence can help us to understand the development of the tradition of Anaxagoras as an atheist. The volume's two chapters on the Atomists cover a great deal of the papyrological evidence. In the first (‘Democritus’ Doctrine of Eidola in the Herculaneum Papyri: A Reassessment of the Sources’), Enrico Piergiacomi presents a revised account of Democritean simulacra. In the second (‘Anaxarchus from Egypt to Herculaneum’), Tiziano Dorandi surveys the relatively meagre papyrological evidence for the Democritean Anarchus of Abdera. In the only chapter assigned to a section titled ‘The Sophistic Movement’ (‘The Authorship of the Derveni Papyrus, A Sophistic Treatise on the Origin of Religion and Language: A Case for Prodicus of Ceos’), Andrei Lebedev makes an extensive and detailed case for classifying the author of the Derveni treatise as an Ionian Sophist, rather than a natural philosopher. He goes on to argue that the Sophist Prodicus of Ceos is the most likely candidate for authorship. In the final chapter in the volume (‘Lists of Principles and Lists of Gods: Philodemus, Cicero, Aëtius, and Others’), Jaap Mansfeld considers the relationship between the papyrological and doxographical traditions by comparing the theological evidence as it is found in Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods and the remains of Philodemus’ On Piety with the Aetian Placita.

As this brief overview of a selection of the chapters in this volume aims to demonstrate, Presocratics and Papyrological Tradition offers innumerable insights, provocations, and avenues for new research. It is a testament to the value of papyrological evidence for the ongoing study and developing understanding of the earliest philosophers in the Western tradition and will offer rewards for any scholar with an interest in philosophical papyri or early Greek philosophy.

A new volume edited by Hallvard Fossheim, Vigdis Songe-Møller, and Knut Agotnes returns to the well-trodden path of the relationship between form and content in Plato's writing.Footnote ⁴ As one would expect, the thirteen chapters collected by the editors address this issue from a broad range of perspectives. In some cases, the concern is with the explicit connection between dialogue form and philosophical argument. In others, we see an interest in the specifics of Plato's attitude towards and reworking of ‘poetic’ ideas. The editors provide a useful introductory summary of the interests which motivate the volume, making clear their commitment to the idea that Plato is more or less unique in the demands he puts on the reader to be a ‘creative presence “in” the text’ (7).

The chapters are divided into four sections. Two of those collected under the heading ‘Genre and Philosophical Dialogue’ take the Symposium as their focus. Drew Hyland (‘The Whole Comedy and Tragedy of Philosophy: On Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato's Symposium’) concentrates on Aristophanes’ speech to argue that, in combining tragedy and comedy within the story he attributes to the comic author, Plato represents the tragedy of erotic striving. But this tragedy is united with comedy by the absence of beauty and nobility from the speech. Elena Irrera (‘As Praise of the Philosophical Written Speech? Ethics and Philosophical Progression in Plato's Symposium’) considers the Symposium as a whole to argue that the presence of multiple speeches within the text demonstrates the ‘dialectical potentialities of the philosophical written speech’ (29). She suggests that the Symposium is as much about philosophical writing itself as it is about eros.

In the first of three chapters on ‘Virtue and Soul-Shaping’, Paul Woodruff (‘Plato's Inverted Theatre: Displacing the Wisdom of the Poets’) offers a fascinating case for reading the Phaedrus’ Palinode as a condemnation of poetic authority. Woodruff suggests that the landscape of the heaven described by Socrates inverts the topography of the Athenian theatre. At the same time, it alters the audience's role, shifting them from passive observers of drama to a state of constant and active watching of divine activity. In one of three chapters dedicated to ‘Reason and Irrationality’, Cynthia Freeland reconsiders the role of pleasure, and specifically the pleasure we gain from art. She makes the case for a more nuanced reading of Plato's attitude towards art than is generally offered. According to Freeland, Plato is not straightforwardly dismissive of the value of art. In fact, certain kinds of art and poetry produce pleasures that are essential for the good life.

Many will expect the Symposium, Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Republic to feature heavily in a volume on drama and dialogue form in Plato, but it is notable that the Sophist appears in several of the chapters here. In the final chapter of the fourth section, on ‘Place and Displacement’, and the final chapter of the volume, John Sallis offers a ‘Different Look’ at the Sophist. He considers what sets the Sophist apart from the Theaetetus, with which it is dramatically linked, suggesting that the ‘othering’ of the Stranger is significantly linked to the dialogue's search for the nature of the philosopher.

Discussions of philosophical dialogue form are understandably dominated by Plato. But he is not, of course, the only philosopher to write philosophical dialogues. In his Augustine and the Dialogue,Footnote ⁵ Erik Kenyon sets outs to present a re-evaluation of Augustine's particular use of the genre. He argues for the need to take Augustine's dialogues on their own terms, at a distance from the autobiography of the Confessions. Focusing on the method rather than the doctrine of the dialogues, and treating them as unified wholes, he demonstrates their central and sophisticated pedagogical concerns as texts which encourage in increasingly sophisticated ways a philosophical progress based on methodological reflection and a reliance on plausibility. Kenyon's careful treatment of individual dialogues as carefully constructed wholes will have value for any scholar interested in philosophical method more generally and dialogue form more specifically.