The debate among political scientists regarding the relationship between Congress and the executive on issues of Cold War foreign policy would seem, in some structural ways, to be analogous to the very relationship itself. While, as Edwin Corwin famously noted, the Constitution provides the executive and legislative branches with an “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy, and sporadic Cold War congressional activism nominally influenced foreign policymaking, the president generally appeared to reign supreme. Likewise, though both the prospect and manifestation of Cold War activism spurred scholarly arguments identifying the legislature as an important foreign policy actor, few of these arguments have appeared to present existential challenges to the dominant pro-executive and consensus themes in academe. Illustratively, one of the most prominent studies of the relationship (Barbara Hinckley's suggestively titled Less than Meets the Eye) concludes that congressional foreign policy assertiveness—even after the War Powers Act—is largely mythic, and effectively chides scholars who infer systematic congressional power from intermittent attempts to influence policymaking for making mountains of molehills.
In Congress and the Cold War, Robert David Johnson composes what is undoubtedly the most comprehensive attempt to dispute these overriding views. In his richly descriptive analysis of the entire Cold War period, Johnson utilizes hundreds of archival sources to develop a complex conceptualization of Congress's foreign policy role. His central contention is that Congress routinely employed several agenda-setting techniques to exercise influence well beyond its constitutionally-mandated powers. Specifically, the emergence of “subcommittee government” in the wake of extensive, legislative reorganization afforded chairs and ranking members the opportunity to constrain presidential policy options through the use of legislative procedure, the conduct of oversight and fact-finding hearings, and, most notably, the introduction of riders and amendments to appropriations and defense spending bills. As Johnson's investigation reveals, congressional Cold War power was greatest when the high-profile members who employed these tactics presented cogent, ideological alternatives or caveats to executive policy and were immersed in the substantive details of foreign and defense issues. Thus, by credibly challenging the dominant foreign policy discourse, these leaders could both influence popular sentiment and ease the way for the procedural efforts integral to victory in jurisdictional conflicts within Congress (and, by extension, the power to determine the content and political purpose of fiscal constraints).
This framework proves quite instructive when applied to episodes of both foreign policy bipartisanship and interbranch competition. Johnson's treatment of the immediate postwar period highlights the complexities of Republican support for the Truman Doctrine: rather than simply “rubber stamping” Truman's plan (as has been assumed in some academic treatises), the leadership and procedural efforts of senators such as Vandenberg and Lodge worked both to shape its content and to render impotent legislative objections from the left and right. In chronicling the later rise and fall of direct threats to presidential authority based upon these objections, Johnson's analysis is laudable. The first challenge, organized by Republican “revisionists” to enhance internal security and recast the focus of containment, saw its initial successes ultimately effaced by the excesses of McCarthyism. On this score, Johnson does well to show how command over procedural politics extended the movement's strength beyond the diminution of its popular support (which was itself enhanced by committee hearings), and how the subsequent association of any overt congressional activism with the revisionists' radical agenda temporarily impeded the development of succeeding efforts to assert congressional control.
Reflecting the backlash to the revisionist movement, the second significant challenge (the “new internationalism” of the 1960s and 1970s, which broadly opposed the use of force and the support of right-wing dictatorships in the struggle against communism) saw congressional critics duplicating their predecessors' tactics in the context of more nuanced legislative strategies and a more favorable institutional environment. For example, though public hearings allowed informed committee heads to criticize Vietnam policy, control was most directly exercised through subcommittee-sponsored amendments and riders to funding bills dealing with ancillary aspects of president's international agendas (e.g., spending cuts for assistance programs in Spain and Thailand). Through such “flanking” maneuvers, the new internationalists were able to broadly policy commensurate with their ideological alternative without fundamentally threatening the traditional foreign policy ascendancy of the president. Indeed, Johnson's work reveals that the demise of the new internationalists began with their direct assault on Vietnam policy (culminating in the War Powers Act) and became irrevocable when containment “failures” in states like Angola and Nicaragua were blamed on aid reductions by a power-hungry Congress. In the end, both movements failed when their overreach cast serious doubt on executive dominance and, by extension, engendered foreign policy paralysis.
Congress and the Cold War is clearly an exceptional piece of historical research, ably addressing in its broad sweep such additional topics as the critical role of personalities, the turf wars among several important committees (such as Foreign Relations and Armed Services), and the double-edged sword of increased House influence in foreign affairs. Its major conclusions, however, are novel only in the detail with which they are supported. Several case studies in the congressional activism vein posit that the capacity of Congress to weigh in on Cold War foreign policy issues derived from its use of complex procedure (e.g., Sharyn O'Halloran's “Congress and Foreign Trade Policy” in Ripley and Lindsay's Congress Resurgent), committee and subcommittee policy review, and budgetary amendments (Loch Johnson's “Playing Hardball with the CIA” and Alton Frye's “Searching for Arms Control” in Peterson's The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy). Moreover, while successfully discrediting claims of congressional docility and demonstrating how activism constrained executive choice, Johnson does not establish convincing evidence that staunch critics wielded genuine power over critical foreign policy outcomes, even when their views were shared by the majority. In fact, though Johnson seeks explicitly to refute the notion that congressional assertiveness only truly matters in the wake of the executive “abdication” brought about by error or scandal, his analysis provides oblique support for just that inference. As such, the book not only does little to debunk the conventional wisdom that the Cold War Congress was unable to meaningfully executive foreign policy power, it reveals the dangers posed to the institution—and to the nation—when it sought to do so.
Johnson's thoroughness nevertheless permits readers to identify and contextualize actions and events that are essential to understanding elite foreign policy debates during the Cold War and beyond. Indeed, the lessons derived from Johnson's analysis are applicable to the current legislative-executive struggle over Iraq policy. Certainly, Democratic leaders of the 110th Congress adopted some basic tenets of the Cold War strategy, such as bundling withdrawal timetables with supplemental appropriations bills and proposing amendments to further expedite departure. However, the visceral and reactive tenor of the Democrats' opposition and their failure to marshal practical alternatives have vastly diminished the intellectual weight of their message and the overall efficacy of their endeavor. Moreover, directly confronting the primary issue in the absence of a supermajority guarantees the veto of relevant appropriations bills, necessitating post hoc compromises that smack of defeat despite considerable public support for withdrawal. In the end, the current challenge has been devoid of nuance and political savvy, qualities that Johnson ably demonstrates are essential to legislative attempts to impinge upon executive control over foreign policymaking.
