Few topics are as politically charged as why America went to war against Iraq in 2003. In the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, members of the George W. Bush administration offered several reasons, including the need to eliminate Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship, the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the fear that President Saddam Hussein would one day disperse WMD to terrorists. After the attack, when WMD were not found, the administration shifted gears and began emphasizing Iraq's importance to reforming the Middle East and taming the virulent Islamic radicalism that infects its body politic. The administration rarely mentioned oil, although the fact that Iraq straddles approximately 10 percent of the world's proven resources surely must have factored into its thinking.
In his new book, America's Oil Wars, Stephen Pelletière grapples with the question of why the United States invaded and occupied Iraq and directs his attention to the oil component of America's strategy. Having served as the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) senior political analyst on Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, Pelletière is well positioned to answer this question. His access to the intelligence community is complemented by contacts inside the U.S. military, provided by his subsequent position as the U.S. Army's expert on the Persian Gulf at the U.S. Army War College. Both sets of contacts set him up to flesh out the intricate and complicated set of decisions that ultimately led America to occupy Iraq.
In this short book, Pelletière argues that, for at least the past quarter century, Washington's quest for power has driven the United States to control Persian Gulf oil. He argues that America invaded Iraq because “Washington has come to see that, if it is to preserve its status as world hegemon, it must control oil, and to control oil it must regulate the production of OPEC … all the wars that America has been fighting—the first and second Iraq wars and the one in Afghanistan—have been over resources” (p. 144). The end of the cold war, and the rise of Iraq in the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq War (a war which he argues Iraq won), presented the United States with an opportunity to exploit the region's oil and with a direct challenge to its ability to do so.
Pelletière also argues that American arms policy in the region, driven by the needs of U.S. decisionmakers to shore up the American military industrial complex, exacerbated regional instability and eventually threatened American oil interests. “If the focus of activity in the area was oil production,” writes Pelletière, “the region ought to have been kept stable” (p. 69). However, the United States directly undermined local stability by selling significant quantities of arms because “arms trading promotes wars” (p. 69). Little serious attention is given to the role that massive Soviet arms transfers into the region also played; the all-important 1955 Czech arms deal is not referenced, nor is the contentious argument that “arms trading promotes wars” given due consideration.
According to Pelletière, the architect of America's hegemonic quest to sell arms and secure oil was a small band of neoconservatives. This set of ideologically savvy former Democrats like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, “primarily Jews who believed the Democratic party had gone soft on Israel” (p. 76), artfully persuaded millions of Americans to support war by both demonizing Saddam Hussein, who “had a lot of morality on his side” (p. x), and by building conspiracy theories that linked Saddam to the “Islamic Fundamentalist movement” (p. x), a charge that Pelletière attempts to rebut in the book's first chapter.
Unfortunately, America's Oil Wars is long on innuendo and conspiracy but short on proof and the kind of hardheaded analysis that one expects from a former CIA analyst and a senior professor at the Army War College. Rather than using his contacts to undergird his assertions with rich and insightful interviews, Pelletière relies on single-sourced footnotes of secondary texts. The book is chock-full of sentences like “if we assume that” and “we will never know, perhaps, but it does appear that something like the following was decided on” (p. 133). In a book like this, the reader expects the author to offer facts to illuminate assumptions, not merely to ruminate and hypothesize.
There are many puzzling aspects to Pelletière's argument that the author unfortunately sidesteps. If oil were America's primary objective, why did the United States military downsize in Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm instead of digesting the lucrative oil fields it had so easily occupied? Why did the United States simply not lift Iraq's sanctions or the sanctions on other oil producers such as Libya and Iran? Perhaps most troubling is the author's unwillingness to explore seeming inconsistencies in his own argument. If the attack were undertaken in the name of oil companies, for instance, how does he reconcile the fact that they “interestingly, seem to be holding back” (p. 142) their investments in Iraq?
Even Pelletière's argument about the neoconservatives begs as many questions as it answers. He never says exactly who the neocons are, although he refers to the membership list of the Defense Policy Board—members ranging from Kenneth Adelman and Eliot Cohen to Harold Brown and James Schlesinger. He never offers a convincing discussion of how a seemingly small group of individuals was able to influence the most senior members of the Bush cabinet, including Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and much of “the American elite establishment” (p. 137)—although by implication (and conventional wisdom), they clearly did. The equally important question is, were the neocons really that important if “under Clinton, the Democrats adhered to basically the same line as the neo-cons” (p. 137)? It is easy to forget that, in 1997, Clinton's secretary of defense, William Cohen, primed the American public for an attack on Iraq by producing a five-pound bag of sugar on the ABC Sunday morning show This Week and stating that “this amount of anthrax could be spread over a city—let's say the size of Washington. It would destroy at least half the population of that city.”
America's Oil Wars offers sweeping historical generalizations that will resonate with many who have followed the Iraq debate but provides little analytic justification to ground specific points. The five chapters are better read as individual essays than as components of a well-developed argument. Why, for example, Pelletière spends valuable pages talking about the brutality of Desert Storm in a chapter entitled “Techno War in the Gulf” remains a mystery. Important, yes. Relevant to his argument? Hardly. Unfortunately, this book, which has much potential given its title and the author's background, comes up short against the growing literature on the causes and consequences of the U.S. war in Iraq.
