Liberty and Law introduces its readers to the neglected but long-standing place of permission and liberty within Western accounts of law from 1100 to 1800. Brian Tierney has a more modest interpretive enterprise here than he did in his earlier works on the history of natural rights and the origins of papal infallibility. Some ambition, however, appears in his selection of an opponent with whom to tussle about the proper role of liberty in understanding law. Readers of Tierney's earlier works will again find Thomas Hobbes in his sights for having, “with guileful simplicity” (ix), sharply distinguished the concept of law as a fetter from that of right as a liberty. Earlier legal and philosophical discourse, Tierney observes, had its eyes not on Hobbes's distinction but on St. James's invocation of the “law of liberty” that separated Christianity from the Mosaic law. As in earlier works, Tierney dwells with greatest detail on the canonistic and theological accounts of law from the twelfth through sixteenth centuries—the core of his many seminal contributions to the history of legal and political thought. But as Liberty and Law offers more survey than pointed story, Tierney carries his account through Suárez, Grotius, Selden, Pufendorf, and finally Kant.
The broad effort Tierney undertakes is encapsulated in his selection of the phrase “permissive natural law” to gather the disparate accounts found in the volume. As he recalls at the outset, permissive natural law first drew his attention as a solution to the knotty questions occasioned by his earlier work on the history of natural rights. In a series of articles gathered in The Idea of Natural Rights (1997), Tierney had argued that twelfth-century canon lawyers had launched a premodern tradition of “subjective” natural rights as faculties or powers exercised by individuals. Then, too, Hobbes was Tierney's bête noire, having beguiled many modern scholars into assuming the conceptual separation of natural law and natural rights, and having left them with false assumptions about premodern thought to boot. The permissive natural law, Tierney suggested in the Journal of the History of Ideas in 2001, would offer a ground for natural rights separate both from arguments about subjective powers and from mere dependence on precepts of the natural law. Those familiar with the earlier debates concerning Tierney's history of natural rights (the subject of a Review of Politics symposium in 2002) may be surprised to read a work now hesitant to identify permissive natural law as a key feature of the development of natural rights.
The foundational legal text for Tierney's survey is collected in Justinian's Digest: “the force of the laws is to command, to prohibit, to permit, to punish.” This text made permission a common subject for the canonists surveyed by Tierney but, as Tierney notes, it was absent (as was any discussion of the natural law) from Peter Lombard's Sentences, the foundational text for much medieval theological discussion. For this reason, I suspect, the medieval theologians Tierney discusses tended not to present permission as an aspect of law but rather as a specific dispensation from law made by a lawgiver. According to the theologians, acts that were not prescribed, proscribed, or permitted were licit acts that could be elected or omitted. Selecting a certain profession, decorating in a certain manner, or talking about one subject rather than another were all licit acts, not commanded by the natural law though still good. Hugh of St. Victor and Ivo of Chartres, both cited by Tierney (10–12 and 14), used permission to describe God's decision to permit things otherwise forbidden, and not to describe the licit. Though canonists sometimes used permissio to describe the licitum, Tierney's decision to translate licitum as “permitted” (e.g., 44–45) may obscure a distinction important in some contexts.
The distinction of licitum and permissum also explains why Thomas Aquinas, rather to Tierney's disappointment, discussed the realm of choices not fully specified by the natural law but neglected to classify that realm under permissive natural law (86–87). When Aquinas discussed the permissive function of law, he agreed with the common opinion that permission is a lawgiver's dispensation from something otherwise required or forbidden. Since permission or exception requires the act of a lawgiver, it is not surprising to find it discussed especially by Francisco Suárez, who insisted on the will's role in legislating. Tierney shows that Suárez's Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore of 1612 was the first theological work to say that a lex permissiva obliges others not to interfere. A discussion of the relationship between obligation and will in Suárez might have drawn out why, in tension with the framing of Tierney's book, certain earlier theologians were reluctant to describe a permissive natural law.
The question of licit and indifferent acts gained particular import, as Tierney shows, during the Reformation controversies over traditions, ceremonies, and related practices that were not biblically prescribed. Maintaining an area of lawful human embellishment, so to speak, was crucial to Richard Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, whose first five books appeared in 1593 and 1597. Hooker described law's ability to permit things otherwise forbidden, but also (expanding the sense of permission) its permitting different ways of fulfilling law's commands (177). Yet like the earlier scholastics, Hooker said nothing about indifferent or merely licit acts in his discussion of permission. Somewhat ironically, Hooker's insistence that God allowed men to determine indifferent matters (such as some ecclesiastical ceremonies) for themselves went hand in hand with his defense of the civil authority's power to settle indifferent matters—and thus rescind permission for further tinkering.
Selden and Pufendorf's disagreement over the possibility of permissive law takes center stage in Tierney's account of permissiveness after an inconclusive discussion of Grotius. While Selden accepted “permissive law,” for example, he rejected Suárez's move to make permission obligatory by obligating others to noninterference. Pufendorf, on the other hand, so accepted the obligatory character of law that he rejected Suárez's jerry-rigging of permission into obligation, as well as Selden's embrace of a purely permissive law. Distinguishing among matters not strictly commanded by law was difficult even for the scholastics, and the later thinkers surveyed by Tierney more frequently expanded the category of permission to include indifferent matters as well as lawful choices among goods. Eventually, Tierney shows the French jurist Jean Barbeyrac (1674–1744) linked Suárez's permission with a modern rights theory.
In a spirit similar to Tierney's earlier works, Liberty and Law answers those who doubt that liberty played as great a role in premodern law and politics as it came to play in the works of Locke and his successors. The thinkers Tierney surveys assume that law requires certain things to be done in a certain way, while other things may be done in different ways, some things may be dispensed from mandate or prohibition, and other matters still are indifferent or ad libitum. They differ on what the matter of permission is, and whether or in what way permission is a subject of law. In view of those differences Tierney concludes by modestly remarking the “protean” nature of permission (357). But by grouping these theories together under permissive natural law (a phrase rarely used by the authors examined), he leaves important questions open—for example, the comparative roles of will and law in permission-granting, and the significance of distinguishing the licit and the permitted. Not for the first time Brian Tierney has opened a new area of discussion, fluidly presenting detailed research—a remarkable achievement for a scholar now in his tenth decade.
